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Chapter 1
Introduction
Paul J. du Plessis
In the introduction to Law and Life of Rome (1967), John Crook described the 
aim of his book as follows: 
This is not quite a book about Roman law, on which there already exist any 
number of excellent treatises. Neither is it quite a book about Roman social and 
economic life; that subject, too, is already illuminated by massive works of schol-
arship. It is a book about Roman law in its social context, an attempt to strengthen 
the bridge between two spheres of discourse about ancient Rome by using the 
institutions of the law to enlarge understanding of the society and bringing the 
evidence of the social and economic facts to bear on the rule of law.1
As an ancient historian with a keen interest in Roman law, Crook must 
have been aware that he was courting controversy with this statement which 
essentially called for a broadening of disciplinary horizons and greater col-
laboration between both ‘spheres of discourse’. Not only did this approach 
expect historians to take greater account of Roman law, but it also expected 
legal scholars to look beyond the then prevailing dogmatic approach to the 
study of Roman law practised by most.2 It was perhaps owing to an aware-
ness of the complexity of what Crook was advocating, since the crossing 
of disciplinary boundaries is never easy, that he took great care to explain 
what he meant by a ‘law and society’ approach to the study of Roman law. 
While Crook was undoubtedly infl uenced by contemporary debates in juris-
prudence regarding the relationship between law and society, he was also 
aware that these debates had limited use in the study of ancient Rome.3 The 
study of Roman law could not be subjected to a sociological enquiry in the 
contemporary sense, since too much of the empirical data required for such 
an enquiry was lacking.4 Furthermore, as Crook pointed out, controversies 
1 Crook (1967), p. 7.
2 For perspectives on the dogmatic methodology, see Ernst and Jakab (2005), p. v; Tuori 
(2006), p. 13. 
3 See Crook (1967), p. 7. On the purpose of a ‘law and society’ methodology in modern legal 
scholarship, see Cotterrell (2006), p. 5.
4 Crook (1967), p. 9. See also Cotterrell (2006), pp. 17, 54; and Travers (2010), pp. 5–6, 9, 19 
for a summary of the prerequisites of the modern sociological study of law.
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 surrounding the meaning of concepts such as ‘Roman society’, ‘Roman law’ 
and the fact that both law and society change with time also complicate mat-
ters.5 Nevertheless, Crook maintained that since some relationship between 
law and society existed, it was possible to provide a broader context for 
Roman law using elements of social and economic history.6
[L]aw is certainly some refl ection of society (usually of its more conservative 
aspects, because of the law’s function as a guarantor of stability), and not only a 
refl ection, but also in some degree an infl uence upon it (usually a brake, providing 
only cautiously and tardily the mechanisms to fulfi l the changing desires of society 
as a whole, but sometimes an accelerator, a tool in the hands of a particular section 
of the community such as an intelligentsia for achieving new ends that people in 
general do not actively want but will not positively oppose).7
It is not the aim of this introduction to engage once more with the critics of 
Crook’s approach as this debate has been comprehensively explored recently 
elsewhere.8 Studies such as those by Cairns and du Plessis have shown that 
Alan Watson’s view on ‘law and society’ in the Roman world, sometimes 
cited as being in opposition to that of Crook, is in fact complementary and 
that new insights can be achieved, provided that scholars are suffi ciently sen-
sitive to the methods, perspectives and legitimacy of the conclusions of the 
other ‘sphere of discourse’.9
 Since the ground rules for interdisciplinary collaboration have now been 
established, further exploration of the emergent fi eld of research relating to 
‘law and society’ in the Roman world has become possible. This is what this 
book seeks to do. It is designed to be read as an integrated whole. The chap-
ters have been grouped into three larger themes and within these, individual 
chapters have been arranged in a specifi c order to form a cumulative picture. 
 The fi rst theme explored in this book, ‘perspectives on Roman legal 
thought’, addresses issues of Roman juristic writing and its contexts. The 
chapter by Howley, which introduces this theme, examines the place of 
Roman juristic writing within the broader context of Roman society using 
the work of Aulus Gellius as his example. By investigating the way in which 
Gellius used juristic writing when compiling his own works, Howley pro-
vides a fascinating external perspective on the way in which these works 
were perceived and utilised by the Roman educated classes at large. In doing 
so, Howley demonstrates that Roman juristic writing formed part of the 
broader intellectual culture of the Roman world and was used by the elite for 
5 Crook (1967), pp. 9–10.
6 Crook (1967), p. 7; see also Treggiari (2002), p. 47.
7 Crook (1967), p. 7.
8 See Watson in Cairns and du Plessis (2007), pp. 9–23.
9 See Sirks (2002), pp. 169–79; Aubert (2002), pp. 183–6; Cairns and du Plessis (2007), pp. 3–8. 
On the dangers of interdisciplinarity with reference to modern socio-legal scholarship, see 
Cotterrell (2006), p. 18.
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a variety of different purposes, apart from merely as juristic authority. The 
theme is continued by Tellegen-Couperus and Tellegen on the relationship 
between law and rhetoric. Their elegant chapter explores the extent to which 
Roman juristic thought as recorded in the works of the jurists was doctrinal 
and thus removed from the demands of legal practice dominated by orators 
trained in rhetoric. The authors argue that the prevailing orthodoxy whereby 
Roman juristic thought is said to be removed from legal practice in the 
courts based on rhetoric is incorrect and should be abandoned in favour of 
a more integrated assessment whereby Roman juristic thought and rhetoric 
are seen as two sides of the same coin. The last chapter on this theme is that 
of Harries who, using a controversial senatorial decree relating to slave ry 
as an example, argues in favour of a greater appreciation of the context in 
which law was created and developed and the interest groups which drove 
the enactment of a law.
 The second theme, ‘interactions between legal theory and legal practice’, 
explores Roman law as a working ‘legal order’. This theme is introduced by 
a fascinating chapter by Humfress in which she challenges the prevailing view 
about the universal application of Roman law in the Roman Empire post 
212 CE. Using elements of an anthropological approach, Humfress argues 
that the notion of an Empire-wide ‘legal system’ imposed from above by the 
Roman state onto its people should be rejected in favour of a more nuanced, 
pluralist understanding of Roman law as a number of interconnected ‘legal 
orders’ in terms of which individuals had access to different legal solutions 
based on status and affi liations to local communities. In reaching this con-
clusion, Humfress advocates that research in this area should not merely 
focus on the perceived ‘gap’ between legal theory and legal practice, but on 
the motivations of individuals for choosing to use one legal solution over 
another and the manner in which this informs modern understanding about 
the concept of an Empire-wide ‘Roman law’.10 This challenge is refl ected 
in the remaining chapters on this theme in which three authors explore the 
relationship between legal theory and legal practice in three different periods 
of Roman society. The fi rst of these, by Roselaar, is devoted to the notion 
of conubium and the legal signifi cance of this concept in the early Roman 
Republic. Through a re-examination of the sources, Roselaar shows that 
conubium was an instrument that the Roman state employed strategically to 
secure allegiances in order to gain political supremacy on the Italian main-
land. The second chapter explores the legal world of the Sulpicii archive 
with a view to assessing the role of women in commercial transactions. This 
chapter challenges the accepted view that women, owing to various legal 
restrictions and social conventions in Roman society, did not engage in 
commerce directly, but relied instead on (mostly male) relatives or business 
10 Humfress’s chapter also ties in with recent advances in ‘law and society’ research in relation 
to ‘community’; see Cotterrell (2006), pp. 62–9.
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agents. From Jakab’s analysis of the sources, it becomes clear that women 
engaged far more actively and fully (albeit sometimes indirectly on account 
of their status) in Roman commercial transactions, and that some of the legal 
impediments which appear to have inhibited their participation in commerce 
could be circumvented. The last chapter in this theme, by Urbanik, investi-
gates the use of ‘classical’ Roman law in sixth-century Byzantine legal prac-
tice. Using the contract of pledge as an example, Urbanik assesses whether 
the legal needs of society were met by the existing law, and  highlights certain 
creative legal solutions to new problems.
 The last theme explored in this book is ‘economic realities and law’. 
Three chapters examine the interplay between law and economic considera-
tions in the context of the Roman world. Kehoe uses a ‘law and economics’ 
approach to investigate the law of agency. He argues that in developing the 
Roman law of agency, the jurists and the Imperial bureaucracy were aware 
of and driven by the economic implications of law. The remaining two chap-
ters explore related issues. Aubert focuses on the liability of slave agents for 
debts incurred in relation to their peculium and argues that the legal rules in 
this area of law cannot be fully understood without an appreciation of the 
economic realities in which commercial transactions by a slave operated. 
Bannon’s account of fi xtures and fi ttings in relation to the sale of property 
demonstrates that the jurists were aware of the commercial reality of such 
sales and factored these into their legal thought.
 The fi nal chapter by Thomas is meant to provoke further thoughts on 
interdisciplinarity. Thomas explores a topical theme in modern historical 
scholarship, namely plurality of perspective, which has yet to make a signifi -
cant impact on traditional Roman-law scholarship.11 He argues that it is pos-
sible to look at Roman legal texts from different angles to appreciate the full 
complexity of their different layers of meaning. In a certain sense, Thomas’s 
chapter represents the very essence of the approach of this book. When read 
as a whole, the themes explored in this book demonstrate that it is possible, 
to paraphrase John Crook, to ask ‘new questions about Roman law’.12 These 
are the new frontiers of ‘law and society’ in the Roman world.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
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Chapter 2




Aulus Gellius, the Antonine chronicler of his own and others’ reading, 
knew a thing or two about the hazards of misjudging the contents of a book.1 
Among the books he describes reading in his Noctes Atticae are many works 
of Republican and early Imperial jurists, preserving fragments of them 
for modernity.2 It is often assumed that his reading was connected to his 
occasional service as a judge, despite his lack of interest in reconciling his 
reading of older material with his own contemporary legal situation.3 If we 
consider the Noctes as simply the product of scholarly efforts, then we are 
left to conclude that he fi nds jurists’ work an interesting source of facts for 
his project. But the Noctes is a literary work with its own strategies, and so we 
might ask: how does Gellius, one of the most involved narrators of reading 
in the Roman empire and the only non-jurist author to discuss in such 
depth the reading of jurists, represent that reading and its relationship to the 
 intellectual life of a learned member of the elite?
 What I offer here is a brief tour of that material. I am interested not in 
the legal content of Gellius’s juristic reading, or even the jurists themselves, 
but rather how he describes and represents the reading of them; I thus am 
interested here to interpret and characterise narrative technique rather than 
analyse legal substance. I take the Noctes as a strongly protreptic text: under-
standing its narration of its author’s reading as a careful and intentional pro-
gramme of self-representation (rather than mere documentary fact), designed 
to emphasise and prompt refl ection on certain elements of an intellectual 
lifestyle, will allow us to take its use of narrative, rhetoric, and juxtaposi-
tion as a valuable illustration of an imperial Roman who was thinking and 
talking about his own mind. In short, if we let it, the Noctes can begin to 
help us situate juristic literature along more ‘mainstream’ disciplines on the 
 intellectual landscape – or at least elite bookshelves – of Antonine Rome.
1 E.g. Noctes Atticae 9.4, 14.6, 18.6 (Noctes Atticae is hereafter abbreviated to N.A.).
2 For a tally, see Holford-Strevens (2003), pp. 298–9, in the course of a discussion with differ-
ent interests than mine here.
3 The assumption implicit at Frier (1985), p. 205 fn. 35; but see Holford-Strevens (2003), p. 31.
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 Jurists feature regularly in a kind of narrative moment important to 
Gellius’s project: he turns towards an authority fi gure. I will examine the 
various questions that Gellius turns to a jurist to answer, and the other 
authorities who are present when a jurist has something to offer. Gellius 
frames encounters with juristic literature as an important part of learning 
about the mos maiorum and the language of the ancient Romans, carefully inte-
grating jurists into enquiries alongside other kinds of authoritative source. 
He emphasises the studiousness and curiosity of good juristic writers which 
lead them to provide accounts of customs and words that can supplement or 
even supplant those of more commonly-encountered writers of antiquitates.4 
As he excludes juristic reading from his judicial duties, he also emphasises 
the broad range of other kinds of knowledge and literature whose authority 
can speak to questions that arise from actual legal experience.
 The effect is twofold: we are reminded that when we answer legal ques-
tions, it is important to be well read, but we are also encouraged to make 
jurists part of our wide reading, for purposes that go well beyond the legal. 
Juristic knowledge, for Gellius, is both culturally mainstream in its antiquar-
ian methodology, and uniquely complementary to the other genres and 
modes of books and enquiry available to the curious Roman intellectual.
2. GELLIUS AND DISCIPLINARY KNOWLEDGE
Adopting the proper attitude towards disciplinary expertise and knowledge 
concerns Gellius greatly. For many kinds of knowledge, Gellius weaves into 
the Noctes Atticae autobiographical refl ections on formative experiences 
with those disciplines: tales of learning that kind of knowledge and learning 
about the nature of the discipline’s experts. For example, he realises that 
grammatici cannot be trusted with innocent and earnest questions because 
they are often too rude and ignorant.5 He also offers glimpses of the various 
steps of learning about the nature of authority, fi nding the rare good experts 
but also identifying their limits.6 This gives the reader a framework in which 
to understand the text’s contents as having been encountered and excerpted 
by a judicious author: we have met the bad experts and the good ones, we 
have learned what Gellius thinks is the right way to approach a topic, and 
so we have more confi dence in (or have more specifi c questions for) his own 
researches on that topic. There are high ethical stakes for an individual’s 
intentional decision to self-educate in a realm that has its own experts.
 Gellius does not ever clearly articulate the turn toward juristic self-
4 On jurists and antiquarians, see Harries (2006), pp. 176–7.
5 N.A. 6.17 is the locus classicus. For a full analysis, see Vardi (2001).
6 There is more on this below, but consider, e.g., N.A. 18.5, where the beloved rhetorician 
Antonius Julianus speaks ‘erudite . . . et adfabiliter’, but the words are revealed not to be his 
own (18.5.12).
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education (with the exception of Noctes 20.10, discussed below). However, 
an interesting and rare articulation of why a learned Roman might study the 
law can be found in Cicero’s De Oratore.7 There, part of Crassus’s case for 
the orator having mastery of the law (1.166 ff) is that it can be easily mastered 
even by an amateur (1.191–2) because its basic principles are part of everyday 
life and practice; and, moreover, the study of law is pleasant and stimulating 
because of the various kinds of interests it satisfi es:
[. . .] plurima est et in omni iure civili et in pontifi cum libris et in XII tabulis 
antiquitatis effi gies, quod et verborum vetustas prisca cognoscitur et actionum 
genera quaedam maiorum consuetudinem vitamque declarant.8 (De Oratore 1.193)
[. . .] there is in all the civil law and in the pontiff’s books and in the Twelve Tables 
an immense portrait of antiquity, as the ancient antiquity of words is mastered 
and certain kinds of legal formula reveal the customs and lifestyles of the maiores.
Political science, institutions of state, the Twelve Tables themselves – all this 
knowledge is yielded by study of law, of more value to those interested in 
ethics than ‘all the libraries of philosophers’ (1.193–5). By framing Roman 
law as a uniquely Roman cultural property, Crassus makes the study of law 
(and realisation of Roman superiority to Greece) a patriotic act that also 
brings pleasure through the pictures it paints of ancient mores.9
 Gellius makes a turn toward medical self-education that seems to echo 
these terms in important ways. As a youth in Athens staying at the country 
villa of Herodes Atticus (when and where, he tells us in his Preface, he 
began composing the Noctes),10 he was taken ill (Noctes 18.10). A doctor 
comes to check on him and, in the presence of Gellius’s teacher Taurus and 
various learned friends, gauchely mishandles the terms for veins and arteries 
(18.10.4–5), earning a careful rebuke from the philosopher Taurus (18.10.5–
7).11 This sickbed experience leads Gellius later to an epiphany (18.10.8): that 
it is shameful (turpe) not to know even those things about one’s body (such as 
taking a pulse) which Nature has made clear and self-evident (in promptu . . . 
in propatulo). So he hunts up medical books and with a taste (attigi) of them 
he learns various such things relevant to the human condition (humanitatis 
usu non aliena).
 Learning a little medicine helps one understand one’s body, but what 
is – to Gellius – the value of studying law? Here the problem of disciplinary 
7 Known to Gellius, N.A. 1.15.17, 4.8.8.
8 I omit the disputed beginning of the sentence, a comparison to Aeliana studia, which refers 
either to early grammatical and antiquarian writing (by way of Varro’s and Cicero’s teacher 
L. Aelius Stilo Praeconinus, Brutus, pp. 205–7) or the early jurist Sextus Aelius Paetus Catus. 
For the controversy, see Leeman and Pinkster (1981), pp. 100–1.
9 On the Twelve Tables as common Roman property, see Harries (2006), p. 171.
10 N.A. Pr. 4.
11 18.10 also arrogates the intimacy and affection of Taurus seen in 12.5.
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authority is central: as Crassus says, law not only touches on all aspects of 
life, but its practice can involve a variety of methodologies. Law’s utility is 
in fact so ubiquitous that Gellius uses it to identify the limits of other disci-
plines’ authority: so, in 12.13, Gellius recalls when as a young man, having 
been appointed iudex, he has a question about the terms of legal procedure 
and takes it to his preferred grammaticus, Sulpicius Apollinaris. This is the 
story of learning that a beloved teacher does not know everything, and that 
one’s own questions may not be properly formed: Gellius recalls asking 
what he knows now to be a silly question about what it means that he must 
rule intra Kalendas.12 Apollinaris demands to know why he has not taken 
a procedural question to the usual periti studiosique iuris (12.13.2). Gellius 
responds that he would consult a jurist for the interpretation of a law, but 
his question here is simply about a word (12.13.3–4). Apollinaris assents, 
but makes Gellius promise not to actually use this grammatical answer 
in his duty as iudex, seeing how language is as susceptible to the deprada-
tions of usage as law is to obsolescence (12.13.5). And when Apollinaris 
fi nally explains the word intra, Gellius reveals he has challenges prepared to 
counter this interpretation (12.13.17). Apollinaris responds with a smile and 
a counter- argument, enjoying the repartee.13 Gellius here models the sort 
of sophisticated, friendly and well-informed conversation that one should 
aspire to have with a truly qualifi ed grammaticus; but he also shows himself 
having found the actual limit to his teacher’s knowledge in this matter:
haec tunc Apollinaris scite acuteque dicere visus est. Set postea in libro M. Tullii 
epistularum ad Servium Sulpicium sic dictum esse invenimus [. . .] (12.13.20–1)
At that time, Apollinaris seemed to have said these things knowledgeably and 
acutely. But later I found the word used thus in a book of Letters of Marcus Tullius 
to Servius Sulpicius [. . .] 
Gellius is always keen to appeal to Cicero, and it is only fi tting that he is 
reading Cicero’s correspondence with a jurist friend.14 But he is also making 
explicit to the reader his discovery of Apollinaris’s limitations in this matter, 
and we might read it as Gellius’s ‘graduation’ from his devotion to grammati-
cal studies when he fi nds that his teacher (1) does not have all the answers 
and (2) cannot offer answers directly relevant to Gellius’s professional needs. 
And this revelation about the apparently scite acuteque speech of the teacher 
comes as a result of later, independent reading on Gellius’s part.15
 The tension played out in this passage about the boundaries of utility and 
12 Holford-Strevens (2003), pp. 85–6, with fn. 30.
13 12.13.19: Tunc Sulpicius Apollinaris renidens: ‘non me hercule inargute’ inquit ‘nec incallide 
 opposuisti hoc [. . .].’  Cf. Keulen (2009), p. 75.
14 Gellius may know these letters well, given the general resemblance in premise between N.A. 
2.21 and Cic. Fam. 4.5.
15 As it does in N.A. 18.5.12.
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relevance between different disciplines is inherent to the nature of ancient 
disciplinary thinking. Gellius establishes a clear rivalry between the experts 
with a natural claim to a question by virtue of their title (iuris periti versus 
grammatici), but also points out the possibility of reading begun for one 
reason yielding an answer relevant to something else entirely. One’s private 
intellectual lifestyle is thus a place of active synthesis, in which wide reading 
and enquiry has unexpected rewards. And as Gellius turned to a grammaticus 
to help with the law, so he regularly fi nds that turning to the law helps with 
other things, including grammar.
 A hallmark of Gellius’s regular forays into ‘archaic’ and Republican litera-
ture is the frequent consultation of grammatical commentaries for assistance 
with the diffi culties that old language presents.16 He represents an instinctive 
turn toward such commentaries with questions arise in reading, but also 
regular disappointment with them: so in 17.6 a group encounters an obscure 
phrase in a speech by Cato and immediately calls for the obvious commen-
tary (17.6.2: libri statim quaesiti allatique sunt Verrii Flacci de obscuris Catonis). 
But Gellius rejects Flaccus’s answer and instead reports his own better one: 
so a story that relates a fact (the meaning of the phrase in question) also plays 
out a lesson about how such facts are found.
 In a similar encounter, in Noctes 20.2, when the grammarian fails, it is not 
Gellius but the Republican jurist Ateius Capito who comes to the rescue. 
There, three words (siticines, liticines, tubicines) from a speech of Cato’s 
prompt confusion (20.2.1). Caesellius Vindex’s Commentarii Lectionum 
Antiquarum yields defi nitions of the latter two – lituus- and tuba-players, 
respectively – but Vindex, a regular target of Gellius, throws up his hands for 
the fi rst.
nos autem in Capitonis Atei Coniectaneis invenimus ‘siticines’ appellatos, qui 
apud sitos canere soliti essent, hoc est vita functos et sepultos, eosque habuisse 
proprium genus tubae, qua canerent, a ceterorum tubicinum differens. (20.2.3)
However, I found, in the Miscellanies of Ateius Capito, that those are called sit-
icines who customarily played in the presence of the ‘stored’ (siti), that is, the dead 
and entombed, and that they had a special kind of tuba, on which they played, 
differing from that of the rest of the tubicines.
Following Gellius’s scepticism about grammatici to its margins, then, has 
taken us over into the land of the jurists. Reasoning simplistically has led 
Vindex to a dead end, but Capito brings knowledge of ancient custom to 
bear on the problem and fi nds the answer: the bad grammarian knows only 
how to disassemble and reassemble words, but the good jurist knows far 
more than law, a clear contrast between those who restrict themselves to 
16 On Gellius and archaism, see generally Marache (1952); Vessey (1994). For Gellius on 
 archaism and obscurity, see 1.10, 11.7.
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disciplinary boundaries and those who are truly learned (and happen to 
specialise or direct that learning toward a particular end). Jurisprudence, 
with its unique interests, has emerged to fi ll the cracks in another discipline’s 
expertise, and the reading of juristic literature provides knowledge one might 
not otherwise come across. To the elite gentleman who spends his otium on 
intellectual efforts, the jurists would seem to have something to offer. 
3. GELLIUS READS JURISTS 
The main authoritative role which Gellius assigns to juristic authors (and 
legal primary texts) is not the answering of legal questions. My discussion 
here will focus on what kinds of questions the juristic texts seem to solve 
– that is, not why Gellius tells us he is reading them (for he rarely, if ever, 
does), but to what benefi t of having read them he is drawing our attention by 
setting them in the context he does.
 A  jurist’s analysis of a word may be cited as one among several compet-
ing explanations for Gellius. So Noctes 6.4 is a short piece on why captives 
for sale as slaves are said to be sub corona, and it opens with a citation of 
Caelius Sabinus on the use of headgear to distinguish slaves for sale; explain-
ing which ones wear pilleati and which sub corona (6.4.1–3). ‘However,’ says 
Gellius, ‘there is another reason’, and he supplies a competing but unsourced 
theory (6.4.4). Then, as often, he passes judgment on the two, the evidence 
supporting Caelius’s explanation being a rhetorical usage of the term by 
Cato in his work de Re Militari (6.4.5). Gellius combines juristic thought, 
common opinion, and archaic literary evidence to come to an authorita-
tive answer. Similarly, Masurius Sabinus’s etymology of religiosus (from his 
Commentarii de Indigenis) is just one of many pieces of evidence consulted 
in Gellius’s lengthy exploration of that word, prompted by a line of verse 
quoted without citation by Nigidius Figulus (4.9.8–9). The jurist here is an 
effective antiquarian etymologist.17
 The turn to authority with which Gellius is concerned is often based on 
assumptions about who will know what, and more often than not is explic-
itly depicted in part because it was misguided. So in 10.20 he attempts to 
answer a common question:
quaeri audio, quid ‘lex’ sit, quid ‘plebiscitum’, quid ‘rogatio’, quid ‘privilegium’. 
Ateius Capito, publici privatique iuris peritissimus, quid ‘lex’ esset, hisce verbis 
defi nivit: [. . .] (10.20.1–2)
I hear it asked what a lex is, and what a plebiscitum is, and what a rogatio is, and 
what a privilegium is. Ateius Capito, a man most learned in public and private law, 
defi nes what a lex is with these very words: [. . .]
17 For another comparison, see the anonymous Commentarii ad Ius Pontifi cum Pertinentes that 
offer an account of bidentes in 16.6.13.
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This seems to sketch an assumption by Gellius that an answer would be 
found in this qualifi ed juristic source. But if Capito’s defi nition is true, 
then the various legislative documents that survive from the Republic are 
misnamed (10.20.3), which allows an excursus that requires Gellius to quote 
some Lucilius (10.20.4), after which we return to Capito and his rationale 
for plebiscitum (10.20.5–6) – and only then can Gellius explain, on his own 
authority, that it all comes down to rogatio because the people are rogatur 
their opinion (10.20.7). But, Gellius observes, the usage one encounters fails 
to respect any of this careful distinction (10.20.9).
Sallustius quoque proprietatum in verbis retinentissimus consuetudini conces-
sit et privilegium, quod de Cn. Pompei reditu ferebatur, ‘legem’ appellavit. 
(10.20.9–10) 
Even Sallust, the most observant of correctness in speech, yielded to custom and 
called the privilegium which was passed about the return of Cn. Pompey a lex. 
There follows the relevant quotation from Sallust. Where does this whole 
discussion leave us? What is the answer to the question Gellius was hearing 
about the difference between the terms? This encounter with Capito’s 
grammatical authority thus casts juristic reading, or rather the knowledge 
to be gained therefrom, as a kind of bonus to the usual literary canon of 
Republican speeches and histories. It is neither incorrect nor irrelevant; 
indeed, it is both exceptionally authoritative and off the beaten path.
 Although juristic interest in language is an obvious element of their prac-
tice, Gellius makes a special effort to identify a jurist whose legal expertise 
is augmented by his researches into language. Noctes 13.10, which provides 
etymolgies of soror by Antistius Labeo and of frater by Nigidius Figulus, 
introduces the former thus:
Labeo Antistius iuris quidem civilis disciplinam principali studio exercuit et con-
sulentibus de iure publice responsitavit; set ceterarum quoque bonarum artium 
non expers fuit et in grammaticam sese atque dialecticam litterasque antiquiores 
altioresque penetraverat Latinarumque vocum origines rationesque percalluerat 
eaque praecipue scientia ad enodandos plerosque iuris laqueos utebatur. sunt 
adeo libri post mortem eius editi, qui posteriores inscribuntur, quorum librorum 
tres continui, tricesimus octavus et tricesimus nonus et quadragesimus, pleni sunt 
id genus rerum ad enarrandam et inlustrandam linguam Latinam conducentium. 
praeterea in libris, quos ad Praetoris edictum scripsit, multa posuit pariter lepide 
atque argute reperta. sicuti hoc est [. . .] (13.10.1) 
Antistius Labeo cultivated the discipline of the ius civile with especial zeal and 
gave responsa to those who consulted him about the ius publicum; but he was 
not without experience of indeed the rest of the fi ne arts, and he delved deeply 
into dialectic and older and more remote literature and became well versed in 
the origins and derivations of Latin words, and he applied this especially to the 
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unknotting of many tough points of law. Indeed, there are books of his published 
after his death, which are called Posteriores, of which three continuous volumes 
– the thirty-eight, thirty-ninth and fortieth – are full of that kind of material that 
tends to explain and shed light on the Latin language. And in addition to that, he 
has included in his books that he wrote On The Praetorian Edict many things he has 
fi gured out fi nely and cleverly. Such a one is this: [. . .]
In this passage – itself longer than both etymologies it introduces (13.10.3–4) 
– Gellius gives a clear rationale for the wide and careful reading of juristic lit-
erature, reminding the reader of the grammatical knowledge it can provide.18 
Gellius honours Labeo in that sphere by here giving him a sibling role to 
Nigidius Figulus, a scholar himself the equal of Varro.19 Labeo was not only 
a legal expert, but made a special point of seeking grammatical knowledge he 
could apply productively to the law. Gellius explains that it is not only his 
obviously language-related works that have something to offer in this regard, 
but that indeed a grammatically learned jurist will leave traces of that learning 
in everything he writes. The best jurists, in Gellius’s view, are learned in lan-
guage too, and so authority on matters of grammar is not a matter of one’s pro-
fessed title (to the contrary, this is often the problem with his grammatici). It is 
instead a matter of what interests, learning and skills one has actually mastered, 
and grammar, we are reminded, falls into that category for a good (to Gellius) 
jurist. So, when we consider a word of the sort that everyone uses without 
knowing exactly what it means, we might quite sensibly turn to a jurist, even if 
we end up listening to Sulpicius Apollinaris cite Lucretius, Lucilius and Virgil 
for a fuller account of its ratio.20 When a word is under examination, those 
who have read their jurists will have something extra to contribute.
 Similarly, the jurists’ necessary interest in the mos maiorum makes their 
generous intersection with ‘antiquarianism’ unsurprising. Gellius under-
stands jurists to be a useful source of such knowledge about the customs and 
institutions of Romans and, as with grammar, he intentionally inserts them 
into the interrogation of such topics so as to highlight their utility in that 
regard.
 Gellius cannot resist a good exemplum. He cherishes stories about impres-
sive words and deeds, stories well told, and even competing versions of 
the same story.21 In Noctes 4.20 Gellius has gathered three examples of the 
18 Intrinsic to the nature of their work and a common juristic activity; see, for example, the 
collected defi nitions at D.50.16.
19 N.A. 4.9.1: Nigidius Figulus, homo, ut ego arbitror, iuxta M. Varronem doctissimus [. . .]. Cf. 19.14.
20 N.A. 16.5 turns fi rst to Gaius Aelius Gallus, On the meaning of Words Which Pertain to the Ius 
Civile for a meaning of vestibulum that accords with the choice ratio Gellius recalls hearing 
from Sulpicius Apollinaris.
21 For example, 4.18 or 9.13. N.A. 10.27 offers two versions of a story we are likely to know 
from Liv. Hist. 21.18, that of the Roman emissary offering ‘peace’ or ‘war’ to the Carthaginian 
senate, but it also appears – ascribed to a different fi gure entirely – in Pomponius, D.1.2.2.37 
(Pompon. 1 Enchirid.), attesting perhaps to its currency at the time of Gellius’s writing.
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 traditional severity of the censors.22 The fi rst two are introduced without 
source, but Gellius admits at the end that he has taken them from a speech 
of Scipio (4.20.10). For the third, he turns to the fi rst-century CE jurist 
Masurius Sabinus (4.20.11).23 Here again he models explicitly the added 
wealth of knowledge that comes from reading not just the classic works of 
oratory but also volumes of juristic scholarship.
 Thematic collections of material in juristic works can offer the backbone 
for a Gellian enquiry. The piece Gellius offers ‘on old-time frugality, and on 
ancient sumptuary laws’ (cap. 2.24) in fact uses the latter as a way of explor-
ing the former; and the synthetic application of juristic reading to antiquar-
ian enquiry is also framed by explicit gestures on Gellius’s part to his own 
habits of reading and writing, emphasising the performance for his reader 
of an intellectual activity. Montaigne-like, he opens by asserting a premise 
about the mos maiorum, and then offers an example to support it:
parsimonia apud veteres Romanos et victus atque cenarum tenuitas non domes-
tica solum observatione ac disciplina, sed publica quoque animadversione leg-
umque complurium sanctionibus custodita est. legi adeo nuper in Capitonis Atei 
coniectaneis senatus decretum vetus C. Fannio et M. Valerio Messala consulibus 
factum [. . .]. (2.24.1–2) 
Among the ancient Romans, frugality and simpleness of nourishment and meals 
was observed not only by domestic observation and discipline but also by public 
censure and the restrictions of many laws. In fact, I recently read in the Miscellany 
of Ateius Capito that in the consulships of Gaius Fannius and Marcus Valerius 
Messala an old decree of the Senate was made that [. . .]
Capito has cited senatorial decrees, and Gellius picks up this research tech-
nique, citing six more (2.24.3–14) which he may well have by way of Capito 
but which he re-articulates to suit his discussion, injecting a claim to addi-
tional autopsy research (2.24.12). He also intersperses snippets of verse from 
his usual stable of archaic poetic readings: Lucilius on the Fannian law in 
2.24.4–6, with a pause to engage rival commentators on the poet, and Laevius 
and Lucilius both on the Licinian law in 2.24.8–10. Not until the end does 
Ateius Capito re-emerge.
esse etiam dicit Capito Ateius edictum, divine Augusti an Tiberii Caesaris non 
satis commemini; quo edicto [. . .] (2.24.15) 
Ateius Capito also says that there is an edict, whether it was of the deifi ed 
Augustus or the deifi ed Tiberius, I don’t rightly remember; by this edict [. . .]
Gellius creates a sense of collaboration with Capito, seeming to follow the 
general outline of his discussion but laying at least verbal claim to it and 
22 Cf. Holford-Strevens (2003), p. 315.
23 Harries (2006), p. 88.
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adding a by-now recognisable literary body of evidence to the legal. He also 
uses the device of incomplete recollection to direct the reader’s attention to 
the text in question. Elsewhere, we are tantalised by the content of the story 
of Papirius Praetextatus to seek out Cato’s rendering of it that so caught 
Gellius’s eye (1.23.1–3), and to seek out the answer (which Gellius knows 
Aristotle will have) to a disagreement between Herodotus and Homer (13.7). 
Noctes 2.24 is, by the same token, both a use of juristic reading and a depic-
tion of that reading and use. Gellius invites us into his compositional process 
to show how a jurist’s discussion provides insight into the mos maiorum 
when combined with fashionably archaic literature, and leaves just enough 
 unfi nished to point the way to further enquiry.
 Gellius hangs several discussions of Roman religious institutions on 
writers on pontifi cal law (not properly jurists, but operating analogously as 
far as the antiquarian aspects of their expertise go) as well as the occasional 
primary text, larding them often with these gestures of active research and 
judgment that foreground both the industry of his own approach and its 
viability as an option for his audience. Noctes 13.14 cites anonymous augural 
authors de Auspicis (13.14.1), M. Valerius Messala (13.14.5), and a juicy 
titbit of the recently-read grammarian ‘Elys’ (13.14.7: praetermittendum non 
putavi, quod non pridem ego in Elydis, grammatici veteris, commentario offendi 
[. . .])24 for the nature and history of the pomerium, all of which is framed as 
a matter of long and current debate (13.14.4). Messala continues to be the 
source for the next few pieces, offering a lengthy and well-sourced explana-
tion of the magistratus minores (13.15) and their relationship to the consul as 
regards the holding of contiones (13.16), and Gellius lets the jurist speak for 
him:
quaeri igitur solet, qui sint magistratus minores. super hac re meis verbis nil opus 
fuit, quoniam liber M. Messalae auguris de auspiciis primus, cum hoc scriber-
emus, forte adfuit. (13.15.2–3) 
So, it is often asked who the magistratus minores are. On this subject there’s no 
need for my words, since the fi rst book of M. Messala the augur On Auspices 
happens to be right here as I am writing this. 
In a similar vein, on the fl amen Dialis, Gellius offers pointers to some primary 
sources and then relates material limited, he reminds us, by his own powers 
of recollection (10.15.2: unde haec ferme sunt, quae commeminimus). That col-
lection of facts is capped with language from the praetor’s edict (10.15.31) 
and Varro’s Divine Antiquities (10.15.32). Meanwhile, Noctes 7.7, on Acca 
Larentia, gathers antiqui annales (7.7.1), the lex Horatia (7.7.2), the Twelve 
Tables (7.7.3), and historians (7.7.6: Valerias Antias, inter alios); Masurius 
Sabinus (7.7.8), who has the last word, is quoted verbatim at length, and – 
24 Holford-Strevens (2003), p. 163 observes something is wrong with Elys’s name.
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we are told – has consulted actual historians himself on the matter (secutus 
quosdam historiae scriptores).
 Perhaps the best example of the way Gellius stages an active and pro-
ductive enquiry to which jurists contribute is 1.12, on the taking (cepi) 
of vestal virgins. Gellius starts by citing various authors on the topic, ‘of 
whom Antistius Labeo wrote most diligently’ (1.12.1). Then Ateius Capito 
is invoked (1.12.8), and again Capito seems to bring with him legal primary 
texts (here, an uncited lex Papia). At 1.12.13 Gellius pivots around the word 
cepi and pursues that linguistic question, involving, in short order, Fabius 
Pictor (1.12.14), the autobiography of Sulla (1.12.16), and a bon mot of Cato 
(1.12.17), culminating in quotation from Labeo ad XII Tabulas (1.12.18–19).
 Discussions of old civic procedure likewise involve juristic writing. Gellius 
in 15.27 epitomises a survey of kinds of comitia from Book 1 of Laelius Felix’s 
ad Q. Mucium, which itself quotes Labeo. Varro’s monologue on senate 
procedure is challenged by something Ateius Capito says that Tubero said 
(14.7.12–13); but Capito and Varro are found in 14.8 to join ranks contra 
Junius on the praefect of the Latin festival. Another discussion of senatorial 
procedure at the end of the Republic seems like it will turn to Tullius Tiro for 
Cicero’s account second-hand, but Tiro is surpassed by Capito, who offers 
the same information alongside other material of interest (4.10.6–8).
 Opinions on the civil law are persistently useful. Tackling the delinea-
tion between one day and the next, Gellius turns at fi rst to Varro’s Human 
Antiquities, considering Roman custom, Athenian custom, and what can be 
gleaned from the Roman taking of auspices at night (3.2.1–11). But Gellius 
then introduces, second-hand, an opinion of Q. Mucius concerning eman-
cipation that allows Gellius to conclude Mucius’s opinion about the ques-
tion at hand (3.2.12–13). Noctes 4.3 and 4.4, on the history of divorce and 
betrothal in Italy, starts out with what is memoriae traditum (4.3.1) but then 
turns to Servius Sulpicius de Dotibus, on which both pieces depend heavily 
(the latter being confi rmed in its account by Neratius de Nuptiis, 4.4.4).25 
Such writings also offer evidence of the general severity of the veteres Romani: 
Noctes 6.15 needs to relate Labeo’s observation on the cruelty of old-time 
judgments (6.15.1) to contextualise Q. Mucius’s opinion in Book 16 de Iure 
Civili that improper use of a loaned item constitutes theft (6.15.2). Ateius 
Capito, meanwhile, offers us in his Commentarii de Iudiciis Publiciis a juicy 
exemplum of the plebeian aediles’ punishment of arrogant speech (10.16).
 Juristic observations and facts are extricated thoroughly from whatever 
discussion they originally appeared in, and are interpreted and synthesised 
by Gellius with other material to yield observations about the mos maiorum. 
25 For this sort of enquiry, compare the not-quite-antiquarian discussion in 5.19 of adoption 
procedure, in which no jurist or indeed any authority is cited until 5.19.11. On Servius as 
antiquarian, see Harries (2006), p. 84, and on Gellius’s use of Servius, see Harries (2006), pp. 
85–90 (and on adoption, pp. 153–5).
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Gellius demonstrates two ideas to his reader simultaneously: that he read 
juristic writing and it prompted a wider-ranging enquiry into some aspect of 
the mos maiorum, and that, pursuing an enquiry (for whatever reason) into 
some mos maiorum, Gellius turned to jurists and found they yielded thorough 
and learned material.
 Perhaps the most interesting appearance of juristic reading in an anti-
quarian or grammatical enquiry (and we should note that Gellius rarely 
distinguishes between the two except in refutation of the latter) comes on 
an occasion when it serves to elucidate a word the meaning of which is of 
critical programmatic importance to the Noctes Atticae itself. Noctes 4.1 is 
the much-discussed penus episode, a discussion of this word for provisions 
or a store of food that pits a philosopher against a grammarian. Favorinus 
casually exposes a boastful grammaticus who knows the various declensions 
and genders of the noun (4.1.1–4) but, when faced with a challenge to defi ne 
it (4.1.5), sputters and fl ails about with examples but not defi nitions (4.7–14). 
Having shown up the man’s intellectual limitations, Favorinus shares various 
competing defi nitions he has found in juristic reading (4.15–18). After an 
explanation of Favorinus’s socratic mode (4.19), Gellius offers some further 
juristic writing (4.20–3) to emphasise that, indeed, jurists over the years have 
been unable to reach a consensus on the word’s meaning.
 The scene offers an important paradigm for the Gellian exposure of a 
fraudulent professor, focusing on the grammaticus’s rudeness and elucidat-
ing the exact nature of his intellectual fl aws.26 There is the genital pun that 
is suspiciously aptly fi tted to Favorinus’s infamous sexual ambiguity.27 And, 
perhaps most critically, there is its confrontation of the ‘axial’ term penus, 
which can only recall Gellius’s own preface.28 Near where our text of the 
Preface picks up, Gellius, describing his compositional method, explains 
that whenever he saw or heard something worthy of memory in either lan-
guage, he made a note of it and stored these things up ‘as a reinforcement to 
memory, like a certain penus of letters’ (Pr. 2: quasi quoddam litterarum penus 
recondebam). The Preface goes on to emphasise that material in the Noctes is 
meant to be useful, a stimulation to further study, and also to invite careful 
scrutiny and reevaluation;29 so in 4.1 we are in the presence of something 
critically important to Gellius’s intellectual value set.
 Favorinus’s speech here is Gellius’s; he too reads his Scaevola second-
hand (4.1.16; cf. 3.2), and at the close of the speech Gellius immediately 
chimes in with more of the kinds of things Favorinus was quoting (4.1.20).30 
26 Holford-Strevens (2003), pp. 1213–14.
27 Keulen (2009), pp. 87–94.
28 Gunderson (2009), pp. 75–7.
29 Pr. 14–18.
30 For this, cf. 2.22.30, where Gellius refers to Favorinus’s speech as his own, or 14.1, where 
the pretense of modestly reporting a Favorine speech cannot withstand Gellius’s ambition 
for aemulatio.
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It is not uncommon for Favorinus to serve as a Gellian mouthpiece.31 
Here he preaches the Gellian gospel of juristic reading for better Latinity 
and better Romanitas; he concludes thus his report of what he has ‘heard’ 
Scaevola used to say:
‘haec ego,’ inquit ‘cum philosophiae me dedissem, non insuper tamen habui 
discere; quoniam civibus Romanis Latine loquentibus rem non suo vocabulo 
demonstrare non minus turpe est, quam hominem non suo nomine appellare’. 
(4.1.18) 
‘Although I am a philosopher,’ he said, ‘nevertheless I did not think it beneath me 
to learn these things; for it is no less shameful for a Latin-speaking Roman citizen 
to indicate something by a word that is not its proper name than to call a man by 
something other than his name’. 
Favorinus attaches to proper speech the same ethical value (turpe) that 
Gellius attached to knowledge of readily apparent medical phenomena (see 
section 2 above), with the nationalistic twist of Cicero’s Crassus.32
 But as we zero in on a meaning of penus, we also explore an important 
programmatic aspect of the Noctes. We have been pointed at the idea that the 
penus contains goods and materials set aside for household use (4.1.17–13). 
This makes Gellius’s claim that his work is a penus into a forceful confron-
tation of traditional fi scal language around knowledge; his predecessor and 
regular target for attack as a knowledge-glutton, Pliny the Elder, assigns 
thesaurus the analogous role in his own Naturalis Historia, and in spite of 
that term’s long history as the name for a personal store of knowledge, 
Gellius, by offering the dynamic penus as contrast, renders the thesaurus a 
static hoard.33 The penus, full of things useful and productive, placed there 
for a purpose, goes some way to making Gellius’s unsystematic disorder an 
anti-encyclopedic claim for the idiosyncrasy and engagement of the intel-
lectual lifestyle. And Favorinus’s explanation of what he learned from the 
jurists – that there is no agreed-on defi nition of the word, even among such 
wise men – makes the stocking of a penus a process of constant re-evaluation. 
Does this belong? Does that?
 The penus episode is a clear example of knowledge (the meaning of penus) 
being put into action (to prove a point about grammatici) in service of a 
programmatic argument about actionable knowledge; and in all of this, it 
relies heavily on juristic reading. Gellius has given juristic reading and what 
it can offer those with an interest in language a starring role in the Noctes’s 
31 For example, the moral of 11.7 about excessive archaism is also put forth, with more fl air, by 
Favorinus in 1.10.
32 Cf. Swain (2004), pp. 32–3.
33 Plin. H.N. Pr. 17 (cf. 22).  See especially N.A. 9.4 and 10.27 for (unfair) attacks on Pliny. Cic. 
De Or. 1.18 also invokes the thesaurus ideal, but cf. Quint. Inst. 10.1.2 for its negative side. 
On fi nance and wealth in Pliny, see Murphy (2003); Lao (2011).
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 treatment of authority as well as its self-awareness about intellectual activity 
and standards.
 The kinds of questions Gellius invokes jurists to answer and the other 
kinds of sources to which he compares them situate them strongly in the 
interlinked realms of antiquarian and grammar. One juristic source can 
provide various facts and contribute to the examination of divergent topics, 
as the same volume of Masurius Sabinus has the last word in both the penus 
episode of 4.1 and the comparison of morbus and vitium in 4.2.34 At Noctes 
11.18, a survey of the punishment of theft throughout history, Gellius 
pauses in his (rare) exegesis of modern law to endorse a juristic work:35
sed quod sit ‘oblatum’, quod ‘conceptum’ et pleraque alia ad eam rem ex egregiis 
veterum moribus accepta neque inutilia cognitu neque iniucunda, qui legere volet, 
inveniet Sabini librum, cui titulus est de furtis. in quo id quoque scriptum est, 
quod volgo inopinatum est [. . .] (11.18.12–13) 
But anyone who wants to read about what oblatum is, and what conceptum is, 
and many other things along these lines excerpted from the outstanding mores 
of the ancients, neither useless nor unpleasant to learn, will look up the book 
of Sabinus’s which is titled de Furtis. Also written there is this thing, which is 
 surprising to most people [. . .]
To set oneself and one’s speech and one’s learning apart from the vulgus is a 
recurring concern in the Noctes. The message from Gellius’s use of juristic 
reading is clear: the best jurists have been diligent scholars of language and 
custom, and so to read their works is to learn things about those topics that 
might not be available elsewhere. The primary documents of Roman law are 
also documents of law and custom and so worthy of attention in their own 
right.36 What one fi nds in reading about the history of the law, then, is clear 
depictions of the customs and language of the past.
4. GELLIUS CONSIDERS LEGAL QUESTIONS 
Gellius shows himself reading jurists to learn about various topics, mostly 
antiquarian, but not to resolve specifi c legal questions. In a neat corollary, 
problems that do arise from discrete legal encounters are often answered 
with knowledge from these other spheres. The use of grammatical, philo-
sophical and even antiquarian expertise to resolve legal questions illustrates 
Gellius’s commitment to the diverse intellectual life and sheds some light on 
the place assigned to juristic learning.
 We have seen that the kind of legal study that returns to the Twelve 
34 For the latter, cf. D.21.1.1–12 (Ulpian. 1 ad Ed. Aed. Cur.).
35 But note Holford-Strevens (2003), p. 299, and Stevenson (2004), p. 154.
36 Consider 15.13.11, 2.15, and especially 11.17.
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Tables and their original language provides a useful frame of reference 
for the mastery of archaic language. Correspondingly, Gellius fi nds that 
the grammatical approach helps to elucidate technical language. Why is it 
called a divinatio? Gavius Bassus, On the Origin of Words tells us (2.4). How 
is ususcapio pronounced and formed? Reason by analogy to Cato’s account 
of pignoriscapio (6.10). Does the future perfect in a law refer to the past or 
future? Not even the great jurists of the Republic could agree, as Nigidius 
Figulus will explain (17.7). And just think – in the courtroom as well as in 
the street, people use superesse to incorrectly refer to legal representation 
(1.22.1–2); advocates fail to speak integre, having not read their Varro, and 
so open themselves up to punning humiliation by a more learned judge 
(1.22.3–6). Courtroom speech should be informed by thorough grammati-
cal knowledge.37 So those whose negotium takes them into the courtroom 
would do well to spend their otium as Gellius does, walking in the evening 
and quietly refl ecting on questions which seem minor but in fact have great 
signifi cance for understanding of the Latin tongue (11.3.1), such as the 
 meanings of pro.38
 Rightly or not, Gellius often makes the turn to philosophy for questions 
that arise from law. This is not just because logical fl aws should be avoided 
in argument (5.10, 9.15), but because legal rulings have ethical dimensions: 
among the initial essays that gesture to values integral to the whole project 
(Noctes 1.1’s nod to Plutarch and the utility of knowledge; 1.2’s paradigmatic 
fraud exposure) is 1.3, a lengthy survey of philosophical opinions from 
Chilo to Favorinus on ruling on the interests of a friend. Favorinus eluci-
dates a law of Solon to explain the moral hazards of impartiality (2.12), and 
plays a starring role in a passage which suppresses the judicial utility of juris-
tic handbooks: Noctes 14.2 paints the author as only initially emerging from 
curricular liberal education, at that tender age – adulescens – which in the 
Noctes is ignorant of nothing so much as its own ignorance.39 Knowing only 
rhetoric and poetry, and having no juristic teacher, he seeks out writings on 
the duties of the judge (14.2.1). They teach him old laws, but fail to prepare 
him for the inexplicabilis ethical dilemmas a judge often encounters (14.2.3). 
Faced with one such, Gellius convenes a consilium of busy legal profession-
als who have no time for such considerations and advise him to simply 
37 Gellius’s ascription of the mocking pun in 1.22 to an unspecifi ed learned praetor may 
recall, for example, the speechifying ‘mask’ character for Lucian in his Peregrinus.  For the 
difference grammar can make to those practising law, cf. also N.A. 7.6, where the grammar-
ian Sulpicius Apollinaris invokes Homer to explain the sense of praepes in the context of 
 discussing augural law with an urban prefect.
38 For this, cf. Taurus’s defense of the captio in 7.13, taken to heart by the Roman students 
at Athens in their expat Saturnalia games of 18.2 and 18.13. The question that seems small 
but has large signifi cance is a defi ning programmatic concept for the Noctes. On recreational 
habits, see 10.25.
39 See, for example, 9.15. Cf. Keulen (2009), p. 68 fn. 3.
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rule on the available evidence (14.2.9).40 He turns to Favorinus, who offers 
a lengthy disquisition on the subject (14.2.12–24).41 Although Favorinus, 
unlike Sulpicius in 12.13, makes no warning about the inapplicability of 
his philosophical advice to a legal situation, Gellius realises that making the 
ethical judgment which Favorinus encourages would demand an auctoritas he 
lacks as a youth, and so he declares non liquet (14.2.25). Jurists feature here 
only for their unhelpfulness; what 14.2 illustrates to the reader is not just the 
many kinds of knowledge one should consider in a tricky legal situation, but 
also the way that each authority fi gure’s status, profession and age will affect 
the practical utility of his knowledge. In rapid succession, young Gellius 
has found the practical limits of grammar and rhetoric, jurists, philosophy, 
and – most importantly – his own youthful intellectual ideals. If nothing 
else, this delineates clearly to readers the differences not only between dif-
ferent spheres of knowledge but between the private realm of learning and 
the public realm in which articulations of knowledge are also articulations of 
social power.42
 Indeed, where actual legal questions arise, the turn to juristic knowledge 
is treated with no small amount of skepticism. The image in 14.2 of young 
Gellius called out of his studies and forced to reconcile what he knows with 
judicial duties complements that found in 13.13. In the preceding essay, 
13.12, Gellius has been learning from the letters of Ateius Capito about his 
ideological rivalry with Antistius Labeo, manifested in his obstinate refusal 
of a summons by a tribune of the commons (13.12.1–4). Gellius appends 
a more expanded version of Labeo’s opinion from Book 21 of Varro’s 
Divine Antiquities (13.12.5–6), and then passes judgment himself on Labeo’s 
 obstinacy (13.12.7–9), laying the groundwork for the following essay.
 Noctes 13.13 offers a valuable example of Gellius’s portrayal of juristic 
authority:
cum ex angulis secretisque librorum ac magistrorum in medium iam hominum et 
in lucem fori prodissem, quaesitum esse memini in plerisque Romae stationibus 
ius publice docentium aut respondentium, an quaestor populi Romani ad pra-
etorem in ius vocari posset. id autem non ex otiosa quaestione agitabatur, sed usus 
forte natae rei ita erat, ut vocandus esset in ius quaestor. (13.13.1–2)
When I emerged from the nooks and crannies of books and teachers into the midst 
of men and into the light of the forum, I recall it being asked in the workplaces 
at Rome of those who publicly teach and give responsa about the law whether a 
40 The theoretical aspects of consilium and responsa as an intellectual process are more sup-
pressed in the Noctes than there is room here to explore, but the text’s general question-and-
answer structure (see Pr. 25 and the phraseology of the capita rerum, on which Riggsby (2007)) 
is suggestive in this light. On 14.2, see Holford-Strevens (2003), pp. 294–5.
41 Gunderson (2009), pp. 68–70.
42 Cf. Gunderson (2009), p. 72.
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quaestor of the Roman people could summon a praetor into court. This was not 
being discussed as a leisurely academic inquiry, but it happened to be actually 
relevant to a case that had arisen, as a quaestor was to be summoned into court. 
The power of magistrates to summon one another was also at stake in 
Labeo’s refusal at 13.12. Gellius tells us that the emergent consensus of the 
jurists in 13.13 is that the maiestas of the quaestor’s offi ce protects him from 
a summons.
sed ego, qui tum adsiduus in libris M. Varronis fui, cum hoc quaeri dubitarique 
animadvertissem, protuli unum et vicesimum rerum humanarum in quo ita 
 scriptum fuit: [. . .] (13.13.4) 
But since I was at that time always reading the books of Marcus Varro, when I 
noticed that this thing was being investigated and in doubt, I brought out volume 
21 of his Human Antiquities in which this is written: [. . .]
Varo’s declaration about which magistrates may be summoned, in combina-
tion with another passage of the same work (13.13.5), makes it clear that the 
quaestor may be summoned after all, and Gellius settles the debate by having 
the relevant passages read out of his Varro (13.13.6: utraque igitur libri parte 
recitata, in Varronis omnes sententiam concesserunt).43 An antiquarian has come 
to the rescue, and contemporary juristic discourse is set straight by a proper 
respect for and interest in the historical status of institutions and offi ces; in 
short, Gellius here enacts the same value which has made the juristic authors 
he reads such an effective source of antiquarian knowledge. So although the 
youthful Gellius, new to his judicial duties, sometimes strays across disci-
plinary boundaries, he brings back uniquely valuable knowledge with the 
kind of interdisciplinary reading we see here – wide and synthetic in both 
jurisprudence and antiquarianism and grammar.
 On the one other occasion at which current legal questions are recalled, 
jurists are nowhere to be seen. Noctes 3.16 considers the possible variations 
in the term of pregnancy in a set of interlocking interpretive frameworks: 
archaic literature as cultural evidence, traditions of linguistic interpreta-
tion, and the interpretation of archaic medical literature (Hippocrates). 
The legal implications of this question are various, with the upper limit 
touching on postumi as well as infamia for a wife who does not respect the 
mourning period and the lower limit – specifi cally, the vexed question of 
eight-month pregnancy – having bearing on the ius trium liberorum.44 Gellius’s 
discussion here is lengthy, involved and assertive: he hunts down in Varro 
an Aristotelian explanation for the differing accounts in poetry (3.16.5–
6, 3.16.13), goes toe-to-toe with known grammatical offender Caesellius 
43 Gunderson (2009), pp. 177–8.
44 For various ramifi cations, see Hanson (1997), p. 589; Treggiari (1991), p. 29; Gardner (1986), 
p. 51; Milnor (2005), p. 153.
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Vindex for  misinterpreting Livius Andronicus (3.16.11), integrates his 
own recent literary reading (3.16.13), pits laughable grammatici against the 
Latinising Favorinus to apply Homeric evidence (3.16.15–19), and, having 
learned from the commentary of Sabinus about the interpretation of 
Hippocratic aphorism (3.16.7–8) offers his own exegesis of that vitally but 
vaguely  authoritative author (3.16.20).
 Gellius indicates both the specifi c legal ramifi cations of this otherwise 
somewhat aimless discussion and the authority for the approach he takes 
to it with personal recollections. Besides book learning, he recalls learning 
about an actual case at Rome (3.16.12); Gellius emphasises his autopsy of 
Hadrian’s rescript and the claim the emperor makes there to having con-
sulted the opinions of philosophers and doctors (as advertised by Gellius 
in his heading for the piece, cap. 3.16).45 The approach is hardly unique; the 
Digest preserves a ruling of Antoninus Pius and an opinion of Paul that both 
attest to the currency of the problem and the consultation of Hippocratean 
evidence.46 Gellius recalls another legal investigation, too, the ultimate judg-
ment in which he omits (3.16.21) as a test to the reader (who has just read 
Gellius’s pronouncement of an authoritative principle that should account 
for all permutations of the question, at 3.16.20).47 He then closes with a story 
from Masurius Sabinus by way of Pliny the Elder about a praetor who ruled 
with obvious ignorance of all this material (3.16.23); for Pliny, the length of 
pregnancy was wondrous, but Gellius fi nds wonder in the absurdity of the 
praetor’s assertion that the law has fi xed no limit on pregnancy. There are 
some questions, Gellius shows, that have no need of juristic opinion, and 
every need of wide, careful reading of all kinds of literature.
5. GELLIUS MEETS THE JURISTS 
Thus far I have omitted those rare occasions on which Gellius depicts 
himself meeting a living jurist. He seems to lack juristic teachers, but is 
not blind to the presence of jurists in contemporary Rome (although 
Apollinaris’s reference to jurists quos adhibere in consilium iudicaturi soletis at 
12.13.2 is suggestive – there were jurists in his judicial consilium, but they do 
not appear in the Noctes). The two main encounters with jurists – 16.10 with 
an anonymous iuris peritus and 20.10 with Sextus Caecilius – are much com-
mented upon and peripheral to my discussion here, but a brief discussion 
will shed some light on the themes that have emerged from Gellius’s treat-
ment of juristic reading. Just as Gellius’s encounters with fl esh-and-blood 
grammatici teach him the scepticism he brings to the grammatical writings 
45 On Hadrian and ruling on wills, see Honoré (1994), pp. 13–18.
46 D.38.16.12 (Pompon. 30 Quint. Muc.) and 1.5.12 (Paul. 19 Resp.), respectively. 
47 3.16.20: . . . quod aliquando ocius fi eret, non multo tamen fi eri ocius, neque quod serius, multo 
serius.
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of Verrius Flaccus and Caesellius Vindex, his run-ins with jurists resonate 
closely with his handling of juristic literature, and encapsulate perfectly his 
values for that reading.
 Perhaps the best illustration of the Gellian Favorinus’s role as cipher/
provocateur for Gellius is Noctes 20.1, in which he openly claims (20.1.9) 
the sceptic’s right to play at ignorance in order to elicit a learned disquisi-
tion. His criticisms of the obscure cruelty of the Twelve Tables compel the 
famously learned (20.1.1) Sextus Caecilius to defend their continued rel-
evance; obscurity, Caecilius points out, is created at the point of reception 
(20.1.5–6), and the cruelty is ameliorated when we consider the nature of 
linguistic and customary change throughout history, and indeed the inter-
vening legal history which has reconciled the spirit and letter of the Tables to 
contemporary values. Favorinus boasts of his reading of the Tables (20.2.4) 
as well as juristic commentary on them (20.2.13), and his learning earns him 
an embrace.48 Caecilius’s speech wins the approval of all (20.1.55), an unusu-
ally explicit endorsement for the Noctes.49 Caecilius is not an intimate of the 
author’s, but his excellence has a clear rationale: the kind of jurist who pays 
attention to the Twelve Tables (and whatever other ancient law and jurispru-
dence goes with it) will necessarily know much about the history of Roman 
customs and practice.50
 The other jurist at 16.10 proves a corollary.51 When a word in Ennius, 
read in public, requires elucidation, Gellius makes the turn toward authority 
that often presages disappointment as he asks a friend of his ius civile callens 
to explain it. A pun on the man’s juristic authority accompanies his refusal 
(16.10.4: . . . cum illic se iuris, non rei grammaticae peritum esse respondisset . . .) 
as he pleads disciplinary boundaries, and Gellius must remind him that the 
word appears also in the Twelve Tables – that, in fact, Ennius has taken 
it from that source (16.10.5).52 The man sneers at the archaism: ‘I would 
have to explain and interpret this if I had studied the law of the Fauns and 
Aborigines’, he says (16.10.7), arguing that he is only responsible for the 
laws that are currently binding (16.10.8).53 When a passing poet is able to 
easily explain the word, the lesson becomes clear: Latin is the purview of any 
Roman intellectual, a jurist who disdains the Twelve Tables (and, we may 
infer, its accompanying tradition of interpretation and scholarship) will be 
ignorant of the language that is a common cultural property.
 Between 20.1, the virtuoso performance of the rare excellent jurist, and 
20.2, the grammatical assistance offered by a juristic book with which we 
48 20.1.20, for which compare his response to Fronto at 2.26.20.
49 On 20.10, see Holford-Strevens (2003), pp. 127–9 and Keulen (2009), pp. 170–4.
50 Gunderson (2009), pp. 79–84.
51 On 16.10, see most fully Nörr (1976).  See also Gunderson (2009), pp. 157–8.
52 For the plea that a word is outside one’s purview, cf. the grammaticus of 19.10.
53 The allusion to mythic history is familiar from N.A. 1.10 as shorthand for risible obscurity.
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began, we have a complete illustration of Gellius’s relationship with juristic 
knowledge. But if we are in search of an ‘origin story’ for this relationship, 
the necessary coda is 20.10, in which a young Gellius takes a question about 
a legal phrase to a grammaticus. The exchange inverts 16.10: the grammaticus 
claims only to interpret literature, Gellius responds that the phrase appears 
in Ennius, and the grammaticus begs off again:
cum hos ego versus Ennianos dixissem, ‘credo’ inquit grammaticus ‘iam tibi. sed 
tu velim credas mihi Quintum Ennium didicisse hoc non ex poeticae litteris, set 
ex iuris aliquo perito. eas igitur tu quoque’ inquit ‘et discas, unde Ennius didicit.’ 
usus consilio sum magistri [. . .] (20.10.5–6) 
When I had quoted these lines of Ennius, the grammarian said, ‘I believe you now. 
But you believe me when I tell you Quintus Ennius learned this phrase not from 
reading poetry, but from some jurist. Therefore you should go and learn from the 
same source as Ennius’. So I took the teacher’s advice [. . .]
Gellius’s description of the defeated authority as nonetheless a magister 
reminds his reader there is still a lesson to be learned here. And Gellius 
learns it, resolving to append to his discussion ‘what I have learned from 
jurists and their writings’ on the grounds that it is unseemly (non oportet) to 
be ignorant of the meaning of the legal phrases one encounters in everyday 
business (20.10.6). This enquiry too leads us to the Twelve Tables (20.10.8). 
That ancient code, then, and all the study, interpretation and legislation that 
follows with it – collectively, the study of jurisprudence as Gellius believes 
it is best done – bestows a kind of learning that offers not only access to 
common cultural property but also the language and formulae that surround 
one in everyday life, just as Crassus said. This fact is learned fi rst-hand in an 
experience as formative as his fi rst encounter with an unreliable grammaticus 
(6.17).
6. CONCLUSIONS
No small part of the Noctes’s enduring charm for modern readers is 
accounted for by the deft way Gellius builds, cumulatively, his recalled and 
current authorial personae. Piece by piece, we are given glimpses of someone 
with a vague biography but distinct interests, from whom performances of 
and opportunities for learning prompt increasingly recognisable responses. 
And so it is that we know what is going on when we read the following:
edicta veterum praetorum sedentibus forte nobis in bibliotheca templi Traiani 
et aliud quid requirentibus cum in manus incidissent, legere atque cognoscere 
libitum est. (11.17.1) 
The edicts of the ancient praetors just happened to fall into my hands one day 
when I was sitting in the library of Trajan’s temple, looking for something else 
entirely, and it pleased me to read and get to grips with them. 
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This is the very mira quaedam in cognoscendo suavitas et delectatio that Cicero’s 
Crassus assured his audience accompanies legal study (De Oratore 1.193). It 
is not part of the training of an orator; it is, instead, the turn toward author-
ity, the pursuit of ‘immense portraits of antiquity’, that ensures for a man of 
learning, responsibility and legal negotium an awareness of Roman custom, 
values and language throughout history. And it is, in Crassus’s terms, a 
direct encounter with the Roman cultural heritage that has made them the 
rulers of the world.
 Why read jurists in the Noctes? It is very rarely to help answer a legal 
question – those may well have other answers. The question is instead, why 
not read jurists? Why deprive oneself of the impressive antiquarian and 
linguistic learning, the unique insight into values and institutions, and the 
surprising and interesting material that lurks in the pages of Labeo, Capito, 
Sabinus and others? Juristic literature is, in the classic formulation of adver-
tisements for breakfast cereals in the United States, part of this complete diet 
– a distinct and irreplaceable element of a larger intellectual lifestyle for the 
learned gentleman of Antonine Rome. Gellius shows us a library lifestyle 
in which the jurists’ books are available to the curious reader, and indicates 
how they contain the answers to questions as well as the kind of material and 
knowledge with which one can set oneself apart from the herd.
 The jurists understand ancient speech and mos maiorum because these 
are essential to the interpretation of law. Gellius fi xates on this antiquar-
ian quality in jurisprudence and expands it – in spite of the rising tide of 
intellectual professionals, most notably grammatici, who seem to haunt him 
with their restrictive self-defi nition, he knows the disciplines never had 
true boundaries.54 He identifi es a distinction among contemporary jurists 
between those who still regard the Twelve Tables (and accompanying tradi-
tions) as relevant, and those who use the lex Aebutia (16.10.8) as an excuse 
to ignore them; and into that distinction, which might seem like one of 
intra-disciplinary concerns, inserts a provocative and assertive claim to key 
cultural values.55 The right sort of jurists, for various reasons, are those who 
take advantage of the deep and authoritative claim to antiquarian enquiry 
that characterises their profession.
 The elite intellectual gentleman has studied certain disciplines in his edu-
cation, and in his social life has the optional acquaintance of experts in both 
these and others. This generates a wide array of questions with an equally 
wide array of stakes. Gellius is interested to short-circuit certain assump-
tions about which disciplines can answer which questions, and thus the law 
teaches non-legal knowledge as much as non-legal knowledge helps with the 
practice of law. Gellius is perhaps concerned with no moment in one’s intel-
lectual lifestyle more than when a question has arisen and the student’s hand 
54 Harries (2006), p. 180.
55 For the Twelve Tables did not belong to the jurists alone: Harries (2006), p. 172.
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hovers uncertainly in front of the bookshelf. The professional title of the 
author is as poor a guide as the title of the book: a Roman curious about his 
customs or language would do well to reach for a book on law.
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Chapter 3
Artes Urbanae: Roman Law and Rhetoric
Olga Tellegen-Couperus and Jan Willem Tellegen
1. INTRODUCTION
Modern Romanists generally assume that Roman law was completely 
separate from rhetoric. Whereas Roman law was a science, rhetoric was not. 
Rhetoric was a skill developed by the Greeks that was used by advocates 
to pervert the truth. The Roman jurists did not need rhetorical arguments 
to support their case: stat pro ratione auctoritas. They never wanted to have 
 anything to do with rhetoric.1
 In the twentieth century, this view has been challenged several times. 
First Johannes Stroux and later Theodor Viehweg argued – be it in different 
ways – that Roman law was closely connected to rhetoric.2 Their ideas trig-
gered much discussion, but failed to convince the majority of Roman law 
scholars. Over the past ten years or so, we have also tried to demonstrate 
that Roman law and rhetoric were closely connected, but so far, our work 
has not changed the commonly held view either.3 The reason may be that we 
have not yet addressed the basic assumption that Roman law was a science 
and rhetoric was not. We will do so now.
 The assumption that Roman law was a science is based on another sup-
position: that the concept of science, including legal science, already existed 
in classical Antiquity. However, it was only in the sixteenth century that 
legal science as we know it now came into being.4 It originated in the minds 
of the French legal humanists, for example Donellus. In the words of Peter 
Stein, ‘he assumed that Justinian’s law must be logical even though it did 
not appear to be so, and applied himself to identifying what he conceived 
1 Cf. Schulz (1946), p. 54. A more differentiated approach is in Crook (1995), pp. 40–1. 
2 Johannes Stroux, ‘Summum ius summa iniuria, Ein Kapittel aus der Geschichte der interpre-
tatio iuris’ intended for the Festschrift P. Speiser-Sarasin, Leipzig 1926, which never appeared 
in its entirety. The work was reprinted in Römische Rechtswissenschaft und Rhetorik (1949), pp. 
9–66. Viehweg (1974).
3 For instance, in Tellegen-Couperus and Tellegen (2000), pp. 171–202; Tellegen-Couperus 
and Tellegen (2006), pp. 381–408; Tellegen-Couperus and Tellegen (2007), pp. 231–54. It all 
began with Tellegen (1982).
4 Cf. Feldman (2009), pp. 109–20; remarkably, she does not refer to Roman law or rhetoric at 
all.
DU PLESSIS PRINT.indd   31 19/12/2012   16:49
32 New Frontiers
to be its underlying rational structure’.5 In the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries, various orderings of the civil law were made, showing the infl u-
ences of natural law and the Enlightenment. In some countries, for example 
Austria and France, they resulted in codifi cations. The last step was made by 
the founder of the German Historical School, Friedrich Carl von Savigny. 
Focusing on the works of the second-century classical jurists, he tried to 
ascertain the central principles of Roman law and created the new scientifi c 
system of present-day Roman law.6
 When the codifi cations of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries turned 
Roman law into a historical phenomenon, scholars – now called Romanists 
– began to apply this legal system to Roman law as well. Because classical 
Roman law was regarded as the basis of modern private law, it was sup-
posed to share the same rules and principles. However, some of these rules 
and principles did not belong to classical Roman law. At the same time, 
Roman legal practice was familiar with rhetoric, but rhetoric was excluded 
by modern legal science. Consequently, problems arose when legal sources 
like Gaius’ Institutes and Justinian’s Digest were studied. These problems 
were sometimes ‘solved’ by adapting the text to the theory, for instance, 
by declaring words or sentences in the Digest to be sixth-century interpola-
tions.7 Sometimes, however, they were not solved at all because the rhetori-
cal aspects of, for instance, the controversies in the Institutes of Gaius were 
ignored. Problems also arose when so-called rhetorical sources like the pleas 
of Cicero were studied. These problems were solved by regarding the refer-
ences to legal practice as biased and therefore as unreliable. As a result, a 
Roman law was (re)constructed that was not always in accordance with the 
sources.
 In this chapter, we will fi rst discuss the theories put forward by Stroux 
and Viehweg, adding our comment. Then we will deal with the role of 
rhetoric in Gaius’ Institutes and in Justinian’s Digest. We hope to make it 
clear that Roman law was not a science in the modern sense and that law and 
rhetoric belonged together as two sides of the same coin: legal practice.
2. THE THEORIES OF STROUX AND VIEHWEG
Johannes Stroux (1886–1954) was a German classicist and historian. In 1926, 
he published a paper entitled ‘Summum ius summa iniuria, ein Kapitel aus der 
Geschichte der interpretatio iuris’. In the introduction to the paper, Stroux 
described the various stages of legal development in Greek and Roman soci-
ety.8 Originally, there was only the oral tradition of law. In both cultures, 
5 Stein (1999), p. 80.
6 Stein (1999), pp. 104–27.
7 Stein (1999), pp. 128–9.
8 Stroux (1949), pp. 9–12.
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this stage was followed by that of recording law in order to protect it against 
arbitrariness and distortion, as well as against time. Its being unchangeable 
seemed to guarantee the essence of the law, and the interpretation of the law 
necessarily had to serve that purpose. Over time, however, the words of the 
law hardened whereas life went on and society changed. Neither the inter-
pretation of the law by judges nor its application by others could provide 
the much needed innovation. Then, next to the law came equity. In Rome, 
the praetorian edict became the instrument to make aequitas a fundamen-
tal legal principle. According to Stroux, the aphorism summum ius summa 
iniuria, ‘the greatest right is the greatest wrong’, is like a war cry indicating 
that positive law without equity is no law. As such, it was fi rst formulated by 
Cicero, but the idea originated in Greek culture. One could even say that it 
belongs to all times and all places.
 Stroux suggested that it was through Hellenistic philosophies and rheto-
ric that Rome was infl uenced by the idea behind the aphorism summum ius 
summa iniuria. Here, however, the contrast between strict law and equity was 
incorporated into legal practice and, in that way, had stimulated legal devel-
opment.9 Rhetoric provided the means for implementation, particularly the 
so-called status doctrine.
 We know the status doctrine because it is described by Cicero in his De 
inventione but it may have been developed in the second century BCE by the 
Greek rhetorician Hermagoras.10 It basically deals with the question of how 
to defend oneself against an accusation: by focusing on the facts or on the 
law. The latter category is particularly interesting when the words of the law 
are not clear and have to be interpreted. This can happen if the words are 
ambiguous, if the words of the law do not seem to refl ect the intention of 
the lawgiver, if there are two applicable laws that contradict each other, or if 
the words of a law do not refer to a particular case but can be interpreted by 
analogy so that they do. According to Stroux, this system did not only apply 
to the interpretation of laws, but also to wills, stipulations, and other ‘formal 
gefasste rechtsgeschäftliche Willensäusserungen’.11 Stroux presented two 
examples to illustrate how the aphorism summum ius summa iniuria worked 
in legal practice: the famous causa Curiana and Cicero’s speech pro Caecina.12 
In both cases, the status of verba – voluntas was applied. In both cases, the 
jurists argued for an interpretation according to the verba, the orators for the 
voluntas. In both cases, equity won.
 Stroux noticed that Roman jurisprudence then also changed into a legal 
science, and he wondered whether this happened under the infl uence of rhet-
oric as well. In his time, it was generally assumed that the scientifi c approach 
9 Stroux (1949), p. 20.
10 Stroux (1949), pp. 23–40.
11 Stroux (1949), p. 33.
12 Stroux (1949), pp. 42–8.
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to law was provided by Hellenistic philosophy, and particularly by the Stoa. 
Stroux admitted that Stoic philosophy was very infl uential in Rome, but not 
its dialectic. He assumed that rather the New Academy and the Peripatetic 
School supported the development of Roman legal science. Again, rhetoric 
provided the means, as is shown by the methodological work called Topica 
which Cicero wrote for his friend, the jurist Trebatius. By drawing up an 
abstract Topica – that is, a scientifi c theory of argumentation – the orators 
offered the jurists a means to systematise their casuistic opinions.13 Stroux 
concluded that the fact that Justinian’s Corpus Iuris does not contain a com-
prehensive theory of interpretatio iuris does not prove that such a theory 
did not exist in classical Roman law, but that Justinian, in his new codifi ca-
tion, wanted to exclude all signs of interpretation: he even wanted to make 
 interpretation superfl uous.14
There are two comments we would like to make on Stroux’s theory. First, 
we think that Stroux made an important contribution to the rediscovery of 
classical Roman law by connecting rhetoric to law, but we are surprised to 
notice that he still regarded the jurists and the orators as thinking in com-
pletely different ways: the jurists focused on form and the orators focused on 
justice. Second, Stroux was right in assessing that Cicero’s Topica is a method-
ical work that could be helpful to jurists, but he still adhered to the idea that 
the jurists of the late Republic developed a legal science, a ‘Methodenlehre’. 
It was Viehweg who, several decades later, questioned exactly this point, 
whether law could really be organised as a systematic science.
Theodor Viehweg (1907–88) was Professor of Philosophy and Sociology 
of Law at the Johannes Gutenberg University at Mainz, Germany. His 
approach to the relationship between law and rhetoric was very different 
from that of Stroux. In his book Topik und Jurisprudenz, Viehweg ‘con-
trasted the deductive systematic intellectuality that has been infl uential since 
Descartes and the more contextual problem oriented style inherited from 
classical rhetoric’.15 On the basis of examples drawn from two millennia of 
legal history, he concluded that the rhetorical or topical approach is more 
suitable for law. In the context of this chapter, we will focus on the fi rst part 
of his book, where Viehweg dealt with Greek and Roman Antiquity.
Because the concept of topica was practically unknown in his time, 
Viehweg fi rst wanted to discover its meaning and therefore turned to the 
works of Aristotle and Cicero on this subject (§2). He noticed that Aristotle 
did not present his Topica as part of logic but as belonging to dialectics. 
In this work, Aristotle offered a catalogue of ways of reasoning that could 
help in a discussion of any problem whatsoever to draw conclusions from 
sentences that were probably true. Cicero, in his Topica, did not add this 
13 Stroux (1949), pp. 51–2.
14 Stroux (1949), pp. 65–6.
15 Cf. the blurb of the English translation of Viehweg (1993).
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philosophical context but only created a catalogue of arguments that were 
based on probability and that could be used in daily life. Viehweg concluded 
that topica can be described as a techne of problem-oriented thinking that had 
been developed by rhetoric.
Next, Viehweg analysed the concept of topica (§3). He assumed that a 
problem is any question that seems to allow more than one answer, and that 
only relevant questions need to be answered. The problem is brought into 
the context of a more or less explicit and extensive deduction from which 
the answer is inferred. This context can be called a system. In short, solving 
a problem involves classing it into a system. If an attempt is made to solve a 
problem by focusing on system A, then only some problems can be solved, 
the others cannot: they will no longer be regarded as real problems. If, on 
the other hand, an attempt is made to solve a problem by focusing on the 
problem, systems A, B, C and so on may be taken into consideration. Topoi 
are points of view that can help when choosing a particular system or way of 
reasoning. Some topoi can be used to solve all sorts of problems; others are 
particularly suited to solving legal problems.
Viehweg then turned to the Roman ius civile. ‘It is well known’, he wrote, 
‘that ius civile [Roman law] is rather disappointing to deductive systematiz-
ers’ (§4). The texts in the Digest, for instance, belong to contexts that are 
problem-oriented rather than system-based. Consequently, the concepts 
and rules developed by the ius civile cannot be readily systematised; they 
must be understood to form part of topical thinking. Topica tends to collect 
points of view and summarise them in catalogues. Ius civile did the same, for 
law. The jurists proceeded to formulate propositions that could be used as 
topoi. According to Viehweg, the so-called regulae provide a good example of 
such propositions. At times, they were collected and summarised. Viehweg 
thought that the last section of the Digest, book D.50.17, constituted such a 
catalogue.
Can Roman law be problem-oriented and still be qualifi ed as a science? 
Viehweg used the Aristotelian distinction between techne (art) and episteme 
(science) to answer this question; he concluded that the Roman jurists 
themselves regarded ius as an art. In his view, jurists and orators applied the 
same method of working which derived from Aristotle’s dialectics. Viehweg 
stressed that the latter had nothing to do with Stoic dialectics which were 
closely connected to the mathematic intellectuality of Antiquity: in the 
structure of the ius civile, no trace of the Stoic Chrysippus can be found.16
Viehweg went several steps further than Stroux in connecting law and 
rhetoric. In our view, he demonstrated convincingly that Roman law was 
characterised by a problem-oriented way of working, and that the jurists 
and the orators applied the same topical approach. However, we have two 
16 Viehweg may not have noticed that Cicero, in Topica 54, refers to the Stoic dialectics; see the 
comment by H. M. Hubbell in his translation of Cicero’s Topica (1976), p. 422.
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points of criticism; both regard his connecting topica and Roman law. First, 
Viehweg did not see that Cicero’s Topica cannot really be compared to that 
of Aristotle, let alone be qualifi ed as inferior. As Robert Gaines has demon-
strated, it contains various ways of fi nding arguments ordered in a systematic 
way meant for legal practice.17 Secondly, Viehweg was wrong in qualifying 
the regulae as topoi of Roman law. They are concrete precedents rather than 
abstract ways of reasoning.18 In our view, it is certainly possible to fi nd topoi 
in legal sources like Gaius’ Institutes and Justinian’s Digest. In the following 
two sections, we will apply Viehweg’s theory to these sources.
3. LEGAL SCIENCE AND RHETORIC IN GAIUS’ INSTITUTES
If the Roman jurists had created a legal science that was independent from 
rhetoric, it must be possible to fi nd traces of a scientifi c system in the legal 
literature of the classical period. However, this is not so simple. Our main 
source of information for classical Roman law is Justinian’s Digest, but the 
framework of that source does not really correspond to what in modern 
times is regarded as a system. We will return to the Digest in the next section. 
There is, however, another source that did seem to refl ect the system of 
Roman law and to exclude rhetoric: the Institutes of Gaius.
Gaius’ Institutes, an elementary textbook of Roman law, was written in 
the second century.19 It was structured in a simple way, dividing the law into 
‘persons’, ‘things’ and ‘actions’. About the author, Gaius, we know next to 
nothing. The textbook must have been popular because various later edi-
tions have been published and because sections have been quoted in the 
fl orilegia of the fourth and fi fth centuries and in Justinian’s Digest of the 
sixth century. It was even used as a model by the Byzantine law professors 
when Justinian ordered them to compose a new textbook, the (Justinianic) 
Institutes. However, for many centuries after the fall of the Roman Empire, 
the work itself was not available.
The fi rst complete manuscript of Gaius’ Institutes was discovered in 
Verona in 1816, by B. G. Niebuhr. Before that time, Roman law had been 
studied for more than six centuries on the basis of Justinian’s Digest, Codex, 
and Institutes.20 As was pointed out in the introduction to this chapter, the 
sixteenth century had witnessed the rise of legal science based on the Corpus 
Iuris Civilis. The rediscovery of Gaius’ Institutes, therefore, took place 
17 Gaines (2002), pp. 445–80, particularly pp. 469–76.
18 For instance, the regula about expenses and assets of something (D.50.17.10) (Paul. 3 ad Sab.): 
Secundum naturam est, commoda cuiusque rei eum sequi, quem sequentur incommoda) may form 
a proposition in a specifi c form of reasoning, whereas topoi as presented by Cicero contain 
general points of view like the argument of time, cause and effect, authority, and so on.
19 See Gordon and Robinson (1988), pp. 7–13. 
20 As of the fi fteenth century, these books came to be called Corpus Iuris Civilis, as opposed to 
the Corpus Iuris Canonici. 
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after, in countries like France and Austria, the new codifi cations had been 
introduced and, in the German Länder, Savigny had just begun to create ‘das 
heutige römische Recht’. It will be clear that the rediscovery of Gaius’ Institutes 
caused a shock among the Romanists. The text was partly familiar to them 
through the Institutes of Justinian. However, it was also partly new because 
it referred to legal concepts and procedures that no longer existed in the sixth 
century and that had been left out of Justinian’s Institutes. Therefore, Gaius’ 
Institutes provided a lot of new information on Roman law and its history.
There were two major issues in Gaius’ Institutes that puzzled the 
Romanists. First, the system of Roman law that had been developed over the 
centuries and that was based on the division of rights in rem (dominium and 
iura in re aliena) and rights in personam (obligations) could not really be recog-
nised in the work of Gaius. And yet, it should be there. Secondly, through-
out his textbook, Gaius mentioned approximately twenty controversies 
between leading Roman jurists which referred to as many unsolved legal 
problems. If the Roman jurists had created a system that could provide the 
one correct solution for every legal problem, there could not have been con-
troversies, let alone in a law textbook. In the following, we will fi rst analyse 
how the Romanists have tried to solve the system-related problem and give 
our comment. Then we will discuss the problem of the controversies and 
show that it can be solved by connecting it to rhetoric.
The system of Roman law in Gaius’ Institutes
In his Römische Rechtsgeschichte, Max Kaser, one of the leading Romanists 
of the twentieth century, described the essence of legal science. In his view, 
it was the development of legal concepts that are well determined as to 
content and clearly separated from each other, and that are ordered and 
linked together in a logical system.21 Under the infl uence of the Greek dia-
lectical method, the Roman jurists had developed such concepts and such a 
system, but their way of working had remained casuistic. The one exception 
to this rule was Gaius. In his Institutes, he divided the subject matter into 
personae and res, that is, into legal subjects and legal objects, or, into the law 
of persons (including family law) and the law of property (Vermögensrecht). 
The subdivision of things into res corporales and res incorporales gave the fi rst 
impulse to dividing the law of property into things, inheritance and obliga-
tions. This fi rst step towards a system can still be traced in the codifi cations 
of our day, according to Kaser.
It is clear that the essential element for Gaius’ Institutes is the subdivi-
sion of things into res corporales and res incorporales. In 2.13, Gaius describes 
21 Kaser (1967), p. 164: ‘Zum Wesen einer solchen gehört die Entwicklung inhaltlich genau 
bestimmter und von einander abgegrenzter juristischer Begriffe und ihre Ordnung und 
Abstimmung aufeinander in einem von der Sachlogik bestimmten System’.
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 corporeal things as tangible things, such as land, a slave, a garment, gold, 
silver, and so on. In the next section, Gaius describes the incorporeal things:22
Incorporeal are things that are intangible, such as exist merely in court, for 
example an inheritance, a usufruct, obligations however contracted. It does not 
matter that corporeal things are comprised in an inheritance, or that the fruits 
gathered from land (subject to a usufruct) are corporeal, or that what is due under 
an obligation is commonly corporeal, for instance land, a slave, money; for the 
rights of inheritance, usufruct, and obligation themselves are incorporeal [. . .]
In modern Romanist literature, it is assumed that the word res and therefore 
also the distinction between res corporales and res incorporales refers to legal 
objects. However, this distinction is commonly regarded as illogical. The 
res corporales would be legal objects, that is, objects of ownership. However, 
ownership is a right. Therefore, the right must be identifi ed with the object, 
and ownership must be regarded as a res corporalis. The res incorporales should 
be legal objects, too, but then it would be unclear what the objects were. 
This problem was solved by regarding the res incorporales as (subjective) 
rights.23 Consequently, the phrase ‘quae in iure consistunt’ in the fi rst line of 
Inst. 2.14, is translated by most scholars as ‘that exist in a right’.24 With the 
distinction between res corporales and res incorporales, Gaius was supposed to 
have referred to the distinction between dominium and iura in re aliena. In 
other words, he had done a bad job. 
In our view, this interpretation is rather far-fetched.25 It goes wrong at the 
22 Inst.Gai. 2.14: Incorporales sunt, quae tangi non possunt, qualia sunt ea, quae [in] iure 
consistunt, sicut hereditas ususfructus obligationes quoquo modo contractae. Nec ad rem 
per[tinet quod in hereditate res corporales con]tinentur, et fructus, qui ex fundo percipiun-
tur, corporales sunt, et quod ex aliqua obligatione nobis debetur, id plerumque corporale 
est veluti fundus homo pecunia: nam ipsum ius successionis et ipsum ius utendi fruendi et 
ipsum ius obligationis incorporale est: text edition by David (1964), p. 36. Our translation is 
based on that by de Zulueta (1946), p. 69. The main difference is the translation of in iure in 
the fi rst line as ‘in court’. In the following, we will explain why we prefer this translation.
23 It is interesting to see how, in the past 100 years, this distinction has been dealt with in text-
books of Roman law. They all interpret res incorporales as (subjective) rights, but all have prob-
lems explaining the distinction. See, for instance, Salkowski (1898), p. 204; van Oven (1948), 
p. 138; Arangio Ruiz (1960, repr. 1978), pp. 162–3; Jolowicz and Nicholas (1972), p. 412; 
Villers (1977), p. 253; Kaser (1989), p. 90; Borkowski and du Plessis (2005), pp. 153–4,  (2010, 
4th edn), pp. 151–2). Some think it originated in Greek grammar and/or philosophy. Two do 
not mention the distinction at all, namely Schulz (1951) and de Francisci (1968).
24 Some scholars translate it as ‘that exist in law’. This phrase caused a lot of discussion, partic-
ularly because it is not quite certain that the phrase contained the preposition ‘in’. According 
to David and Nelson (1954–68), p. 240, it did. For an overview and renewed discussion, see 
Nicosia (2009), pp. 821–35.
25 In this vein, see Tellegen (1994), pp. 35–55. According to Bretone (1999), p. 284, this inter-
pretation is ‘fantasiosa’. For us, however, it would be fanciful to explain that res means some-
thing other than ‘things’, let alone that Gaius would use it to refer to ‘legal objects’ as well as 
‘subjective rights’.
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very beginning, with the assumption that the concepts personae and res are to 
be interpreted as referring to legal subjects and legal objects, respectively. We 
think they do not. In the fi rst book of his Institutes, Gaius describes the three 
categories of status that refer to persons (freedom, citizenship and family) 
and how a person’s status can change. He does not describe the capacity of a 
person to perform a legally valid act or to have property. Consequently, the 
word personae cannot mean ‘legal subjects’ but only ‘persons’.
In the second and third books, Gaius deals with the res. At the begin-
ning of book II, he mentions a number of distinctions of things, all the time 
explaining why a particular distinction is relevant. He does not describe 
what qualifi es as a legal object. Gaius defi nes the res corporales as things that 
can be touched, and the res incorporales as things that cannot be touched but 
that exist in iure. The relevance of this distinction is explained in Inst 2.28: 
incorporeal things cannot be transferred by tradition, the informal way of 
transferring property, but only by means of in iure cessio. This legal concept, 
however, originated in the law of procedure. For a proper understanding of 
the distinction between res corporales and res incorporales, it must be borne 
in mind that, in his Institutes, Gaius did not only deal with personae and res, 
but also with actiones. In our view, this distinction can only be explained in 
its context, that is, in connection with the in iure cessio as part of the Roman 
law of procedure.
The in iure cessio begins like a normal procedure per formulas before the 
praetor, when the plaintiff claims the usufruct (or another res incorporalis) 
from the defendant. This phase of the procedure is called ‘in iure’. The 
praetor asks the defendant whether he also claims the usufruct. The defend-
ant may keep silent or indicate that he does not do so. Then the praetor will 
assign the usufruct to the plaintiff and a transfer of the usufruct will have 
taken place. The defendant can also indicate that he does want to claim 
the usufruct; then the praetor may grant a formula, and a regular trial (apud 
iudicem) may follow. In short, res incorporales can be the object of a transfer 
and of a procedure.
The procedure to claim the usufruct makes it clear that, in this connec-
tion, the word res cannot be taken to mean ‘rights’. The formula of a vindicatio 
ususfructus was based on that of the reivindicatio (to claim dominium, prop-
erty) but it was slightly adapted. Let us compare both formulae. According to 
the reconstruction of Lenel, the formula of the reivindicatio ran as follows:26
X must be judge. If it appears that the thing at stake belongs to Aulus Agerius 
according to the ius Quiritium, and if this thing has not been restituted by the order 
26 Lenel (1927), pp. 185–6. ‘Iudex esto. Si paret rem qua de agitur ex iure Quiritium Auli Agerii 
esse neque ea res arbitrio iudicis Aulo Agerio restituetur, quanti ea res erit, tantam pecuniam 
iudex Numerium Negidium Aulo Agerio condemnato, si non paret absolvito’. In the pattern 
formula, the name of the plaintiff is always given as Aulus Agerius, and that of the defendant 
as Numerius Negidius. The translation of this formula is our own.
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of the judge to Aulus Agerius, then the judge must condemn Numerius Negidius 
to pay so much money to Aulus Agerius as this thing is worth. If it does not 
appear, then he must absolve him.
The formula of the vindicatio ususfructus is:27
X must be judge. If it appears that Aulus Agerius has the right of usufruct on that 
land that is at stake and if this thing has not been restituted to Aulus Agerius, 
then the judge must condemn Numerius Negidius to pay so much money to 
Aulus Agerius as this thing is worth, if it does not appear then he must absolve 
him.
In the fi rst part of the reivindicatio, the thing that is claimed is referred to 
as res, a res corporalis. In the vindicatio ususfructus, however, the thing that 
is claimed is referred to as ius, that is, the right of usufruct that rests on 
someone else’s land. In the latter part of the formula, the word res is used, 
but then it indicates the thing at stake, the res incorporalis. Apparently, the 
words ius and res are used as synonyms. By adapting the formula, it became 
possible to claim a usufruct in court. Consequently, the word res in Gaius 
Inst. 2.12–14 cannot be taken to mean ‘rights’.
Now the meaning of the phrase ‘quae in iure consistunt’ becomes clear: 
it refers to the fi rst part of the formulary procedure, before the praetor, 
which is called in iure. The res incorporales only exist in iure, ‘in court’. Gaius 
did a good job when he added this explanation: it helped to clarify a simple 
 distinction which he made for his elementary textbook.
The fundamental mistake made by modern Romanists is their assumption 
that Gaius is dealing with subjective rights. This concept was unknown to 
Gaius; it originated only between the fourteenth and sixteenth centuries.28 
Gaius, and the other Roman jurists for that matter, had a completely differ-
ent way of thinking than present-day civil-law jurists. It must be concluded 
that Gaius’ Institutes did not refl ect the system of subjective rights of 
modern civil law and that the system that was used does not qualify as legal 
science in the modern sense.
The controversies in Gaius’ Institutes
The second issue that puzzled the Romanists was the twenty or so contro-
versies mentioned in Gaius’ Institutes. These controversies existed between 
the two law schools that had emerged in Rome in the early Principate, the 
27 Lenel (1927), p. 190: ‘Iudex esto. Si paret Aulo Agerio ius esse eo fundo qua de agitur uti 
frui neque ea res arbitrio iudicis Aulo Agerio restituetur, quanti ea res erit, tantam pecuniam 
iudex Numerium Negidium Aulo Agerio condemnato, si non paret absolvito’.
28 Villey (1946–7), pp. 201–27. According to the same author, it was William of Ockham who 
fi rst introduced the concept of subjective right. Feenstra (1989), pp. 111–22 suggests it was 
Donellus.
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Sabinian or Cassian school and the Proculian school.29 The leaders of these 
schools defended opposite positions over several points of private law. How 
could they do so, if there was only one correct solution to a legal problem? 
Moreover, the jurists in question gave arguments to support their opin-
ions. Why would they do so if they normally did not because, according to 
Schulz, stat pro ratione auctoritas? The leaders of the schools may have had 
the ius respondendi ex auctoritate principis and will have had a lot of authority. 
Finally, some of these controversies were solved by a compromise, a media 
sententia. How could such a solution be fi tted into a system that allowed only 
one correct solution?
Ever since the discovery of the manuscript of the Institutes, dozens of 
scholars have tried to solve the problem of the controversies. Most of 
them did so from a dogmatic perspective on Roman law, trying to fi nd one 
overall interpretation that could bring the controversies within the system 
of Roman law. However, they did not succeed in fi nding one interpretation 
that could explain all the controversies. They have not adapted their way of 
working until recently. 
A few years ago, Tessa Leesen wrote a monograph about the controversies 
in Roman law.30 She suggested that they could be explained by connecting 
them to rhetoric. Her main thesis was that jurists, like orators and lawyers, 
made use of the art of rhetoric, and of its argumentative theory, the topica 
as developed by Cicero and Quintilian, to make their opinions persuasive. 
By analysing the twenty-one controversies in Gaius’ Institutes, she was able 
to demonstrate how, in these cases, the jurists used topical arguments to 
support their view. There was not one correct solution, but the opinions 
of both jurists could be defended without one of them losing his integrity. 
We will give one example that is discussed by Leesen, namely, that of the 
 controversy on specifi catio mentioned in Gaius, Inst. 2.79:31
On a change of species also, we have recourse to naturalis ratio. If, therefore, you 
have made wine, or oil, or grain from my grapes, olives, or ears of corn, the ques-
tion is asked whether this wine, oil, or grain is mine or yours. In like manner, if 
you have made some vase of my gold or silver or if you have constructed a boat, 
or a cupboard, or a bench from my planks. In like manner, if you have made a 
garment from my wool or if you have made mead from my wine and honey or if 
you have a plaster or an ointment from my drugs, the question is asked whether 
what you have thus made from my material is yours or is mine. Some think that 
the material and the substance have to be taken into consideration, that is, the 
manufactured article is considered to belong to the owner of the material. And 
29 In modern literature, the very raison d’être of the law schools is also controversial, cf. Stein 
(1999), p. 17, but see also Tellegen-Couperus (1990), pp. 95–7.
30 Leesen (2010).
31 Leesen (2010), pp. 70–90. For the Latin text here and in the following, see http://www.
TheLatinLibrary.com (accessed 13 February 2012) under Ius Romanum.
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this opinion is above all preferred by Sabinus and Cassius. Others, however, think 
that the object belongs to him who created it; this is the view held above all by the 
authorities of the other school. However, they also think that he who owned the 
material and the substance has the actio furti against him who stole it and also a 
condictio against the same person because, although it is no longer possible to bring 
a vindicatio when things have perished, they may be the object of a condictio against 
thieves and certain other possessors.
The text forms part of a discussion on the different means of acquisition 
of ownership based on naturalis ratio. The fi rst example has become classic: 
When somebody (A) makes wine by processing the grapes of somebody 
else (B) without mutual agreement, a problem of ownership arises: does 
the owner of the grapes (B) or the maker of the wine (A) become owner of 
the wine? The owner of the grapes will claim ownership of the wine from the 
maker who is in possession, and he will do so by means of a reivindicatio. The 
Sabinians supported B’s claim, the Proculians defended the view that A had 
become the owner. 
Gaius does not explicitly mention the arguments used by the Sabinians 
and the Proculians, but they have come down to us via the Digest in the 
second book of the so-called Res Cottidiana sive aurea, a fourth-century 
version of Gaius’ Institutes. The relevant text, D.41.1.7.7, runs as follows:
When someone has made for himself something from another’s material, Nerva 
and Proculus think that the maker owns that thing, because what has been made 
previously belonged to no one. Sabinus and Cassius rather think that the naturalis 
ratio requires that the person who has been the owner of the material also becomes 
the owner of what is made from his material, since nothing can be made without 
the material: if, for example, I make some vase from gold, silver or bronze, or a 
garment from your wool, or mead from your wine and honey, or a plaster or an 
ointment from your drugs or wine, oil or grain from your grapes, olives or ears 
of corn. Nevertheless, there is also a media sententia of those who correctly think 
that, if the thing can be returned to its material, the better view is that propounded 
by Cassius and Sabinus. If it cannot be returned, Nerva and Proculus are sounder. 
Thus, for example, a fi nished vase can be returned to its raw mass of gold or silver 
or bronze. It is not possible, however, to return wine, oil or grain to grapes and 
olives and ears of corn. Neither can mead be returned to honey and wine or plas-
ters or ointment to drugs. It seems to me, however, that some have said correctly 
that there should be no doubt that the grain, shaken from someone’s ears of corn, 
belongs to him whom the ears of corn have come from. For since the grain, that 
is contained in the ears of corn, has its own perfect form, the one who has shaken 
out the ears of corn does not make a new form. But he uncovers what already 
exists.
This text shows that both schools base their claim on the naturalis ratio, so 
there is no fundamental difference.
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In the course of time, various explanations of this controversy have 
been offered. The most typical one is that based on philosophy: it has been 
argued that the Sabinians were infl uenced by the Stoa and the Proculians by 
Aristotle and the Peripatos. Other scholars explained it by the conservative-
progressive antithesis, some stating that the Sabinians were conservative and 
the Proculians progressive, others that it was the other way around.
According to Leesen, both the Proculians and the Sabinians used topical 
arguments. Cicero’s Topica and particularly Quintilian’s Institutio oratoria 
helped her fi nd the relevant topoi or, in Latin, loci. She reconstructed the 
reasoning of the Proculians with the locus ab adiunctis:
– What has been made did previously not belong to anyone.
– Therefore what someone never had, he has not lost. 
– B is the owner of the material, i.e. the grapes.
– Therefore, B cannot vindicate the nova species, i.e., the wine.
The Sabinians used the locus ex causis to support their argument: 
– Since nothing can be made without the material,
–  the ownership of a nova species (e.g. wine, oil, or grain) must be granted to the 
owner of the materia (i.e. to the owner of the grapes, olives, or ears of corn).
– B is the owner of the material.
– Therefore, B is the owner of the nova species.
In D.41.1.7.7, the media sententia is mentioned that was supposed to be 
a compromise between the two positions. If a thing has been made from 
some material but cannot be reduced to its material, then the opinion of 
the Proculians must be followed and the thing be regarded as belonging to 
the maker. However, this compromise is not very convincing because it is 
equally reasonable to state that the material is still present in the nova species 
and that therefore the wine belongs to the owner of the material. Yet it was 
this media sententia that was approved by Justinian and was included in his 
Institutes (Inst 2.1.25).
In this and other controversies, the leaders of the Sabinian and the 
Proculian schools defended two opposite positions on a legal problem 
with arguments offered by rhetoric, that is, with topical arguments. Both 
positions were reasonable. The controversies were included by Gaius in 
his elementary textbook on Roman law. For him, and for his students, the 
 relationship between Roman law and rhetoric was a matter of course.
4. LEGAL SCIENCE AND RHETORIC IN JUSTINIAN’S DIGEST
Justinian’s Digest is generally regarded as refl ecting the culmination of 
Roman legal thought. It contains fi fty books divided into titles. Each title 
consists of texts taken from the work of one or more jurists who lived in 
a period ranging from about 100 BCE to 250 CE. In these texts, the jurists 
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 summarise legal problems and indicate how they should be solved, some-
times also referring to other jurists who do or do not hold the same opinion. 
The works of the classical jurists have not been preserved; we know them 
because they were included in collections made between the fourth and sixth 
centuries, the most important one being the Digest.
On 15 December 530, Emperor Justinian I ordered his Minister of Justice, 
Tribonian, to make a compilation of classical Roman law.32 In the Byzantine 
Empire, the writings of the classical jurists were still used to support or 
deny legal claims but the content and authenticity of the texts were often 
dubious. The new collection, the Digest, was intended to solve that problem. 
Tribonian and a dozen experts were given wide powers: they were allowed 
to select texts that were suitable for inclusion, to delete superfl uous and out-
dated elements, and to solve contradictions. To structure the collection, they 
used the same order that had been used by the classical jurists themselves, 
that of the praetorian edict. 
Since the second century BCE, when the new praetor urbanus started his 
year of offi ce, he published an edict in which he announced for what types 
of claims he would allow a procedure, and how such claims and possible 
defences could be worded in a formula.33 In the course of time, the edicts 
had grown into a body of law that was ordered more or less according to the 
formulary procedure. No edict has come down to us, but from the time of 
S. Sulpicius Rufus, a prominent jurist of the late Republic, the jurists used 
the edict as a frame of reference to order their opinions. They published 
their collections under the title Digesta, Responsa, Quaestiones, and the like.34 
In the third century, the formulary procedure was replaced by imperial 
jurisdiction, but the substantive law remained applicable. Therefore, it made 
sense for Tribonian and his compilers to use the structure of the edict for 
ordering the opinions of the classical jurists. 
As we described in the previous section, the jurists of modern times pre-
ferred the structure of Gaius’ Institutes to create a new system of Roman 
law. However, Roman law as described in Justinian’s Digest was regarded 
as the high point of Roman legal science. The question then arose how it 
could be established that Roman law was a science. This is the subject of the 
famous monograph by Franz Horak, Rationes decidendi, published in 1969.35 
In this book, Horak discusses some 300 texts in order to ascertain whether 
Roman law was a science. Horak adheres to the commonly held view that 
rhetoric is irrelevant in this context. 
In the following, we will fi rst summarise Horak’s view, adding our 
32 See Tellegen-Couperus (1990), pp. 141–4.
33 On the formulary procedure and the activities of the jurists, see Tellegen-Couperus (1990), 
pp. 53–62.
34 On the basis of these works, Lenel (1927) has been able to reconstruct the praetorian edict.
35 Horak (1969). The second part has never been published.
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 comments. Then we will discuss a Digest text that, in his view, ‘proves’ the 
scientifi c character of Roman law. We will demonstrate that it does not do 
so and that it can only be properly explained by connecting it to rhetoric.
Legal science in Justinian’s Digest 
Whereas Kaser in his defi nition of legal science only mentioned the exist-
ence of a dogmatic system, Horak also required a context of justifi cation 
(Begründungszusammenhang). He described justifi cation as a combination of 
sentences that are connected in such a way that one is considered explicitly 
as a logical consequence of the other. This connection may exist because a 
conclusion is drawn from a premise, or because one sentence is connected 
with another, argumentative one. Horak took into account only those moti-
vations that were explicitly qualifi ed as such. In his view, there is a constant 
interaction between the system and the justifi cation.
According to Horak, it was essential to distinguish the context of justi-
fi cation from the context of discovery. The latter concept serves to fi nd an 
argument, and particularly requires intuition. The former serves to prove a 
logical reasoning to be correct. For legal science, only the context of justifi -
cation is relevant. Nowadays, however, there is a tendency to involve facts 
and values in legal reasoning, for instance by using analogy, so that law can 
only partially be regarded as a science. In this connection, Horak discussed 
Viehweg’s book.
There are various reasons why Horak disagreed with Viehweg. One of 
them is that Viehweg does not distinguish between the context of justifi ca-
tion and the context of discovery. As a result, he applies topica to an indis-
criminate range of cases and veils the contrast between legal understanding 
and normative legal policy. According to Horak, Aristotle’s Topica and 
its historical derivations hardly contribute to scientifi c understanding as a 
method to fi nd an argument, and do not do so at all as a method to prove a 
logical argument to be correct or not.
The main part of Horak’s book consists of the analysis of about 300 texts 
dating from the late Republic that contain some form of argumentation. 
They are divided into two groups. In the fi rst group, the argumentation con-
sists of deduction from a certain premise, for instance the application of a 
general or individual legal norm, the conclusion from a legal rule, or deduc-
tion from a certain legal concept. In the second group, the argumentation is 
not so clear. Here, for instance, the premise is uncertain or the deduction is 
not compelling like arguing from analogy. Only for the fi rst category can the 
rationes decidendi be qualifi ed as scientifi c. Therefore, Roman law can only 
partially be regarded as a science. Although Horak does not want to draw a 
general conclusion from texts that only belong to the late Republic, he sug-
gests that the Roman jurists reached the same scientifi c level as jurists of our 
day.
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We would like to make a few comments on Horak’s monograph. First, 
Horak regarded two elements as essential requirements for establishing the 
existence of a legal science: a kind of system and a context of justifi cation; he 
analyses the texts as to the context of justifi cation, but he does not specify 
the system of Roman law. Second, we doubt whether it really makes sense to 
distinguish between the context of justifi cation and the context of discovery 
in connection with topoi; the topos is relevant not only to law-fi nding but also 
to justify a decision, a rule or a subsumption.36 Third, just like Viehweg, 
Horak dramatically underestimated Cicero’s Topica. In the previous section, 
we demonstrated that the controversies described in Gaius’ Institutes could 
only be explained by connecting them to topical argumentation.
In the following, we will try to assess whether Horak’s conclusion about 
the scientifi c character of Roman law is correct. Horak dealt with the 300 or 
so texts in an order beginning with the one that provides the best evidence of 
the scientifi c character of Roman law, and ending with the one that is least fi t 
to do so. In the context of this chapter, we want to discuss one of his texts. It 
seems to make sense to focus on the very fi rst one.
Legal reasoning in D.43.19.3pr
The fi rst category of texts discussed by Horak consists of those that include 
justifi cations by applying a legal norm. Horak qualifi ed this category as the 
most obvious way of justifi cation for the modern lawyer, since it is a simple 
subsumption under a general or individual norm. In the late Republic, there 
were not as many laws as there are today, so the Roman jurists did not have 
much to do in the way of justifi cation by simple subsumption. Consequently, 
this fi rst category includes but a few texts and has hardly anything attractive 
to offer as to law.
For the fi rst category, justifi cations by applying a general norm, Horak 
admits that it has been diffi cult to fi nd suitable texts. Indeed, there is only 
one that qualifi es: D.43.19.3pr:37
Ulpian in book 70 Edict. Hence, also Labeo writes as follows: If you have right-
fully been having the use of a road from me, and I sell the farm through which the 
road you used went, and then the buyer prohibits you, then even if you are held to 
have used it by stealth from him (for whoever uses a road when prohibited, uses it 
by stealth), the interdict is still available to you within a year, because in this year 
you will have used it not by force or stealth or precarium.
Digest title D.43.19 deals with the edictal clause about the private right of 
way in person and with cattle. It consists mainly of texts taken from the 70th 
book of Ulpian’s commentary on the praetorian edict. In this text, Ulpian 
36 In the same vein, Wieacker (1970), pp. 339–55, particularly p. 352; Honoré (1973), p. 59. 
37 Translation from Watson (1985). 
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quotes Labeo, a jurist who lived at the time of Emperor Augustus. The facts 
are relatively simple. Plaintiff A claims to have a right of way through his 
neighbour’s land. The previous neighbour has sold the land to B, probably 
without telling him about the servitude. When B sees A walking on his land, 
he forbids him to do so. A turns to the praetor and asks him to grant the 
interdict De itinere actuque privato. It is granted, but the new neighbour does 
not comply, and a trial follows.
The interdictum De itinere actuque privato was a praetorian remedy prohib-
iting interference with rights of way. It protected anyone who, in the year 
before the interdict was issued, had used the way not by force or stealth or 
precario.38 In the opening text of title D.43.19, it is formulated as follows:39
The Praetor says: I forbid the use of force to prevent you from using the private 
right of way in person or with cattle that is in question, which you have used this 
year not by force or stealth or precario from him.
According to Horak, the interdict posed a general norm and the only thing 
the jurist Labeo had to do was subsume the facts under this norm. The only 
condition for applying the interdict would be that the plaintiff had used the 
right without force, stealth or precario during the previous year, even if he 
had done so only during a short time. Later wrongful use did not exclude the 
interdict. This is Horak’s interpretation of the case.
In our view, this is not simply a case of subsumption. If so, it would not 
have been necessary to interpret the wording of the interdict. However, the 
wording is not clear. When is someone acting clam, with stealth? How is the 
time limit of one year to be understood? Labeo admits that someone who 
is using the servitude after the owner has prohibited him from doing so is 
acting clam. Still, he argues that the interdict should protect that person. The 
time limit of one year is vague but Labeo does not specify whether even a 
short time within that year is suffi cient. Here, Horak refers to Ulpian who, 
in another text, argued that even a short time like thirty days would be suf-
fi cient. Apparently, the words ‘with stealth’ and ‘in this year’ were subject 
to discussion.
In the procedure, both parties would have presented arguments to 
support their views. A claimed that B should stop hindering him from using 
the right of way because, in the past year, he had used it nec vi nec clam nec 
precario. B could put forward two arguments. First, he could deny that the 
interdict was applicable because, after he had forbidden A to use the road 
38 Precarium was a contract consisting of the gratuitous grant of the enjoyment of land or mov-
ables, the grantor being able to terminate the arrangement at any time. Cf. Borkowski and du 
Plessis (2005), p. 309, (2010, 4th edn), p. 308.
39 D.43.19.1pr: ‘Praetor ait: Quo itinere actuque [privato], quo de agitur, [vel via] hoc anno 
nec vi nec clam nec precario ab illo usus es, quo minus ita utaris, vim fi eri veto’. Translation 
based on Watson (1985). 
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through his farm, A had still done so and therefore had acted with stealth. 
Second, he could state that the interdict should not be taken literally. During 
the previous year, A had hardly used the road or not at all and it would be 
unreasonable to let him be protected by the interdict. The purpose of the 
interdict was to protect the use of a servitude on a regular basis.
A could reply to the second argument that the interdict does not specify 
a minimum time limit for using the interdict, and that it therefore should 
be applied in his case. Moreover, what is ‘a minimum’? A could refer to the 
paradox of the sorites introduced by the Greek philosopher Eubulides;40 it 
was not until 200 years later that Ulpian fi xed it at thirty days. It was more 
diffi cult for A to refute B’s fi rst argument; even Labeo himself had to admit 
that. However, Labeo succeeded to convince the judge that the words of the 
interdict allowed it to be granted to A. 
From the above, it is clear that the interdict in question does not provide 
a certain premise and that Labeo’s text does not present a case of subsump-
tion. The interdict was interpreted by one party according to the letter, by 
the other party according to the intention. In terms of the status theory of 
rhetoric, the status scriptum – sententia was used. The text therefore does not 
present a case of legal science.
5. CONCLUSION
If we are right to suppose that Roman law was not a science in the modern 
sense and that it was closely connected to rhetoric, then new fi elds of 
research open up. The accepted method of researching Roman law will 
change. It is no longer necessary to (re)construct the system of Roman law as 
has been done over the past fi ve centuries or to try to accommodate opinions 
of jurists that seem to deviate from the regular pattern. It is no longer neces-
sary to try to explain why the same jurist had a different opinion in another, 
similar case. It is no longer necessary to keep Cicero out of the way.
What remains is the notion that the Roman jurists reached a remark-
ably high level of sophistication in creating law. However, it will now be 
interesting to discover how they argued legal problems from both sides; 
in the Digest, there are a number of texts showing such discussions. It will 
be interesting to see whether so-called rhetorical sources can contribute to 
understanding the development of Roman law. Unfortunately, it will hardly 
be possible to assess whether the actual presentation of a point of view in a 
trial infl uenced the outcome: a bad actio could completely undermine a good 
legal argument, and vice versa.
It will be necessary to acquire some knowledge about the various rhetori-
cal systems that were taught to young Romans belonging to the upper class, 
40 Döring (1998), p. 211. The sorites paradox is mentioned by Cic. Acad. 2.49: ‘[B]y adding a 
single grain at a time they make a heap’.
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some of whom we now know as jurists. Here is a problem, for there is not 
much literature on classical rhetoric, particularly not on rhetoric in a legal 
context.41 But a problem can be regarded as a challenge, and we hope this 
chapter may inspire scholars to take it up and study Roman law from a legal 
and rhetorical perspective.
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Chapter 4
The Senatus Consultum Silanianum: Court Decisions 
and Judicial Severity in the Early Roman Empire
Jill Harries
1. INTRODUCTION
In status-conscious ancient Rome, while legal discourse aspired to fairness 
(aequitas),1 the poor were more cruelly punished, when convicted of criminal 
conduct, than the rich,2 and the slave’s legal protection was almost non-exist-
ent compared with that of the free man or woman.3 In some respects, Roman 
attitudes to slavery were benign: good slaves could be freed by will or in the 
master’s lifetime; freedmen were often close confi dants of their masters, as 
Tiro was of Cicero; and the manumitted slave might live to see his descend-
ants prosper as full Roman citizens. But master-slave relationships were not 
always so harmonious: a slave-owning society could never be entirely at ease 
with itself. A specifi c source of concern was that, in wealthy households, 
the master and his family would be heavily outnumbered by his slaves. And 
disaffected slaves, it was feared, might either kill the master themselves or 
connive at his killing by others.
A policy of deterrence was the answer. One element in this was the 
Senatus Consultum (SC) Silanianum, which was passed in 10 CE, and 
 modifi ed over time by a series of court decisions, supplemented by juristic 
interpretations. The Roman Senate had, through its resolutions (senatus con-
sulta), a role as a legislator, which became more signifi cant after the popular 
assemblies ceased to function late in the reign of Augustus (30 BCE to 14 
CE).4 But where its own interests were at stake, the Roman Senate made its 
decisions not on the basis of the kind of dispassionate legal thinking we 
might associate with Roman law as a discipline, but in line with its own 
emotions, social attitudes and prejudices. Whatever their personal relation-
ships with their slave establishment, senators were terrifi ed of ‘Slaves’ in 
the abstract. The reaction of the Younger Pliny, early in the second century 
1 Cf. Ulpian at D.1.1.1.1 (Ulpian. 1 Inst.) that law is the ‘art of the good and the fair’ (ars boni 
et aequi).
2 See Garnsey (1970). 
3 For the convention that slaves should not be treated with excessive harshness, see Inst.Gai. 
1.53; Garnsey (1996), pp. 90–3.  On slaves’ right of asylum, see Garnsey (1996), pp. 95–6.
4 See Talbert (1984), pp. 431–59.
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CE, to the brutal murder by his slaves of an admittedly cruel master, was 
representative of this attitude:5 even kind and considerate masters were in 
danger, he wrote, because slaves were not reasoning beings but followed 
their instincts, like animals. 
The evolution of the SC Silianianum therefore provides a useful case 
study of the impact of elite self-interest on the development of law. But it 
should be emphasised that, in some respects, the elite behaviours revealed 
in their reactions to master-murder are extreme. Other voices were more 
understanding, notably those of philosophers like Seneca,6 who emphasised 
the shared humanity of master and slave, although none challenged the 
institution of slavery as such. Legal discourse acknowledged the ‘quality’ of 
slaves as people, although sometimes only because this affected their value 
as property: the damages, for example, that could be sued for because of an 
injury to a slave would be assessed in terms of his qualitas, as honest and 
entrusted with important responsibilities or, alternatively, as a notorious 
convict.7 Under the Early Empire, the killing of slaves by masters could 
qualify as homicide8 and, in the second century, cases of maltreatment of 
slaves by their masters could reach the attention of provincial governors, 
even of emperors. In 152 CE Antoninus Pius listed a series of cases of abuse, 
which had come to the attention of the governor of Baetica in southern 
Spain; in all three cases, the complaints of the slaves were taken seriously – in 
part because disaffected slaves were less valuable – and their abusive masters 
(or mistresses) cautioned or punished.9 
The SC Silanianum is peculiarly harsh, designed to address exceptional 
situations, in which slaves had (apparently) got out of control. Perhaps 
because it was they who were most threatened, senators were the most active 
in the extension of the application of the SC, through senatus consulta and 
decisions reached by them acting as a court. Through these and the occasional 
verdict issued by provincial governors, who in the fi rst and second centuries 
CE were also senators, the elite as a collective, rather than the jurists, control-
led its implementation, and their fears, as we shall see, created new and, in 
general, harsher precedents. The history of the SC Silanianum, therefore, 
does not only document the effect of senatorial self-interest on a specifi c 
aspect of slave law, that of master-murder; it also provides an illustration of 
the importance of court-made law for legal evolution. The spectacle is not 
an edifying one. Little heed seems to have been paid to legal precision or to 
such residual human rights as slaves might still claim. Separate issues became 
5 Plin. Ep. 3.14.
6 Sen. Ep. 47 and Ben. 3.18 and 20; Garnsey (1996), pp. 67–9.
7 D.47.10.15.44 (Ulpian. 77 ad Ed.).
8 Suet. Claud. 25.2; D.40.8.2 (Modestin. 6 Reg.)
9 D.1.6.2 (Ulpian. 8 de Off. Procos.);  Coll.3.3.1–6 (Ulpian. 8 de Off. Procos.); Inst 1.8.1. For 
an argument that legal policy towards slaves was consistently harsh (i.e. more in line with the 
attitudes that drove the SC Silanianum), see Watson (1983), pp. 53–65.
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confused and, on at least one occasion, procedures designed to ensure that 
the processes of investigation, interrogation and conviction were carried out 
in the right order, and punishment infl icted on the right people, seem to have 
been casually disregarded.
The SC Silanianum was also of interest to jurists although, as we shall 
see, it was categorised in a characteristically technical and specialist way, as a 
civil law matter. But for the attitudes that drove its evolution, we must rely 
on Roman senatorial writers, especially the Annales of the advocate and his-
torian Tacitus, and the Letters of his contemporary the Younger Pliny. Both 
fl ourished under the Flavians (r. 69–96) and Trajan (r. 98–117). Pliny died in 
around 112 CE and Tacitus’ Annales are the product of the end of Trajan’s 
reign and the early years of Hadrian (from 117). As senators and prominent 
orators, they observed the reactions of their colleagues to events; Pliny in 
particular also shows their social assumptions at work by voicing them as 
his own. But, although both Tacitus and Pliny knew some law, they did not 
write as legal specialists. Theirs, therefore, is the perspective on law of the 
intelligent layman, who appreciated from their own experience that law was 
not the preserve only of lawyers, and that the Senate had considerable discre-
tion to act in matters concerning itself, as it saw fi t. It was also the perspective 
of literary craftsmen, masters of allusion, who reshaped the raw material of 
law and history as commentary on their times.
Although not the main decision-makers, the jurists, especially Ulpian, 
have an important role as a supplement and a corrective to a record domi-
nated by senatorial decisions. It is they, rather than Pliny or Tacitus, who 
reveal that part of the diffi culty with interpreting the SC was that the 
meanings of key terms, which could affect the scope and severity of its 
implementation, were disputed. Ulpian’s analysis – which is contained in 
his commentary on the praetorian edict, as codifi ed in c 130 CE – was the 
last signifi cant stage in the development of law based on the SC Silanianum, 
although later texts provide extra information on how some questions, still 
live in Ulpian’s time, were resolved.10 Jurists, with the signifi cant exception 
of C. Cassius Longinus (suffect consul in 30 CE), were not directly involved 
in the main stages in the evolution of the law on master-murder after 10 CE, 
which were the SC Claudianum or Neronianum in 57 CE; the controversial 
execution of the slave familia of the murdered Pedanius Secundus in 61 CE; 
a debate recorded in a letter of the Younger Pliny concerning the fate of the 
familia of a dead senator, the cause of whose death was disputed, in 105 
CE; and a court decision made by the legatus, Trebius Geminus, which was 
 validated by its incorporation into juristic commentary.
10 Later modifi cations and explanations are contained in Paul. Sent. 3.5 and C.6.35.
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2. ‘VETUS MOS’: CUSTOMARY LAW BEFORE THE 
SC SILANIANUM
In his account of the execution of the slaves of the murdered Pedanius 
Secundus, Tacitus did not ascribe their deaths to the provisions of the SC 
Silanianum but to ‘ancient custom’ (vetus mos).11 As an advocate, Tacitus 
knew his law. He knew also the difference between unwritten customary law 
and statute – and that the relationship between the two was far from straight-
forward and required frequent clarifi cation. Adultery was a good example: 
adulterous wives had ‘customarily’ been punished by their families, but 
Augustus had, in 18 BCE, introduced a criminal court to try alleged offenders, 
and probably stipulated the penalty of confi scation of property and exile on 
separate islands.12 Despite this, custom persisted. For example, when record-
ing the sentence passed in 17 CE at the suggestion of Tiberius on Appuleia 
Varilia by her family for adultery, Tacitus refers to the ancestral customary 
practice of exile beyond the 200th milestone from Rome.13 Tacitus’ treat-
ment of the episode makes a clear distinction between the statute on the 
one hand and the procedures and penalties established by the customary 
law, that preceded it and still (thanks to Tiberius) ran in parallel with the 
Augustan reform. 
As Tacitus was fully capable of drawing the line between customary legal 
practice and formal legal enactment, we would expect similar care from him 
in his treatment of the Pedanius Secundus episode; ‘vetus mos’ was not to 
be identifi ed with the SC Silanianum, because it was something different. 
This does not establish beyond doubt that the SC made no mention of the 
penalties that awaited slaves, under customary law, for failure to protect. 
The point is that it was not responsible for their introduction and that they 
were incidental to its main purpose, which, as we shall see, was to instruct 
the praetor, or investigating magistrate, on the rules governing conduct of 
the quaestio, the investigation into the causes of the master’s death and who 
(if anyone) was responsible. 
Little is known of legal practice in cases of master-murder under the 
Republic, but two incidents are indicative. One was the reaction of the 
slaves and freedmen of Marcus Marcellus, the ex-consul, to the murder of 
their master by a known individual with a grievance in Athens in 45 BCE.14 
11 Tac. Ann. 14.42.
12 Paul. Sent. 2.26.14.  On the Augustan adultery law, see Treggiari (1991), pp. 277–90.
13 Tac. Ann. 2.50.4: ‘ut exemplo maiorum propinquis suis ultra ducentesimum lapidem 
removerentur suasit’. Cf. Suet. Tib. 35, allowing jurisdiction ‘in line with ancestral custom’ 
(more maiorum) by the family council in cases of adultery where no public prosecution 
was forthcoming; and Tac. Ann. 13.32.3 on the trial in 57 CE of Pomponia Graeca by her 
husband and family council for adultery ‘in line with ancient established practice’ (prisco 
instituto).
14 Cic. Fam. 4.12.3.
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They ran away, and ‘very few’ were left, when the body was discovered. We 
do not know specifi cally what consequences were anticipated by Marcellus’ 
familia; clearly, even though the murderer was not a member of the familia, 
they were terrifying enough for the slaves and freedmen to prefer the risks of 
running away to those of staying put.
The second, from a later source and therefore possibly anachronistic, is of 
more interest, as it shows a Republican jurist’s awareness of what the conse-
quences to a slave might be of a master taking his own life. After the defeat 
of Brutus and Cassius at Philippi in 42 BCE, Pacuvius Labeo, father of the 
more famous jurist Antistius Labeo, committed suicide with the assistance 
of a slave. However, he manumitted the slave fi rst, so that the slave could 
not be entrapped by the customary sanction that he should be punished, as a 
slave, for failing to, in effect, protect the master from himself.15 It is possible 
that Appian, writing long after the passing of the SC Silanianum, has allowed 
his account to be infl uenced by later developments. However, the likeliest 
original source for the anecdote, if not an invention, would be a reliable one, 
Pacuvius’ son, Antistius Labeo, who would follow his father in keeping a 
sturdily ‘Republican’ distance from the new Augustan order.16
3. THE SC SILANIANUM, 10 CE
The sponsor of the Senatus consultum Silanianum was the consul of 10 
CE, one C. Junius Silanus, a member of a distinguished senatorial family.17 
His cousin, Marcus, would also be consul nine years later and Marcus’ 
daughter, Junia Lepida, would marry the distinguished jurist and suffect 
consul of 30 CE, C. Cassius Longinus, who, in 61 CE, would play a promi-
nent and controversial role in the further evolution of the application of the 
SC Silanianum. Perhaps he may even have felt some sense that his family 
‘owned’ the resolution or should, at the very least, have some privileged say 
in its interpretation.18
Despite the seriousness of master-murder, and the setting-up under the 
SC of a publica quaestio, which would be conducted under the conventions 
governing criminal offences, the framework within which juristic discus-
sion of the SC would be conducted was that of private or civil law. As part 
of its regulation of the quaestio process, the SC contained provisions, to 
15 Appian. H.R. 4.135; D.29.5.1.22 (Ulpian. 50 ad Ed.) states that the SC Silanianum does not 
apply in cases of suicide except if done in the presence of a slave who could have intervened 
but failed to do so. See also Paul. Sent. 3.5.4.
16 Tac. Ann. 3.70 and 75 (his freedom of speech contrasted with the servility of Ateius Capito); 
Aulus Gellius, N.A. 13.12.1 (traditionalism of Labeo as a lawyer); Dio, H.R.  54.15.7–8 
 (distance from Augustus).
17 Syme (1986), ‘The Junii Silani’, pp. 188–99 and Tables XII and XIII.
18 This may also be the reason for Pliny’s addressing of his letter on his own diffi culties with the 
SC to Cassius’ pupil, Titius Aristo (Ep. 8.14, discussed below).
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be enforced by the praetor, which prevented the opening of the will of the 
deceased. These were incorporated at some point into the praetorian edict 
and were commented on by Ulpian and others in the context of the Edict, 
not of the law on homicide. Later sources, such as Paulus’ Sententiae (3.5) and 
Justinian’s Digest (29.5), followed his lead and incorporated interpretation of 
the SC Silanianum into discussion of how wills should be administered and 
under what conditions they should not be opened.
The instruction of the SC to the praetor declared that, where a master had 
been killed by open violence, the will of the deceased should not be opened, 
until an investigation (quaestio) into the death had been completed.19 The 
purpose of this was to prevent any possible murderer hoping to benefi t from 
the will from profi ting from its provisions, if they were implemented prior 
to investigation, trial and conviction. This was especially relevant to slaves 
manumitted in the will. As the will would not be opened prior to the quaes-
tio, the slaves who hoped for freedom would remain slaves, and thus subject 
to the other provisions of the SC, until the truth was known.
There was clearly, therefore, an obligation on the heirs not to open the will 
and confi scation of property would follow if the heirs were shown to have 
failed in their duty.20 That obligation could, however, be breached, owing to 
ignorance, which was excusable.21 The failure had implications; implementa-
tion of legacies or manumissions in the will could benefi t a murderer or his 
associates and was a failure of duty, in that the heir denied himself the power 
to ‘avenge’ the death of the testator. The integrity of the will was not, there-
fore, a technical matter; it also refl ected the social requirement on a dutiful 
heir to exact justice and punish the guilty.22 Still, an heir could not be held 
liable forever and, in 11 CE, a rider to the SC imposed a time limit of fi ve 
years on the lodging of a complaint against him.23 Nor, as Severus Alexander 
ruled in 232, could an heir be held liable if the killers could not be traced.24
What were the circumstances in which the SC Silanianum would apply? 
Ulpian’s commentary shows that four terms (at least) in the (now lost) text 
required elucidation. Dominus, he wrote, referred to the man who had 
full ownership (proprietas), not the usufruct, and the protection of the law 
should be extended to the fi lii familias, the sons of the household, and the 
19 D.29.5.3.18 (Ulpian. 50 ad Ed.) (the opening of a will of a man said to be occisus): ‘edicto 
cavetur, priusquam de ea familia quaestio ex senatus consulto habita suppliciumque de 
noxiis sumptum fuerit’.
20 D.29.5.3.5 (Ulpian. 50 ad Ed.); 29.5.8 (Paul. 46 ad Ed.); 29.5.9 (Gaius 17 ad Ed. Prov.); 
29.5.15 (Marcian. 1 Delat.); 49.14.14 (Gaius 11 ad Leg. Iul. Pap.).
21 D.29.5.3.22 (Ulpian. 50 ad Ed.).
22 Cf. Paul. Sent. 3.5.2: it befi ts the honour of the heir that he does not allow the death of the 
testator, by whatever means, to pass unavenged (‘honestati enim heredis convenit qualem-
cumque mortem testatoris inultam non praetermittere’). 
23 D.29.5.13 (Venul. Saturn. 2 de Pub. Iud.).
24 C.6.35.7 (a. 232).
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other children in power (in potestate) – as well as, perhaps, those who were 
not.25 Servi, slaves, liable for interrogation, included also slaves who might 
achieve their freedom under arrangements already made, and slaves of a 
son, even when part of the son’s independently owned property as a soldier 
(peculium castrense).26 There were also debates about the liability of the slaves 
of spouses (who were liable) and of fathers-in-law, who were not, although 
Ulpian and others disagreed.27
Moreover, masters could die without being killed (occisus). Antistius 
Labeo, who could have been present at the debate, when the SC was agreed, 
stated that there had to be visible evidence that force had been used.28 
Poison, therefore, by defi nition a secret crime, did not, initially, activate the 
SC, unless there was evidence that it had been forcibly administered. This 
exemption, however, had been overturned by the end of the third century.29 
Nor, in Ulpian’s view, was it applicable if a master committed suicide in 
private, although the slaves were expected to intervene, if they knew about 
it. And, fi nally, there was the question of where the slaves were. Those liable 
were described as ‘under the same roof’ (sub eodem tecto), which evoked 
further discussion about how far away a slave could be, and still be liable. 
The ‘roof’ became a mobile concept; slaves in attendance (and therefore 
not under a roof) were liable if their master was killed on a journey away 
from home.30 Here judges’ law through court decisions made an unwelcome 
intervention. According to another jurist, cited by Ulpian, ‘it had often 
been adjudged’ (sic esse saepe iudicatum) that being under the same roof could 
apply to anyone close enough to hear a cry for help. Ulpian did not agree: the 
strength of voices, he said, varies.31 The last word on this lay with Justinian 
who, in 532 CE, ruled that, as the ancients had failed to provide an adequate 
defi nition of ‘sub eodem tecto’, henceforward all slaves who were within 
shouting distance of the master, wherever he and they were, would be liable, 
be that ‘in the house, on the road or in the countryside’.32
25 D.29.5.1.1; 6; 8 (Ulpian. 50 ad Ed.).
26 D.25.5.1.4–5; 14 (Ulpian. 50 ad Ed.).
27 D.29.5.1.15–16 (Ulpian. 50 ad Ed.).
28 D.29.5.1.17 (Ulpian. 50 ad Ed.).
29 D.29.5.1.18 (Ulpian. 50 ad Ed.) (poison); D.29.5.1.19 (forcible administration of poison); 
Paul. Sent. 3.5.2; not only were men deemed to be killed (occisus) when lethal force applied 
‘per vim aut per caedem’ but also when a man is killed by poison (‘sed et is qui veneno 
necatus dicitur’).
30 D.29.5.1.31 (Ulpian. 50 ad Ed.); Paul. Sent. 3.5.6: ‘Sed et hi torquentur, qui cum occiso in 
itinere fuerunt’.
31 D.29.5.1.27 (Ulpian. 50 ad Ed). However, the hard line taken by Ulpian’s anonymous judges 
was endorsed by Paul. Sent. 3.5.7:  Slaves from close by, if they failed to bring help to the 
master on hearing his cries for help, when they could have done, are punished (‘Servi de 
proximo si, cum possent ferre, auditis clamoribus auxilium domino non tulerunt, puniuntur’).
32 C.6.35.12 (a. 532): ‘ex quocumque loco sive in domo sive in via sive in agro possent clamo-
rem audire vel insidias sentire et non auxilium tulerint’.
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4. THE POWER OF FEAR
The primary purpose of the SC Silanianum was deterrence. Early in the 
third century, Ulpian, who was not a senator, set the passing of the SC 
Silanianum and its successor resolutions fi rmly in the context of masters’ 
fears for their own safety:
cum aliter nulla domus tuta esse possit, nisi periculo capitis sui custodiam dominis 
tam ab domesticis quam ab extraneis praestare servi cogantur, ideo senatus con-
sulta introducta sunt de publica quaestione a familia necatorum habenda.33 
As no household could be secure in any way other than that the slaves should be 
compelled under pain of capital punishment to offer protection to their masters 
from dangers both from those within the house and from outsiders, for this 
reason, senatorial resolutions were passed concerning the public investigation 
(quaestio) to be conducted taking evidence from the familia of the persons killed. 
The subject of the SC, then, was the procedures governing the running of the 
quaestio. However, embedded in the tradition, as it had evolved by Ulpian’s 
time, was a fundamental confusion, between the investigative process (quaes-
tio), established by the SC, and the infl iction of punishment on the guilty. 
How, in such a context, was guilt to be defi ned? The opening part refers to 
the punishment, which, under Tacitus’ ‘ancient custom’, awaited slaves who 
failed to protect their masters from danger, when they could have done; they 
were compelled to protect him ‘periculo capitis sui’. But the second part 
refers specifi cally to the court of investigation, quaestio, established by the SC 
Silanianum and its successors. As part of this process, slaves resident ‘under 
the same roof’ (sub eodem tecto) would become liable to judicial interrogation, 
which, for slaves, entailed the automatic use of torture,34 a rule which had 
the incidental effect of violating the principle established by Augustus and 
his successors that torture should not be used as a fi rst resort.35 The primary 
purpose of the quaestio process was not to punish the slaves for failing to 
protect their masters but to fi nd out what they knew about the murderer 
and his accomplices.36 Eligibility for judicial torture should not have meant, 
33 D.29.5.1pr (Ulpian. 50 ad Ed.).
34 D.48.18 on quaestio (interrogation) procedure contains extensive regulations on which 
slaves were liable for interrogation/torture; voluntary confessions of slaves implicating their 
masters were invalid (D.48.18.18.5 (Paul. 5 Sent.)).
35 D.48.18.1pr and 1 (Ulpian. 1 de Off. Procos.), from Ulpian, On the Duties of the Proconsul, 
which goes on to list slaves liable, or not, in other criminal judicial contexts.
36 Cf. Buckland (1908), p. 96, who confuses the investigative roles of the quaestio with the (pun-
ishment for) the failure to protect, but does observe the distinction between judicial torture 
and punishment: ‘the basis of the liability to torture was that they did not render help.  The 
torture was not punishment; it was a preliminary to the supplicium that awaited the guilty 
person. Not doing his best to save the dominus justifi ed torture; more than that would of 
course be needed for the conviction of the murderer’.
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in itself, that the interrogated were automatically liable for punishment for 
failure to prevent the death. 
One source for the confusion was that the two categories of slave, those 
who were liable for the quaestio and those who should face punishment for 
failure to protect, were virtually co-extensive. The slaves ‘under the same 
roof’ who might know about the murder were the same unfortunate indi-
viduals who should have protected him. Slaves resident not ‘under the same 
roof’ could not have intervened and, in general, were not likely to know 
anything useful either. Nor should the fate of the murderer him/herself be 
ignored. The failure to protect was a different order of wrongdoing from 
being directly or even indirectly involved in the killing itself – yet the slaves 
who did nothing and the murderer faced the same penalty. These three ele-
ments, then – the eligibility for interrogation, the liability for punishment 
for failure to protect, and liability for the death – became, from 10 CE, inex-
tricably linked, owing to confusion in the Senate and the courts and, behind 
it all, elite masters’ fear of their own slaves. By the time of Ulpian, the all-
important distinction between quaestio and supplicium had disappeared and 
regulations on punishment were also now ascribed, perhaps erroneously, to 
the original text of the SC:
Hoc autem senatus consultum eos quidem, qui sub eodem tecto fuerunt omni-
modo punit, eos vero, qui non sub eodem tecto, sed in eadem regione non aliter 
nisi conscii fuissent.37
This senatus consultum infl icts punishment (omnimodo punit) on those who were 
under the same roof but those who were not under the same roof but merely in 
the same region, it does not (punish), unless they were complicit in the deed. 
There were also wider social assumptions at work. Punishments infl icted on 
the lower orders, slave and free, were designed to cause pain, to degrade and 
humiliate.38 The idea of torture as punishment was therefore already present 
in the Roman penal system and would fi nd further expression, for example 
in the tortures of Christian martyrs who were ‘punished’ by torture in the 
context of the quaestio, as well as in the arena, for failing to recant. But, as we 
have seen, there were other aspects of the SC Silanianum too, notably lack 
of clarity on the defi nitions of words and phrases, which were reinterpreted 
by successive legislative decision-makers, expanding its application in the 
general direction of increased severity. Students of law in Late Antiquity 
and the era of Justinian’s Corpus Iuris Civilis (compiled 529–34 CE) are famil-
iar with the apparent excesses of the late Roman judge, as evidenced in the 
infl iction of extreme penalties on criminals, and the extension of the use of 
37 D.29.5.1.26 (Ulpian. 50 ad Ed.). The conventions of juristic shorthand would allow for the 
subsuming of the punitive aspect into the application of the SC, even if it were not covered 
in the original text.
38 Millar (1984), pp. 124–47; Millar (2002), pp. 120–50.
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judicial torture up the social scale39 But Roman justice was always harsh; 
the expanded implementation of the SC Silanianum over the fi rst century 
CE both foreshadows and helps to explain the judicial severity of the later 
centuries of the Roman Empire.
The SC Silanianum, like many Senatus consulta of the fi rst century 
CE, was primarily concerned with providing instructions to the magistrate 
about a process. Its main focus, therefore, was on the quaestio, by which the 
violent death of a dominus would be investigated and the killer(s) punished. 
The ‘liability’ of slaves under the SC’s provisions on the quaestio was to be 
interrogated under torture to fi nd out what they knew. Coexisting with the 
resolution, however, was a separate convention, enshrined in older custom-
ary law, that slaves who failed to protect their masters, were liable for pun-
ishment. While it is possible that this was also acknowledged in the SC, it 
was not germane to its primary purpose. However, given the overlap of the 
categories of slave liable for judicial torture and those liable, under vetus mos, 
for execution, it was not likely that they would remain distinct for long.
5. THE MURDER OF PEDANIUS SECUNDUS, 61 CE
In 61 CE, the application of the SC and the customary law, which preceded it, 
was tested in a cause célèbre. Four hundred slaves from the familia (household 
establishment) of the murdered city prefect of Rome, Pedanius Secundus, 
were condemned to execution for failing to protect him, in line with ‘ancient 
custom’. The killer, one of the slaves, was known and his motive, while 
disputed, was agreed to be a private grudge. While a large crowd assembled 
outside to demonstrate their disapproval at the apparent inhumanity of the 
sentence, within the Senate, the now aged C. Cassius Longinus, jurist and 
former suffect consul (in 30 CE), rose to defend the decision. The historian 
Tacitus, who would have had access to the original text in the Acta Senatus, 
the proceedings of the senate, reworked the speech to draw attention to the 
wider implications of the incident.40 Cassius, as characterised in the speech, 
is Tacitus’ most vivid representation of the senator as jurist, whose austere 
reputation acts to legitimise the raw emotion, which his argument in effect 
condoned. The speech thus exemplifi es (some) Roman views on masters 
and slaves, the function of punishment, and the humanity, or lack of it, of 
 princeps, senate and people.
In Tacitus’ version of Cassius’ speech, a socio-legal justifi cation for sever-
itas is combined with the self-portrait of a speaker who glories in being out 
of line with contemporary mores, despising modernity and intervening only 
when the need was greatest. However, it should also be recognised that 
Tacitus’ Cassius is a literary creation. Like other jurists who delved into 
39 MacMullen (1986), pp. 147–66.
40 Tac. Ann. 14.43–44. See Nörr (1983), pp. 187–222; Wolf (1988).
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the meaning of obscure words in the Twelve Tables and the darker recesses 
of Roman antiquarian lore,41 Cassius is represented as a stereotypical con-
servative. He was also a relic of the Roman Republic in another sense. The 
namesake of, and in some sense related to, C. Cassius Longinus, the assassin 
of Caesar, Tacitus’ Cassius is the self-proclaimed embodiment of ancient 
Republican virtue. His high standards had already been evidenced in his 
strict governance of the army in Syria,42 and he would later be implicated in 
a plot by his nephew by marriage, L. Silanus, against Nero and exiled;43 one 
count against him was that he had images of the assassin Cassius in his house, 
an indication that he aspired to follow his example.44 Yet the decisions of 
Cassius the jurist which survive suggest that he had a strong sense of fairness 
and could take the more lenient option: the status of athletes, for example, 
was safeguarded by his ruling that they competed for glory (virtus) not 
money; and no one, he said, should be compelled to undertake a  curatorship 
of an estate against his will (although some thought otherwise).45
Cassius’ speech, in Tacitus’ representation, is therefore an assertion of 
ancient Republican integrity, against the debasement of public discourse 
by mistaken modern values. He is a throwback, but empowered by the fact 
that what he seeks to advocate and protect is ‘ancient custom’. Behind this 
is a more sinister reality. Cassius’ advocacy is not of ‘ancient custom’ but, 
as so often with Roman advocates, his reading of it. His justifi cation for 
the execution – or judicial murder – of the 400 was based, not on a jurist’s 
scrupulous reading of text, but simply on fear. Masters were afraid of their 
slaves, he said, and always had been, although the risks were greater now, 
because slaves were now drawn from many lands and cultures. According to 
the speaker, the slave familia had also demonstrably failed to protect their 
master: surely, Cassius argued, the murderer must have let slip some words, 
or someone should have noticed that he had acquired a weapon, or seen him 
making his way through the house with his light. In short, the other slaves 
had a duty to disclose what they knew, and must be controlled through fear 
of the consequences to them of failure. While Cassius conceded that the 
41 See, in brief, Harries (2006), pp. 85–90.
42 Tac. Ann. 12.12.1.
43 Tac. Ann. 16.7–9.
44 O’Gorman (2000), pp. 59–60: ‘(Family imagines) . . . represent both the glorious past and the 
possibility of its repetition in the future . . . The images of Cassius do not stand for a dead 
past but one which is dangerously contiguous with the present’.
45 D.3.2.4pr  (Ulpian. 6 ad Ed.): ‘Athletas autem Sabinus et Cassius responderunt omnino 
artem ludicram non facere; virtutis enim gratia hoc facere’; D.42.7.2.3 (Ulpian. 65 ad Ed.): 
‘Quaeritur, an invitus curator fi eri potest: et Cassius scribit neminem invitum cogendum 
fi eri bonorum curatorem; quod verius est’. He did, however, take a hard line on interpreta-
tion of the Lex Julia on res repetundae (restitution of the proceeds of extortion), arguing that a 
senator convicted under the law could not act as a witness (D.1.9.2 (Marcell. 3 Dig.): ‘Cassius 
Longinus non putat ei permittendum qui propter turpitudinem senatu motus nec restitutus 
est, iudicare vel testimonium dicere, quia lex Iulia repetundarum hoc fi eri vetat’).
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execution of innocent people was unjust, the fate of a few individuals was 
justifi ed as contributing to the public good (utilitas publica) as a whole.
Cassius’ authority, as both lawyer and ex-consul, and his advocacy of 
punishment as a means of deterrence carried the day. ‘No one individual 
dared’, wrote Tacitus, to contradict him, but pleas were nonetheless forth-
coming from anonymous protesters among the crowd on the grounds of 
the numbers, age and sex of the victims.46 Humanity and severity were in 
direct confl ict. Cassius’ arguments based on fear anticipate the formulation 
by Ulpian, as do his comments on the liability of slaves to execution on the 
grounds that they should have known or noticed something and therefore 
disclosed what they knew in time to prevent the murder. They had failed, in 
other words, in their duty to protect, as originally enshrined in customary 
law.
This, it may be suggested, was the point at which the procedural provi-
sions of the SC Silanianum converged fully with customary law on the pun-
ishment of slaves for failure to protect. For Tacitus combines reference to 
‘ancient custom’ with the phraseology of the SC: it was the familia ‘under the 
same roof,’ which, under vetus mos, was liable to punishment.47 But neither 
Tacitus, nor his Cassius, cited specifi c clauses in the SC to validate Cassius’ 
argument. And Tacitus could have done; he knew of the SC, as he records a 
clarifi cation introduced by, probably, the SC Neronianum or Claudianum in 
57 CE, that when a master was killed, even slaves manumitted by will could 
be subject to the quaestio and punished (although it is not clear than one 
inevitably followed from the other).48
The SC Neronianum and the aftermath of Pedanius’ murder are mile-
stones along a road leading towards increased judicial severity. The SC of 
57 expanded the scope of the SC Silanianum by making slaves manumitted 
by will liable to the quaestio; and the precedents created by the executions in 
61 were still more serious in their implications. One was that the slaves were 
executed even though the identity of the murderer was known. Secondly, 
children, it seems, were not spared; later interpretations, if not the SC itself, 
exempted children ‘under age’ from liability to the quaestio or punishment, 
although they could be frightened into telling what they knew.49 And thirdly, 
perhaps most signifi cantly for the future, a new debate was opened up on 
the defi nition of familia. For one over-zealous senator, Cingonius Varro, 
proposed that the freedmen ‘under the same roof’ should also be banished 
from Italy. This was fi rmly vetoed by Nero; compassion might not have 
altered ‘ancient custom’ (antiquus mos) but harsh innovations, he said, had 
46 Tac. Ann. 14.45.1: ‘ut nemo unus contra ire ausus est’.
47 Tac. Ann. 14.42.2: ‘quae sub eodem tecto mansitaverat’.
48 Tac. Ann. 13.32. See also Paul. Sent. 3.5.6, which, as was standard by his day, confl ates 
 judicial torture and punishment.
49 D.29.5.1.32–33 (Ulpian. 50 ad Ed.).
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no place.50 Though the threat to freedmen, whom all would have agreed were 
part of the familia, was, for the time being, averted, it would return.
6. PLINY THE YOUNGER IN THE SENATE, 105 CE
In 105, an unassertive jurist, Titius Aristo, who had been an auditor of the 
great Cassius and a commentator on his work, was the recipient of Pliny’s 
thoughts, conveyed at some length, on the writer’s conduct of a senatorial 
vote.51 The matter at issue was the decision taken on the fate of the freed-
men of a dead senator, the consul Afranius Dexter. Written after the event, 
the letter presented Aristo with a fait accompli. He could agree with Pliny, 
whose line of conduct in relation to the vote is justifi ed in a series of agi-
tated rhetorical questions, object, or abstain from comment: his reaction 
is not on record. A large part of the letter is also taken up with an explana-
tion as to why the question needed to be asked in the fi rst place; thanks to 
Domitian, the Senate had become poorly educated and unable to understand 
how to take decisions properly. This problem, as we shall see, was more 
 fundamental than Pliny acknowledged. 
Placed in the centre of book 8, the letter is pivotal and designed, not 
merely as a technical query, but as a literary exercise.52 As Whitton argues, 
the opening profession of ignorance is designed to dazzle, the ‘digression’ on 
the ‘enslavement’ of the Senate to Domitian and its consequent ignorance of 
its own procedure is a commentary on the body of the letter, the unfettered 
judgment of a free Senate, no longer ‘exiled’, exercised over real slaves. But 
this was how Pliny hopes that his contemporary readership will react. To 
them, his rescuing of the freedmen from the worst penalty, death, in favour 
of exile, would read like mercy. But, as will be argued below, Pliny’s conduct, 
and that of the Senate, falls short in a number of key respects. The observa-
tion that the Senate had lost the ability to make sensible judgments about 
voting could be extended to its failure to appreciate why legal procedures 
should be conducted in the right order and that, in particular, a verdict of 
guilt or innocence should be formally reached and recorded before sentence 
is pronounced. Perhaps this was even part of Pliny’s intention; the Senate’s 
ignorance, the result of past tyranny, was even more all-encompassing than 
the author could openly admit.
Pliny’s account dodges a number of relevant questions. First, had it been 
50 Tac. Ann. 14.45.2: ‘censuerat Cingonius Varro ut liberti quoque, qui sub eodem tecto fuis-
sent, Italia deportarentur. Id a principe prohibitum est, ne mos antiquus, quem misericordia 
non minuerat per saevitiam intenderetur’.
51 Plin. Ep. 8.14.  For Aristo as Cassius’ auditor, see D.4.8.40 (Pompon. 11 ex Var. Lect.) and 
for his notae on Cassius’ works, D.7.1.7.3  (Ulpian. 17 ad Sab.); 7.1.17.1 (Ulpian. 18 ad Sab.); 
for his unobtrusive demeanour and wide-ranging culture, see Plin Ep. 1.22.
52 For its wider literary and cultural signifi cance and relation to Tacitus, see Whitton (2010), 
pp. 118–39.
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proved, at the time of the vote, that a crime had been committed? The cause 
of Dexter’s death, which was agreed to be unnatural, was uncertain and Pliny 
cites three possibilities: suicide by his own hand; murder at the hands of his 
household; and suicide, but by their agency in obedience to his orders.53 
According to Pliny, at the time that the Senate chose to debate the matter, 
responsibility for the death was still unknown. Was the death suicide? Were 
the slaves in a position to prevent it? Where the slaves were at the time is 
not stated; a more considerate suicide, if such he was, might have ensured 
that the slaves and freedmen were out of the house at the time (and there-
fore unable to supply assistance or prevent him). Pliny does not know, but 
he should have done. Answers to those questions were directly relevant to 
the fate of the slaves, as well as the freedmen; all might be liable to judicial 
torture but it was still, in theory, possible for them or others to prove that 
they were unable to intervene. 
Secondly, and assuming that a crime had been committed, were the freed-
men liable on grounds of failure to protect? As we have seen, ‘customarily’ 
members of the familia of masters who were killed, and who took no action 
to protect them, even against themselves in cases of suicide, were liable to be 
executed. Before 61, the question of the liability of freedmen, as members 
of the familia, for interrogation and punishment had not, apparently, been 
raised. Nero’s decision in 61 had held the line that slaves were liable to 
punishment but freedmen were not. Forty years later, however, the ques-
tion was still a live one and the Senate were invited, again, to adjudicate on 
whether the freedmen of a man, who had died violently, should suffer as a 
consequence of his death. 
Thirdly, had the quaestio, to be conducted by the praetor or some other 
magistrate, already taken place? Or was it, or a further stage of it, to take 
place in the future? Pliny makes no reference to a preliminary investigation, 
yet the narrowness of the question under debate, the fate of the freedmen, 
suggests that there had been an enquiry of some kind, which had been 
inconclusive. On the other hand, the decisions reached by the Senate as to 
liability of both slaves and freedmen to the quaestio suggest that some part 
of the investigation, if not the main part, was still to come. Regardless of the 
outcome, the Senate, would proceed on the basis of unproven assumptions 
to pass judgment as to the guilt or innocence, not only of the freedmen but of 
the slaves as well, without waiting for the quaestio to run its course. With the 
verdicts still unresolved, it was not surprising that the senators themselves 
were far from unanimous as to the guilt or innocence of the freedmen, whose 
fate they were to decide.
Why was the outcome of the quaestio anticipated? The senate seem to have 
proceeded on the basis of an understanding that, as Dexter had been ‘killed’, 
53 Plin. Ep. 8.14.12: referebatur de libertis Afrani Dextri consulis, incertum sua an suorum 
manu, scelere an obsequio perempti.
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his familia were liable to punishment for their failure to protect, regardless 
of the circumstances of his death, which were still unknown. In terms of 
the mention in the SC of the familia of the occisus, the man killed, the hard-
liners were technically correct. Freedmen were also members of the familia. 
Whether inclusion of the freedmen in the quaestio (or as liable automati-
cally to punishment for failure to protect) was the intention of the original 
drafters of the SC is another matter; had they been liable, Pacuvius Labeo’s 
freeing of his slave to save him from answering for his master’s suicide would 
have had no benefi cial effect. 
Sitting as a court, the Senate, including Pliny, whose humanity did not 
extend to the slave element in the familia, disposed of the slaves without 
controversy. They were liable to torture in the quaestio and would then be 
executed, not for the crime (which had yet to be proved) but, presumably, 
for failing to keep the master alive. While this may refl ect practice at the 
time, it was out of line with juristic opinion later; suicide, as we have seen, 
did not make the familia automatically liable for torture or for punishment, 
unless they were in a position to intervene. But worse was to come. All 
agreed also that the freedmen were also liable to interrogation; this may have 
generated the Trajanic decision recorded by the jurists, that those freed in 
the master’s lifetime were liable to the quaestio.54 This did not automatically 
entail torture: Ulpian later stated that the term quaestio referred to the whole 
interrogation process, not solely to tormenta.55 But the potential extension of 
judicial torture up the social scale in the context of master-murder, without 
apparently much refl ection or, on this occasion at least, any debate, was char-
acteristic of the court decisions that would further this process and erode the 
immunities even of the elite from judicial torture in Late Antiquity.
When the time to vote on the fate of the freedmen arrived, Pliny faced two 
problems. One, which he did not admit, was that the Senate had pre-empted 
the conclusions of the quaestio as to guilt or innocence. Secondly, a majority 
of the Senate favoured punishment of some kind, either the death penalty 
or exile (relegatio), and assumed the guilt of the freedmen, but a substantial 
minority, Pliny included, favoured acquittal, believing them innocent, or at 
least not liable for failure to protect. His disagreement with the other two 
groups was fundamental: the divergence concerned not the punishment but 
the verdict. The supporters of the death penalty and banishment then threat-
ened to make common cause, and use tactical voting to remove the option 
of acquittal fi rst. Pliny, despite constant interruptions, insisted that the three 
proposals be taken separately, the main proponent of the death penalty then 
54 Cf. D.29.5.10.1 (Paul. 1 ad SC Silan.): it was resolved under the deifi ed Trajan that those 
freedmen whom the deceased had freed during his lifetime should also be subject to 
the quaestio (‘sub divo Traiano constitutum est de his libertis quos vivus manumiserat 
 quaestionem haberi’).
55 D.29.5.1.25 (Ulpian. 50 ad Ed.).
DU PLESSIS PRINT.indd   65 19/12/2012   16:49
66 New Frontiers
abandoned his proposal and compromised on exile because he was afraid 
that acquittal would have a plurality if the three were taken separately. 
Despite some doubts expressed by scholars in recent decades, it is clear that 
the result was the compromise: exile or relegation.56
A rapid reading of Pliny’s letter leaves the impression of a writer eager to 
celebrate his own moderation. The reality, from a modern standpoint, is less 
appealing. Pliny made no attempt to protect the slaves, unlike the demon-
strators against the executions in 61; he condoned the use of the quaestio for 
the freedmen as well as the slaves; and he failed to admit the possibility that 
Dexter’s death was a suicide that could not have been prevented, a question 
that could perhaps have been clarifi ed if the quaestio process had fi rst run its 
course. Instead, the Senate had rushed to judgment, pre-empting the verdict 
of the quaestio both on the cause of death and the liability, if any, of the 
familia. On the issue of principle concerning the freedmen, Pliny also failed. 
Although he believed the freedmen innocent, he was forced to acquiesce in 
their punishment. Thus not only was Cassius’ legacy of severitas with regard 
to the fate of the slaves left intact, but the Neronian precedent of clemency 
towards the freedmen was also, arbitrarily, reversed. 
7. THE SC SILANIANUM IN THE SECOND CENTURY CE 
The muttered protests of the crowd, who objected to the execution of the 
slaves of Pedanius in 61, is evidence that the increasing severity in the imple-
mentation of the SC Silanianum did not go unchallenged. But they would 
not be the dominant voices in the debate. Such evidence as survives for its 
evolution in the second century suggests that the issue of liability was still 
a live one and that (some) judges continued the expansion of its operation, 
while at least one emperor, Marcus Aurelius, sought to reverse the trend. 
Judicial decisions by provincial governors and their reasoning are seldom 
cited by name and that of the legatus Trebius Geminus on the meaning of a 
key phrase in the SC is an exception.57 In a treatise on the public or criminal 
courts – a reminder that the SC bears on public as well as civil or private law 
– the jurist Maecianus described the reasoning behind Geminus’ decision to 
execute a slave boy who was under-age (impubis), despite the convention that 
children were not liable under the SC Silanianum. Geminus’ justifi cation 
was based on the circumstances of the murder, and on an original reading of 
the SC’s phrase ‘under the same roof’. The under-age slave had slept in his 
murdered master’s room, at his very feet, and yet had not raised the alarm 
or even informed on the murder afterwards. In Geminus’ view, this under-
mined the usual immunity of the impubis; the boy, who admittedly was too 
young to assist, was nearly an adult and was old enough to understand what 
56 Whitton (2010), pp. 118–19.
57 D.29.5.14 (Maecian. 11 de Pub. Iud.).
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was going on. He should therefore have taken action to call for help and not 
have preserved his silence afterwards. Secondly, ‘he believed’ that the SC 
protected those impuberes who were merely under the same roof – not those 
who were in close attendance on the master, and who therefore were in a 
position to act. Such under-age children, provided they understood what 
was happening, were not, he argued, exempt from punishment under the 
law. 
Geminus’ decision, and the reasons for it, moved the reading of the SC 
further in the direction of judicial severity, expanding its scope and under-
mining a traditional exemption from both torture and punishment. The defi -
nition of being ‘too young’, he argued, no longer depended on the physical 
condition of being impubis but on a new, more subjective test, the expected 
level of understanding. Moreover, the shelter afforded by the roof had, 
again, shifted. All those not ‘under the same roof’ were, of course, already 
exempt from the quaestio, unless shown to be complicit. Within the group 
under the same roof, who were in general liable, an exemption hitherto had 
been granted to impuberes. But this impubis had not simply been under the 
same roof, he had been in the same room (and therefore able to assist by 
calling for help, which he did not). At a stroke, some parts of a household 
sheltered by the same roof had become more endangered than others.
All the documented decisions and debates of the Roman Senate, acting 
as a court, and of other judges, such as Geminus, tend in one direction: an 
expansion of those categories of socially inferior people liable for judicial 
torture and punishment under new readings of the SC and a general willing-
ness to implement the decree in its harshest form, rather than opt for a more 
merciful approach. By contrast, as we have seen, the emperor Nero (or his 
legal advisers) had refused to bow to pressure to expand the application of 
the SC to freedmen, although the benefi ts of his decision were largely eroded 
in the decades that followed. It was therefore perhaps not a coincidence that 
the Roman Senate, which had been collectively responsible for the increased 
harshness of the SC over the years, was the recipient of an oratio, or legal 
speech, which went against that trend. 
Marcus Aurelius (r. 161–80), unlike, say, Pliny and his Senate, is perhaps 
the only later legislator to show awareness of the all-important distinction 
between the investigation process under the quaestio and the infl iction of 
punishment. Marcus’ Stoic philosophy provided a distinctive perspective; 
regardless of status, only the wise man could be truly free.58 Perhaps this 
motivated his insistence on the rights of innocent slaves as set out in an 
oratio (formal address on legal matters) to the Roman Senate. The speech 
addressed a situation in which, we may assume, the quaestio had taken place 
and slaves found innocent by the process were left in a position to benefi t 
58 Garnsey (1996), pp. 134–8, arguing that Stoics did not (by implication) believe in ‘natural 
slavery’.
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from the master’s will; not all, therefore, were expected to be put to death 
just because they were part of the familia.59 If they were shown later to have 
been freed and to have benefi ted from the dead master’s will, the will’s provi-
sions for them and their children should be honoured. Marcus’ views were 
still current in the early sixth century and were revisited, endorsed and tidied 
up on a matter of detail in a constitution of the emperor Justinian, issued in 
531.60
8. CONCLUSION
The subject of the SC Silanianum was an emotive one for the Roman elite; 
its subject was the process that would ensure their safety (it was hoped) 
when alive and, at worst, avenge them when violently dead. While under 
the Republic, the familia of a murdered man could expect judicial interroga-
tion and perhaps punishment for their failure to protect, the SC Silanianum 
regulated the procedure of the quaestio, which would establish the truth 
and punish the guilty. While its clauses may have referred in passing to the 
liability of the familia for failure to protect, rather than for the murder itself, 
this was not its main purpose. Its stipulation that the heirs should not open 
the will prior to the quaestio, on pain of confi scation of the property by the 
fi scus, provoked extensive juristic commentary and established the place of 
the SC Silanianum in juristic interpretation of civil and praetorian law on 
wills and their administration. That the lawyers privileged the question of 
the will over that of the lives of the familia says much about (some) Roman 
juristic priorities.
As time passed, different elements in the investigative and punitive 
process became confused. Slaves were liable to judicial torture, because slave 
evidence in criminal cases was always taken under torture; in addition, under 
‘ancient custom’, they were liable to punishment, for failure to protect. It 
followed that the familia of a murdered man, resident under the same roof, 
or close enough, in some sense, to intervene, and who failed to help, would 
suffer the death penalty, whatever the degree of individual guilt, and regard-
less of whether the identity of the murderer had been discovered. The result 
was the infamous execution in 61 of Pedanius’ familia of 400 slaves, includ-
ing, it appears, women and children, the last a direct violation of rules on the 
liability of minors.61
In a parallel development, the application of the quaestio was extended to 
59 This could of course refer to the slaves not ‘sub eodem tecto’, who were not in a position to 
have provided assistance.
60 C.6.35.11 (a. 531). Another constitution in the same section revisits the defi nition of ‘sub 
eodem tecto’, complaining about the failure of the ancients to provide clear guidance as to its 
meaning.
61 D.29.5.1.32 (Ulpian. 50 ad Ed.).
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other elements in the familia, including freedmen. By Pliny’s time, freedmen 
also fell foul of the general confusion of liability for the quaestio with liability 
for punishment; the freedmen of Dexter, against whom nothing had been 
proved, were duly, if controversially, exiled. And the slaves hauled before 
Geminus’ court found that the under-age exemption from execution no 
longer applied, if the child happened to be in the wrong place at the wrong 
time. 
It would be going too far to assume, on the basis of two examples, Nero 
and Marcus Aurelius, that emperors were less inclined to judicial severity 
than the Roman Senate of the early empire or the courts. Hadrian, indeed, 
provides one counter-example, ruling that slaves capable of assisting their 
masters should do so, even at their own risk, as slaves must learn not to 
prefer their own safety to that of the master; a slave girl may not be physi-
cally capable of taking on a murderer, but she can cry out for help.62 But 
emperors were not driven, as senators were, by waves of collective emotion, 
or even panic and, while senators had friends, like Titius Aristo, who knew 
the law, emperors could employ the best lawyers available on their advisory 
councils, to give them learned, but also dispassionate, guidance. 
By contrast, the behaviour of the Senate and of such judges as we know 
of is consistent in its resolve to maximise the scope of the SC Silanianum 
and its effi cacy as a deterrent. Pliny’s colleagues, scared as they doubtless 
were already by the death of Dexter, would also have recalled the murder of 
Larius Macedo, battered to death by his slaves in the bath-house, the occa-
sion, noted above, of Pliny’s comment that even kind masters were not safe 
from their brutish slaves.63 The Senate’s contribution to court-made law 
was the product of emotion, even panic; the effects were profound and not 
always salutary. Yet, rational or not, they contributed by their decisions to 
the evolution of court-made law, one element that would contribute over 
time to the increased judicial severity evidenced in Late Antiquity.
Finally, the story of the SC suggests questions of how we should read law 
in literature. Students of Classics are familiar with the techniques of liter-
ary allusion. Perhaps we should look harder at legal allusions as well, the 
web of connections silently woven by and within the consciousness of the 
Roman reader. Allusion can play strange tricks with chronology. Tacitus’ 
Annales were aimed at a readership alive in the second decade of the second 
century and aware of recent controversies on the SC; readers in c 120 of 
his account of 61 (and Nero’s exemption of the freedmen) would have been 
conditioned by their recollections of the Dexter case in 105. And one jurist, 
more than any other, was associated with how the SC Silanianum was read 
and implemented. When Tacitus gave Cassius’ speech pride of place in his 
account of the executions in 61, the message was that he, like Cassius (and, 
62 D.29.5.1.28 (Ulpian. 50 ad Ed.).
63 Plin. Ep. 3.14.
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later, Ulpian), saw masters’ fears of their slaves as the prime motive for the 
implementation of the law as deterrent. And it was surely no coincidence 
that Titius Aristo, Pliny’s addressee in 105, was Cassius’ pupil. Decades 
after his death (c 70 CE), the austere ghost of a man, who embodied the stern 
values of a lost Republic, was, for both Pliny and Tacitus, still a force to be 
reckoned with.
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Chapter 5
Laws’ Empire: Roman Universalism and 
Legal Practice
Caroline Humfress
1. INTRODUCTION: CITIES AND EMPIRE
Sometime in the late third or possibly early fourth century, a rhetorician, 
writing in Greek, probably in the Roman provinces of the East, com-
posed a treatise on epideictic rhetoric (the rhetoric of praise and blame). 
Transmitted under the name of Menander of Laodicea (a city in south-west 
Asia Minor), the treatise advises orators on how to praise gods, peoples 
and cities according to a long and technical tradition of encomiastic speech. 
There are explicit references to Isocrates’ Panathenaicus, various works by 
Plato, the ‘encomium on Sicily’ in Cicero, and orations by Aelius Aristides 
on both Rome and Athens. Amongst other subjects, we fi nd specifi c advice 
on how an orator should assess the actions of a city, according to the four 
classical philosophical virtues: courage, justice, temperance (sophrosune) and 
practical wisdom (phronesis).1 After a lengthy discussion concerning how a 
city’s actions should be praised according to the virtue of justice, and some 
brief pointers concerning praise for temperance ‘in public life’ and then in 
relation to the household, the discussion turns to the virtue of practical 
wisdom:
In the public sphere, we consider whether the city accurately lays down legal 
conventions and the subject matter of the laws – such as inheritances by heirs 
and other topics covered by the laws. (This aspect, however, is now redundant, 
because we use the universal laws of the Romans.) Within the private sphere, 
the issue is whether there are many famous rhetors, sophists, geometricians, and 
 representatives of other sciences that depend on practical wisdom.2
According to the author of this late Graeco-Roman treatise, praising cities 
for the display of practical wisdom in the legal sphere was an outdated 
activity. Public offi cials in the cities of the East no longer exercised their 
1 (Ps-)Menander, Treatise I.III.361–5; Russell and Wilson (1981), pp. 60–70. Heath (2004), 
pp. 127–31 argues that Treatise I should not be attributed to Menander of Laodicea.
2 (Ps-)Menander, Treatise I.III.364, lines 10–16; Russell and Wilson (1981), p. 68. For 
discussion of this passage, see Nutton (1978), pp. 214–15; Carrié (2005), p. 274; Mélèze 
Modrzejewski (1982), p. 350; and Garnsey (2004), pp. 148–9. 
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 practical wisdom in framing their own laws and legal procedures, because 
the  inhabitants of their cities used ‘the universal laws of the Romans’. Thus 
whereas Isocrates (fourth century BCE) and Aristides (mid second-century 
CE) could both use ‘the topic of laws’ to amplify their praise of a city, 
 rhetoricians working under the later Roman empire apparently did not need 
to bother. The orator could now only praise a city for its ēthē (customs).3 
The implication is that by the late third century CE, the Graeco-Roman 
cities in the East had lost whatever autonomy they had previously possessed 
as lawgivers.
The question of to whom these Graeco-Roman cities had lost their 
law-making powers seems to fi nd an answer in a second late Roman rhe-
torical treatise, also transmitted under the name of Menander of Laodicea 
and copied with the fi rst treatise in the manuscripts.4 This second treatise 
addresses the orator directly as ‘the voice of the city’, and includes a section 
on how to construct a formal speech of praise for an emperor (basilikos logos). 
As in an encomium for a city, praise for the actions of an emperor should 
be set out according to the four virtues.5 Under ‘justice’, the orator should 
praise an emperor’s ‘mildness towards subjects, humanity towards petition-
ers, and accessibility’, as well as commending him for sending ‘governors 
around the nations, peoples, and cities, [who are] guardians of the laws and 
worthy of the emperor’s justice, not gatherers of wealth’.6 With regard to 
the emperor’s practical wisdom (phronesis), the orator should say that it 
 surpasses that of all other men on earth, hence:
Of his legislative activity, you should say that his laws are just, and that he strikes 
out unjust laws and himself promulgates just ones. ‘Therefore, laws are more 
lawful, contracts between men are more just’.7
3 (Ps-)Menander, Treatise I.III.363, lines 7–14; Russell and Wilson (1981), p. 67. The context 
is how to praise a city with respect to the topic of ‘fair dealing towards men’, one of three 
subdivisions within the virtue of justice (the other two subdivisions are piety towards the 
gods and reverence towards the dead): ‘If the citizens neither wrong foreigners nor do harm 
to one another and have customs that are equal and fair and laws that are just, they will 
manage their city with the highest degree of excellence and justice. Nowadays, however, 
the topic of laws is of no use, since we conduct public affairs by the universal laws of the 
Romans. Customs (ēthē), however, vary from city to city, and form an appropriate basis for 
an encomium’.
4 This second treatise survives in the manuscript tradition alongside (Ps-)Menander, Treatise 
I but they do not seem to have been written by the same individual; see Heath (2004), 
pp. 128–9.
5 (Ps-)Menander, Treatise II.373, lines 5–8; Russell and Wilson (1981), p. 84.
6 (Ps-)Menander, Treatise II.375, lines 8–10 and lines 18–21; Russell and Wilson (1981), 
pp. 88–90. 
7 (Ps-)Menander, Treatise II.375, lines 24–8; Russell and Wilson (1981), p. 90. Compare 
Themist. Orat. 1.15b, Orat. 5.64b and Orat. 15.187a. Early Christian writers also make 
various uses of this (Hellenistic kingship) ideology; for discussion, see Nasrallah (2010), 
pp. 119–63; Buell (2002); and Chadwick (1993). 
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The ‘topic of laws’ was thus seen to have excellent potential in terms of 
amplifying praise for a Late Roman Emperor’s actions, in stark contrast to 
praise for a city, where, as we have seen, it counted as a futile exercise.8 As 
far as our late Graeco-Roman orator was concerned, emperors, not cities, 
made laws.
Book I of Gaius’ Institutes, an elementary legal textbook composed in 
the mid-second century CE, lists a number of sources for Roman law, past 
and present: ‘laws’ of the Roman people (leges); enactments of the plebe-
ians (plebiscita); resolutions of the senate; constitutions of the emperors; 
‘the edicts of those who have the right to issue edicts’ (which would include 
consuls, praetors, aediles and governors of provinces); and the responses of 
jurisprudents.9 Each of the sources named by Gaius remained relevant to 
learning Roman law and doing Roman law – in different ways and to dif-
fering extents – throughout the later Empire. For good reasons, however, 
modern Roman historians – like late Roman orators – tend to focus upon 
the emperors themselves:
L’empereur a le quasi monopole du droit. La loi au troisième siècle, ce sont les 
décisions impériales qui, à l’époque postclassique, seront qualifi ées par le terme 
de lex qui désigne la source principale et presque exclusive du droit.10
Moreover, the juristic sources give the impression that imperial decisions 
could be interpreted as having a universality that other sources of law lacked. 
For example, in book 25 of his commentary on the praetor’s edict, the 
Severan jurist and imperial bureaucrat Ulpian refers to an imperial rescript, 
issued by Hadrian, which laid down monetary penalties against anyone who 
buried a body in a city, as well as any magistrate who allowed the practice, 
but, Ulpian continues:
What if the municipal law allows burial in the city? We must consider whether, 
in the light of Imperial rescripts, this provision has to be departed from; for the 
rescripts are of general scope and Imperial legislation has its own force and should 
apply everywhere.11
From at least the late second century CE Roman jurists had begun to copy 
imperial rescripts together systematically, an activity that was continued 
in the codices of the late third-century legal experts (and probably  imperial 
8 A point made again in (Ps-)Menander, Treatise II in the section on ‘The speech of arrival’ for 
an imperial governor at 386, lines 1–4; Russell and Wilson (1981), pp. 108–10: ‘If there had 
still been a need for lawgiving, it [namely, the city which the governor is entering] would have 
legislated for mankind universally, as Sparta and Athens did once for the Greeks’. See also 
Slootjes (2006), p. 112.
9 Inst.Gai.1.1.2; compare D.1.2.2, 12 (Pompon. 1 Enchirid.).
10 Coriat (1997), p. 70. 
11 D.47.12.3.5 (Ulpian. 25 ad Ed.).
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 offi cials) Gregorius or Gregorianus and Hermogenianus, both cited as 
models for the later fi fth-century imperial Codex Theodosianus.12
Before the promulgation of Justinian’s ‘Corpus Iuris Civilis’, however, 
jurists did not approach imperial constitutions as exclusive sources of 
Roman law. In fact, before the Justinianic reforms to the legal curriculum, 
students at law schools (such as those at Beirut, Rome and Constantinople) 
had apparently ‘barely begun to read Imperial pronouncements after four 
years of study [. . .]’.13 Nonetheless, late Roman legal experts – whether 
giving responsa to private individuals or employed as various types of offi -
cials within the imperial bureaucracy – certainly worked within a legal and 
administrative system that functioned with the emperor at its apex.14 What 
Hopkins terms ‘the symbolic unity of the Roman emperor’ is thus as impor-
tant to our understanding of Roman law under the empire, as it is to our 
understanding of politics, administration and religion.15
There can be no doubt that in the course of the fi rst three centuries of the 
empire, Roman law had expanded from the city of Rome and Italy into the prov-
inces. Processes associated with ‘municipalisation’ and ‘provincialisation’ led to 
rapid developments in (what we now term) administrative and fi scal law under 
the early Empire, as well as contributing to a marked expansion in the scope of 
the imperial bureaucracy. One estimate for the numbers of imperial offi cials 
operating between c 250 and 400 CE gives a rise ‘from about 250 overall to at 
least 3,000 per generation in each half of the Empire, a twenty-fold increase’.16 
In particular, emperors and their offi cials had an empire-wide concern for the 
maintenance of law and order and for the effi cient extraction of tax revenue and 
other fi scal burdens. Moreover, as Brélaz argues: ‘Law and order are, together 
with taxation, the main attributes of sovereignty and the most visible dem-
onstrations of the power of an authority’.17 Hence, in terms of an ideology of 
Empire-building, taxation and a concern for the maintenance of public law and 
order should be understood as unifying and ‘universalising’ forces.18
12 On the late second-century collection of Papirius Iustus, see Franciosi (1972). On the 
later third-century codices, see Sperandio (2005); Cenderelli (1965); and CTh.1.1.5pr with 
Scherillo (1934). See also Honoré (1994), and more generally on the ‘idea’ of an exclusively 
‘imperial’ law, Riccobono (1949).
13 Justinian, Institutes pr: ‘Until now even the best students have barely begun to read imperial 
pronouncements after four years of study; but you have been found worthy of the great honour 
and good fortune of doing so from the beginning and of following a course of legal education 
which from start to fi nish proceeds from the emperor’s lips’. See also Digest, Const. Omnem, 1.
14 Liebs (1987); Liebs (1989); and Liebs (2002) discuss jurists in the Western provinces. Honoré 
(1998) and Honoré (2004) argue for a special relationship between legal expertise and govern-
ment in the East. 
15 Hopkins (1978).
16 Heather and Moncur (2001), p. 31.
17 Brélaz (2008), p. 45.
18 On the army, see Galsterer (1986), p. 26; Demougeot (1981); and Palmer (2007). On taxation, 
see Hobson (1993), p. 197; Eck (2000), p. 282; and Carrié (2005), pp. 275–6.
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In practice, imperial offi cials tended to work through, or alongside, local 
elites. Civic elites, where they existed, were particularly important: ‘From the 
administrative point of view the Roman world empire was a union of urban 
communities; the city was the foundation on which imperial administration 
rested’.19 Whilst different models of imperial and local civic interaction 
developed in distinct geographical regions of the early empire, all Roman 
cities had some administrative responsibilities in terms of executing orders 
and judgments from imperial offi cials. Epigraphic evidence from the Eastern 
empire, however, suggests a marked shift in relations between cities and 
central government dating from the mid-third century CE, when inscrip-
tions honouring imperial governors begin to outweigh those dedicated to 
local offi cials.20 Carrié is right to reject the idea of a ‘pre-conceived politi-
cal  programme of authoritarian centralization’ under the Severi; we should 
likewise be wary of attributing an ‘out-and-out bureaucratization of the 
administration’ to the age of Diocletian and Constantine.21 Nonetheless, it 
is noteworthy that when local governments performed legal administrative 
functions in the later third and early fourth centuries, they did so increas-
ingly under the supervision of or in tandem with imperial offi cials. For 
example, the text of the Pauli sententiae which circulated in various copies 
and editions in the late Roman West, states that municipal magistrates can 
arrest fugitive slaves and ‘transfer them to the offi ce of the governor or the 
province or proconsul’ (1.6a.4); that municipal magistrates, ‘if they have the 
legal power’, can emancipate and manumit slaves (2.25.4); and that an heir 
can be compelled by a municipal magistrate to enter upon and transfer an 
estate, on request of the benefi ciary of a fi deicommissum, ‘on the authority of 
the governor’ (5.5a.1). Late Roman imperial constitutions also refer to the 
duties of municipal magistrates with regard to the administration of testa-
mentary bequests and the performance of manumissions and guardianships, 
as do a number of fourth- and fi fth-century papyri from Egypt. Municipal 
magistrates were involved, along with imperial offi cials, in prosecutions 
against Christians in the early fourth century, as well as later prosecutions 
against Christian schismatics and heretics.22 There is also some evidence 
for city councils and municipal magistrates judging legal cases on their own 
authority, although the main subject of petitions to boulai (city councils) in 
third and fourth-century Egypt concerned municipal liturgies, in particular 
19 Wolf (2006), p. 443. See, in general, Nörr (1969); Gascou (1999); Eich (2005); and Camodeca 
(2006).
20 Robert (1948), discussed by Nutton (1978), pp. 219–20; Saller (1982), p. 168 and Rouché 
(1998).
21 Carrié (2005), pp. 275–6 and 282.
22 For the evidence on municipal magistrates being involved in the persecution of Christians, 
see Carrié (2005), p. 289 with n. 85. On the prosecution of schismatics and heretics, see 
Humfress (2007), pp. 243–68.
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attempts to avoid nominations and burdens.23 The fact that an imperial 
constitution, issued in 412 and addressed to the Proconsul of Africa, forbids 
duumvirs from extending ‘the power of their fasces’ (i.e., their jurisdictional 
authority) outside the limits of their own municipalities, implies that munici-
pal magistrates still had jurisdictional powers to abuse.24 Nonetheless, as 
Denis Feissel has demonstrated, between 324 and 610 CE a mere handful of 
inscriptions survive which record legal acts undertaken at either a municipal 
or provincial level (i.e., at provincial assemblies).25 In the later Roman legal 
epigraphy, then, the focus is almost exclusively on what Feissel terms ‘les 
actes de l’État imperial’.
Given the emphasis on imperial law and state jurisdiction within late 
Roman epigraphy, in addition to the promulgation of centralised imperial 
law codes – coupled with fourth-century developments establishing ‘new’ 
imperial legal offi cials within the localities, such as the defensor civitatis and 
‘new’ central ‘Palatine’ legal offi ces, such as the imperial Quaestor – it begins 
to seem absurd not to assume that all law and legal practice in the later 
Roman empire was subject to the universal control of the emperors and their 
bureaucrats.26
2. CONTEXTUALISING ‘THE UNIVERSAL LAWS OF THE 
ROMANS’: THE EARLY EMPIRE
Our problem is then: was Rome at all interested in producing a single juridical 
framework for the whole Empire, or at least for all Roman citizens living in any 
part of the Empire? Did they want Superinius Aquila of Cologne and Aurelius 
Bonosus of Carthage to live under the same system of laws?27 
Galsterer’s problem, as outlined in the quotation above, is central to the 
question of legal universalism under the early Empire: did ‘Rome’ seek to 
impose a uniform application of Roman law in the provinces?28 Supposing 
for the moment that our Graeco-Roman rhetorician, Ps-Menander, was right 
to imply that local law had been displaced by Roman law by the late third/
early-fourth centuries, does it necessarily follow that this was a consequence 
of imposition from above? In terms of private law (‘inheritances by heirs and 
other topics’), Ps-Menander’s Treatise I states only that the inhabitants of the 
23 Bowman (1971), p. 113. P.Oxy LIV 3758 records a case heard before the logistes in 325; Liban. 
Orat. 11.139 refers to the boule of Antioch judging a legal case. See also the epigraphical 
sources listed by Feissel (2009), pp. 99–102.
24 CTh.12.1.174 = C.10.32.53 (412 CE); cf. D.50.1.26 (Paul. 1 ad Ed.).
25 Feissel (2009).
26 On defensor civitatis, see Frakes (2001); on imperial Quaestor, see Harries (1988); and Faro 
(1984). See in general Meyer (2004), pp. 217, 252, 296. On ‘imperial law’, see Vessey (2003); 
a review article of Honoré (1998); Harries (1999); and Matthews (2000). 
27 Galsterer (1986), p. 23; see also Galsterer (1999). 
28 Stolte (2001), p. 169 discussing Galsterer.
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Eastern cities made use of the ‘universal laws of the Romans’; it does not tell 
us that Roman private law was forced upon them by imperial offi cials, or 
indeed by any other kind of offi cial.
Ps-Menander’s treatise, however, was composed after 212 CE and the 
promulgation of Caracalla’s Constitutio Antoniniana (an imperial edict 
granting Roman citizenship to almost all free inhabitants of the Roman 
empire).29 As such, the brief comments that Ps-Menander makes on the 
‘universal laws of the Romans’ have been cited as evidence for the fact 
that Roman law was imposed on the vast majority of the free inhabitants 
of the empire, as a result of Caracalla granting them Roman citizenship.30 
Roman historians and legal scholars from Mitteis onwards have suggested, 
to widely varying effects, that Caracalla’s Constitutio Antoniniana required 
large numbers of provincials to order their private relations with each other 
according to Roman law.31 Thus Ando, for example, states that: ‘Caracalla’s 
grant of citizenship to all freeborn residents of the empire in 212 CE will 
have dramatically altered the legal landscape: any and all earlier provincial 
edicts will have had to be entirely rewritten’.32 Having accepted some kind 
of necessary link between the extension of Roman citizenship and the ‘state’ 
imposition of Roman law, other scholars place Caracalla’s edict at the apex 
of historical processes that reach back into the Roman Republic. Bispham, 
for example, links the Constitutio Antoniniana to the provisions of late 
Republican and early imperial municipal charters and relates both in turn to 
the extension of Roman law and citizenship to Italy and the provinces:
How far, and how quickly, the new municipia picked up the ius ciuile is, then, 
an important question, and one which recurs again and again as Roman citizen-
ship spreads across the Empire, right up to the aftermath of the Constitutio 
Antoniniana. One would like to know, in particular, whether Rome was proac-
tive and dirigiste, enforcing the adoption of the ius ciuile and other provisions 
of universal application in the new municipia, or whether it was left up to the 
 communities themselves to mug up on it as best they could.33
29 See Sasse (1958); and Wolff (1976).
30 Talamanca (1971).
31 Mitteis (1891), esp. pp. 160–6, arguing that the Constitutio Antoniniana was part of a pro-
grammatic attempt to replace existing local laws (Volksrecht) with Roman law (Reichsrecht).
32 Ando (2006), p.178. Compare Lintott (1993), p. 154: ‘Only after Caracalla gave Roman 
citizenship to almost all the free population of the empire (in AD 212 on the usual view), 
can Roman law be said to have been, at least in theory, the law of the empire’, and Honoré 
(2004), p. 113: ‘With the constitutio Antoniniana Roman law had became a universal 
law’. Rowlandson and Takahashi (2009), p. 117, state that sibling marriage in Egypt ended 
abruptly when the Constitutio Antoniniana made it ‘illegal’ (i.e., it was not permitted by 
Roman law and virtually all were now Roman citizens).
33 Bispham (2007), pp. 205–6. Compare Gardner (2001). On the ‘Roman private law’ clauses 
within the Flavian municipal charters, see Gonzaleź (1986), in particular lex Irnitana chapters 
93, 10B 52–102C and 85; Johnston (1987); Rodger (1990); Lamberti (1993); Tomlin (2002); 
Wolf (2006); and Nörr (2007).
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Looking forward from the Constitutio Antoniniana, most scholars express 
doubts as to the success of Caracalla’s (supposed) attempt at legal universal-
ism. As Yiftach-Firanko questions with respect to law in Graeco-Roman 
Egypt:
In 212 the Antonine Constitution turned the provincial population into Roman 
citizens. Formally, it subjected all its inhabitants to the precepts of Roman law. 
Yet did this change in status also mean a profound change in the legal practices in 
Egypt?34
Virtually none of the vast secondary literature questions the premise that 
once an individual or community had been granted Roman citizenship, 
they were henceforth required to use Roman law to govern their private 
relations.35
To assume that the Roman authorities aimed at the unifi cation of law 
through the extension of citizenship is, in fact, one aspect of what Galsterer 
has rightly identifi ed as ‘a tendency among the legal historians of the unifi -
cation school [namely, Mitteis, Arangio-Ruiz, Wolff, and so on] to assign 
motives to the Roman state which are taken unselfconsciously from the 
modern national state as it developed in the nineteenth and twentieth centu-
ries’.36 In reality, no state act obliged Roman citizens to use Roman private 
law.37 Citizenship should be understood rather ‘as an enabling mechanism, 
offering access to the judicial procedures and remedies of the society at dif-
ferent levels’.38 The papyrological record, alongside other sources, certainly 
provides a wealth of evidence for individuals and communities engaging in 
numerous different ways with Roman private law, both before and after 212 
CE; but the reasons why they did so need to be sought from below.39 Those 
who had more at stake than others in terms of land-owning and ‘elite’ socio-
political status may have been more likely to seek out the remedies and 
34 Yiftach-Firanko (2009), p. 543; see also Yiftach-Firanko (2009), p. 554 on the use and adapta-
tion of the stipulatio clause in Egypt after 212 CE.
35 Exceptions are Schönbauer (1931) and Schönbauer (1937), both contra Mitteis. See also Seidl 
(1973); Galsterer (1986); Cotton (1993); Meyer (2004), p. 183; Garnsey (2004), pp. 146–7; and 
Carrié (2005), pp. 274–5.
36 Galsterer (1986), p. 24.
37 Mélèze Modrzejewski (1993), p. 998.
38 Garnsey (2004), p. 155. For a broader contextualised reading of Roman citizenship, see 
Dench (2005), pp. 93–151.
39 For ‘new’ papyri from the Roman Near East (provinces of Syria; Mesopotamia; Arabia; 
Judaea/Syria Palaestina), see Cotton, Cockle, and Millar (1995), including relevant texts from 
P. Euphr: see Cotton, Cockle and Millar, nos 24–9; P. Dura: see Cotton, Cockle and Millar, 
nos 44 and 45; P. Bostra: see Cotton, Cockle and Millar, no. 171; and Pap. Colon.; see Cotton, 
Cockle and Millar, no. 173. See also Cotton and Yardeni (1997); Cotton (2006); Kraemer 
(1958) = P. Nessana III; Arjava, Buchholz, and Gagos (2007) = P. Petra. For Egypt, see also 
now Richter (2008). For the later West, see Tjäder (1955); Wessel (2003); and Velázquez 
Soriano (2000), esp. document nos 8, 39, 40A and 40B.
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protections of Roman law, or to be enmeshed in them already. The establish-
ment of economic rights and entitlements to property; the agreement and 
regulation of contracts; and the negotiation of a host of other material inter-
ests might demand the use of specifi cally Roman legal instruments within 
any particular context. Moreover, as John Crook notes, the de controversiis 
agrorum, one of ‘the least-discussed’ of the handbooks of Frontinus (fi rst 
century CE), ‘shows what a lot of litigation was generated by land, with its 
questions of ownership, boundaries and taxation’.40 This activity, however, 
still does not amount to the emperor or Roman ‘state’ offi cials requiring 
 individuals to use Roman law because they were Roman citizens.
Caracalla’s grant of citizenship to virtually all free inhabitants of the 
empire would have certainly increased the number of individuals who 
had the right (ius) to make use of Roman law, qua citizens. Prior to 212 CE, 
however, there were also various types of legal mechanisms that gave ‘non-
citizens’ the ability to make use of some Roman legal concepts and practices. 
According to Gaius’ Institutes, every individual was either slave or free: 
some were free by birth (ingenui) and some were made free through a grant 
of freedom (libertini or liberti, ‘freedmen’). A free man or woman was either 
a Roman citizen; or a ‘Latin’ (i.e., holding the ius Latii); or a peregrine, a 
foreigner or ‘alien’, who might in turn be a citizen of some other specifi c per-
egrine community.41 As a class, Latins had some of the juridical iura (rights) 
of full citizenship: in particular the right to make a contract with a Roman 
which would then be enforceable according to Roman law (ius commercii). 
As Woolf states: ‘In this, and in other respects, Latins had access to Roman 
law, even if Roman law was in practice probably interpreted in the light of 
local traditions’.42 Nor were foreigners (peregrini) entirely outside the Roman 
legal system. Ius gentium (‘law of the peoples’) referred to ‘those legal habits 
which were accepted by the Roman law as applying to, and being used by, 
all the people they met, whether Roman citizens or not’.43 The elaboration 
of this concept enabled jurists to defi ne certain interactions between per-
egrines, Latins and citizens as being under Roman jurisdiction: for example, 
peregrines could acquire ownership through ‘natural’ modes of acquisition 
(traditio, occupatio, accessio); slavery was also iure gentium, all peoples had it 
– although there were aspects of the (Roman) law of slavery which were pecu-
liar to the Roman ius civile alone. Moreover, according to Gaius’ Institutes 
4.37, a legal fi ction enabled foreigners to either sue or be sued ‘as if’ they were 
40 Crook (1995), p. 53. See now Campbell (2000) and Cuomo (2007), pp. 103–30 discussing the 
expertise of land surveyors vis à vis legal experts (including jurists) in resolving boundary 
disputes.
41 On the Roman law of status, see Crook (1967), pp. 36–67 including a lucid discussion of the 
relative status of ‘Coloniary Latins’ and ‘Junian Latins’. On the ius latinum, see also Kremer 
(2006).
42 Woolf (1998), p. 67.
43 Crook (1967), p. 29.
DU PLESSIS PRINT.indd   81 19/12/2012   16:49
82 New Frontiers
Roman citizens, in certain actions. At Rome, the praetor peregrinus handled 
litigation between foreigners and citizens and probably also cases where 
foreigners were the only parties – such cases were judged according to, what 
the jurists termed, ‘honesty and fairness’ (in the iudicia bonae fi dei).44 Within 
the city of Rome and across the Empire, contact with foreigners and ‘aliens’ 
was unavoidable, especially in terms of commerce, business dealings, and so 
on. The Roman senate, the jurists, the emperors and their offi cials were well 
aware of a world of private legal transactions involving ‘non-citizens’, and 
recognised the need to regulate those transactions from within the Roman 
legal system itself. From the perspective of the peregrinus, on the other hand, 
a grant of Roman citizenship would have by no means necessarily implied a 
fi rst contact with Roman law.
Certain historical developments within Roman law and legal practice 
were peculiar to the city of Rome; one such fundamental development was 
the ius honorarium, a branch of law developed by the urban praetor (and other 
magistrates at Rome) in order to ‘support, supplement and correct the civil 
law’.45 In theory, the edictal remedies developed under the authority of the 
urban praetors were only valid for Rome and its environs, because this was 
the limit of the urban praetors’ own jurisdiction. It thus became necessary 
to develop mechanisms through which Roman citizens throughout Italy and 
the provinces could access important praetorian innovations, as and when 
they were developed (for example, the praetorian remedy bonorum possessio, 
‘possession of goods’).46 This was partly achieved through imperial constitu-
tions, juristic commentary and responsa, and partly through the actions of 
imperial offi cials within the provinces. This is a much contested topic, but 
provincial governors – or magistrates of at least praetorian standing – were 
apparently responsible for promulgating provincial edicts, primarily for the 
benefi t of Roman citizens within their own jurisdiction. The contents of 
the ‘provincial edicts’ seem to have essentially mirrored those of the urban 
praetors at Rome, with some variation. The stabilising of the urban praeto-
rian edict around 125 CE (the edictum perpetuum) prompted the writing of 
relatively large-scale edictal commentaries, such as that by Ulpian under the 
Severans.47 The fact that Gaius wrote a commentary on ‘the provincial edict’ 
may imply a similar type of juristic development. Imperial constitutions 
and governors’ edicts could also contain legal and administrative measures 
directed to a single province, or part of a province – what was technically 
termed Provinzialrecht (‘provincial law’) in nineteenth-century Romanist 
44 For discussion, see Turpin (1965). 
45 D.1.1.7.1 (Papinian. 2 Def.).
46 See Watson (1971) and for the later Empire, Pulitanò (1999).
47 Ulpian’s ad edictum apparently had a wide circulation under the later Empire, with numer-
ous fragments found in papyri; in addition, the Fragmenta Berolinensia possibly indicates a 
postclassical edition; for further discussion, see Purpura (1995).
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scholarship.48 Again this ‘provincial law’ – as far as it goes – was elaborated 
piecemeal and in response to specifi c situations. In sum, as even this brief 
sketch highlights, we cannot think in terms of a ‘ready-made’ Roman law 
being exported en bloc from Rome to the provinces, either before or after 
212 CE. As recent studies and critiques of the concept of ‘Romanisation’ have 
demonstrated, particularly with respect to religion, urbanism and cultural 
identity: ‘imperialism was a dialectic in which both sides played a part’.49 
The same insight can be developed with respect to ‘Roman’ law and legal 
practice.
According to the benefi cial ideology – which advertised power relations 
of mutual benefi t to both ruler and ruled – emperors were the ultimate 
bestowers of gifts and largesse, as well as dispensers of justice.50 They 
 regularly granted general acts of amnesty in criminal matters (indulgentia) 
as well as dispensing special legal privileges and exemptions to individual 
petitioners on a daily basis. In terms of private law (inheritance, family, prop-
erty, contracts, commerce, and so on), petitioners throughout the Roman 
provinces also looked to the emperors and imperial offi cials for decisions 
on individual situations and case specifi c responses.51 They thus contributed 
to, in the words of Fergus Millar, ‘the formation of a body of rules which 
were in principle valid throughout the Empire’.52 As Millar also stresses, 
however, ‘the body of rules thus created was not so much enforced by any 
apparatus of government as available for use by interested parties making 
claims or bringing suits, and then by offi cials, or Emperors, giving rulings in 
response’.53 The question for us, then, is not so much whether ‘Superinius 
Aquila of Cologne’ and ‘Aurelius Bonosus of Carthage’ had the same system 
of laws enforced upon them by Rome; but rather why ‘Superinius Aquila of 
Cologne’ or ‘Aurelius Bonosus of Carthage’ used Roman law, as and when 
they did, in any specifi c context or situation. Re-framing Galsterer’s problem 
in this way demands asking much broader questions concerning Roman 
private law and its ‘reception’ in the provinces under the early Empire. It 
also necessitates exploring what other alternatives – and limitations – existed 
on the ground, in specifi c localities, in terms of maintaining socio-legal order 
and handling confl ict.
How and to what extent any given individual, before or after 212 CE, 
either could make use of, or would want to make use of, Roman private 
48 See Amelotti (1999).
49 Revell (2009), p. 191; also Mattingly (2002).
50 Nutton (1978); also Stolte (2002). 
51 See Hauken (1998); Connolly (2010), pp. 137–58; and Gascou (2004). For the later Empire, 
see Fournet and Gascou (2004); and Fournet (2004). Petitioners also variously looked to 
Roman military offi cials, as discussed by Peachin (2007).
52 Millar (1983), p. 78. 
53 Millar (1983), p. 78. See also Carrié (2005), pp. 273–6 and Arjava (1999) on the ‘penetration’ 
of Roman family law into Egypt.
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law would have depended on a combination of various economic, politi-
cal, cultural and socio-legal factors. What kinds of access any specifi c 
individual, group or community had to (Roman) legal advice, to notaries 
and/or to Roman legal offi cials needs to be considered.54 Juridical capac-
ity, gender, and socio-economic status are also relatively obvious deter-
minants (although how they functioned in practice under both the early 
and later empires is often less than clear).55 Neither juridical capacity nor 
socio-economic status should be thought of as static phenomena within an 
individual’s lifespan: slaves could become freedmen; a fi lius familias could 
become sui iuris; honestiores and potentiores could suffer a loss of status, 
and so on. Patronage was fundamental, alongside the expectation that elite 
social status would be given its proper due within Roman legal processes.56 
Individuals, and groups, would also have weighed the costs and benefi ts – in 
terms of time, money and social status – of using Roman private law, rela-
tive to any specifi c situation.57 Lodging a formal case before a Roman offi cial 
was a particularly costly option: alongside the payment of necessary tips 
and fees to various offi cials, petitioners had to reckon with the possibility 
of a lengthy wait for justice – P. Euphrates 1 (246 CE) registers a complaint 
from the villagers of Beth Phouraia (Syria Coele) that they had waited for 
over eight months in Antioch for a decision from the governor.58 An appeal 
to an imperial offi cial, or a general reference to ‘the law of the emperors’ in 
a petition, however, could function as a marker of elite status and/or as a 
deliberate advertisement of loyalty to imperial authority. To use an example 
from the later Roman period, Joelle Beaucamp has demonstrated from 
papyrological evidence that the elite in Justinianic Egypt were more likely 
than those lower down the social strata to invoke substantive Roman law 
principles and imperial constitutions, throughout their legal dealings. She 
concludes that: ‘closeness to Imperial law was therefore connected to social 
conditions’.59 The Byzantine Egyptian elite may have had better access to 
imperial law, in the sense of better access to legal expertise, but they also had 
sociological reasons for aligning themselves with texts of law promulgated 
by the emperors.
Existing social structures and traditional local practices would also have 
infl uenced the way in which individuals engaged – or not – with Roman law 
principles and/or practices. For example, justice could be sought from the 
god(s), via a local temple, priest or holy man or through ‘self-help’ activities 
54 For the early Empire, see Kantor (2009).
55 On gender, see Grubbs (2002) and Bannon (2001); on socio-economic status, see Garnsey 
(1970) and Humfress (2006). 
56 On patronage, see now Garnsey (2010).
57 On the time and expense associated with Roman litigation in particular, see Kelly (2006), 
pp. 138–85.
58 Cotton and Eck (2005), p. 41.
59 Beaucamp (2007), p. 286.
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such as cursing.60 More generally, within any given community, disagree-
ments may usually have been heard before a local ‘big man’, for example a 
senatorial landowner, a tribal chief, or community elder(s). Depending on 
the context or situation, local ‘big men’ might have intervened in disagree-
ments and disputes with some awareness of Roman legal principles and 
practices (such as, for example, formal arbitration). It is just as likely, on the 
other hand, that a local big man would seek to resolve a dispute using local 
knowledge alone and employing general socio-cultural norms – thus provid-
ing a type of ‘justice’ in which the parties to the dispute were more likely to 
acquiesce.61 The social density of any given community – in a city, village, 
rural area, ‘great estate’, and so on – could also determine whether any use 
was made of Roman legal procedures or institutional structures.62 As numer-
ous modern studies in social anthropology, micro-economic theory and law 
have shown, socio-legal order can be maintained in a ‘tight-knit’ community 
or group with little or no recourse to formal law. In a 1991 monograph, for 
example, Ellickson showed how contemporary boundary and cattle trespass 
disputes in Shasta County, California were settled in the context of long-
established and continuing social relationships and groupings, highlighting 
the role of ‘strategic’ gossip, the threat of violence and the appeal to ‘com-
munity elders’.63 This perspective also provides a crucial context for the 
development of the Christian ‘episcopalis audientia’, the ‘bishop’s hearing’.64 
Finally, violent self-help should not necessarily be thought of as simply an 
alternative to Roman law and state-sanctioned coercion. Imperial offi cials 
took breaches in public law and order very seriously, if and when they came 
to their attention; ‘private’ violence, however, could also work in conjunc-
tion with Roman law. For example, an individual might attempt to enforce a 
property claim by violently seizing possession as a prelude to lodging a court 
case for rightful ownership; or seek out a Roman legal remedy for posses-
sion, and then use private violence to enforce it. All of the various factors 
discussed so far could change over time, as well as differ from one locality 
to the next – and each, of course, needs to be understood as operating in 
 relation to the others, in any given context.
When we do fi nd individuals using Roman law – whether in Rome or 
the provinces – that engagement could take place on a number of different 
levels, each implying various types of legal knowledge. First, in the broadest 
sense, Roman concepts of property, contract, trust, inheritance and so on 
were not just ‘legal’ concepts, they were also part of a broader socio-cultural 
60 Chaniotis (2009). See also Tomlin (1998) and Versnel (2010).
61 For discussion of potentially relevant ‘Roman’ socio-cultural norms, particularly in the 
context of elite behaviour, see Barton (2001).
62 Shaw (2000), p. 373 notes the ‘vast tracts of cityless lands that had to be controlled through 
the agency of local landowners and their domains’. 
63 Ellickson (1991). See also Galanter (1981), pp. 17–25.
64 This argument is explored in Humfress (2011).
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 repertoire.65 Hence, for example, we fi nd the technical Latin phrase sine dolo 
malo translated into Greek and inscribed on ‘confession inscriptions’ in 
Lydia and Phrygia (fi rst to third centuries CE).66 Or we fi nd early Christian 
authors, such as Tertullian and Cyprian in North Africa, developing theolog-
ical ideas by working through Roman legal metaphors.67 Second, on a more 
specifi c level: ‘Law may be used as a cookbook from which we learn how to 
bring about desired results – disposing of property, forming a partnership, 
securing a subsidy’.68 Until at least the Age of Justinian, there was no clear set 
of authoritative Roman legal ‘cookbooks’ to work from: hence the ‘recipe’ 
being followed would have differed according to access to legal advice, 
local practices, specifi c situations, and so on. Moreover, as the legal anthro-
pologists Franz and Keebet von Benda-Beckmann explain, with  reference to 
modern ethnographic studies:
In each arena actors make more or less constrained choices. They may avoid any 
use of law, opting for non-legal means. They may opt for one law and exclude 
others; they may also use more than one law. They may sharply distinguish legal 
systems, or efface their boundaries, or develop hybrid forms. Most of the time, 
people just go along in their daily routines without refl ecting on [the] law that has 
shaped these routines, their social relationships and attitude [. . .]69
Seen from the perspective of the individual actor, then, specifi c Roman legal 
forms could be used to transform an everyday occurrence – the making of a 
promise, the offering of a loan, a gift of property – into something that could 
then be viewed (plausibly) as a Roman ‘legal’ act, whether by other parties 
to the transaction, or by an imperial offi cial, or in a Roman court, and so 
on. This is perhaps the situation that we fi nd in the fi rst-century BCE Tabula 
Contrebiensis, in which a judgment is preceded by two technical Roman formu-
lae, despite the fact that the ‘underlying dispute did not rely on Roman law’;70 
or, similarly, with the evidence for third-century CE Egyptians inserting 
Roman stipulatio clauses into their ‘Greek’ contract documents.71 Individuals 
might also make use of Roman institutionalised practices by having a con-
tract drawn up according to a specifi c Roman structure, maybe employing 
specialist notaries or copyists where available, whilst expressing the contents 
of that document in non-technical Latin, or Greek, or Aramaic, or Hebrew, 
and so on.72 Imperial constitutions and juristic writings had to develop 
65 Fögen (2002).
66 Chaniotis (1997), pp. 382–4.
67 Humfress (2007), pp. 174–5.
68 Galanter (1981), p. 12.
69 Benda-Beckmann and Benda-Beckmann (2006), p. 24.
70 Birks, Rodger, and Richardson (1984). 
71 See Yiftach-Firanko (2009), p. 554.
72 For Roman documentary forms, see Ciulei (1983); Cotton (2003); Meyer (2004), pp. 170 and 
180–2; and Meyer (2007).
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various principles to decide upon the ‘legality’ of such agreements, if and 
when they were tested in the Roman courts. Individuals might equally opt 
for a ‘Roman’ procedure, such as appointing an arbitrator ex compromisso (by 
formal agreement), at the same time as deciding the dispute itself according to 
‘local’ norms.73 In all these examples, the focus is on what any given actor’s 
particular use and/or adaptation can tell us about how Roman law functioned 
within a specifi c ‘local’ framework, or even just with respect to a single case.
Those who went to the trouble and expense of litigating a dispute through 
a Roman court (or courts), or petitioning a Roman offi cial or emperor, 
would be judged, in general, according to Roman legal principles. Emperors, 
jurists and Roman offi cials under the Early Empire did take some established 
customs, ‘ancient practices’ and even ‘peregrine laws’ into account. For 
example, an imperial rescript promulgated on 26/27 March, 224 CE informs 
a certain Aper, a veteran, that whether the ruins of a house could be legally 
turned into a garden or not (thus changing the original land use) would be 
decided by the provincial governor on the basis of ‘what has usually been 
done in the town in similar cases’.74 Determining certain long-established 
local practices might also be essential to deciding cases according to Roman 
legal principles; for example, as in C.3.34.7 (286 CE), which refers to respect-
ing ‘ancient practices’ and ‘established customs’ in determining the right 
(servitude) to take water. In fact, according to Ulpian’s commentary on the 
praetorian edict, taking the customary practices of an urban neighbour-
hood into account could be an essential part of aequitas (equity).75 Certain 
practices, however, could be judged by the emperors and their offi cials to 
be ‘non-Roman’ – as and when they came to their attention.76 There is also 
(limited) evidence for some petitioners addressing questions to the emper-
ors with ‘Greek’ legal principles in mind. Other petitioners had done their 
Roman law homework, or else had found someone else to do it for them: 
a 294 CE rescript, addressed to a certain Fronto, instructs him to ‘cite the 
response of the jurist Papinian and the opinion of others whom you [sc. 
Fronto] have mentioned’ and to set up the defence of fraud (C.5.71.14). 
A certain Mucianus had likewise apparently copied an opinion of Papinian 
73 On arbitration ex compromiso, see Roebuck and De Loynes de Fumichon (2004), pp. 174–85.
74 C.8.10.3; see also C.8.52.1 which probably relates to the same case. Compare D.1.3.32 
(Iulian. 84 Dig.) and D.1.3.33 (Ulpian. 4 de Off. Procos.). 
75 D.25.4.1,15 (Ulpian. 24 ad Ed.) with specifi c reference to determining the paternity of a new-
born child, according to a list of praetorian formalities.
76 C.5.5.2 (285 CE, to Sebastina): the praetor’s edict brands a man who has two wives with 
infamy, thus having two wives should be punished; C.8.46.6 (288 CE, to Hermagenes): a 
Greek custom of publicly disowning children is ‘not approved by Roman laws’. For the 
restriction of Jewish marriage under the Late Empire, see C.1.9.7 (393 CE to Infantius, Count 
of the Orient) and more generally C.5.5.4 (to Andromachus, Count of the Private Estate). 
Millar (2008), p. 126 discusses a Jewish marriage contract (ketubah), dated 417 CE and written 
in Aramaic, from Antinoopolis, Egypt. 
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into his petition to the emperors (C.6.37.12, 240 CE). In general, classical 
jurists – addressing themselves perhaps to a particular ‘elite’ top section of 
society – agreed that those who made use of Roman law could not then plead 
ignorance of Roman law as a defence. Ulpian, again commenting on the pra-
etorian edict, specifi cally on time limits for claiming praetorian possession 
of an estate, goes further:
Pomponius says that the knowledge which is necessary is not such as is exacted 
from persons learned in the law, but is what anyone can acquire, either by himself 
or through others; that is to say, by taking the advice of persons learned in the law, 
as the diligent head of the household should do.77
In sum, a culture of ‘professional’ Roman law was by no means irrelevant to 
legal practice within the provinces of the empire, but it was not determinant 
of it either. Even if we were to suppose that individuals had unlimited access 
to relevant jurisprudential texts and legal expertise (in some cases, a big ‘if’), 
we still need to acknowledge what Wickham terms ‘a constant dialectic 
between local practices and organized legal knowledge’.78
Since at least Mitteis and Schönbauer, Roman historians have in fact 
acknowledged the existence of other types of ‘organized legal knowledge’ 
existing alongside Roman law in certain provinces of the early Empire: 
‘Greek law’, ‘Egyptian law’, ‘Jewish law’, ‘Nabatean law’, what Mélèze 
Modrzejewski terms ‘Hellenistic law’, and so on.79 Much of this scholar-
ship, however, tends to be based upon what Lauren Benton (in a different 
context) describes as a ‘stacked legal systems or spheres’ model: a model 
that imagines a number of ‘ordered, nested legal spheres or systems’, with 
state law, in our case to be understood as Roman law, ‘capping the plural 
legal order’ through its ability to establish a monopoly on violence.80 Benton 
argues that this ‘stacked’ model is fundamentally fl awed because individuals 
on the ground engage in ‘rampant boundary crossing’ across legal systems 
or spheres:
Legal ideas and practices, legal protections of material interests, and the roles 
of legal personnel (specialized or not) fail to obey the lines separating one legal 
system or sphere from another. Legal actors, too, appeal regularly to multiple 
legal authorities and perceive themselves as members of more than one legal com-
munity. The image of ordered, nested legal systems clashes with wide-ranging legal 
practices and perceptions.81
77 D.38.15.2.5 (Ulpian. 49 ad Ed.); compare D.37.1.10 (Paul. 2 ad Sab.).
78 Wickham (2003), p. 4.
79 See, in general, Tuori (2007). On ‘Nabatean law’, see Cotton (2009); on ‘Coptic law’ as a 
misleading concept, see Papaconstantinou (2009), p. 450 with fn. 16.
80 Benton (2002), p. 8. See also Benton (2007).
81 Benton (2002), p. 8.
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This argument can be developed with respect to the fi rst-century ‘Babatha 
archive’, a collection of papyri, found in the Nahal Hever cave in the 
Judaean desert, consisting primarily of legal family documents including 
contracts of loan, marriage contracts and deeds of sale and gift –  variously 
written in Jewish, Greek, Aramaic and Nabatean Aramaic languages. 
Babatha’s archive (and the accompanying archive of Salome Komaise) has 
generated a great deal of scholarly discussion concerning what type of law 
might have governed the legal situations envisioned in these papyri: whether 
it was Jewish, Rabbinic, Hellenistic, or Roman.82 The question of the ‘legal 
identity’ of the Babatha archive has also been linked to questions con-
cerning the ‘identity’ of Babatha herself: was she more Jewish, Hellenistic 
or Roman? Comparatively little work, however, has been done on how 
Babatha might have attempted to strategically range across different types 
of law and legal institutions in order to achieve an outcome favourable to 
her interests. A 2005 essay by Satlow, focusing on marriage payments and 
succession strategies in the Judaean desert documents, begins to explore this 
alternative perspective:
I have tried to avoid explaining the papyri in the light of Rabbinic or ‘Hellenistic’ 
law or practice. I have done this not because I believe, a priori, that such com-
parisons are methodologically unsound; indeed in this particular case the rabbinic 
material nicely illustrates and confi rms some of the suggestions offered here. 
Rather, my goal has not been to see how ‘Jewish’ or ‘Hellenistic’ Babatha and her 
friends were, but to try to understand a family at work, negotiating the mundane 
and treacherous terrain of money and familial relationships.83
Likewise, Elizabeth Meyer and Hannah Cotton have both drawn attention 
to the fact that:
Babatha was a woman who fl ed to the Nahal Hever cave with no fewer than 
three Greek translations of the Roman formula of the actio tutelae in her leather 
pouch, so it is easy to believe that she was investigating the legal possibilities of 
the Roman legal system in Arabia for the likes of herself, and trying to exploit the 
opportunities it offered to the best of her abilities.84
Babatha’s use of both Rabbinic and Roman law thus becomes evidence for 
(her access to) a kind of ‘multi-legal’ knowledge or at least a ‘multi-legal’ 
awareness – through which she attempted to achieve certain specifi c goals.85 
Franz von Benda-Beckmann has developed a similar argument on the basis 
82 See, for example, Cotton (2002); Cotton and Eck (2005); and Mélèze Modrzejewski (2005).
83 Satlow (2005), p. 65.
84 Meyer (2007), pp. 62–3; also Cotton (2002), p. 18: ‘Rome’s subjects could and would seek 
Roman justice whenever they believed that it would be more effective, more advantageous, 
and more just than the local one’.
85 On ‘multi-legal’ awareness, compare, for example, Pirie (2006) on Tibetan Pastoralists. 
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of ethnographical fi eldwork in contemporary Western Sumatra; working in 
the fi eld, legal anthropologists were:
forced to contextualize, [to] see how different categories of actors were infl uenced 
by, and made use of, different legal bodies in different contexts of interaction. In 
order to do this systematically, they had to dissociate categories of actors from the 
categories of law to which the actors ‘belonged’ by normative construction, that 
is, the farmer from his/her customary law; the bureaucrat from his state law; the 
religious functionary from his religious law. Only then could they see that farmers 
used, or were infl uenced by, state law; bureaucrats by traditional law etc. Empirical 
research further showed that the relations between the elements in a plural legal 
whole could be different; people could distinguish legal subsystems and choose 
between them, or accumulate them, or create new combined legal forms and 
 institutions, while other actors, in other contexts, would act differently.86
There seems to be real potential for developing this kind of legal anthro-
pological methodology further with respect to the much broader vista of 
legal practice revealed to us by papyrological evidence, epigraphical data 
and other fi rst to third-century sources (including ‘Patristic’ texts). This 
approach leads us fi rmly away from the idea of an empire-wide imposition of 
Roman law potentially or actually governing the legal behaviour of Rome’s 
subjects; rather, it will reveal them, as groups or individuals, negotiating 
the structures of Roman law and choosing – in so far as they were able – to 
engage with them, or not.
3. ROMAN LAW AND THE LATER EMPIRE: DEVELOPING A 
LEGAL ANTHROPOLOGICAL APPROACH
I ask of your illustrious knowledge, whether there is one law for advocates and 
another for retired advocates, one equity for Rome and another for Matar?87
These questions, written in an early fi fth-century letter addressed to a practis-
ing advocate by a retired advocate (ex togato), were intended to be understood 
rhetorically: according to the questioner at least, when two such learned 
individuals had a dispute with each other, their sense of equity, of ‘fairness’ 
and right dealing, should be the same whether the confl ict unfolded at Rome 
or in the environs of their home town of Matar in Africa Proconsularis. 
Whilst some important modern scholarship has explored the kind of out-of-
court negotiations and ‘extra-legal’ strategies that our two elite fi fth-century 
North Africans were engaged in here, law in the Later Roman Empire is 
more usually associated with the unifi ed legal system of the Emperor and 
86 Benda-Beckmann (2009), p. 32. 
87 Ep. ad salvium PL 20.243C-D. For discussion of this letter and its background, see Lepelley 
(1989), pp. 240–51; and Sirks (1999).
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their imperial magistrates (as well as other legal offi cials operating from 
within the imperial bureaucracy).88
What is most visible in the late Roman legal evidence is, naturally, the 
product of the ‘central’ imperial government (imperial constitutions and 
law codes), and the imperially-sponsored institutional Christian church 
(especially with respect to the development of a specifi c ius ecclesiasticum and 
the early beginnings of a ‘canon law’).89 Moving from the principate to the 
dominate, we seem to shift from a legal world of ‘citizens’ to one of ‘citizens 
and subjects’: ‘As the Roman Empire expanded, the state became ever more 
intrusive in seeking to resolve the disputes of its citizens . . . The judge under 
the Empire in the provinces was an extension of state power and a symptom 
of the expanded role of the state in the lives of its citizens and subjects’.90 This 
is a trend that appears to culminate in the sixth-century emperor Justinian’s 
insistence that he alone is the sole interpreter of the law and the source of 
both Roman and ecclesiastical jurisprudence, alongside his confi rmation of 
the canons of the Christian church themselves as civil laws.91 However, even 
if, for the sake of the argument, we were to equate all late Roman law with 
imperial law, a ‘legal anthropological’ perspective is still essential to under-
standing how that law functioned in practice. As Chris Wickham has argued 
with reference to courts and confl ict in medieval Tuscany:
Even if we restricted our interest to the impact of Roman law, we would have 
to recognize that its nature and extent depended on the choices of the members 
of different local communities (whether litigants, lawyers or judges) as to how 
to approach law, and what law (if any) to use [. . .] These were cultural choices, 
whether conscious or unconscious, made inside locally specifi c realities; the social 
processes that generated them must be studied before anything else. There was 
everywhere, furthermore, a constant dialectic between local practices and organ-
ized legal knowledge: each affected the other. What we need to study in order to 
understand this dialectic is how people approached courts and arbitrations, with 
what expectations, and which strategies they used to get their way.92
88 On late Roman out-of-court negotiation and formal arbitration, see Gagos and Van Minnen 
(1995); Harries (2003); and Harries (2007), pp. 28–42. Studies for the post-Roman West 
are, of course, more numerous, for example: Davies and Fouracre (1986); Wormald (1998); 
Rosenwein (1999); Brown (2001); Brown and Gorecki (2004); Karras, Kaye, and Matter 
(2008); and Rio (2009).
89 See Gaudemet (1985); Gaudemet (1983); Gaudemet (1979); Crogiez-Pétrequin, Jaillette and 
Huck (2009); and Aubert and Blanchard (2009).
90 Harries (2003), p. 71. Garnsey (2004), pp. 140–50 rightly stresses that citizenship and its 
various gradations still functioned as important legal mechanisms in the later Roman empire.
91 C.1.14.12, Justinian to Demosthenes PP (529 CE); Digest, Const. Deo Auctore, 6; Justinian, 
Institutes pr.; Justinian, Novel 9pr (535 CE) and Justinian, Nov.131.1 (545 CE). Compare 
C.1.14.11 (474 CE). On Roman and Canon law in the age of Justinian, see the introductory 
chapter to Van der Wal and Stolte (1994).
92 Wickham (2003), p. 4.
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This kind of legal anthropological approach foregrounds individual parties, 
their perceptions of action and the choices that they make within any given 
socio-cultural situation, whilst still taking account of law codes, ‘state’ insti-
tutions and legal offi cials where relevant. It thus contrasts with what the legal 
sociologist Marc Galanter characterised as a legal-centralist perspective: ‘The 
view that the justice to which we seek access is a product that is produced – 
or at least distributed – exclusively by the state [. . .]’.93 If we set to one side 
a (nineteenth- and early twentieth-century) state-based theory of law that 
puts offi cial law codes, formal legal institutions and the state at the core of all 
social order, then the idea of legal universalism under the Later Empire has 
the potential to look quite different.
What is at stake in developing a legal anthropological approach, rather 
than adopting a legal-centralist perspective, can be demonstrated via a brief 
analysis of the concept of ‘legal practice’ itself. If we adopt a legal-centralist 
starting point, then exploring legal practice inevitably involves some kind 
of questioning as to how far the ‘law-in-the-books’, or indeed unwritten 
customary law, relates to the law-in-action.94 Exploring legal practice thus 
becomes an exercise in ‘gap analysis’: does the law on the ground match the 
offi cial law as promulgated, or at least as transmitted, in the books? If not, 
how big are the gaps and why might they exist?95 Late Roman historians, for 
example, tend to ask to what extent late Roman imperial constitutions – or 
even the canons of church councils – were applied in practice, and whether 
they were used correctly or not; in other words, we go to the ‘legal’ texts, 
then we look at law in practice, we inevitably fi nd gaps, and try to account 
for them.96 A ‘legal anthropological’ approach, on the other hand – where 
we try to understand legal processes as socio-cultural processes – does not 
neglect the ‘law-in-the-books’ (whether imperial codes, juristic writings), 
but seeks rather to contextualise that ‘state’ law in terms of a much broader 
understanding of legal practice. From a legal anthropological perspective, 
for example: ‘The principal contribution of courts to dispute resolution is 
providing a background of norms and procedures against which negotia-
tions and regulation in both private and governmental settings take place’.97 
Individuals bargain and strategise ‘in the shadow of the law’, hence, in the 
words of Galanter: ‘The courts (and the law they apply) may thus be said 
to confer on the parties what Mnookin and Kornhauser call a “bargaining 
endowment,” i.e., a set of “counters” to be used in bargaining between 
disputants.’98 All of this activity, moreover, takes place in the context of 
93 Galanter (1981), p. 1.
94 On the concept of ‘customary law’ as ‘unwritten law’, see Schulze (1992), pp. 13–14.
95 On ‘gap analysis’, see Hartog (1985), p. 925 with fn.94 and Galanter (1981), p. 5.
96 This was the methodology that I (unconsciously) followed in Humfress (2005) and Humfress 
(2006b). Compare Arjava (2003–4) and Stolte (2009).
97 Galanter (1981), p. 6.
98 Galanter (1981), p. 6. The reference is to Mnookin and Kornhauser (1979).
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what Galanter terms ‘indigenous ordering’ or ‘indigenous law’, a ‘social 
ordering that is indigenous – i.e., familiar to and applied by the participants 
in the everyday activity that is being regulated’.99 For the later Roman 
Empire we might think of a particular Christian community within the city 
of Constantinople, or a specifi c trade association at Carthage, and so on. In 
order to explore ‘law in practice’, we fi rst have to take account of who is 
using the formal/offi cial law, in the context of what ‘indigenous order’ or 
‘indigenous law’ and to what ends. As Galanter concludes:
I am not trying to turn legal centralism upside down and place indigenous law in 
the position of primacy. Instead I suggest that the relation of offi cial and indig-
enous law is variable and problematic. Nor do I mean to idealize indigenous law 
as either more virtuous or more effi cient than offi cial law. Although by defi ni-
tion indigenous law may have the virtues of being familiar, understandable, and 
independent of professionals, it is not always the expression of harmonious 
egalitarianism. It often refl ects narrow and parochial concerns; it is often based 
on relations of domination; its coerciveness may be harsh and indiscriminate; 
 protections that are available in public forums may be absent.100
A legal anthropological approach, then, acknowledges that rule-systems 
and their measures of enforcement were effectively spread throughout Late 
Roman society. Its starting point would be an attempt to reconstruct the 
fi eld of late Roman legal practice from the perspective of individual actors, 
groups or communities, given their respective ‘horizons of the possible’: 
who they were, where they were and what kinds of indigenous ordering 
structured their lives – as well as their access to different types of formal legal 
‘knowledge’ and imperial institutional structures.
4. CONCLUSION
Offi cial Roman (or Graeco-Roman) sources envisage a world ruled by the 
universal law of Rome and its emperors. However, the central government 
of Rome, whether in the early or the late empire, before or after the edict 
of Caracalla, did not control the lives of all its subjects in the sphere of 
law, and did not attempt to do so. It is more profi table to look at the issue 
of law and legal practice from the bottom up, and to ask whether, how and 
why Rome’s subjects, as individuals or as groups, availed themselves of 
the Roman legal system – given that from the third century CE, the sphere 
of Roman law had expanded, and that the bulk of the inhabitants of the 
empire (most of those who were free) had rights, as Roman citizens, to 
access it. Such an enquiry takes us well beyond the imperial law codes into 
papyri, inscriptions and diverse literary texts (including the works of the 
99 Galanter (1981), p. 17.
100 Galanter (1981), p. 25.
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Church Fathers, a rich source of evidence for legal or extra-legal behaviour 
at the local level); and it leads us to explore the ways in which Roman law 
and legal knowledge were used and adapted to local conditions and needs, 
or simply bypassed, as diverse other strategies were employed for settling 
disputes and securing order. A legal anthropological approach is an essen-
tial complement to and corrective of the legal-centralist perspective that is 
dominant in late Roman legal studies. ‘The main point may be, that law 
never was one and that, however sublime justice may be, law is a complex 
of systems of social control among other complexes of systems of social 
control’.101
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Chapter 6
The Concept of Conubium in the Roman Republic
Saskia T. Roselaar
1. INTRODUCTION
During their conquest of Italy, the Romans devised various legal instru-
ments to regulate their relations with people who did not possess Roman 
citizenship. One of the issues that needed regulation was marriage: laws had 
to be formulated to enable marriage between people from different politi-
cal entities, and to lay down rules for the regulation of inheritance in such 
unions.
It is often assumed that the main instrument devised by the Romans to 
regulate marriage with peregrini – a term which included Latin and Italian 
allies, as well as other non-citizens – was conubium or ius conubii, which might 
be translated as a ‘right to marry each other’. It is usually assumed that conu-
bium was a right that could be granted by Rome to non-citizens, and permit-
ted them the use of certain legal instruments related to marriage, which were 
otherwise only available to citizens. The presence of conubium was especially 
important because of its implications for inheritance law. If a marriage was 
not concluded legally, any children would not be recognised and therefore 
would not be the automatic heirs of the parents. This meant that the legality 
of marriage remained important throughout Roman history. Unfortunately, 
our sources for conubium in the Republic are extremely scanty; for the 
Empire there is much more information available, but we cannot assume 
that conubium in this period followed the same rules as before. Nevertheless, 
some sources exist that claim to be describing very early Roman history, 
although their reliability is questionable.
Here I will review the legal possibilities for marriage between Romans and 
non-citizens in the Republic, especially the idea that conubium with Roman 
citizens was a privilege granted to people with Latin status. Thus, the rela-
tions between the legal framework and the practical side of marriage will 
become clear. I will argue that many long-standing assumptions about mar-
riage between Romans and aliens in the Republic cannot hold; in particular, 
the idea that Latins enjoyed widespread conubium with Romans seems to 
me very unlikely. This has important implications for our ideas concerning 
social relations between Romans and their allies in Italy.
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2. CONUBIUM UNDER THE EMPIRE
First of all we must investigate the basic meaning of the term conubium, which 
was derived from con + nubere (‘marry + to/with’). The usage of conubium 
as a shorthand for ‘marriage’ occurs occasionally from the late Republic 
onwards, for example in Livy’s description of the war between Romans 
and Sabines. The Sabine women tell their fathers: ‘If you are weary of these 
ties of kindred, these marriage-bonds (si conubii piget), then turn your anger 
upon us; it is we who are the cause of the war, it is we who have wounded 
and slain our husbands and fathers’.1 Cicero describes the development of 
ties between people, leading to the growth of states: ‘Then follow in turn 
marriages (conubia) and connections by marriage, and from these again a 
new stock of relations, and from this propagation and growth states have 
their beginnings’.2 This meaning becomes much more common in the later 
Empire, for example in Augustine: ‘It is perhaps not absurd to call it “mar-
riage” (conubium), if (the union) has been agreeable to them up to the death of 
one of them’.3 It was also used in this way in offi cial texts: ‘It seems unworthy 
for men who do not possess any rank to descend to sordid conubia with slave 
women’.4 However, for the Republican period and the early and middle 
Empire, conubium usually denotes a legal right or privilege to  conclude 
marriage.
Conubium as a legal right is widely discussed in imperial sources; however, 
it should be kept in mind that we cannot assume that the same rules applied 
during the Republic. A starting point is the Rules of Ulpian, written down in 
the third century CE. Ulpian states:
A rightful marriage exists, when between those who contract a marriage there is 
conubium [. . .] Conubium is the ability to take a wife. Roman citizens have conubium 
with Roman citizens, but with Latins and peregrini only if this has been granted. 
With slaves there is no conubium.5 Between parents and offspring to a certain grade 
conubium never exists6 [. . .] If conubium applies, the children always follow the 
(status of) the father; if conubium does not apply, they pertain to the condition of 
the mother, except that from a peregrinus and a Roman citizen woman a peregrinus 
is born, because the Lex Minicia ordered that one born from a peregrinus on one 
1 Liv. Hist. 1.13. Tacitus uses it thus in Hist. 3.34: Cremona, through ‘the many connections 
and intermarriages formed with neighbouring nations (adnexu conubiisque gentium), grew and 
fl ourished’. See Hist. 4.65: ‘Those who in former days settled here and have been united to 
us by marriage’ (nobiscum per conubium sociatis). Similar meanings in Verg. Aen. 3.136, 4.168, 
7.96, 7.333, 12.821; Cul. 299; Stat. Theb. 7.300; Silv. 1.2.195.
2 Cic. Off. 1.54.
3 Augustin. Bon. Con. 5.
4 CTh.12.1.6 (318 CE); Prudent. c. Symm. 2.617. See Volterra (1950), pp. 368–9. 
5 Treggiari (1991), p. 44 thinks marriage between free and freed was not forbidden in the 
Republic.
6 See Corbett (1930), pp. 47–51.
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side should follow the condition of the inferior parent. From a Roman citizen and 
a Latin woman a Latin is born, and from a free man and a slave woman a slave, 
because in these cases there is no conubium, and they therefore follow the status 
of the mother.7
Gaius in the second century gives much the same regulations:
Roman citizens are understood to have contracted legal marriage and to have 
children born from it in their power, if they have married Roman citizen women 
or Latin or peregrine women with whom they have the right of marriage. For it 
happens that, because the right of marriage results in children following their 
father’s status, not only do they become Roman citizens, but they are also in their 
father’s power.8
Therefore, the rule was that ‘conubium always means that he who is born 
follows the condition of the father’.9
Therefore, someone enjoying conubium would be able to contract a iustum 
matrimonium according to the rights of Roman citizens. Thus, conubium was 
‘the right to contract a marriage with a foreigner which will be upheld in a 
Roman court of law, with full validity of testamentary power and paternity 
rights’.10 Roman citizens could always marry each other, unless there was 
a legal impediment.11 However, being a Roman citizen did not automati-
cally carry conubium with everyone else; it was a condition that had to exist 
between both people.12 Marriage with a Latin or peregrine was only possible 
7 Ulpian. Reg. 5.2: ‘Iustum matrimonium est, si inter eos, qui nuptias contrahunt, conubium 
sit [. . .] 3. Conubium est uxoris ducendis facultas. 4. Conubium habent cives Romani cum 
civibus Romanis; cum Latinis autem et peregrinis ita: si concessum sit. 5. Cum servis nullum 
est conubium. 6. Inter parentes et liberos infi nite cuiuscumque gradus conubium non est 
[. . .] 8. Conubio interveniente liberi semper patrem sequuntur, non interveniente conubio 
matris conditioni accedunt, excepto eo, quod ex peregrino et cive Romana peregrinus nasci-
tur, quoniam lex Minicia ex alterutro peregrino natum deterioris parentis condicionem sequi 
iubet. 9. Ex cive Romano et Latina Latinus nascitur, et ex libero et ancilla servus, quoniam, 
cum his casibus conubia non sint, partus sequitur matrem’. For marriage between freedmen 
and their patrons, see D.24.2.11pr-2; 23.2.45.4–6; 25.7.1pr (all Ulpian. 3 ad Leg. Iul. et Pap.); 
C.5.5.1; for pupils, see C.5.6.1. See Serv. Aen. 1.73: Conubium est ius legitimi matrimonii. See 
Gardner (1986), pp. 32–6; Treggiari (1991), pp. 37–43; Evans-Grubbs (2002), pp. 154–5.
8 Inst.Gai.1.56–7: ‘Iustas autem nuptias contraxisse liberosque iis procreatos in potestate 
habere cives Romani ita intelleguntur, si cives romanas uxores duxerint vel etiam Latinas 
peregrinasve cum quibus conubium habeant, cum enim conubium id effi ciat ut liberi patris 
condicionem sequantur, evenit ut non solum cives Romani fi ant sed et in potestate patris 
sint’. See 1.76–80; C.5.27.11pr.
9 Inst.Gai.1.81: ‘Semper conubium effi cit ut qui nascitur patris condicioni accedat’.
10 Sherwin-White (1973), pp. 33–4. See Corbett (1930), p. 24: ‘Conubium is said to exist between 
a man and a woman when they are capable of legal intermarriage’.
11 De Visscher (1952), p. 405. For conubium as a right awarded to discharged soldiers, see Inst. 
Gai. 1.57 with Corbett (1930), pp. 39–42; Sherwin-White (1973), p. 268; Mirkovic (1986); 
Treggiari (1991), p. 44. 
12 De la Chevalerie (1954), pp. 272–3.
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if conubium had been granted to them, individually or to a whole people or 
city, by the Roman state.13
Children from such a marriage followed the citizenship status of the 
highest-ranked partner, at least after the Lex Minicia was introduced (see 
below). Children from a iustum matrimonium were in patria potestas; without 
lawful marriage, they were fatherless and sui iuris.14 This had important con-
sequences for inheritance rights: in case of intestate death, the fi rst heirs were 
the sui heredes, that is those who were in potestate (legitimate children who 
had not been emancipated) or manus (wives married in manus, see below);15 
they now became sui iuris. Illegitimate children were not in patria potestas and 
therefore were not sui heredes. If there were no sui heredes, the intestate heirs 
would be, fi rst, the agnati proximi (male relatives on the father’s side), then the 
gentiles.16 All sui, male or female, took equal shares. A woman could not have 
sui heredes, since she did not have patria potestas.17 Therefore, in a marriage 
without conubium, there was no automatic succession between parents and 
children on intestacy in Roman law.18 Furthermore, after the death of one 
partner, the remaining partner could only claim the estate if the marriage was 
valid, and only if there were no heredes or agnates.19 Wives married sine manu 
and who were sui iuris could be appointed heirs, but only by a will; they were 
not intestate heirs.20 Furthermore, if someone was not a Roman citizen sui 
iuris, he could not make a will. Making a will was an act of the ius civile, and 
 therefore peregrini could not make one, nor inherit from a Roman by law.21
In practice, it was diffi cult to check whether conubium existed between 
two intended partners; at the census a man had to declare that he had a wife 
‘to his best knowledge’ (ex sententia);22 since, if he were married without 
conubium, he would not have a legal wife, the question likely intended to 
ask whether he was legally married. However, the censors could not easily 
check the truthfulness of the answer; if the husband and/or wife were Roman 
citizens, it would have been possible to check previous census lists to see if 
they had been registered before as such. For a Latin or peregrinus, the only 
13 Volterra (1950), pp. 357–8; Crook (1967), p. 40; Gardner (1986), pp. 142–4; Evans-Grubbs 
(2002), pp. 18–21; Frier and McGinn (2004), p. 32.
14 Inst.Gai.1.87. 
15 Fayer (2005), pp. 197–222 points out that marriage and conventio in manus were not necessar-
ily part of the same process nor occurred at the same time.
16 Treggiari (1991), pp. 28–9; Saller (1994), p. 163; Gardner (1998), pp. 15–16; Frier and 
McGinn (2004), pp. 322–4.
17 Inst.Gai.3.1–8. See Watson (1971), p. 175; Gardner (1986), pp. 190–4; Evans-Grubbs (2002), 
p. 219; Frier and McGinn (2004), pp. 339–40. 
18 Treggiari (1991), pp. 49–50.
19 D.38.11.1pr (Ulpian. 47 ad Ed.). See Cic. Top. 4.20.
20 Treggiari (1991), p. 383.
21 Watson (1971), pp. 22, 26, 33; see in general Kaser (1960), pp. 695–7. 
22 Sulp. ap. Gell., N.A. 4.3.2; Gell. N.A. 4.20.3; Dion. Hal. 2.25.7; Cic. De Or. 2.260. See 
Treggiari (1991) p. 58.
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option was to check local census records, but this would have been cumber-
some or impossible. Therefore, it may regularly have occurred that a couple 
discovered they were not legally married, even if they thought they were. The 
discovery that no conubium existed with a betrothed was a valid reason to end 
the engagement.23 Under the Empire there were regulations about marriage 
in error, since this may have occurred frequently:
If a Roman citizen man has married a Latin or peregrine wife through ignorance, 
because he believed that she was a Roman citizen, and has begotten a son, the child 
is not in his power, because he is not even a Roman citizen, but either a Latin or 
peregrine [. . .] By a decree of the Senate it is permitted to prove a case of error, 
and so the wife also and the son arrive at Roman citizenship, and from that time 
the son begins to be in his father’s power [. . .] Likewise, if a Roman citizen woman 
has married a peregrine man through error, as if he were a Roman citizen, it is per-
mitted to her to prove a case of error, and so also her son and her husband arrive 
at Roman citizenship, and equally the son begins to be in his father’s power.24
The most important aim was to ensure that children were legitimate, because 
having legitimate children, and therefore making sure they were legal 
 intestate heirs, was the most important goal of marriage.
3. CONUBIUM AMONG CITIZENS IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC
The sources suggest that a concept of conubium already existed in the early 
Republic, and that some of its elements were similar to those we encounter 
in later sources.
In 445 BCE debate erupted about intermarriage between patricians and ple-
beians: ‘C. Canuleius, a tribune of the plebs, introduced a law with regard to 
the intermarriage of patricians and plebeians. The patricians considered that 
their blood would be contaminated by it and the special rights of the houses 
thrown into confusion’.25 Canuleius then held a speech in which he argued:
In one of these laws we demand the right of intermarriage, a right usually granted 
to neighbours and foreigners – indeed we have granted citizenship, which is more 
than intermarriage, even to a conquered enemy [. . .] Was not this very prohibi-
tion of intermarriage between patricians and plebeians, which infl icts such serious 
injury on the commonwealth and such a gross injustice on the plebs, made by the 
decemvirs within these last few years? [. . .] They are guarding against our becom-
ing connected with them by affi nity or relationship, against our blood being allied 
with theirs [. . .] If your nobility is tainted by union with us, could you not have 
kept it pure by private regulations, by not seeking brides from the plebs, and not 
23 Sen. Ben. 4.27.5. See Treggiari (1991), p. 158.
24 Inst.Gai.1.67. 
25 Liv. Hist. 4.1.2.
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suffering your sisters or daughters to marry outside your order? [. . .] That this 
should be prohibited by law and the intermarriage of patricians and plebeians 
made impossible is indeed insulting to the plebs [. . .] For, as a matter of fact, what 
difference is there, if a patrician marries a plebeian woman or a plebeian marries a 
patrician? [. . .] Of course, the children follow the father.26
Dionysius states that the decemviri in the Twelve Tables of 451–50 BCE forbade 
marriage (epigamia) between patricians and plebeians; epigamia may be a 
translation of conubium, or at least of the concept as it existed in Dionysius’s 
own time.27 It is likely that patricians and plebeians in earlier periods did in 
fact marry each other, and that the ban on doing so was only a result of an 
increasing movement by the patricians to separate themselves from the plebe-
ians.28 Already for the very start of Roman history, Livy describes conubium 
as a legal concept that could be shared by different peoples:
Rome had now become so strong that it was a match for any of its neighbours in 
war, but its greatness threatened to last for only one generation, since through the 
absence of women there was no hope of offspring, and there was no right of inter-
marriage with their neighbours [. . .] Romulus sent envoys amongst the surrounding 
nations to ask for alliance and the right of intermarriage on behalf of his new 
community.29
Of course most of these stories are legendary, so they do not offer real 
 evidence for a legal concept of conubium in this early period.30
It is likely that this episode was constructed later as an element of the 
‘Struggle of the Orders’ between patricians and plebeians, possibly on 
the basis of misunderstood evidence. Forsythe, for example, argues that the 
idea of a marriage ban between the classes was based on a later obligation 
for priests to marry by the rite of confarreatio, which Livy might have under-
stood as being the result of an earlier limitation on marriage between patri-
cians and plebeians.31 The class struggle was not limited to Rome, but was 
considered by later authors to be an element of society in Latium in general. 
Livy relates that in 443 BCE a confl ict erupted in Ardea, because
26 Liv. Hist. 4.3.4–4.11.
27 Dion. Hal. 10.60. See Twelve Tables 11.1; Dion. Hal. 11.2.2; Cic. Rep. 2.63. See Volterra 
(1950), p. 373; Catalano (1965), p. 99.
28 Corbett (1930), p. 30, however, states that intermarriage occurred from 445 BCE onwards 
apparently misunderstanding Livy.
29 Liv. Hist. 1.9.1–2: ‘... nec cum fi nitimis conubia essent. Tum ex consilio patrum Romulus 
legatos circa vicinas gentes misit qui societatem conubiumque novo populo peterent’. Ov. 
Fast. 3.195–200 also says that ‘rights of intermarriage’ were granted to foreigners: ‘Rights of 
intermarriage are granted to distant peoples, / yet none wished to marry a Roman’ (‘extremis 
dantur conubia gentibus, at quae Romano vellet nubere, nulla fuit’).
30 Cornell (2005).
31 Forsythe (2005), p. 229.
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two young men were courting a girl of plebeian descent celebrated for her beauty. 
One of them, the girl’s equal in point of birth, was encouraged by her guardians, 
who belonged to the same class; the other, a young noble captivated solely by her 
beauty, was supported by the sympathy and good-will of the nobility.32 
If we assume that Romans and Latins at this time shared conubium (see 
below), then it appears that conubium would have been especially important 
for the nobility as a mechanism by which they created alliances throughout 
Latium, while not permitting the members of their class to reduce its power 
by marrying plebeians.33 In any case, it is likely that the ban on marriage 
between patricians and plebeians was lifted shortly after 445 BCE, since 
there is much evidence for marriage between the two groups in the later 
Republic.34
4. CONUBIUM BETWEEN ROMANS AND LATINS BEFORE 
338 BCE
A commonly held belief among modern scholars is that conubium was essen-
tial for a legal marriage between Romans and peregrini. A special group of 
peregrini were the Latins, and it is usually assumed that conubium existed 
between them and the Romans before and after the Latin War of 341–38 BCE.
Our earliest evidence for conubium in a non-legendary context appears in 
Livy’s description of the settlement of Latium by the Romans in 338:
Lanuvium received the full citizenship [. . .] Aricium, Nomentum, and Pedum 
obtained the same political rights as Lanuvium. Tusculum retained the citizenship 
which it had had before. [. . .] Antium [. . .] [was] admitted to citizenship. [. . .] The 
rest of the Latin cities were deprived of the rights of intermarriage, free trade, and 
common councils with each other (‘ceteris Latinis populis conubia commerciaque 
et concilia inter se ademerunt’). Capua [. . .] was given civitas sine suffragio, as were 
also Fundi and Formiae.35
This passage is crucial in our study of conubium, although we should keep in 
mind that it was written 300 years after the events it describes. Nevertheless, 
Livy’s detailed enumeration of Latin towns and their varying treatments 
suggest that he had reliable details available regarding the privileges and pun-
ishments they received. The phrasing suggests that most of the Latins (apart 
from those retaining their privileges) were deprived of conubia and commercia 
32 Liv. Hist. 4.9.
33 De Visscher (1952); see De la Chevalerie (1954), p. 280.
34 Gardner (1986), p. 32.
35 Liv. Hist. 8.14: ‘Lanuvinis civitas data sacraque sua reddita [. . .] Aricini Nomentanique et 
Pedani eodem iure quo Lanuvini in ciuitatem accepti [. . .] Et Antium [. . .] civitas data. [. . .] 
Ceteris Latinis populis conubia commerciaque et concilia inter se ademerunt. Campanis 
[. . .] Fundanisque et Formianis [. . .] civitas sine suffragio data’.
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generally, both those with Rome and with each other, whereas the concilia 
were inter se, that is between the Latin towns.36
Dionysius mentions that isopoliteia existed between Romans and Latins in 
the period before 338 BCE, and that they had received this through the Foedus 
Cassianum of 493 BCE: ‘All the Latins, to whom we lately granted equal rights 
of citizenship, will be on our side, fi ghting for this commonwealth as for a 
country now their fatherland’.37 In combination with Livy’s passage for 338 
BCE, this leads to the assumption that before 338 conubium was a reciprocal 
right, which not only granted a Latin the right to marry a Roman, but also a 
Roman to marry a Latin, and for Latins between themselves to marry each 
other. This would be in keeping with the principle of isopoliteia as claimed 
by Dionysius. Some assume that this was the result of individual treaties 
between Rome and the Latin cities, or of a grant by Rome;38 however, in the 
early Republican period, there is no reason to assume that Rome was very 
much stronger than the other Latin towns, and that therefore this grant was 
a hegemonic permission emanating from Rome, as it would later become. In 
any case, it is likely that marriage between Romans and Latins already existed 
very early in the Republic.39
The Latin War of 341–38 BCE marked a fundamental change in the rela-
tionship between Rome and the Latins. Before this war, Rome had not been 
powerful enough to impose its will on other states – at least in theory; we 
can see growing interference by Rome and resulting dissatisfaction among 
the allies from the early fourth century. Now, however, Rome was the most 
important power in central Italy, and could take one-sided, hegemonic deci-
sions about the rights of its allies (or rather subjects), as is clear from Livy’s 
description of Rome’s decisions in 338 BCE.
In 306 BCE, according to Livy,
36 Sautel (1952), pp. 38–9 assumes that all these rights were valid between the Latin towns, not 
with Rome. De Visscher (1952), p. 417 suggests that Latins were still allowed to marry into 
Roman families, but not amongst each other; this would have strengthened Rome’s control 
over the Latins. However, the text suggests that they were deprived of conubium generally, 
including with Rome.
37 Dion. Hal. 7.53.5. This speech was held during the trial of Coriolanus in the early fi fth 
century. Similarly, in 8.35.2 Coriolanus demands that ‘the Romans will . . . give [the Volsci] 
equal rights of citizenship: as they have done in the case of the Latins’. In 6.63.4, citing a 
speech held by Brutus before the Foedus, Dionysius suggests that the Latins did not yet have 
equal rights: ‘I say nothing of the thirty cities of the Latin nation, which would be only too 
glad to fi ght our battles by reason of their kinship, if you would but grant them equal rights 
of citizenship, which they have constantly sought’. See also 8.70.2, 8.72.5, 8.74.2, 8.75.2, 
8.76.2; see 4.58.3 for isopoliteia between Romans and Gabii. For the Foedus itself, see Dion. 
Hal. 6.95.2, where, however, he does not mention marriage rights. 
38 Mommsen, cited in De Visscher (1952), p. 405.
39 De Visscher (1952), pp. 406–7; Dixon (1992), p. 79; Forsythe (2005), pp. 184. Humbert 
(1978), p. 97 thinks that isopoliteia was the same as Roman citizenship, but it is not clear why 
Latins would have desired Roman citizenship.
DU PLESSIS PRINT.indd   109 19/12/2012   16:49
110 New Frontiers
three of the Hernican communities – Aletrium, Verulae, and Ferentinum – had 
their municipal independence restored to them as they preferred that to the 
Roman franchise, and the right of intermarriage with each other was granted 
them (suae leges redditae conubiumque inter ipsos), a privilege which for a con-
siderable period they were the only communities amongst the Hernicans to 
enjoy. The Anagnians and the others who had taken up arms against Rome 
were admitted to the civitas sine suffragio, were deprived of their municipal self-
government and the right of intermarriage (concilia conubiaque adempta).40
Sherwin-White argued that ‘if civitas sine suffragio implied the equation of its 
holder to a civis Romanus in all but political rights, then the Anagnini would 
automatically have shared in the conubium with the other Hernici which all 
cives Romani enjoyed’.41 However, this is not what Livy says: he states that 
Anagnia was deprived of conubia and concilia. It is likely that the concilia were 
again inter se, as in 338 BCE; for the conubia we do not have evidence, but since 
the Hernici had been admitted to the Foedus Cassianum on equal terms with 
the Latins, we can assume they had enjoyed the same rights, namely commer-
cium and conubium, with Rome. This they would now have lost.42 The other 
towns received conubium with each other (inter ipsos), not with Rome, so we 
cannot conclude that all Hernici were now allowed to marry Romans. We 
see here again a clear indication of Rome’s growing power, which allowed 
her to make unilateral decisions about which legal rights were granted to 
her allies; any rights should therefore be seen as privileges granted by Rome, 
which could be taken away at any point. This  development became even 
more pronounced in the later Republic.
5. CONUBIUM IN THE LATER REPUBLIC
A persistent assumption for the later Republic is that Latins enjoyed many 
privileges in their relations with Rome; these are usually cited as conubium, 
commercium, and the ius migrationis. Conubium would have constituted a 
privilege that could be granted to Latins (and peregrini), which would have 
allowed them to contract valid marriages with Romans. This would mean 
that a Roman could marry those Latins and peregrini who either individu-
ally or as a group had received conubium with Rome. It is almost universally 
believed that the Latins as a collective had been granted conubium by the 
Foedus Cassianum and that they retained this after 338.43 Sherwin-White, 
40 Liv. Hist. 9.43.23.
41 Sherwin-White (1973), p. 49.
42 De Visscher (1952), p. 417 believes they only lost the right of intermarriage with each 
other. 
43 Crook (1967), p. 44; Sherwin-White (1973), pp. 32–7; pp. 109–16; Humbert (1978), 
pp. 98–108; Treggiari (1991), pp. 44–5; Crawford (1992), p. 36 who assumes that this 
remained unchanged since the Foedus Cassianum; Capogrossi Colognesi (1994), pp. 16–23; 
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for example, thinks that Latinitas became ‘the path to Roman citizenship, 
and almost a secondary form of the civitas itself’.44 He argues that ‘for the 
Republican period before the Social War there can be no doubt. The state-
ment in Livy [. . .] implies that these rights persisted between Latin and 
Roman’. However, I have argued above that the commercia and conubia 
that the Latins lost referred to all rights, both between Romans and Latins 
and between Latins themselves, while the concilia that were taken away 
were common councils between Latins only.45 Livy clearly states that the 
Latins were now deprived from commercia and conubia with Rome, and it is 
nowhere indicated that they regained these rights later.
Therefore, there is in fact no reason to assume that the Latins were 
privileged over other allies in their contacts with Rome after this year. The 
evidence in fact suggests that Latins were placed on the same footing as all 
other peregrini. Livy states that in 169 BCE ‘there were two portents which 
were not taken into consideration, one because it occurred on private, the 
other on foreign soil’ (in agro peregrino).46 The ‘foreign soil’ in question was 
the Latin colony of Fregellae. Furthermore, Gaius states: ‘The Lex Minicia 
classes as peregrini not only foreign races and peoples but also those called 
Latins; it also applied to the other Latins, who had their own communi-
ties and cities and were in the category of peregrini’.47 There has been some 
debate over the date of the law, but it is likely that it should be dated to 
shortly before 90 BCE,48 showing that in the late Republic Latins were con-
sidered peregrini.
The privilege of conubium between inhabitants of different Latin towns 
is another debated issue; Livy suggests that the Latins were deprived of 
this right in 338 BCE. However, Servius Sulpicius refers to a particular 
betrothal procedure among Latins: ‘The man who was to take the woman 
Cornell (1995), pp. 295–7; Forsythe (2005), p. 290. Coşkun (2009), pp. 35–6, n. 70 argues that 
the ban on marriage between Latins issued in 338 BCE did not last long, although there is no 
evidence that it was lifted. Watson (1971), p. 27 argues that Latins could receive inheritances 
from Romans, but it is not clear why this should be the case.
44 Sherwin-White (1973), p. 98.
45 This is not considered by Sherwin-White, who actually omits the word concilia from his 
quote: Sherwin-White (1973), pp. 109–10.
46 Liv. Hist. 43.13.6. 
47 Inst.Gai.1.79. The passage may be interpreted in two ways: either the Latins were always 
classed as peregrini or they were only interpreted as such in this law. However, it is more 
likely that the defi nition was not created only for the Lex Minicia, but was valid in other cases 
as well; see Catalano (1965), pp. 278–87.
48 Cherry (1990), pp. 248–50; Treggiari (1991), p. 45; Dixon (1992), p. 124. Coşkun (2009), 
p. 38, fn. 80 argues it should be dated after 90 BCE or even in the imperial period, but gives 
no arguments. A date shortly before 90 BCE fi ts well with other laws passed at the same time, 
which all aimed to restrict the rights of Italian allies. This may refl ect a desperate attempt 
by the Roman state to maintain a barrier between it and other Italians, who increasingly 
demanded more rights. The Lex Licinia Mucia of 95 BCE, which expelled peregrini from the 
Roman census lists, is another example of such a law.
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to wife made a formal promise’. If the marriage was cancelled, ‘he who 
had asked for her hand, or he who promised her, brought suit on the 
ground of breach of contract’, and a fi ne was payable. Sulpicius adds that 
‘this law of betrothal was observed up to the time when citizenship was 
given to all Latium by the Lex Iulia’ (i.e., 90 BCE).49 It may be that this was 
a custom of the prisci Latini and had earlier been shared by Romans; the 
Latin colonies seem not to have been involved.50 This passage is sometimes 
used to argue that all Latins possessed conubium with each other, although 
Sulpicius does not say that marriage occurred between different Latin 
peoples; the partners could very well have been of the same Latin group. 
There is therefore no positive evidence that Latins were allowed to marry 
each other after 338.
The problem of the possession of conubium by Latins should be connected 
to that regarding the other two privileges they are commonly assumed to 
have had: commercium and the ius migrationis. However, the possession of 
both these privileges by the Latins has recently been questioned. Regarding 
the ius migrationis, in two well-known episodes from 187 BCE and 177 BCE the 
Romans were asked by some Latin towns to return to them people who had 
moved to Rome; Rome then ordered the Latins to return home.51 However, 
if the Latins had possessed ius migrationis, these expulsions make no sense. 
If Latins had the right to migrate to Rome, then the Roman state could not 
expel them.52
I have argued elsewhere that it is also unlikely that the Latins, as a rule, 
held commercium,53 apart from those who were settled in colonies of Latin 
status. It is likely that a similar arrangement pertained to conubium as well. 
A passage dating to 177 BCE has been interpreted as showing evidence for the 
widespread existence of commercium among the Latins:
The law entitled the Latin allies to become Roman citizens as long as they left a 
son of their own at home [. . .] To avoid the necessity of leaving a son at home, 
men would hand their sons over as slaves (mancipio dabant) to anyone with Roman 
citizenship, on the condition that the sons would be manumitted; as freedmen 
they would become citizens. Men with no offspring to leave behind adopted sons 
to become Roman citizens.54
49 Sulp. ap. Gell. N.A. 4.4. See Corbett (1930), pp. 9–15. 
50 Coşkun (2009), p. 37 fn. 76.
51 Liv. Hist. 39.3.4–5; 41.8.6–12; 41.9.9–12; 42.10.3; Cic. Sest. 13.30.
52 Broadhead (2001) in more detail; Coşkun (2009), pp. 107–10. Laffi  (1995), p. 51 thinks that 
ius migrationis was a privilege granted to all Latins at the time of the Foedus Cassianum, but 
in that case it would have been abolished in 338; furthermore, there is no reason why the 
Romans would care about the population levels of Latin towns other than colonies, since 
they were not of strategic importance. 
53 Roselaar (forthcoming).
54 Liv. Hist. 41.8.8–10. See Laffi  (1995) for a detailed discussion of this passage. 
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The expression mancipio dabant seems to suggest that peregrini (in this 
case, Latins) who sold their sons as slaves – which were res mancipi – to 
Roman citizens were admitted to mancipatio, and therefore that they held 
commercium.55
However, the passage should be considered in the light of the ius migra-
tionis. It is thought that Latins were allowed to migrate to Rome and thereby 
take up Roman citizenship. However, from Livy’s passage, it is clear that this 
was not as simple as is often thought: if Latins had been allowed to migrate 
to Rome, they would not have needed to resort to such ingenious methods 
of gaining citizenship for their sons. It is more likely that we should identify 
a specially privileged group within the Latins, namely the inhabitants of the 
Latin colonies. Since many Latin colonists were originally from Rome,56 it 
would make sense that they were allowed to return to Rome if they left a 
son behind in their colony. This would make it more attractive for Romans 
to join a colony, because they would have an opportunity to return; for the 
state this assured that the colonies, which were strategically important for 
the Romans, remained up to strength.57 Those of Latin origin who joined a 
colony may have been granted the same right, to encourage them to join and 
as a reward for services to the Roman state.58
I suggest that the Latin colonists may have been granted the right to use 
mancipatio as a special privilege, like the right to migrate if they left a son 
in the colony. It is possible that they were also granted commercium. This 
would have been necessary especially for reasons of inheritance: if many 
settlers were of Roman origin, then it was to be expected that they would 
receive inheritances from or want to bequeath them to family members who 
had remained Roman citizens. Commercium was needed to receive inherit-
ances, since inheritances might include res mancipi.59 However, commercium 
was not suffi cient to arrange inheritances with their Roman relatives: 
 conubium would be necessary as well.
That indeed some Latin colonies enjoyed special inheritance privileges is 
clear from a passage in Cicero:
Sulla himself passed a law respecting the rights of citizenship, avoiding any taking 
away of the legal obligations and rights of inheritance of these men. For he orders 
the people of Ariminum to be under the same law that they have been. Who does 
55 Galsterer (1976), p. 103; Sherwin-White (1973), p. 109.
56 Sherwin-White (1973), p. 27; Luraschi (1979), pp. 261–2, 272–81; Cornell (1995), 
pp. 367–8.
57 The Romans were adamant about the need to keep up the strength of the colonies; in the case 
of Roman citizens’ colonies, intricate regulations existed to keep the colonist contingent up 
to strength; see Roselaar 2009. 
58 Broadhead (2001).
59 Inst.Gai.2.210 indeed states that peregrini could not inherit, but see Mayer-Maly (2003), 
p. 6. 
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not know that they were one of the twelve colonies and that they were able to 
receive inheritances from Roman citizens?60
It appears that twelve colonies had the right to inherit from Romans, includ-
ing Ariminum, and that the rest did not. Such inheritances could not have 
been possible without conubium, so this passage suggests that there were, 
at least in Cicero’s time, twelve colonies with conubium. A commonly held 
theory is that they were the last twelve Latin colonies, founded from 268 BCE 
onwards; the fi rst of these was Ariminum.61
However, there are problems with this interpretation. Firstly, Cicero’s 
words eodem iure esse, quo fuerint Ariminenses do not sound as if the 
Ariminenses had a clearly defi ned set of rights; it sounds more like an 
ad-hoc measure, possibly a Sullan innovation applying only to Ariminum. 
Furthermore, it is strange that the last twelve colonies, which were furthest 
away from Rome, received more rights than others closer to Rome. Their 
rights would not have been very useful, because they would not interact 
with Romans so much. Since there is no indication anywhere in the sources 
before Cicero that there was a difference in status between Latin colonies, 
I am inclined to believe that Cicero is referring to an innovation by Sulla 
which affected twelve colonies.62
60 Cic. Caec. 102: ‘Deinde quod Sulla ipse ita tulit de civitate ut non sustulerit horum nexa 
atque hereditates. Iubet enim eodem iure esse quo fuerint Ariminenses; quos quis ignorat 
duodecim coloniarum fuisse et a ciuibus Romanis hereditates capere potuisse?’ See Catalano 
(1965), p. 109; Luraschi (1979), pp. 281–99. 
61 Bernardi (1973), pp. 76–88. The others would be Beneventum, Firmum Picenum, Aesernia, 
Brundisium, Spoletium, Placentia, Cremona, Thurii Copia, Vibo Valentia, Bononia and 
Aquileia. However, there is debate about the status of some other towns, especially Luna 
and Luca; if either of them was a Latin colony, as is assumed by some (see Roselaar (2010), 
p. 325), then the total of twelve would not add up. Watson (1971), p. 27 argues that it was 
only by Sulla that the rights of Ariminum were extended to other cities, but Cicero does 
not say this. Corbett (1930), pp. 24–6 argues that Ariminum and eleven other colonies had 
an inferior status, rather than more rights. However, if anything, they would have had more 
rights than other colonies, since they could inherit and others could not. Sherwin-White 
(1973), pp. 102–4 is indecisive, but does not believe that the twelve towns enjoyed other 
rights than the rest of the Latin colonies. Coşkun (2009), pp. 34–9 with fn. 70, 80; 64–70 
with fn. 192; 119; 146–7; 169 fn. 522 argues that the ius XII coloniarum included commercium, 
conubium, nexum, enktesis, the ius testamenti factio, and ius hereditatis captio, and was created in 
the 120s BCE. Because the ius civitatis adispiscendae per magistratum, which Coşkun assumes to 
have been created in this period, made many local elites citizens, Latins in the same colonies 
would have had problems in dealing with their own townsmen, so the ius XII coloniarum 
was created to deal with this problem. It is unclear, however, why only twelve colonies were 
granted this; Coşkun suggests it may have been granted individually to each colony at their 
request. The ius civitatis adispiscendae per magistratum is another thorny problem; Sherwin-
White (1973), p. 112, argues that it was created in the early fi rst century. I am inclined to 
agree with Bradeen (1959) that citizenship per magistratum was not automatically granted to 
Latins at all during the Republic.
62 Antonelli (2006) argues that they were the twelve towns in which Sulla had founded colonies; 
however, we do not know how many colonies Sulla established.
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There would, in that case, be no evidence for the possession of conubium 
by any colony before Sulla, but the idea that the Latin colonies received this 
right, together with commercium and the ius migrationis, is in my view attrac-
tive. I suggest that Latin colonists were the only group in possession of these 
three rights, which would on the one hand make sure that the manpower of 
the colonies remained up to strength, and at the same time make joining a 
colony more attractive because existing family ties were not sundered by the 
change of status from Roman to Latin.63
A second problematic group were the cives sine suffragio. Since they were 
cives, they would fall under the Roman ius civile and therefore have conubium 
with Romans.64 In the case of Anagnia in 308 BCE, the grant of this right 
was clearly intended as a punishment, which makes it unlikely that they 
were given the privilege to marry Romans. However, the Capuans, who had 
received it as a reward in 338 BCE, clearly did marry Romans. They joined 
Hannibal in the Second Punic War, but before they decided to defect,
the only circumstances which prevented them from immediately revolting were 
the old established right of intermarriage (conubium vetustum) which had led to 
many of their illustrious and powerful families becoming connected with Rome 
and the fact that several citizens were serving with the Romans.65
After Rome recaptured Capua in 211 BCE, its leaders were punished with 
the loss of their civitas. They appealed to the Romans, stating that ‘they 
were for the most part Roman citizens, connected with Roman families by 
intermarriage (conubio vetusto)’.66 There is indeed some evidence for marriage 
between Romans and Campanians: Pacuvius Calavius, the leader of Capua 
in the Second Punic War, had married a daughter of Appius Claudius, and 
Calavius’ daughter had married one of the Livii.67 The daughter of Fabius 
Maximus Rullianus married Atilius Calatinus, another Campanian noble.68
The situation of the Campanians had not yet been resolved in 188 BCE. As 
Livy states,
the censors had obliged the Campanians to register for the census at Rome, since 
it had not been clear earlier where they should register. The Campanians now 
requested that they might be allowed to take wives who were Roman citizens and 
63 Bernardi (1973), p. 68 argues that there was no conubium between the colonists of differ-
ent colonies, but this is unlikely, since members of the same family might go to different 
colonies.
64 Sherwin-White (1973), p. 46.
65 Liv. Hist. 23.4.7.
66 Liv. Hist. 26.33.3. A Roman ambassador in 200 BCE, according to Liv. Hist. 31.31.11, pointed 
out to the Macedonians that ‘we had forged links with [the Campanians] fi rst by a treaty, 
subsequently by marriage and family ties (deinde conubio atque cognationibus), and fi nally by 
granting them citizenship’. 
67 Liv. Hist. 23.2.6.
68 Val. Max. Mem. 8.1.9.
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that any who had taken them be permitted to keep them; and they also asked that 
any children born to them before that date be considered as legitimate and able to 
inherit. Both requests were granted.69
This shows clearly that the Campanians, who at this time held the status of 
peregrini, did not have conubium before they made this request, for in that 
case they would not have had to ask for recognition of their marriages.70
It is clear from this passage that a grant of conubium was a unilateral deci-
sion made by the Roman state: it could grant this privilege to an individual 
or group at its own discretion. As in the case of Capua, the Senate could 
also take away the privilege whenever it wanted, especially as a punish-
ment to disloyal allies. In this way grants of conubium – like grants of other 
privileges, like commercium71 – functioned as a tool to maintain Rome’s 
hegemony over its allies. This is itself makes it very unlikely that all allies, 
or even all Latins, possessed this right;72 if that were the case, Rome would 
have found it more diffi cult to use conubium as a tool of government. All 
attestations in fact refer to individual cases. The use of conubium and related 
privileges was, I suggest, fi rst and foremost a hegemonic tool, and not an 
element of ‘Romanisation’; it simply privileged some people over others 
in their relations with Rome, but did not always make them any more 
‘Roman’ in their cultural outlook – Latin colonists of Roman descent 
would have a ‘Roman’ mindset already; other Latin colonists, however, 
may have been proud of their new privileged status, and thus grants of legal 
privileges may have engendered a new feeling of Romanitas among certain 
groups in Italy. It is clear that conubium was a closely guarded privilege, as 
was Roman citizenship itself.
For example, a grant of conubium to a specifi c group was made in 171 BCE:
A deputation from Spain arrived, who represented a new race of men. They 
declared themselves to be sprung from Roman soldiers and Spanish women who 
were not legally married (cum quibus conubium non esset) [. . .] The senate decreed 
that they should send in their own names and the names of any whom they had 
manumitted to L. Canuleius, and they should be settled on the ocean shore at 
69 Liv. Hist. 38.36: ‘Campani . . . petierunt, ut sibi cives Romanas ducere uxores licere, et, si qui 
prius duxissent, ut habere eas, et nati ante eam diem uti iusti sibi liberi heredesque essent’.
70 De la Chevalerie (1954), p. 277. Volterra (1950), p. 367 fn. 57 argues that being counted in 
Rome meant that they gained citizenship, but this is not necessarily the case. It only means 
that they were registered in a separate group by the censors at Rome, since there was no 
Capuan administration that could have done the job.
71 Roselaar (forthcoming).
72 Corbett (1930), pp. 26–8 and Volterra (1950), p. 380 argue that Rome had to grant conu-
bium to every treaty partner separately; however, they still assume that eventually all allies 
received it. In fact, if only a few allies held conubium, there would be no reason why it should 
be part of the treaties with allies; on the other hand, it was possibly a standard item in char-
ters of Latin colonies.
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Carteia, and any of the Carteians who wished to remain there should be allowed 
to join the colonists and receive an allotment of land. This place became a Latin 
colony and was called the ‘Colony of the Libertini’.73
What we see here is a kind of retrospective grant of conubium: the marriages 
were recognised in a sense, since the sons were considered legally born; 
however, they did not receive Roman citizenship, as their fathers had held, 
but only Latin status. If their parents had received full ‘retrospective’ conu-
bium, the men should have been made peregrini, since children of a Roman 
man and a peregrine woman with conubium followed the mother’s status and 
so were peregrini (see below). Apparently this was felt to be inappropriate for 
the situation, and indeed the lex Minicia shortly afterwards changed this law. 
We see again that the Roman state could unilaterally make whatever grants 
it wished from its hegemonic position.
In 186 BCE the Senate decided that the freedwoman prostitute Hispala 
Faecenia, who had assisted Romans in the Bacchanalian affair, ‘be permitted 
to marry a free-born man, and that whosoever married her suffer thereby no 
prejudice or loss of status’.74 The absence of conubium in her case was due to 
her freed status rather than the fact that she was not a citizen; nevertheless, 
the Senate could, again, simply decide that such objections were taken away. 
Citizenship and conubium could also be granted separately: in 89 BCE some 
Spanish cavalry were granted Roman citizenship, but not conubium; this 
would mean that they could not marry Roman women.75 Thus, it is clear that 
the Roman state could decide whatever it wished in regard to its civic rights: 
it could grant all rights separately, to specifi c peoples, groups, or individuals.
As for the Italian socii, there is no indication that they as a group possessed 
conubium, as is sometimes assumed for commercium. Diodorus suggests that 
some Italian socii also enjoyed conubium: in a battle during the Social War, 
soldiers from both parties recognised each other as ‘men whom the law gov-
erning intermarriage had united in this kind of friendly tie’.76 Some scholars 
argue that all socii already possessed conubium,77 but this is very unlikely; 
some of the Italian rebels may have been Latins or cives sine suffragio.
An important change in marriage rights was introduced by the Lex 
Minicia, possibly dated to before 90 BCE (see above). Before this law, if 
there was no conubium between two people, they were not legally married, 
and the child took its mother’s status. If there was conubium, it took the 
father’s status. Therefore, children of a Roman mother and non-Roman 
father without conubium had been Roman citizens, since according to the 
73 Liv. Hist. 43.3.1–4.
74 Liv. Hist. 39.19.5. See Humbert (1987). Volterra (1950), p. 358 and De Visscher (1952), p. 403 
are therefore wrong that conubium was not an individual right, but only that of a group.
75 ILS 8888. See Mirkovic (1986), p. 171.
76 Diod. 37.15.2. See Sherwin-White (1973), p. 125.
77 Galsterer (1976), p. 103; contra Bernardi (1973), p. 83; Coşkun (2009), p. 38 fn. 78.
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ius gentium, illegitimate children followed the mother. In the case of a valid 
marriage, children took the status of the father.78 Therefore, children of a 
Roman woman and a peregrine man with conubium had been peregrini, since 
conubium meant that children followed the father. This was seen as some-
what of a paradox; therefore, the lex Minicia enacted that when there was 
no conubium, the child followed the parent with the lowest status. Nothing 
changed for cases in which the father was a citizen: a Roman father and a 
peregrine mother without conubium had a peregrine child, while a peregrine 
father with conubium and a Roman mother had a Roman child, as had been 
the case earlier.79
Another legal development related to marriage and inheritance rights was 
the growing prevalence of marriages sine manu, which gradually replaced 
those with manus; by the mid-fi rst century BCE, if not earlier, sine manu was 
the most common form of marriage.80 With manus, a woman who married 
passed from the potestas of her father to that of her husband; the husband 
would then have complete control over her possessions, and upon her death 
these would be inherited by his family. If a woman was married in manu, 
her father could only give her a dowry, and she would have no right to an 
inheritance on her father’s death; when married sine manu, she could inherit 
from him. Sine manu, a woman remained in her father’s potestas, to which 
she returned in the case of her husband’s death; her possessions would be 
inherited by her family on her father’s side.81
The earliest reference to sine manu marriage dates to 204 BCE, when the 
Lex Cincia limited gifts between husband and wife.82 It is also referred to by 
Ennius83 and in Cato’s comments on the Lex Voconia of 169, which allowed 
women to have their own property.84 An increase in sine manu marriages 
occurred possibly after the divorce of Carvilius Ruga around 230 BCE, who 
was, apparently, the fi rst to divorce his wife for reasons other than those 
laid down in the Twelve Tables.85 Because no laws existed for this situation, 
the wife and her father did not have a legal action to claim the return of her 
78 Corbett (1930), p. 97; Sherwin-White (1973), ch. 15; Coşkun (2009), p. 34.
79 Inst.Gai.1.76–8. Ulpian and Gaius also say that if either parent was peregrine, the child was 
peregrine, but this refers to parents without conubium. See Gardner (1986), p. 31; Treggiari 
(1991), pp. 45–7; Frier and McGinn (2004), p. 32. 
80 Kaser (1960), p. 324; Dixon (1992), p. 40; Evans-Grubbs (2002), p. 21.
81 Dixon (1992) pp. 40, 74.
82 FV 302. However, the Twelve Tables 6.5 (cited in Inst.Gai.1.111) already refer to the 
avoidance of manus: if a woman did not sleep in the marital bed for three nights per 
year (the so-called ius trinoctium) she would avoid entering into manus and stay instead 
in her father’s control. See Gardner (1986), pp. 12–13; Lewis and Crawford (1996), pp. 
661–2.
83 Her. 2.24.38: a father is given authority to end his daughter’s marriage.
84 Gell. N.A. 17.6.1.
85 Dion. Hal. 2.25.7; Plu. Quaest. Rom. 14; Romulus 35.3–4; Numa 25.12–13; Val. Max. 2.1.4; 
Gell. N.A. 4.3.1–2, 17.21.44. 
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dowry. When divorce became more common, the cautiones rei uxoriae and 
actio rei uxoriae were created.86 A marriage sine manu had other advantages 
for a paterfamilias, who would in most cases make the decisions about his 
daughter’s marriages.87 If his daughter was widowed young, he would be 
able to arrange her next marriage to his advantage, since she was still under 
his potestas. The fact that she was still entitled to a share in her father’s 
inheritance would enable the father to make decisions about his fortune up 
to the moment of his death. The development of sine manu marriages would 
therefore be in keeping with the availability of larger fortunes towards the 
end of the third century, over which a paterfamilias would wish to retain 
control.88
It is possible that the Lex Minicia was passed for the same reasons that 
caused the increase in sine manu marriages, namely a growing preoccupation 
with regulations regarding inheritances. This indicates a growing desire to 
make sure that the increasingly large fortunes accumulated in this period 
remained in the hands of the same family; on the part of the Roman state, 
it suggests a desire to ensure that wealth remained in the hands of Roman 
citizens. Conubium would be a part of this development, because it would 
ensure that peregrini would not have access to Roman wealth: children of a 
marriage in which one of the partners was a non-Roman would, as peregrini, 
not be able to inherit from a Roman citizen. In this sense, conubium and other 
privileges worked as an important element of separation between Romans 
and others, rather than as a mechanism of integration. This fi ts in with the 
very restricted admittance of peregrini to Roman citizenship in general, as we 
have seen.
6. CONCLUSION
I have reviewed some common ideas about conubium in the Roman 
Republic. Conubium as a legal concept originated quite early in the history 
of the Republic, since by 338 it was an established privilege that could be 
granted to others. Conubium underwent some important innovations in the 
Republican period, for example the Lex Minicia. Gradually it developed 
from a loosely defi ned custom, as it was before the Latin War, to a strictly 
86 Kaser (1960), pp. 337–8; Gardner (1986), pp. 48–9; Dixon (1992), p. 45.
87 Gardner (1986), pp. 45–6.
88 Looper-Friedman (1984), pp. 293–5; Gardner (1998), pp. 40–1; Jacobs (2009), pp. 109–10. 
Some have seen this development as a liberation of women from male control (see discussion 
in Dixon (1992), pp. 20, 30–1). However, when this development took place, women were 
still expected to be under the tutela of a man, and the erosion of tutela as a practical limitation 
on women’s powers had not yet begun; see Crook (1986); Dixon (1986); (2002), pp. 77–88; 
Gardner (1986), pp. 16–22; Dodds (1991–2). The ‘liberation of women’ cannot therefore 
have been the aim of those who, in the third and second centuries, chose marriages sine manu 
instead of with manus.
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delineated instrument of Roman hegemony, used to keep a close watch on 
allies and subjects.
The Roman state was completely hegemonic in its decisions; it could 
grant conubium in combination with citizenship or separately, to groups, indi-
viduals, or peoples. There is no evidence for a widespread grant of conubium 
to Latin and/or Italian allies; however, I argue that the inhabitants of Latin 
colonies did enjoy this right, because it was important to maintain the strate-
gic function of these colonies. The cives sine suffragio also shared in this right 
because they participated in the Roman ius civile.
We may conclude that the absence of conubium was an important mecha-
nism of separation between Romans and colonial Latins and, on the other 
hand, the other Latins and allies. It is likely that the limited possibilities for 
access to Roman wealth, and the wish to be able to inherit from Roman 
citizens, formed an important drive in the desire for Roman citizenship that 
peregrini felt in the late Republic. This may have been one of the reasons that 
drove the Italian allies to revolt in the Social War; I hope to explore this issue 
further in future work.89
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Chapter 7
Financial Transactions by Women in Puteoli
Éva Jakab
1. CHANGING TIMES AND METHODOLOGIES
Sed fugit interea, fugit irreparabile tempus1 – in formulating these famous lines, 
the focus of Virgil’s contemplation was human feelings and their change-
able nature, but his wise observation can equally be applied to history: time 
marches on and new historical periods replace the old ones. Each period has 
its own typical social values which include ideas about legal policy or the 
proper view of certain legal institutions. Historians and lawyers are necessar-
ily children of their own age – their reasoning is in various ways infl uenced 
by their social, cultural and economic environment. It is very likely that 
topics such as ‘women and society’ or ‘women and law’ have always been 
highly sensitive to (and often deeply manipulated by) the ideological and 
cultural background in which they are treated.
The present chapter focuses on some of the ways in which women par-
ticipated in business in ancient Rome. It is obvious that the topic is inti-
mately connected with the issue of the role of women in Roman life and 
Roman law – their advantages and disadvantages. As is commonly known, 
modern teaching of and research into Roman law remains to a large extent 
dominated by the fascinating private law theory of the nineteenth century 
known as ‘Pandectism’. The extent to which our ideas about the social role 
and economic activities or possibilities of Roman females are still shaped by 
bourgeois morals of the nineteenth century and by the principles of Roman 
law manuals written by (mostly conservative) men is an interesting question. 
In order to gain some insight into this, a brief survey of work on this period 
is required. Let us look at the works of some of the most famous authors. 
Rudolph von Jhering, for example, seems to have delighted in sketching a 
highly honourable picture of Roman ladies (matronae). He described them 
with much respect, but at the same time banished them to the stage of almost 
idealised creatures:
Kein Volk der alten Welt, die Griechen nicht ausgenommen, hat dem weiblichen 
Geschlecht einen so würdigen Platz in der Gesellschaft angewiesen als die Römer 
1 Verg. Geor. 3,284.
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[. . .] Das weibliche Geschlecht war nach Ansicht der Römer dem männlichen 
nicht bloß völlig ebenbürtig und daher in sozialer Beziehung um nichts zurückge-
setzt, [. . .] sondern es war ein Gegenstand höherer Achtung, es stand eine Stufe 
über dem männlichen.2
In discussing matters such as patria potestas and manus, it is worth noting 
that Jhering only surveyed sources concerning a few aristocratic and heroic 
Roman ladies. An entirely different picture of the social status of Roman 
women emerges in the popular textbook by Dernburg, written towards the 
end of the nineteenth century:
Der Mensch ist männlichen oder weiblichen Geschlechts [. . .] Der Mann gehört 
dem öffentlichen Leben an, der Beruf der Frau weist sie auf das Haus. Zehlreiche 
öffentliche Rechte und Pfl ichten, die dem Manne zukommen, hat daher die Frau 
nicht [. . .] Selbst die Verbote, wonach Frauen nicht intercedieren dürfen, ins-
besondere das S. C. Velleianum, werden von den Römern darauf zurückgeführt, 
dass Frauen dem öffentlichen Leben fern stehen, denn die Intercessionen, – d. h. 
der Eintritt in die Schulden Dritter, um diesen Kredit zu verschaffen, – galten 
in Rom als bedingt durch die politische Stellung des Mannes und durch die 
Beziehungen, welche diese veranlasste.3 
This passage is a very clear statement of what women were expected to be – the 
last few sentences of the short chapter from which the quotation was taken 
also give a hint of the law in force during the time of Dernburg (which might 
have been present in the subconscious mind of the author when formulating 
his opinion): ‘Dies wurde gemeines Recht. Für Handelsfrauen gelten aber die 
Intercessionsbeschränkungen nicht; sie wurden neuerdings in den bei weitem 
meisten Landen Deutschlands gesetzlich für alle Frauen aufgehoben’.4 For all 
the respect that gentlemen felt for their honourable ladies at the fi n de siècle, 
it is clear that they rather wished to avoid confronting them in everyday busi-
ness life. Most of the famous lawyers could not help looking at the ancient 
sources with a certain prejudice, originating in the morals of their own age.
Modern textbooks of Roman law even now emphasise the subordinate 
status of women in ancient Rome, although the whole treatment has become 
much more sophisticated: ‘bleibt die allgemeine Regel [. . .] dass Frauen 
zeitlebens unter Gewalt stehen [. . .] Die rechtliche Stellung der Frau, auch 
der unverheirateten, wird mehr und mehr verselbständigt [. . .]’.5 Textbooks 
in the English tradition were always less concerned about highly systema-
tised theory and kept closer to the sources: ‘The general principles of the 
perpetual tutela of women were the same as those of tutela impuberum [. . .] 
this institution is an uncompromising expression of tutela as in the interest 
2 Jhering (1880), pp. 203–4.
3 Dernburg (1896), pp. 128–9.
4 Dernburg (1896), p. 129.
5 Kaser (1971), pp. 268–9.
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of the tutors, lifelong, because the interest in the inheritance is lifelong, since 
a woman can have no sui heredes [. . .]’.6
Looking at the sources, there is undoubtedly a strong tendency towards 
restrictive measures against women in Roman law, such as patria potestas 
(the power or control of the father, which included the power over death 
and life), manus (control of the husband over the wife in marriage), perpetual 
tutela mulieris (guardianship of women) which existed from the time of the 
Twelve Tables if a woman was sui iuris, as well as measures introduced later 
such as the above-mentioned Senatus Consultum Velleianum which forbade 
women from acting as personal surety for anyone.7 Nevertheless, an emerg-
ing tendency to grant liberties in private law for women, especially from the 
beginning of the Principate, can also be detected in the sources, as in the laws 
of Augustus with the ius liberorum, the sceptical view of Gaius relating the 
sense of guardianship over women or his description of how easy it was for 
women to change their tutors if they were dissatisfi ed with the current one 
(to all these rules we will return below).
In the history of law, new legislation usually follows an earlier develop-
ment in legal life: the legislator satisfi es a certain demand created by social 
and economic changes. If Augustus felt obliged to grant some liberties in 
relation to legislative acts for women, it can be considered as a strong argu-
ment that a similar or equivalent practice must have already existed in every-
day legal life. At the end of the Republic, there may have been legal customs 
that acted ‘against the law’ – and they may have been tacitly and commonly 
tolerated.
Without going into detail, it is suffi cient to mention the tension between 
the ‘law in books’ or ‘law in codex’ and the ‘law in action’ – this is well 
known in modern comparative law but it was less considered until now in 
legal history.8 Legal life consists not only of written laws (or theoretical, 
highly sophisticated decisions of jurists); the individual who forms part of a 
certain society also lives in a legal environment or legal culture.9 Friedman 
explained this distinction through his famous comparison between law and 
language (both being socially bounded phenomena):
A dictionary is full of obsolete, archaic words, alternative forms, unused and 
common words, all jumbled together. Only the person who actually speaks the 
language is a sage guide to usage [. . .] The dictionary gives some hints, but not 
enough [. . .] Similarly, for legal systems: they are very different in real life, from 
the way they appear in formal texts. Study of legal culture must begin with the 
living law.10
6 See Buckland (1939), p. 101.
7 See on this aspect Gardner (1995), pp. 234–5.
8 See, for example, Zweigert-Kötz (1996), p. 10 passim.
9 Legrand (2001), p. 396 passim.
10 Friedman (1990), p. 53.
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In this chapter I will attempt to sketch a new picture about women and 
their fi nancial transactions, focusing on the sources from ‘real life’. Apart 
from written law and highly developed jurisprudence, legal documents offer 
a fascinating vista of ‘living law’, reports of useful tricks and legally dubious 
methods – phenomena of a legal culture 2,000 years ago.
2. THE BEGINNINGS
The story of the special group of sources I will deal with began with a 
dramatic event. In August in 79 CE, the ancient volcano Vesuvius, which 
dominated the bay of Naples, unexpectedly erupted. The lovely Campanian 
landscape with its fl ourishing small towns, profi table agricultural units 
(villae rusticae) and fashionable country houses was taken by surprise by the 
extraordinary power and destruction of the eruption. Streaming lava, raining 
ash and a disastrous confl agration destroyed all life in a few hours. Pliny the 
Younger reports the earthquake and eruption in impressive language (6,16):
The buildings around us were shaking [. . .] and we were very scared that they 
would collapse [. . .] Also we saw the sea dragged back into itself and then appar-
ently driven back by the shaking of the earth [. . .] Indeed, the shoreline had 
retreated, and many sea creatures were stranded on the dry sand. In the other 
direction a terrible black cloud, split by jagged and quivering bursts of fi ery air, 
gaped open to reveal tall columns of fl ame [. . .]11
This vivid description comes from an eye-witness: at the time of the erup-
tion the author was staying with his uncle, Pliny the Elder,12 very close to 
the event. The older Pliny served as the commander of the Roman fl eet, 
stationed at Misenum; his close relatives visited him for a pleasant stay at 
the seaside.
Pliny the Elder, a keen researcher of nature, acted seemingly without 
fear. The scientist in him was curious, and the commander felt it his duty to 
rescue human life – and sacrifi ce his own (6,16):
My uncle, a man of great intellectual curiosity, decided that this was a phenom-
enon of great importance, which had to be investigated at closer quarters [. . .] He 
took some warships out to sea, taking his place on board to help [. . .] Soon ash 
was falling on the ships, hotter and thicker as they drew nearer [. . .] Meanwhile 
fi res erupted from different points all over Mount Vesuvius, and the towering 
fl ames gave off a light whose brightness and clarity contrasted with the shadows 
of the night [. . .] For the buildings were being shaken by frequent and strong 
tremors, and they seemed to move to and fro as if they had been shifted from their 
foundations [. . .] Then the fl ames and the smells of sulphur that preceded them 
11 Translation by Berry (2007), p. 24.
12 Pliny the Elder published a huge encyclopaedia c. 77–9 CE, the Naturalis historia.
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made the others decide to fl ee and woke up my uncle. Leaning on two slaves, he 
got up, and straight away he collapsed [. . .]13
There was no help for the terrifi ed population: an elementary vis maior (‘acci-
dent of nature or human violence’),14 the natural disaster wiped out all life 
in a zone of 10 to 20 km. However, the impact of these forces of nature was 
to prove lucky for later generations, especially for archaeologists, historians 
and legal historians. Although Pompeii and Herculaneum, the most impor-
tant among the surrounding settlements, were lost to the Romans, they sur-
vived well preserved for posterity. Some archaeologists call them ‘frozen in 
time’ – the valuable evidence of ancient culture remained mostly untouched, 
covered with a thick coating of petrifi ed volcanic lava and ash.15 The modern 
archaeological sites and museums offer a fascinating mosaic of living, 
working or contracting in fi rst-century Italy. The topic of the current study 
will comprise but one segment from this mosaic: the monetary  transactions 
of women in everyday legal life.
3. TABULAE – AN ANCIENT WRITING MATERIAL
The Romans usually set up their legal documents on wooden tablets 
(tabulae). This is a special Roman type of preserving evidence which might 
have had some sacral roots.16 What did tabulae look like? Generally, one side 
of a thin, small wooden tablet (their usual size was approximately 10 × 15 cm) 
was slightly indented and covered with a wax (or shellac) coating set into 
the rectangular indentation.17 The scribe wrote with a metallic pen (called a 
stylus) on the waxed surface. It is obvious that this technology was imperfect, 
and could not be trusted to offer infallible proof before a court: the wax 
might have been warmed up and the letters could easily have been erased or 
‘corrected’ by someone who did not fl inch at forgery.
Meanwhile, notary practice developed two types of tabulae to avoid such 
tricks: the diptychon and triptychon. A diptychon consists of two tablets, a trip-
tychon of three. In each type, the legally relevant text was written on the two 
interior wax faces, then closed by a string and sealed by witnesses. The seals 
must not be broken or cut unless before court.
It is astonishing that such simple wooden tablets survived a powerful vol-
canic eruption and can be read today. Admittedly, the originals are mostly 
very damaged, full of holes and cracks. In spite of this, they deliver highly 
valuable sources about our topic.
There are three signifi cant fi nds of writing tablets excavated in the 
13 Translation by Berry (2007), p. 22.
14 Crook (1967), p. 114.
15 Berry (2007), p. 26.
16 See Meyer (2004), pp. 44–63.
17 Wolf (2010), pp. 19–20; Wolf and Crook (1989), pp. 10–14.
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 environs of Mount Vesuvius.18 The fi rst fi nds (counting c 153 pieces) con-
sisted of tablets that belonged to a banker, well known in his day: Lucius 
Caecilius Iucundus. They were discovered in 1875 in a Pompeian house. 
Most of them are receipts drawn up at auctions conducted by his banking 
house. Two further tablets were found in 1887 – these present the docu-
ments of a certain Poppaea Note, a freed woman of Priscus.19 Among them 
are some extremely interesting pieces of evidence for a legal historian: for 
example, a mancipatio fi duciae causa (pledge with transfer of ownership) of 
two slave boys and an acknowledgement of a debt (published already in FIRA 
III as no. 91, 91b). The second, bigger discovery produced several groups of 
tablets from Herculaneum (published long ago by G. Pugliese-Carratelli and 
V. Arangio-Ruiz).20
The third signifi cant fi nd of tablets (in some ways the most important of 
them) was discovered in 1959, during the construction of a highway between 
Naples and Salerno, in a remote building close to Pompeii.21 The original 
stage and function of the house remains uncertain. The archaeologists found 
part of a peristyle and a number of rooms alongside it, with adjoining tri-
clinia (dining rooms). It is very likely that the location was severely damaged 
in the earthquake of 62 CE. A number of objects found in the rooms show 
that in 79 CE, it was still under repair.22 In one of the triclinia lay the remains 
of a boat, an iron anchor, and some oars, as well as a wicker basket con-
taining writing tablets.23 It is likely that these items had been stored there 
 provisionally during the construction work.
It is signifi cant that all the tablets relate to business conducted in Puteoli, 
not in Pompeii. They were fi rst known as the tablets of Murécine (the name 
of the spot where they were found), but later became known as the Sulpicii 
Archive. The name relates to the family (familia) of the Sulpicii, businessmen 
from Puteoli who are preserved as protagonists or intermediaries in most of 
the documents.
This chapter deals only with the above-mentioned third group of sources, 
the famous Archive of the Sulpicii. The story of the conservation and publi-
cation is a complicated one. The archaeological report originally mentioned 
almost 300 tablets, but there are only 137 items listed in the inventory of the 
Museum in Pompeii. The fi rst partial readings of the tablets was made known 
to the world in a speedy publication by Carlo Giordano and Francesco 
Sbordone, though regrettably of rather poor quality.24 It was Giuseppe 
Camodeca who advanced new methods and made the greatest progress in 
18 See Gröschler (1997), pp. 22–32; Meyer (2004), pp. 126–7.
19 For her whole story, see Metzger (2000) with further evidence.
20 See Camodeca (1999), p. 15 passim.
21 Camodeca (1999), pp. 11–14; Andreau (1999), p. 71 passim.
22 Gröschler (1997), p. 31. 
23 Meyer (2004), p. 126 passim.
24 See Camodeca (1999), p. 15.
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reading and re-editing the tablets. He undertook a systematic reading of all 
the tablets, both those that had already been published, and the rest. Then, 
in 1999, he produced an excellent revisited publication of the whole archive. 
Furthermore, the research of Lucio Bove,25 Joseph Georg Wolf26 and John 
A. Crook27 merits a mention. There are also several valuable new studies by 
historians and legal historians, some of which I will mention in passing in the 
following short analysis.
Let us turn to the sources. The new volume of Camodeca contains 127 
tablets. Of these, ninety-fi ve are well preserved and the rest (thirty-two 
tablets) are rather heavily damaged. The documents cover a period of thirty-
two years: the oldest is dated 29 (or possibly 26) CE and the latest 61 CE. 
Although they were found in a building located close to the river port of 
Pompeii, they do not concern business conducted in that city. Most of them 
describe business transactions in the small town of Puteoli, a busy port in the 
bay of Naples (located 12 km from Naples and 6 km from Baiae). In the fi rst 
century, Puteoli was the most important and most heavily frequented port 
for Rome and the whole of Italy. Ships bringing grain from Egypt mostly 
docked here.28 There is no explanation as to how and why these documents 
were brought into the above-mentioned villa, close to Pompeii.
We are well informed about the protagonists in these tablets. The 
tablets belonged, as I mentioned above, to the family of the Sulpicii: Caius 
Sulpicius Faustus, Cinnamus, Eutychus and Onirus. It is well known from 
the documents that they were freedmen or the freedmen of freedmen or – 
possibly – the sons of freedmen.29 Without doubt, all of them were deeply 
involved in some kind of banking – the documents report several types of 
commercial transactions. The phenomenon of freedmen heavily involved 
in industrial and commercial activities was not unusual in Rome.30 Some of 
them became very wealthy and several were moderately wealthy. Freedmen 
were commonly employed also as intermediaries, as business agents.31 On 
the other hand, among the clients of the Sulpicii we fi nd tradesmen, ship-
pers, freedmen, slaves and peregrines, and we are especially interested in the 
female ones. Whether the Sulpicii were argentarii (bankers with extended 
operations in every kind of fi nancial transactions)32 or simply faeneratores 
(moneylenders) remains disputed (a question to which we shall return).33
Camodeca re-edited 127 tablets in his volume. Summarising their  contents, 
25 See Bove (1984) with a detailed analysis.
26 See Wolf (2010), pp. 15–16, with a good survey of earlier publications.
27 See especially Crook (1978), p. 229 passim.
28 See Jakab (2000), pp. 245–6.
29 See Andreau (1999), p. 73; for the social background, see also Camodeca (1993), pp. 342–5.
30 See Garnsey (1981), pp. 362–6, with trifl ing evidence.
31 See especially Garnsey (1981), p. 364.
32 See, for example, Camodeca (1999), p. 22 passim.
33 For the discussion, see Andreau (1999), p. 75 passim.
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thirty-nine tabulae (41%) deal with legal procedure or arbitration, and fi fty-
six (59%) with legal transactions (loans, receipts, pledges, rents, money 
transfers). I have selected ninety-seven tablets (75%) for a larger project in 
progress, restricted to documents with texts complete enough to obtain a 
good account of the legal perspective.
4. WOMEN IN BUSINESS?
In the rich material from the Archive of the Sulpicii, twenty-three tablets 
(24%) record legal transactions performed by women. This simple statistic 
already hints at the importance of women in the business life of Puteoli. 
Women as contracting parties are involved in twenty-one tablets; in two 
further tablets they are indirectly involved.
Serva, liberta, domina: our protagonists come from very different seg-
ments of the population. Some of them are slaves and objects of contracts, 
like Fortunata in TPSulp. 90–3: Marcia Aucta, her owner, pledged her for a 
debt and the creditor put her up for auction after the debt fell due. We are 
well informed about this auction, for the announcement of it is recorded 
in several tablets. There are also several freedwomen contracting their own 
business with the Sulpicii. A good example is Patulcia Erotis, a liberta acting 
as domina auctionis (owner of the merchandise sold by the auctioneer).34 In 
the preserved document, Patulcia confi rms that she has received 19,500 
sestertii, the auction price for an unknown article owned by her (unfortu-
nately the text is incomplete). This was a signifi cant amount at that time: it 
could have been the price of 40 tons of grain or ten to forty slaves on the 
market (depending on their quality).35 A further example of a freedwoman 
in business is a certain Marcia Fausta taking a loan of 2,000 sestertii from the 
Sulpicii.36
A freeborn lady, Caesia Priscilla (in TPSulp. 58 and 71), seems to have 
belonged to the upper-middle class of Puteoli. Her credit with the bank 
was remarkable too: her fi nancial transactions (loans, remittances, deposits) 
amounted to 24,000 sestertii.
Finally, there were also distinguished ladies of high birth involved in 
Puteoli business life: Domitia Lepida and Lollia Saturnina, representatives of 
the Roman senatorial aristocracy, seem to be the most prominent of them. 
Domitia was the daughter of L. Domitius Ahenobarbus37 and the sister of 
Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus;38 their grandmother was Octavia. As we see, 
34 TPSulp. 82.
35 Duncan-Jones (1982), p. 346.
36 TPSulp. 99.
37 C. D. Ahenobarbus, the son of Cn. D. Ahenobarbus, was married to Antonia; he was consul 
in 16 BCE, proconsul Africae in 12 BCE; see Cancik and Schneider (1996).
38 He was married to Agrippina in 28 CE – and their son was Nero. Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus 
became consul in 32 CE; Cancik and Schneider (1996), vol. 3, p. 755.
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they were already closely connected by birth with the family of the Emperor; 
Domitia also became the aunt of the later Emperor Nero.39 Domitia Lepida 
was fi rst married to Valerius Messalla Barbatus, later to Faustus Cornelius 
Sulla and fi nally to Caius Appius Iunius Silanus. The daughter of Domitia 
Lepida was the famous Valeria Messalina who wed the Emperor Claudius. 
Ancient authors characterised her as rich, scheming and unscrupulous.40
Domitia was the owner of admired estates, among them a famous villa at 
Baiae and Ravenna with fi shponds, and probably the horti Domitiae across 
the Tiber in Rome. She also owned some praedia (plots of land) in Puteoli, 
on which were built grain storehouses fi nanced by private investors. TPSulp. 
46 records the rent of a stall in this very storehouse (locatio conductio). 
Another tablet, TPSulp. 79, preserves a pledge of grain in a storehouse with 
Domitia’s name mentioned again as the owner of the location.
The wording of the documents makes it clear that the aristocratic Domitia 
Lepida was only the owner of the plots. It is very likely that an investor (who 
is of no consequence in this context) built storehouses on the grounds to 
let to tradesmen. The plot belonged further to Domitia Lepida who might 
have had a share in the profi t.41 Nevertheless, neither Domitia herself nor 
one of her dependants took part in the business drawn up in the documents 
cited above. Her name (as owner of the plot) served merely for the correct 
 identifi cation of the location.
The other lady of high birth mentioned in the sources was Lollia 
Saturnina, the sister of the more famous Lollia Paulina, who was the wife of 
the Emperor Gaius (Caligula).42 Lollia Saturnina was married to D. Valerius 
Asiaticus, who also owned a pretty villa at Baiae. Her husband reached the 
honour of being a consul suffectus in 35 CE and consul in 46 CE. One of her 
freedmen, a certain Marcus Lollius Philippus, is mentioned in two Puteoli 
tablets (TPSulp. 54 and 73). TPSulp. 54 is a chirographum of Marcus Lollius 
Philippus about a loan: he received 2,000 sestertii and promised to return it. 
It is very likely that the freedman acted here for himself; the small amount is 
a strong argument in support of such an interpretation. In the other tablet, 
Gnostus, a slave of Lollia Saturnina, paid to Caius Sulpicius Cinnamus 
a certain amount (the text is damaged in this part).43 Remarkably, the 
payment was carried out for the account of Marcus Lollius Philippus. Jane 
Gardner supposed fi nancial diffi culties on the part of the freedmen in the 
background:
Has Lollius perhaps been conducting some business on behalf of Lollia, acting as 
her agent, procurator? It is possible; then, for some reason, he was unable to carry 
39 See also Gardner (1999), pp. 12–13.
40 Cancik and Schneider (1996), vol. 3, p. 743.
41 Buckland (1939), p. 167 speaks of a ‘building lease’.
42 See Camodeca (1999), p. 172; also Gardner (1999), p. 14.
43 TPSulp. 54 and 73.
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through some necessary payment (for a debt which he incurred in his own name, 
but could recover from her later), so Lollia is having to intervene and pay directly, 
since, if Lollius was her mandatary, she was ultimately liable to provide the money 
to carry out the deal. However, given the evidence for Lollius’ previous business 
diffi culties and shaky credit rating, it is perhaps more likely that as his patroness 
she is helping out a needy client.44
I do not agree with this reading of this short legal document. Gardner’s 
 interpretation seems rather hypothetical and does not convince. It seems 
more likely that the freedman Marcus Lollius Philippus maintained good 
connections with the household and staff of his former owner. The business 
connections might have remained despite the change of legal status. It is 
very likely that M. Lollius Philippus and Gnostus (who was a slave of Lollia 
Saturnina) were involved in some type of common business (Gnostus prob-
ably using his peculium). The document delivers a good example of mixed 
activities between freedmen and their former ‘families’. Gnostus might have 
paid back a debt of M. Lollius Philippus to the bank of the Sulpicii – such 
money transactions were not rare and were done to avoid the disadvan-
tages of cash payments. Lollia Saturnina, the high-born lady, might have 
had nothing to do with the whole affair – I do not see any evidence for a 
 necessary personal involvement on her side.
As we see, the tablets of Puteoli indicate that members of the emperors’ 
families and of the household of senators were investing money through the 
Sulpicii.45 It can be supposed that the slaves and freedmen acted as interme-
diaries in these fi nancial transactions. The loans agreed in this way were – as 
Andreau assumed – simply money investments, because the aristocracy was 
interested fi rst of all in interest-bearing investments.46
5. WOMEN IN CLASSICAL ROMAN LAW
Our examination will focus on the legal content of Puteoli business transac-
tions carried out by women. What type of contracts did women conclude 
with the Sulpicii? What is the typical legal position of women in these con-
tracts? Which are the most convenient legal constructions chosen by women 
taking part in everyday business?
It is commonly known – and recorded in every manual of Roman 
law – that women had to have a guardian (tutor) and needed authorisation 
from their guardian throughout their lives if they were sui iuris (not under 
potestas). J. A. Crook summed up the main features of this tutela mulierum 
 (guardianship over women) as follows:
44 Gardner (1999), p. 14.
45 Andreau (1999), p. 26.
46 Andreau (1999), p. 90 passim.
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Males were released from guardianship when they reached puberty, since they 
were then capable of having children of their own who would legitimately exclude 
the agnates [. . .] Women were never released (for even if married – except 
with manus – they were sui iuris, and their husband was not their guardian). 
Astonishment at this fact would be misplaced; subjection of women’s legal acts 
to some male authority was virtually universal in antiquity. What does need 
comment is that this lifelong guardianship was whittled away by legal devices, 
though as a formality it hung grimly on.47 
Legal acts requiring authorisation from a guardian were, for example, the 
alienation of res mancipi,48 making a valid will and any contract that placed 
the woman under an obligation (for example, taking of credit, granting per-
sonal security).49 Gaius pointed out the main rules of this guardianship as 
follows (Inst.Gai.1.144):
Parents are permitted to appoint testamentary guardians for their children who 
are subject to their authority, who are under the age of puberty, and of the male 
sex; and for those of the female sex, no matter what their age may be, and even if 
they are married; for the ancients required women, even if they were of full age, to 
remain under guardianship on account of the levity of their disposition.50 
As we see, ancient lawyers usually reasoned for the necessary guardianship 
over women based on the argument of levitas animi or inbecillitas sexus. The 
(from a modern perspective) degrading statement was not a particularly rea-
sonable argument; it looks more like a popular topos. The very idea of ‘female 
weakness’ already existed in the works of the great philosophers of classical 
Athens.51 At Rome, a similar idea existed as may be seen in the description 
of Cicero’s well-known and resolute wife, Terentia, who fearlessly managed 
her fortune ‘like a man’.52 Be that as it may, by the mid-second century CE, 
Gaius seems rather sceptical of the continued necessity of tutela mulierum 
(Inst.Gai.1.190):
There does not seem to be any good reason, however, why women of full age 
should be under guardianship, for the common opinion that because of their 
levity of disposition they are easily deceived, and it is only just that they should 
be subject to the authority of guardians, seems to be rather apparent than real; for 
47 Crook (1967), p. 114.
48 To the ancient group of res mancipi belonged real estates, slaves, easements (servitutes) and 
draught animals (iumenta). But also the old, traditional way of recording wills was an act of 
mancipatio; see Kaser-Knütel (2005), pp. 327–8.
49 Generally Crook (1967), p. 115; for personal security in the tabulae Pompeianae, see Andreau 
(1994), p. 48.
50 The translations of all texts quoted from Gaius follow F. de Zulueta, Gaius Institutions with an 
English Translation and Commentary (1946).
51 Arist. Polit. 1260a; see also Kaser-Knütel (2005), p. 314.
52 Cic. Fam. 14,8,2.
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women of full age transact their own affairs, but in certain cases, as a mere form, 
the guardian interposes his authority, and he is often compelled to give it by the 
praetor, though he may be unwilling to do so.
During the Roman Empire some constitutions (especially the legislation of 
Augustus) had freed mothers with three or four children from the obliga-
tion of having a guardian.53 The weakened practice of women’s guardianship 
is well demonstrated in a short document, which records the granting of a 
guardian by the prefect of Egypt:54
Q. Aenulius Saturninus, prefect of Egypt, at the request of C. Terentius 
Sarapammon, granted a guardian to Maevia Dionysarion in accordance with the 
lex Iulia et Titia and the senatusconsultum, to wit M. Iulius Alexander – this grant 
not being to the prejudice of any legitimate guardian ‘. . .’ I, Maevia Dionysarion, 
have requested the above-named guardian, Iulius Alexander, as stated. I, Gaius 
Iulius Heracla, have written this on her behalf, she being illiterate.55
The small piece of papyrus deals with an unusual situation: obviously the 
woman involved, a certain Maevia Dionysarion, had no guardian for a 
current business. Therefore the magistrate, the local authority, the prefect 
of Egypt appointed one, a certain Iulius Alexander, for the purpose. It 
is remarkable that Maevia formally requested it. The wording which at 
fi rst sight seems complicated (‘this grant not being to the prejudice of any 
legitimate guardian . . .’) refers to the general rule of legal hierarchy in 
guardianship.56
As we have seen above, modern textbooks of Roman law promote a 
systematic view of legal institutions utilising strict defi nitions. By contrast, 
the ancient sources offer a rather more sophisticated treatment of the same 
subject. I would raise the question if the fi rst or the second issue  – or prob-
ably a third one – can be confi rmed through the documents of everyday legal 
life (through the so-called ‘law in action’). I wonder whether the strongly 
systematic approach of the course books is in fact confi rmed by business 
practice. The traditional view gives the impression that women were almost 
totally excluded from business; that they could not act at all without the 
authorisation of a guardian. Did they really act in every legal (or money) 
transaction with a guardian as is commonly supposed? Were women in 
 business disadvantaged at all?
As a working hypothesis, let us assume that there might have been some, 
53 Inst.Gai.1.194: ‘Moreover, a freeborn woman is released from guardianship if she is the 
mother of three children, and a freedwoman if she is the mother of four, and is under the 
legal guardianship of her patron. Those who have other kinds of guardians, as, for instance, 
Atilian or fi duciary, are released from guardianship by having three children’.
54 FIRA III no. 25.
55 Translation from Crook (1967), pp. 114–15.
56 See Inst.Gai.1.173 and 1.186–7.
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probably widely established, artful ways of contracting in practice, which 
could eliminate the strongly discriminating rules of positive law.
6. WOMEN IN LEGAL LIFE
I have selected fi ve tablets from the rich material of the Archive of the 
Sulpicii, comparing them with a few fragments from the works of Roman 
jurists as legal background. It is widely accepted that the Sulpicii should 
be considered predominantly faeneratores.57 Let us start with a fragmentary 
document in which the banker acts – without any doubt – as moneylender 
(TPSulp. 58):
prae[t]er HS vigintì millia | nummum in rationem | Priscil[l]ae d[o]minae meae; 
| eaque HS quatuor millia, | (5) quae su[p]ra s[cr]ipta [s]unt, | proba recte darì 
fi de rogavit | C(aius) Sulpicius F[a]ustus fi de promisi | Pyramus Caesiae Priscillae 
ser(vus) 
. . . except the 20,000 sestertii for the account of my domina Priscilla; that the 
4,000 sestertii, written above, be given properly and in good coin, asked for faith 
by Caius Sulpicius Faustus, promised for faith by Pyramus, the slave of Caesia 
Priscilla.
The document was part of a triptychon (a document which consisted origi-
nally of three waxed tablets), but only one tablet is preserved with a piece 
of the interior side. It shows the ending of a contract (the beginning of the 
text is lost) with the impression of seals of witnesses on the verso. The deed 
was drawn up in Puteoli (as confi rmed in line 9). It is a stipulatio concluded 
between Caius Sulpicius Faustus and Pyramus, one of the slaves of a certain 
Caesia Priscilla (line 8). The stipulatio counts as one of the oldest and most 
useful Roman contracts: it was an oral request and promise. Gaius called it 
an obligation verbis – a contract concluded simply by words (Inst.Gai.3.92): 
‘An obligation is verbally contracted by question and answer, as for instance: 
“Do you solemnly agree to give it to me?” “I do solemnly agree.” “Will you 
give it?” “I will give it.” “Do you promise?” “I do promise” . . .’ The mutual 
conversation (question and response) becomes the very contract; writing or 
witnesses were in no way necessary, though a written record might be the 
best way of keeping evidence of it.58
Obviously the banker, Faustus paid out 4,000 sestertii in cash to Pyramus, 
and called for a stipulation of its repayment.59 It seems very likely that 
the agreement was a loan, a mutuum. However, the deed drawn up for the 
57 Andreau (1999), p. 76: ‘The third hypothesis, which is my preference, is that they were 
 moneylenders (faeneratores), but not traders (either never traders, or traders no longer, 
having decided to devote themselves solely to moneylending)’.
58 For the legal background see Finkenauer (2010), pp. 28–30.
59 For the legal background of the combination, see Gröschler (2006), p. 286.
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 creditor puts only the fact of the payment (numeratio) in writing, without 
recording the type of the contract concluded between the parties.
A mutuum was called in ancient Rome a ‘real contract’: the handing over 
of money for the return of its equivalent. Theoretically, one could not charge 
for the loan. If somebody wanted to contract for interest, it had to be done 
by a separate stipulation. This explains why the two formulas are usually 
mixed in the Archive of the Sulpicii.
Unfortunately, almost the whole text is lacking in TPSulp. 58; nonethe-
less, the tablet remains important for us, being a transaction involving a 
woman. Therefore we need a similar record for reconstructing its main 
legal terms. TPSulp. 50 seems to be suited to our purposes. (TPSulp. 50, 9 
November 35 CE):
M(arcus) An[tonius M(arci) f(ilii)] M[a]ximus [scripsi] me accce=|pi[sse et deber]
e C(aio) Sul[pi]cio Fau[sto HS] ∞ ∞ n(ummum), | (5) [quae ab eo mutua] et 
n[umerata a]cc[epi] [e]aq[ue HS ∞ ∞] nummu[m, q(uae) s(upra) s(cripta) s(unt), 
p(roba) r(ecte) | d(ari)stip[ulat]us est C(aius) Su[lpicius Faustus spopo]ndì | eg[o] 
M(arcus) Anton[ius Maximus ---]
. . . I, Marcus Antonius, son of Marcus Maximus have written that I have received 
and owe to Caius Sulpicius Faustus 2,000 sestertii, that I have received from him 
in cash as a loan; and that 2,000 sestertii, written above, be repaid properly and in 
good coin, questioned for faith by Caius Sulpicius Faustus and promised for faith 
by Marcus Antonius Maximus.
It is a mixed formula again combining the typical features of two different 
types of documents: chirographum and testatio. Gaius notes that in the Greek-
speaking world (which had long been used to treating a contract as a writing) 
‘deeds of hand’, acknowledging debt and promising payment, were accepted 
as contractually in force (Inst.Gai.3.134):
Praeterea litterarum obligatio fi eri videtur chirographis et syngraphis, id est, si 
quis debere se aut daturum se scribat, ita scilicet, ut, si eo nomine stipulatio non 
fi at. Quod genus obligationis proprium peregrinorum est.
Furthermore, literal obligation appears to be created by chirographa and syngrapha, 
that is to say documents acknowledging a debt or promising a payment, of course 
on the assumption that a stipulation is not made in the matter. This form of 
 obligation is special to peregrines.
A chirographum (cheirographon) was a very common type of document, 
written in the fi rst person singular (it means subjectively styled), and mostly 
by the debtor’s own hand, without witnesses.60 The debtor acknowledged 
owing somebody something (for example, a certain amount of money). On 
the contrary, a testatio was drawn up always in the third person (objectively 
styled), mostly by a scribe, and was consequently sealed by witnesses.
60 For exceptions, see Jakab (2011), p. 287.
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The fi rst part of our text records a receipt of Marcus Antonius, written 
in his own hand. It was an acknowledgment of handing over 2,000 sestertii 
from Cinnamus as a loan (cash payment, from hand to hand, through a 
numeratio). It was followed – as usual – by a stipulation (testatio with wit-
nesses). It is remarkable that the stipulation also was formulated in the fi rst 
person singular in our tablet.
It is commonly considered as a threefold document producing two legal 
actions: receipt, acknowledgement of a debt and stipulation of repayment. 
In my opinion, in accordance with Gaius (3.134), there might be three dif-
ferent causae obligationis: the cash payment among the parties concluded 
a loan (mutuum), the mutual conversation of repayment of an obligation 
verbis (stipulatio) and the chirographum, this special type of constitutive legal 
document according to Hellenistic legal practice an obligatio litteris (a con-
tract by writing) with an additional third possibility of claim before court.61
Let us summarise in brief. TPSulp. 50 presents a well preserved deed 
recording a loan contract carried out by one of the Sulpicii. The banker paid 
out hard currency at the cash desk of his bank house and insisted upon a 
legal document (business as usual). Most deeds about loans were drawn up 
following the same formula. Furthermore, it can be assumed that a scribe or 
an employee of the Sulpicii usually prepared the exterior side of the tabulae 
(as mentioned above, this side was only a summary of the agreement without 
procedural relevance). The debtor took it as a model and drew up the inte-
rior side mostly in his own hand.62 This partly automatic way of drafting 
legal documents is a strong argument that the loan of Caesia Priscilla might 
have followed a similar structure.
Armed with this knowledge, we can return to the fi rst document (TPSulp. 
58). It can be assumed that this deed also contained all three legal foundations 
(causae obligationis) observed above – with three different possible actions for 
the creditor to choose from. Of course, the burden of proof is different in 
each action (as the fact of cash payment, the written acknowledgement or the 
oral question and promise).
As we have noticed, in our fi rst document (TPSulp. 58), a slave called 
Pyramus concluded the loan contract with Caius Sulpicius Faustus, although 
he mentioned the name of his owner, Caesia Priscilla. It was a useful feature 
of Roman law that slaves could act without any diffi culties as contracting 
parties. However, the possibilities of a lawsuit were slightly different in 
 business involving slaves.
It is worth looking briefl y at a further document showing how it worked 
(TPSulp. 56, 7 March 52 CE):
61 See Jakab (2011), pp. 286–9; the mixed type of the document was overlooked by Gardner 
(1999), p. 15.
62 See Jakab (2011), p. 289 with further evidence.
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Niceros colonorum coloniae | Puteolanae servus arcarius | scripsi me accep[i]
sse mutu«os» et | debere C(aio) Sulpicio [Ci]nnamo HS [∞]| nummos eosque HS 
mille nummos, qui s(upra) s(cripti) s(unt), p(robos) r(ecte) d(ari) k(alendis) Ìulis 
| prìmis {p(robos) r(ecte d(ari)} fi de rogavit C(aius) | Sulpicius Cinnamus, fi de 
promisi | Niceros col(onorum) col(oniae) servus arcarius.
. . . I, Niceros, servus arcarius of the colonia Puteoli, have written that I have 
received as a loan and owe to Caius Sulpicius Cinnamus 1,000 sestertii. And that 
those 1,000 sestertii, written above, shall be repaid properly and in good coin on 
1 July, and be repaid properly and in good coin has been asked by Caius Sulpicius 
Cinnamus and duly promised for faith by me, Niceros, servus arcarius of the 
colonia Puteoli [. . .]
This deed reports a loan contract between the banker Cinnamus and 
Niceros, a slave, owned by the municipality of Puteoli.63 Niceros specifi ed 
his profession in the deed; this was a common identifi cation method in the 
ancient world. Niceros was a servus arcarius, a minor clerk administering 
matters involving public money in Puteoli. It is unclear whether he might 
have used the 1,000 sestertii, borrowed in this document, privately. In all 
likelihood he contracted on behalf of his peculium (a kind of personal prop-
erty granted to a slave from his master), but he might have contracted also 
for his owner or employer.64
This tablet was again drawn up with a mixed formula – similar to those 
observed above (a combination of a chirographum and a testatio). There are 
also three different causae obligationis (numeratio, chirographum, stipulatio) 
in the detailed wording of the contract. However, everything acquired by a 
slave belonged automatically to his master (dominus or domina) according to 
Roman law. In our case, if Niceros was owned by the colonia of Puteoli, the 
municipality became the owner of every piece of coin acquired by him as a 
loan. Going by this, a claim for repayment must have been brought against 
the owner of the slave-debtor, in this case the colonia of Puteoli.65
Having fi nished this short excursion, we are now equipped to return to 
the legal transaction of Priscilla in our fi rst text (TPSulp. 58). The extremely 
fragmentary document can be reasonably explained in light of the structure 
of TPSulp. 50 and 56, just analysed. It can be assumed that the tabulae about 
the loan raised by Pyramus also contained a chirographum (scripsi me accepisse 
et debere) followed by the promise of repayment (stipulation).
However, the number of persons involved in the legal transaction is 
63 For a detailed analysis, see Gröschler (2006), pp. 261–2.
64 For typical types of agency, see Aubert (1994), p. 30 passim.
65 In line 11, the promise of Niceros is formulated as a fi depromissio which agrees with the rules 
of classical Roman law. The solemn ancient form of stipulation using the word spondeo was 
confi ned to Roman citizens. However, non-citizens were allowed very early to replace it with 
fi de promittere or fi de iubere.
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unusual – not two, but three participants: Faustus, Pyramus and Caesia 
Priscilla. It is not clear whether Pyramus borrowed the money for himself 
(on behalf of his peculium) or vicariously for his domina (owner). And which 
action(s) could be raised from this contract or from the very document?
We have seen above in our third loan on tabulae (TPSulp. 56) that a slave 
need not necessarily represent his owner. On the contrary, the slave was 
able to act also on his own (in fact, within the fi nancial limits of his pecu-
lium). Slaves in business were commonly accepted everywhere in the Roman 
Empire. Also Pyramus the slave might have raised 4,000 sestertii without 
any trouble from the bank of the Sulpicii for himself. In this case Pyramus 
might have had the same legal situation as Niceros above (see TPSulp. 56). 
Indeed, Camodeca argued precisely for this explanation: he assumed that the 
phrase in rationem needs to be related to the 20,000 sestertii already due from 
Priscilla and has nothing to do with the case at issue.66
However, there are some arguments against this solution: especially the 
pre-existing debt of 20,000 sestertii in line 1 and the phrase next to it: in 
rationem Priscillae dominae meae (lines 2–3). Obviously it refers rather to the 
new debt of 4,000 recorded in the present document. This seems to me more 
reasonable, considering the usual meaning of rationes.
Rationes were account books widely used by Romans in fi rst-century 
Italy. All transactions, especially fi nancial ones, were carefully recorded on 
wooden tablets or papyrus and kept by every economic unit: a household, 
villa rustica or bank.67 Ulpian, the leading jurist of the third century, specifi es 
its meaning as follows: ‘a ratio is a transaction involving two aspects, giving 
and receiving, credit and debit, incurring and discharging an obligation on 
one’s own account . . .’68 In the case at issue, it must have been the bank 
account of Priscilla regarding her credit and debit with the Sulpicii. In my 
opinion, the phrase ascertains that the 4,000 sestertii (as the former 20,000) 
were charged to her account. Taking this into account, the obligation (loan 
contract) needs to be considered as concluded between Faustus and Priscilla 
– and not Pyramus, who acted merely as the receiver of the money.69
At this point it is necessary to risk some remarks on the social back-
ground. Although we do not know anything about the social status of 
Caesia Priscilla, the large sum of money suggests that she might have been 
rather wealthy. However, the domina involved in the business seems to have 
been careful to avoid any public appearance at a bank to withdraw money. 
Instead, she sent her slave to pick up the cash credited for her. Her reserved 
manner is typical of female behaviour in ancient society, where ladies of a 
66 Camodeca (1999), p. 149.
67 See Jakab (2009), pp. 39–46.
68 D.2.13.6.3 (Ulpian. 4 ad Ed.).
69 Unclear is the opinion of Gardner (1999), p. 15 – was it a business with a peculium or on 
behalf of Caesia Priscilla?
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certain standing and property were not accustomed or expected to act almost 
publicly.70
However, the banker must have insisted upon drawing up the loan con-
tract properly, according to usual business practice. It meant – as we have 
seen above – always a stipulation of repayment by the debtor, too. Because 
a stipulation (a mutual, oral question and promise) was impossible in her 
absence, the only remaining choice was that Pyramus, the slave of Priscilla, 
had to conclude it. Indeed, this fact slightly altered the proper way of insti-
tuting an action in a future lawsuit.71
In the tablets we have examined thus far, the Sulpicii acted as money-
lenders. However, there are several tabulae that record money transactions 
without mentioning the name of a Sulpicius. It can be supposed that the 
bank took part in these transactions as well. Before continuing our pano-
rama of businesswomen, let us survey briefl y the usual operations of bankers 
in ancient Rome. A short survey can be useful for a better understanding of 
the legal and economical context.
Ulpian, one of the best known classical Roman lawyers, summed up the 
main operations of small bankers dealing with problems of insolvency – 
related of course to a concrete trial (D.16.3.7.2):
Quotiens foro cedunt nummularii, solet primo loco ratio haberi depositariorum, 
hoc est eorum qui depositas pecunias habuerunt, non quas faenere apud nummu-
larios vel cum nummulariis vel per ipsos exercebant.
Whenever moneylenders become insolvent, it is customary for account of the 
depositors to be taken fi rst, that is, of those who had money on deposit, not 
money at interest with the moneylenders, or invested in conjunction with the 
moneylenders, or left with them to make use of it.72
The case deals with nummularii – these were small-style bankers occupied 
mostly with money exchange, although they also sometimes engaged in 
interest-bearing investment. During their usual business transactions, they 
repeatedly accepted deposits from their clients. Ulpian found it important 
to distinguish between two main types of agreements: the banker might have 
paid interest on the capital or he might not have.73 In the latter case, the 
customer was interested fi rst of all in safe custody (safekeeping), and in the 
former case, in profi t (interest-bearing).
According to the regular rules of deposit in Roman law, the depositary 
was not entitled to use the object deposited, and to do so was a breach of 
70 Gardner (1995), p. 257 passim.
71 Instead of a direct action against the promissor from the stipulation (actio ex stipulatu), it could 
be brought in rather as an actio quod iussu against his owner Priscilla – however, with the same 
result.
72 The English translations from the Digest follow Watson (1985).
73 For banking, see Andreau (1999), p. 90 passim.
DU PLESSIS PRINT.indd   140 19/12/2012   16:49
 Financial Transactions by Women in Puteoli 141
contract.74 In general, however, bankers wished to make use of the money. 
In this case, the depositary was not obliged to return the identical coins left 
in his custody but the equivalent value (eiusdem generis).75 With some hesi-
tation, Papinian confi rmed that agreements of such type were widely used 
and, without any doubt, in force, according to the opinion of a vast majority 
(D.16.3.24): ‘for if it was agreed that the equivalent sum be repaid, then the 
matter exceeds the very well-known limits of a deposit’. In this special type 
of deposit, the depositary was able to use the coins kept by him, and in this 
case he came under an obligation to pay interest.
Nevertheless, Ulpian analysed not only two, but three types of possible 
agreements among bankers and their clients. The legally relevant differences 
among these three types emerged most clearly if the bank failed. Those 
whose money had not been touched and who could identify it as theirs 
could simply claim their property back. Those whose money had been used 
but who had not received any interest had a preferential claim in case of 
insolvency. Those receiving interest ranked together with the usually long 
line of ordinary creditors of the banker. Ulpian’s decision seems to suggest 
that there was really a range of possibilities open to a Roman who had cash 
to spare, and which option he chose would have depended on the risk he was 
prepared to accept.
However, this is not the place for a long discussion about banking in 
ancient Rome. For our sources, the wooden tablets from the Archive of the 
Sulpicii, it is only relevant that a regular client might have invested money 
‘at’ the banker, ‘with’ the banker or ‘through’ the banker. In the fi rst case, 
the bank acted as paying agent, while in the second the bank, so to speak, 
borrowed the money from the client against interest (and all risk remained 
with the bank). In the third case, the customer transferred the money to a 
bank and authorised the banker to invest it at a good rate of interest (here the 
bank acted as an agent and the risk remained with the customer).
Let us scrutinise in the next tabulae, concerning transactions by women, 
if Ulpian’s model of banking meets the transactions of the Sulpicii. There 
is, for example TPSulp. 71 (26 March 46 CE), again a fragmentary preserved 
fi nancial transaction with Caesia Priscilla, the lady already presented above:
C(aius) Ìulius Amarantus scripsi | [me] accepisse ab Py[ramo] | [Caesiae] Priscillae 
servo s[e]stertia tria millia | nummum ex epistula
. . . I, Caius Iulius Amarantus have written that I have received from Pyramus, the 
slave of Caesia Priscilla, 3,000 sestertii in accordance with the epistula. 
As we see, almost all the protagonists count as old acquaintances: Pyramus 
was also introduced above, in our fi rst tabula. In the waxed tablet at hand, 
74 Kaser-Knütel (2005), pp. 196–8.
75 Crook (1967), p. 209.
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he might have revisited the bank on the order of his female proprietor, 
Caesia Priscilla. It is very likely that he acted here vicariously for his wealthy 
domina. The document contains a chirographum of a certain Caius Iulius 
Amarantus about a cash payment, hand to hand. The last line gives a hint 
of the existence of a certain epistula, a private or business letter. It seems 
likely that this very letter laid down the causa of the payment, the detailed 
 agreement between the parties.
Lucio Bove argued that the legal content must have been a loan contract 
(mutuum): Priscilla could have played the role of the creditor and Amarantus 
the role of the debtor.76 Camodeca refused this interpretation and noticed 
that there was neither a stipulation nor any other promise of repayment, 
therefore the parties must have changed their roles in the business: Priscilla 
might have been the debtor and Amarantus the creditor receiving the 
 repayment from her.77
As the fragmentary text is short, it could provide some further possible 
interpretations – relying on the role of an epistula in legal transactions. 
Reading the decisions of the Roman jurists, it seems very likely that epistulae 
were special types of documents, and not mere synonyms of chirographum 
(as considered earlier, for example, by Leopold Wenger).78 An epistula could 
have been especially useful in credit transactions between more than two 
parties who contracted merely on confi dential terms. There is plenty of 
evidence for this special function of epistula; and it leads also in the above 
quoted tablet of Caesia Priscilla to a possible new concept of the facts. It 
seems to me that the following aspects should be especially considered: 
the tabula was preserved in the archive of a bank; the epistula mentioned at 
the end must have been of legal relevance; legal transactions were usually 
recorded in more than a single document; furthermore it was not rare that 
more than two parties were involved in money transactions.
In summary, I see two further possibilities for reconstructing the legal 
relations among the parties. In the fi rst case, Priscilla might have deposited 
a larger amount of money with the Sulpicii. Pyramus, her slave, could raise 
and pay out the 3,000 sestertii, recorded here, in cash directly at the cash 
desk of the bank, from the account of Priscilla, to Amarantus. We can better 
understand the legal structure supposed above if we use the next text as a 
possible model for it (D.16.3.28):
Caecilius Candidus Paccio Rogatiano suo salutem. viginti quinque nummorum 
quos apud me esse voluisti, notum tibi ista hac epistula facio ad ratiunculam 
meam ea pervenisse: quibus ut primum prospiciam, ne vacua tibi sint: id est ut 
usuras eorum accipias, curae habebo. 
76 Bove (1984), p. 162.
77 Camodeca (1999), p. 170.
78 Wenger (1953), p. 736.
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Caecilius Candidus to Paccius Rogatianus, greetings. As to the 25 sestertii, which 
you wished to be lodged with me, I inform you by this letter that they have been 
entered on my account. I shall attend to this sum as soon as possible, to see that 
you do not have it lying idle [producing no return]. That is, I shall take care of it 
that you get interest on it. 
A certain Caecilius Candidus (probably a banker) wrote a short memoran-
dum (a surprisingly informal business letter) to his client. He assured him 
that a certain amount of money arrived on his account and that he would 
do his best to invest it with good profi t. Assuming the same model, it can be 
supposed that Amarantus wrote the epistula mentioned and he might have 
received the cash payment. However, he also issued a chirographum (pre-
served in TPSulp. 71) as a receipt. But can it be reasonably supposed that two 
different records were made about the same payment? In my opinion, it does 
not need to be a contradiction. It was very common in everyday legal life 
to issue separate documents about each stage of a transaction. The present 
chirographum (TPSulp. 71) recorded the act of carrying out the cash payment 
between Pyramus and Amarantus (the slave paid out the money entrusted to 
him). Independent of that, Amarantus could have issued another document 
(called an epistula) summing up the terms of the agreement and acknowledg-
ing the receipt of the money for Priscilla (who was his real contracting party 
in this case). Nevertheless, it is not clear what type of contract was concluded 
between the parties; it was probably a loan or a deposit. In a future lawsuit, 
the chirographum would have entitled Priscilla to sue for repayment only 
of the equivalent of the sum paid out (this denotes exactly 3,000 sestertii 
without any interest). The aforementioned epistula, with the exact terms 
of their contractual relations, might have contained a different type of 
contractual obligation with better terms for Priscilla: for example, a money 
deposit which would have entitled her to also sue for interests and remedy. 
Accepting this hypothesis, we would have new evidence for the occupation 
of the Sulpicii as paying agents, and probably Amarantus as a private agent 
for money investments.
However, there is also another possible solution for TPSulp. 71. The epis-
tula (mentioned in line 7) might have been written by Priscilla, as well. Here 
we can use a different legal structure depicted by Marcellus, deciding a rather 
complicated case (D.46.1.24):
Lucius Titius cum pro Seio fratre suo apud Septicium intervenire vellet, epistulam 
ita emisit: Si petierit a te frater meus, peto des ei nummos fi de et periculo meo.
When Lucius Titius wished to stand surety for his brother, Seius to Septicius, he 
sent a letter in these terms: ‘If my brother seeks an advance from you, I ask you to 
give him the money, relying on my honour and at my risk’.
There is a business letter again: the short note of a certain Lucius Titius 
(a typical name in a blank form) showing how informally and effectively 
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epistulae might have been used in complicated legal structures. According 
to this model, the facts behind the fragmentary receipt of Amarantus might 
have been as follows: Priscilla would have asked and authorised her slave, 
Pyramus, to give Amarantus a helping hand (paying out 3,000 sestertii to 
him), from his (Pyramus’) peculium but at her (Priscilla’s) risk. She may have 
wanted to avoid acting openly as a creditor, being a lady of distinguished 
birth or delicate social status. Possibly Amarantus belonged to a lower social 
class, and she was reluctant to publicly cast herself as being involved in busi-
ness with him. The Sulpicii would have acted here again as paying agents and 
discrete intermediaries at the same time. The legal relation, produced by an 
agreement and a mandatory payment, is close to a personal surety (Priscilla 
would be a guarantor for Amarantus at Pyramus). However, there can be no 
valid legal obligations between a domina and her slave.
Let us move forward, leaving Caesia Priscilla for the present to examine 
some further money transactions of female ‘managers’ in ancient Puteoli. 
There was a certain Gaia Primigenia who obviously also preferred discreet 
business through bankers (TPSulp. 105, 9 March 56 CE):
si[· ·]++++[---]+um | [· ·]S++[· ·]+++stipula[tus]s [e]s[t] | C(aius) Sulpicius 
Cinn[amu]s, quì se | procuratorem G[· · ·]ae Primìgeni=|ae esse [di]cebat, spopon-
dit | C(aius) Ìulius Atimetus.
. . . [promise has been called] by Caius Sulpicius Cinnamus, who declared that he 
is the procurator of Gaia Primigenia, promised by Caius Iulius Atimetus. 
In this tablet, the bank of the Sulpicii acted fi nally as a contracting party. 
Cinnamus (one of the members of the younger generation of the Sulpicii) 
concluded a stipulatio with a certain Caius Iulius Atimetus. The document is 
heavily damaged. Camodeca set it under the title Negotia incerta et fragmenta, 
among texts of no consequence. Despite its condition, it can yet deliver some 
useful information. It is evident from line 4 that a certain Gaia Primigenia 
was the contracting party (liberta or domina, it is not clear). Cinnamus acted 
here simply as her procurator (private agent) as mentioned explicitly in line 4. 
Gaia Primigenia might have deposited a certain amount of money with the 
Sulpicii and authorised Cinnamus to invest it on short-term interest-bearing 
terms. It seems very likely that Cinnamus (and not Gaia Primigenia) con-
cluded the present loan contract with Atimetus – and it could have fi tted as 
a very reasonable solution for a lady in ancient Puteoli. However, the banker 
might have charged the interest (paid by Atimetus as debtor) immediately to 
the account (ratio) of Gaia Primigenia.
Let us take another look at Ulpian’s sophisticated model of usual banking 
activities in ancient Rome. Of all the possible models, Gaia Primigenia’s 
business (TPSulp. 105) seems to adhere to this structure: Cinnamus, the 
banker might have acted as a careful agent, investing money for his client 
(money deposited with him) for a good profi t. The usual risk (which is the 
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possible insolvency of the debtor) remained in this case always with the 
client, thus in our case with Gaia Primigenia.
There is a further tablet (TPSulp. 99, 28 February 44 CE) with a rather 
fragmentary textual record of the fi nancial transactions of a certain Marcia. 
Camodeca suggested completing her name for Marcia Fausta; she might have 
been a liberta, a freedwoman. The text is heavily damaged, yet Camodeca 
reconstructed it ingeniously using similar formulas. It looks very likely 
that Marcia was the debtor in a loan contract, concluded with M. Octavius 
Fortunatus. The bank of the Sulpicii might have been involved in the busi-
ness again as a simple paying agency. It is remarkable that Marcia acted with 
her guardian (tutor), a certain Epichares (line 10).
It will have come to our attention that all our businesswomen have acted 
without a guardian. Thinking in terms of modern Roman law textbooks, 
there must have been guardians also in TPSulp. 58, 71 and 105. We shall 
return to this problem later in the summary, where I will try to offer a 
 reasonable explanation for the missing guardians.
Returning to Marcia, we see that she received here a relatively small sum 
of 2,000 sestertii. She was obliged to repay it in three instalments: the fi rst 
one between 15 March and 5 April, the second one on an unknown date, and 
the third one on 1 May. The document was drawn up on 28 February 44 CE. 
The legal transaction between the parties can be reconstructed as follows: M. 
Octavius Fortunatus (probably a freedman) might have deposited a certain 
amount of money with the bank of the Sulpicii (as a kind of current account). 
Later, he concluded a loan contract with Marcia, crediting her 2,000 ses-
tertii for a short term of two months with repayment in three instalments. 
The money was withdrawn by Marcia (and her guardian) at the bank of the 
Sulpicii. The Sulpicii were involved in the business again as a simple paying 
agency.
Finally, we must look at some money transactions between ladies of inter-
est in Puteoli: a certain Titinia Antracis and Euplia. The wooden tablet was 
titled by the scribe as Tabellae Titiniae A[ntracidis]:79
Exp(ensos)| Eupliae Theodori f(iliae) [HS ∞ DC] | Meiliacae tutore aucto[re] | 
Epichare Aphrodisi f(ilio) Athe[niensi]; | petiit et numeratos acce[pit] | domo ex 
r[i]sco | Acceptos | Risco (vac.) [HS ∞ DC]; | Eos HS ∞ DC nu[mmos, qui s(upra) 
s(cripti) s(unt)], | interrogant[e Titinia Antracide], | fi de sua esse ius[sit Epichares 
Aphrodisi] | f(ilius) Athenensis p[ro Euplia Theodori f(ilia)] | Meliacae Ti[tiniae 
Antracidi] | Act[um Puteolis . . . 
The Tablets of Titinia Antracis | paid out | to Euplia, daughter of Theodorus, 
1,600 sestertii | from Melos, with authorization of her guardian | Epichares, son 
of Aphrodisius, from Athens, | she asked and received in cash | from home, out 
of the cash desk. | Received | to the cash desk, 1,600 sestertii | and those 1.600 
79 TPSulp. 60 (20 March 43 CE).
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sestertii written above | questioned by Titinia Antracis | for his faith promised 
Epichares Aphrodisius’ | son from Athens for Euplia the daughter of Theodorus 
| from Melos to Titinia Antracis | acted in Puteoli.
The present triptychon is well preserved, but diffi cult to explain. It is of some 
interest that there are two further texts concerning loans of Euplia in the 
Archive.80 The remarkable title ‘Tabellae of Titinia Antracis’ and further 
typical phrases in accounting (such as exceptos, acceptos) give some hints as 
to its explanation. It looks rather like an unusual, almost unknown type 
of evidence, an extract from an account book (rationes). There were three 
persons involved in the money transaction: Titinia, Euplia and Epichares. 
The ladies formed the parties concluding a contract while the only man, 
Epichares, acted as the guardian and guarantor for Euplia. Euplia was very 
likely a woman of Hellenistic-Greek origin; her guardian might have been her 
husband but could also be a third person.81
Modern scholars have argued for the interpretation of the legal content 
being a simple loan between the ladies: Titinia was the creditor and Euplia 
the debtor.82 However, this interpretation offers no possible solution for 
the role played by the Sulpicii in the matter. It is also very strange that the 
parties chose this unusual formula instead of a regular loan (as cited above, 
for example, with Caesia Priscilla). For a more satisfactory explanation, 
Peter Gröschler suggested that it must have been a transaction not between 
two, but rather three parties.83 The payment might have been carried out at 
the cash desk of a bank. In this case, the fi rst lines would record simply a 
payment with the usual terminology of accounting. Euplia, a freeborn per-
egrine woman from Asia Minor (Melos), might have acted as the receiver of 
the cash money and the debtor named for its repayment. She acted properly 
with her guardian, Epichares – who is also of Greek nationality (and prob-
ably her husband as already mentioned above).84 Jane Gardner supposed 
that the document appears ‘to be written by a man, also a Greek, Epichares 
of Athens’. This seems too speculative – I do not see any evidence in the text 
for Epichares’ writing the deed. Accepting the thesis that the document is an 
extract from the account book of the bank, it might have been written rather 
by a scribe of the very bank.
Epichares acted also as guarantor (personal surety) for Euplia. Gardner 
assumed that ‘the addition of a guarantor usually indicates either that the 
creditor is not satisfi ed that the borrower’s credit is good, or that the debt is 
otherwise unsecured’.85 For a similar situation, she quoted TPSulp. 64 and 
80 TPSulp. 61 and 62.
81 See Gardner (1995), p. 16.
82 See Bove (1984), p. 150 passim; Wolf (2010), p. 85.
83 Gröschler (1997), pp. 67–96; his thesis is accepted also in Rowe (2001), p. 230. 
84 Gardner (1999), p. 17.
85 Gardner (1999), p. 18 passim.
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argued that N. Castricius Agathopus should have been Faecia’s tutor. For a 
better understanding, I should print here the heavily damaged text: ‘. . . sunt, 
ìnterrogante [T]itinia | Basilide, fi de sua esse iussit | N(umerius) Castricius 
Agathopus pro Fa[e]cia . . .’ As we see, the short fragment preserved does 
not give any hint of the legal or personal connections between the parties. 
As for the gender-specifi c importance of guarantors for loans received by 
women, Gardner combined here guardianship and guarantee in a confusing 
manner: ‘Moreover, for women with tutors, there is at least a presumption 
of good credit, since . . . a woman could not take on obligations without 
the consent of her tutor . . .’86 From the legal point of view, both personal 
and real surety seems to have been equally used and broadly accepted in the 
Roman world. However, personal surety was rather typical for Roman deals 
while Greeks preferred pledges. Considering this, I do not see any gender-
specifi c or socially shaped phenomenon in the fact that Epichares acted as 
guarantor for Euplia in TPSulp. 60.
Furthermore, there is a fi nancial transaction involving a woman drawn 
up following the same formula – without mentioning any tutor. In TPSulp. 
63 (also a nomen arcarium), a certain Magia Pulchra borrowed the remarka-
bly large sum of 30,000 sestertii from Caius Sulpicius Cinnamus. Camodeca 
suggested that Magia might have earlier given birth to at least three chil-
dren, therefore she enjoyed the Augustan ius liberorum.87 Unfortunately, 
the text is seriously damaged from line 14; the letters preserved seem to 
introduce the usual stipulation of a guarantor: Idem spo[pondit] . . . We do 
not know anything about the life and pains of Magia Pulchra. However, 
the mere evidence of acting here without tutor seems to me not conclusive 
for the assumption that she must have been the mother of at least three 
children.
But let us return to Titinia Antracis, Euplia and Epichares in TPSulp. 60. 
The two entries (exp. – acp.) cannot stand for the same money transaction, 
in my opinion. Neither legally nor economically would it have made good 
sense. On the contrary, I argue that the relatively small sum of 1,600 sestertii 
was paid out in cash from the cash desk of the bank – and immediately taken 
in to the same cash desk.88
All tabellae documents show a formula that is rare in ancient Italy. 
However, there are some Greek papyri from Roman Egypt with a similar 
structure. Double entries in the account books of banks were usual, if the 
party was an old client of the same bank, carrying out the whole transaction. 
It might have worked well in everyday life, assuming that the debtor immedi-
ately deposited the money, just received on his account, with the same bank. 
86 Gardner (1999), p. 21.
87 Camodeca (1999), p. 158.
88 Gardner (1999), p. 17 assumed here a failure of the scribe and interpreted the entries exp. and 
acp. as synonym phrases.
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There is a fi tting example of this structure in a papyrus document, an extract 
from an account book of a bank:89
To Apollonios, son of Hestiodoros, which to Ariston,
son of Antipatros (paid out) 700 from Ariston, son of Antipatros (received) 700.
It is remarkable that there are fi ve further documents of the same type, as the 
text just explained (TPSulp. 60) in the Archive of the Sulpicii and two further 
deeds in waxed tablets from Herculaneum.90 Six of these eight documents 
record money transactions by women. Until now, nobody has taken notice 
of this surprising fact. The phenomena can be reasonably explained by the 
desire of women for discretion, as pointed out already above. Female partici-
pants in business tried to avoid personal appearances at public places. Acting 
through a bank could offer a discreet and useful alternative to this problem.
To summarise: as mentioned in the introduction above, in ancient Rome 
women had to have guardians for the entire duration of their lives (tutores). 
The acts needing a guardian’s authorisation were alienation of res mancipi 
(mainly land and slaves); making a will; and any contract that put the woman 
under an obligation. This was the law as taught and learned in several 
textbooks.
However, we have just surveyed several tabulae from Puteoli containing 
contracts, receipts and other fi nancial transactions by women from different 
segments of population – and only a few of them include the authorisation 
of a guardian. How was this possible?
It is well known that Augustus’ legislation had already released women 
from the requirement of a guardian’s authorisation to encourage having a 
big family (three children for a freeborn and four for a freedwoman). Are we 
obliged to assume that every woman in Puteoli, acting without a guardian, 
must have had at least three (or four) children? This does not seem to me to 
be an elegant solution.91
As we have seen above, neither Domitia Lepida nor Lollia Saturnina 
appeared in person for business; only their freedmen and their slaves did so. 
In general, persons from the elite lent and borrowed money through their 
dependants as intermediaries. Without any doubt, it cannot be considered 
as a gender-specifi c phenomenon. However, acting through intermediaries 
seems to be useful for all the businesswomen, from each segment of popula-
tion. It appears very likely that the widely accepted practice of contracting 
through slaves and freedmen released women (in fact) from a guardian’s 
authorisation. A woman of some property, owning slaves or having freed-
men, could take part in all business without any restriction – through her 
dependants, acting for her as intermediaries. There was no need to ask 
89 P.Tebt. III, 2 no. 890 (?, second century CE); see Jakab (2003), pp. 498–506.
90 See Gröschler (1997), pp. 97–146, for a good survey.
91 Camodeca (1999), p. 158 and Gardner (1999), p. 19 seem to tend to this solution.
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her guardian or to be present at the bank at all. Using the advantages of a 
good fortune, women could participate in everyday business life on the same 
terms as male Romans. However, other women, who did not have the luxury 
of owning skilled slaves, were forced to appear personally at a bank in the 
company of a guardian.
There is one further question remaining: were the Sulpicii just money-
lenders (feneratores) or rather argentarii, bankers with extended fi nancial 
operations? Andreau argued that they were neither professional bankers 
nor wholesalers, therefore they must have specialised in moneylending: they 
must have been faeneratores.92 Here is not the proper place for a detailed 
treatment of banking in the Roman Empire. With that said, a thorough 
examination of some writing tablets has demonstrated that a new defi nition 
might be possible. Considering the role of the Sulpicii in tablets which do 
not mention their names and in others with more than two parties I rather 
believe that they were occupied in several types of fi nancial transactions, not 
only in moneylending.
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Chapter 8
Tapia’s Banquet Hall and Eulogios’ Cell: 
Transfer of Ownership as a Security in 
Some Late Byzantine Papyri*
Jakub Urbanik
1. INTRODUCTION: SECURING A LOAN IN THE LATE 
BYZANTINE PAPYRI
Modern scholarship has devoted much attention to pignus and hypotheca 
as forms of real security in classical Roman law.1 The same could be said 
about the research on the practical application of these forms, or vice versa, 
the apparent practical origins of the later dogmatic forms: there has been an 
extensive study on real securities in Greek and Hellenistic traditions. Much 
attention has been also devoted to the documents constituting, revoking, and 
accepting a real security in the Demotic and Graeco-Roman legal traditions in 
Egypt. Thanks above all to the classical studies of Andreas Bertalan Schwartz, 
we understand much better the system of ‘real’ – in the civil law vocabulary 
– securities for debt in the law of papyri.2 However, apart from Steinwenter’s 
remarks in his Recht der koptischen Urkunden, the Byzantine practice and doc-
trine remains of much less scientifi c interest. Yet, my purpose in this chapter 
is not to provide an all-embracing general overview of Byzantine securities, 
even thought they merit particular attention in themselves, but to discuss 
their particularity. The deeds of legal practice bring about a few cases of 
 guarantees of obligations in the form of transfer of ownership.
* This chapter started as a short presentation delivered in December 2006 in Vienna at a sym-
posium to honour Peter E. Pieler’s sixty-fi fth birthday. I have developed the idea as a part of 
my research project on legal consciousness in late Antiquity fi nanced by the Polish Ministry 
of Science and Higher Education. The draft has been read by José Luis Alonso (San Sebastian 
and Warsaw) and I thank him for the fruitful discussions and suggestions. I owe modern 
references and discussion to Kamil Zaradkiewicz and the practical modern examples of bank 
law to the kind advice of solicitor Elzbieta Krakowiak.
The English translations of the papyri in Parts 1 and 2 have been taken from McGing 
(1990) and Porten and Farber (1996), respectively, and I have allowed myself minor altera-
tions to keep the consistency of the texts. Other texts, unless otherwise specifi ed, have been 
translated by me.
1 See, above a collection of studies devoted to pledges by Kaser (1982), passim.
2 Schwarz (1911); and see most recently on the subject, Alonso (2008) and (2010). See also a 
very general overview in Rupprecht (1995) and Alonso (2008).
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Obviously, this type of collateral, called in the German doctrine 
Sicherungsübereignung,3 which consists of a (conditional) surrender of the 
debtor’s property to the creditor, is not limited to Byzantine Egypt. Any 
scholar of Roman law will recall the original form of the Roman real secu-
rity, fi ducia, still practised under classical Roman law – yet erased from the 
Codifi cation.4 There are also, quite naturally, Graeco-Egyptian counterparts 
of the same. The Ptolemaic and early Roman documents provide us with 
information about the so-called ‘purchase on trust’ (ὠνὴ ἐν πίστει).5 In the 
deeds documenting these sales, nothing hints at their fi duciary character; 
they were, however, accompanied by a corresponding loan document, 
sometimes written in the second column of the sheet of the papyrus.6 Had 
the latter not been preserved, we probably would not be able to detect the 
mock character of the sales. It has been argued that evolution of ‘purchase 
on trust’ was due to two distinctive but teleologically similar forms of sale 
upon redemption practised in mainland Greece7 and the Demotic ‘mortgage’ 
(yet it is not certain whether the latter actually temporarily preceded the ‘sale 
on trust’).8 Another interesting counterpart of Sicherungsübereignung were 
the Demotic conditional sales,9 whereby the transfer of property was condi-
tioned by the non-repayment of the loan on time (hence a form quite similar 
to the Roman lex commissoria).
The function of the examples that I will discuss here is identical to the 
above-mentioned cases. Yet, they differ from the ‘sale on trust’, demotic 
3 Throughout the article I shall from time to time refer to German legal terminology, for 
obvious reasons closer to the Roman notions. On the other hand – see below – the not-so-
precise parlance of common law actually illustrates better the misty terminological situation 
of the Byzantine times (see further fn. 10). 
4 See, most recently, Noordraven (1999), passim with literature, specifi cally pp. 17–41 and 
ch. 4.
5 On this security, see most recently Hermann (1989), passim; cf. as well Mitteis (1912), 
pp.135–41 and Taubenschlag (1955), pp. 270–4; the term itself does not appear in the actual 
sales, but only in the documents that refer to the original ‘purchases on trust’, cf., for 
example, MChr. 233 (= P .Heid. Inv. G 1278 Recto, Pathyris 13 September 111 BCE).
6 Cf., for example, PSI VIII 908 (Tebtynis, 42–3 CE); PSI VIII 910 (dup. P. Mich. V 332, Tebtynis 
48 CE); and see Pringsheim (1950), p. 119 and fn. 1.
7 The so-called πρᾶσις ἐπὶ λύσει (Pringsheim (1950), pp. 117–18, noted the term was never 
present in the ancient sources). For an overview, see Pringsheim (1950) and more recently 
Thür in Neue Pauly-Wissowa, s.v., with literature.
8 On this form, see most recently Markiewicz (2005), pp. 156–8 and Pestman (1985). For the 
pre-Roman genealogy of the ‘Egyptian mortgage’, cf. Pierce (1972), pp. 119–21, contra, very 
soundly, Markiewicz (2005), p. 158.
9 Or Kaufpfandverträge in Spiegelberg’s terminogy (Spiegelberg (1909), pp. 91–106); see also 
Markiewicz (2005), pp. 154–6. Still, for the transfer to take effect, it was probably neces-
sary to draw a deed of cession in favour of the creditor; see Markiewicz (2005), p. 155 with 
the example of P. Hauswald 18B. We would then have a situation quite similar to the late 
Antique practice as presented by the Coptic loans and cessions of pledges: cf. Steinwenter 
(1954), p. 500 and O. Medinet Habou 69, 72, 73. 
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conditional sale, or Roman fi ducia. Unlike them, they never expressively 
refer to any sum lent, there is nothing that suggests that any separate loan 
agreements have ever been made. In fact, the only reason to interpret them as 
guarantees rather than typical deeds of sale is the fact that they all constitute 
part of what modern papyrologists, following Alain Martin, describe as an 
archive, that is, they pertain to the same person or persons and were assem-
bled together and selected already in Antiquity. It is therefore the context of 
each particular archive, which is not necessarily visible in these papyri, that 
reveals their true nature.
I will analyse three cases of such securities from two different archives. In 
order to present some conclusion, I will compare these with an instance of 
an actual pledge/mortgage10 dated to late Antiquity as well.
2. EULOGIOS’ CELL
The earlier set of documents consists of three deeds from the early sixth 
century CE: P. Dubl. 32, 33, and 34.11 They all concern sales of a monastic 
dwelling in Labla, on the outskirts of Arsinoe.12 According to the excavation 
10 The Byzantine legal practice does not distinguish between a conventional and possessory 
pledge (Faustpfand and Hypotheke): these terms are used synonymously and only the contexts 
allow us to reconstruct the actual legal situation. See, for instance, a loan deed with a mort-
gage: P. Cairo Masp. III 67309, ll. 21–2 (Antinoopolis, 569 CE): ): ἐντεῦθεν ἤδη ὑποτίθημί̣ σοι 
καὶ ὑπεθέμην, ἐν τάξει |22 ἐ̣ν̣εχύ̣ρ̣ου καὶ λόγῳ ὑποθήκης δικαίῳ (‘and hence I am hypothecat-
ing to you and I have hypothecated as pledge and by the title of right of mortgage . . .’). Such 
confusion is by no means surprising, if we consider that some of the Justinianic legal sources 
could induce a careless reader to think of pignus and hypotheca as synonyms; cf. D.20.1.5.1 
(Marcian. 1 ad Form. Hyp.) inter pignus autem et hypothecam tantum nominis sonus differt (‘only 
the sound of the name makes a difference between a pledge and a mortgage’). Clearly, the clas-
sical jurist Marcian in his original work only wanted to state that one could avail oneself of 
actio hypothecaria no matter whether the pledge was conventional or possessory. Yet, the com-
pilers putting this phrase in the general context of D.21.1 De pignoribus et hypothecis et qualiter 
ea contrahantur et de pactis eorum seem to have given it a practical, all-purpose meaning. This 
statement is further corroborated by Stephanos’ reproach of the – apparently common – mis-
identifi cation of pignus and hypotheca: scholion οὐ μόνον παραδόσει to B.25.1.1 (corresponding 
to D.13.7.1 (Ulpian. 40 ad Sab.) pignus contrahitur non sola traditione, sed etiam nuda conventione, 
etsi non traditum est (‘pledge is contracted not only by conveyance by also by mere agreement, 
even if it is not conveyed’): ἐνέχυρον λέγεται καταχρηστικῶς ἡ ὑποθήκη. καὶ διὰ μὲν τοῦ 
εἰπεῖν, παραδόσει, ἐδήλωσε τὸ κυρίως ἐνέχυρον· διὰ δὲ τοῦ, ψιλῷ συμφώνῳ, τὴν ὑποθήκην 
(‘pledge is wrongly called hypothec. And when it is said (through) conveyance, it properly 
means “pledge”, instead (if it is contracted through) bare consent, (it signifi es) hypothec’). 
11 Two of the three documents were originally published by Sayce (1890), pp. 131–44, entered 
in the Sammelbuch under nos 5174 and 5175. A century later, Brian C. McGing identifi ed the 
third piece of the dossier, and published and comprehensively commented on all three of 
them (McGing 1990). The texts were later incorporated in an abbreviated form in P. Dubl. 
by the same author. A new interpretation of the texts has been most recently offered by Ewa 
Wipszycka (2009). 
12 See Wipszycka (2009), pp. 240–1 for a tentative localisation of Labla, in the vicinity of the 
pyramid of Hawara. Unfortunately, Petrie does not describe the exact location of the fi nd.
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diary of Flinders Petrie, the fi nd was of a very particular nature. The deeds 
were found bound together, wrapped in linen and then woollen cloth, placed 
in a jar and buried with it in the ground. It is hence without doubt that these 
papyri belong together.
In the fi rst document, P. Dubl. 32, dated 7 September 512 CE, a certain 
monk, Eulogios son of Iosephos, who at the time lives in another monastic 
community, that of Mikrou Psyon, sells his monasterion – not just a room, 
but rather a small house, usually consisting of two or more chambers, 
storage place, kitchen and sometimes even a workshop13 – to another 
monk, Pousis son of A [. . .], who already lives in Labla. The price, paid 
on the spot in coins, was set to eight solidi and 1,200 myriads of denarii, 
which for the beginning of the sixth century constitutes quite a remarkable 
amount.
In the second document, P. Dubl. 33, less than a year later than its 
counterpart (9 July 513 CE), the same monk Eulogios again sells his cell to 
Paphnoutios, son of Isaac, and Ioulios, son of Aranthios, both living in 
Labla. This time the price is set to ten solidi. I will not address here the very 
interesting problem of the private assets owned by monks, a fact obviously 
contrary to the canon and imperial legislation.14 The reader may be referred 
to authoritative recent studies on the subject.15 Suffi ce to say that, notwith-
standing the commandment of poverty, the monks kept command of their 
mundane affairs, owned property, disposed of it, and borrowed and lent 
money, a fact well attested by papyrological sources.16 Another interesting 
point, which cannot be discussed at length here, is the fact that Eulogios 
declares himself to be an ex-Melitian monk, now orthodox, whereas his 
purchasers are Melitian priests in the fi rst case and monks of the same 
denomination, in the second. Yet again we may observe that the picture of 
highly troubled relations between various factions of Christianity, which we 
usually extrapolate from the literary sources, risks being rather exaggerated 
when compared with real life.
In both of the deeds, the customary clauses securing the rights of the pur-
chasers are inserted, so at the very beginning of both the papyri we read that:
Eulogios acknowledges that he has with free, independent and fi xed will, sold and 
conveyed into complete ownership from the present for all succeeding time . . . 
the cell in the said monastery Labla which belongs to the vendor Eulogios, and 
13 On the terminology referring to monastic dwellings, see most recently Wipszycka (2009b), 
pp. 281–91. 
14 Less than two decades later, Justinian forbade alienation and hypothecation of monasteries 
to private individuals (Nov.7.11, 535 CE).
15 There is obviously a vast body of literature on the subject; most importantly, see 
Steinwenter (1930) and (1958); Barone Adesi (1988) and (1993); Wipszycka (1972), (2001), 
(2009a), (2009b), pp. 471–566; and Markiewicz (2009) with further literature.
16 See, most recently, Markiewicz (2009), passim. 
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which came down to him, as he has had confi rmed and registered . . . [cf. lines 2–3 
in both texts)]
And later, in P. Dubl. 32, we see:
henceforth the purchaser Pousis possesses and owns the same cell he has pur-
chased in its entirety, however many rooms it is, and the courtyard in front of the 
rooms, and with all its rights from the ground to the very top, as stated above; 
and have the authority to inhabit, manage, dispose of it, improve it, repair it, tear 
it down, rebuild it, redesign it, in whatever appearance and condition he wishes; 
hand it over to his heirs and successors, present it to the others or give it as a gift, 
in the manner he wishes and without hindrance. (lines 9–11)17 
In P. Dubl. 33:
henceforth the purchasers Papnouthios and Ioulios possess and own in equal half-
shares the same cell they have purchased in its entirety, however many rooms it is, 
and they have authority to inhabit, manage, dispose of it, improve it, repair it, tear 
it down, rebuild it, redesign it, in whatever condition appearance and condition 
they wish hand it on to their heir and successors, present it to others, give it away 
as gift, in the manner they wish and without hindrance. (lines 10–13)18 
In the fi nal part of both documents, the vendor stipulates that he or his suc-
cessors will take a stand against any possible claims of third parties versus the 
new owner and, should they fail to do so, they will be liable to pay as penalty 
double the price and costs incurred. The contracts were additionally secured 
by hypotheca generalis on Eulogios’ present and future property, a typical 
feature of all late Byzantine documents (the commonness of the clause actu-
ally raises doubts as to its effectiveness). Finally, there is Eulogios’ subscrip-
tion (executed on his behalf as he declares himself to be illiterate) and the 
signatures of the witnesses (fi ve and four, respectively), evidence that both 
documents are executed lege artis and thus fully effective. Also the payment 
of the price on the spot, attested to no less than thrice (in the documents, 
Eulogios’ subscriptions and by each statement of the witnesses), inform us 
that the main condition for the transfer of property in Byzantine law has 
17 καὶ παντὶ δικαίῳ αὐτοῦ |10 ἀπʼ ἐδάφους μέχρι παντὸς ὕψους, ὡς προγέγραπται, καὶ 
ἐξουσίαν ἔχειν διοικεῖν, οἰκονομεῖν, ἐπιτελεῖν περὶ αὐτοῦ, βελτιοῦν, φιλοκαλεῖν, καθελεῖν, 
ἀνοικοδομεῖν, μετασχηματίζειν, ἐν οἵᾳ βούλεται ὄψει καὶ διαθέσει, εἰς κληρονόμους καὶ 
διαδόχους παραπέμπειν, |11 ἐκποιεῖν ἑτέροις καὶ ἀποχαρίζεσθαι καθʼ ὃν βούλεται τρόπον, 
ἀνεπικωλύτως.
18 πρὸς τω (l. τὸ) ἀπὸ τοῦ νῦν τοὺς πριαμένους Παπνούθιον καὶ Ἰούλιον κρατεῖν καὶ |11 
κυριεύειν ἐξ ἴσου μέρους ἡμίσεως τοῦ αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐώνηνται μοναστηρίου ἐξ ὁλοκλήρου, 
ὅσων δʼ ἄν ἐστιν μενημάτων, καὶ παντὶ δικαίῳ αὐτοῦ ἀπʼ ἐδάφους μέχρι παντὸς ὕψους, ὡς 
προγέγραπται, καὶ ἐξουσίαν ἔχειν |12 διοικεῖν, οἰκονο̣μεῖν, ἐπιτελεῖν περὶ αὐτοῦ, βελτιοῦν, 
φιλοκαλεῖν, καθελεῖν, ἀνοικοδομεῖν, μετασχηματίζειν, ἐν οἵᾳ βούλονται ὄψει καὶ διαθέσει, 
εἰς κληρονόμους καὶ διαδόχους παραπέμπειν, ἑτέροις ἐκποιεῖν |13 καὶ ἀποχαρίζε̣σ̣θαι καθʼ ὃν 
βούλονται τρόπον, ἀνεπικωλύτως.
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been fulfi lled.19 All in all, two perfect deeds of sale and at the same time a 
transfer of property.
And yet there is a surprising feature: in both papyri the very same person 
sells exactly the same monasterion within the very same year. To prove it, we 
only need to compare the description of the dwelling found in both texts. In 
P. Dubl. 32 we have:
the neighbours of the cell are: to the south, the desert and the cell of the late 
Andreas the priest; to the north, the cell of the priest Naaraos, to the east, the 
desert, to the west, the public road in front of the cell of Petros the deacon (lines 
6–7),20 
and in P. Dubl. 33, the description runs as follows:
the neighbours of the cell are, as they (the parties) have cordially indicated, to the 
south, a deserted cell; to the north, the cell of the priest Naaraos, to the east, the 
desert and the entry and exit of the same cell; to the west, the public road in front 
of the cell of Peter the deacon. (lines 6–7)21 
The only difference in these two reports is the fact the cell previously belong-
ing to the late priest Andreas is now designated as deserted.22 How was it 
possible that Eulogios sold the same estate twice to two different buyers 
within a year?
Before we attempt a plausible answer to this question, we still need to 
consider the third document from the dossier, P. Dubl. 34. It is a settlement of 
claims, dialysis, executed in poor Greek, rather diffi cult to understand, most 
probably on 24 August 511 CE,23 so it predates both of the sales. Two monks 
living in the same hermitage at Labla settle their rights and claims to it. The 
owner of the monasterion (which unfortunately is not described further), 
Aioulios, son of Arantheios, writes to his brother, another Melitian monk, 
Eulogios, son of Pousi. Having declared as invalid any deed regarding the cell 
that he may have made with Isak, son of Sabinos, Aioulios stipulates that 
after his death the property of the cell, together with his other earthly goods 
as well as debts and assets, will pass to Eulogios. The same should happen, 
19 Cf. Kaser (1971–5), § 242 III and § 264 I.
20 οὗ καί εἰσιν γίτονες, νότου τὸ ὄρος καὶ μοναστήριον τοῦ μακαρίου Ἀνδρέα πρεσβυτέρου, 
βορρᾶ μοναστήριον Νααραοῦ |7 πρεσβυτέρου, ἀπηλιώτου τὸ ὄρος, λιβὸς ὁδὸς δημοσία, μεθʼ 
ἣν μοναστήριον Πέτρου διακόνου.
21 οὗ καί εἰσιν γίτονες, καθὼς ἐκ συμφώνου ὑπηγόρευσαν’, νότου |7 ἔρημον μοναστήριον, βορρᾶ 
μοναστήριον Νααραοῦ πρεσβυτέρου, ἀπηλιώτου ὄρος καὶ ἡ τοῦ αὐτοῦ μοναστηρίου εἴσοδος 
καὶ ἔξοδος, λιβὸς ὁδὸς δημοσία μεθʼ ἣν μοναστήριον Πέτρου διακόνου.
22 See also a schematic chart in Montevecchi (1941), p. 118. Contra, yet entirely solitary, is 
Barison (1938), pp. 69–72 but, as Montevecchi already showed, defi nitely wrongly. Barison 
also claimed, but with no actual textual proof, that Eulogios, having inherited ‘both’ estates, 
would sell them in 513 and 516. 
23 For dating see the very convincing argument of McGing (1995), p. 87.
DU PLESSIS PRINT.indd   156 19/12/2012   16:49
 Tapia’s Banquet Hall and Eulogios’ Cell 157
should Aioulios decide to leave Eulogios and the cell or if he brings into the 
hermitage another monk or any man ‘of the world’ without Eulogios’ con-
sent.24 Eulogios, in turn, promises not to expel Aioulios from the property. 
Both statements are followed by testimonies of the witnesses, two Melitian 
priests, one deacon and three orthodox priests.
It is quite likely that we deal in all the documents with the same people. 
Aioulios, son of Aranthieos, from P. Dubl. 34 could be quite securely identi-
fi ed with the Ioulios, son of Arantheios, who buys the monasterion in P. Dubl. 
33. Aranthios is a very rare name, Aioulios is just a variant of Ioulios.25 It is 
a bit more diffi cult to ascertain that Eulogios, son of Ioseph, the vendor in 
P. Dubl. 32 and 33, is the very same person as Eulogios, son of Pousi of P. 
Dubl. 34. The fact that the documents were found together, as well as the posi-
tion of Eulogios, son of Ioseph, as the vendor and the rightful owner of the 
cell in the two latter documents may indicate that we have the same person 
in front of us, notwithstanding the difference in the father’s name and the 
popularity of the name Eulogios. The scribe of P. Dubl. 34 might have made 
a mistake, or, more likely, Eulogios’ father may have had a double name.26
Assuming that the above is true, the situation would be as follows: in 511 
Aioulios practically cedes to Eulogios his rights to a monasterion in Labla. In 
512 Eulogios sells the monasterion to Pousis, and one year later sells it again 
to Aioulios and Paphnoutios. Brian McGing, following the reasoning of 
Orsolina Montevecchi,27 sees P. Dubl. 32 as a fi ctitious sale, aimed at secur-
ing a loan of eight solidi and 1,200 myriads of silver denarii. Ewa Wipszycka 
adopts this argument, assuming that the second sale was a real one. She 
reconstructs the story of Eulogios as follows: in 511 he gets a settlement with 
Ioulios, then acquires the ownership of the cell (the deed would be missing), 
afterwards he leaves Labla (perhaps after having converted to orthodoxy) for 
Mikrou Psyos, sells his cell to Pousi, presumably only as a guarantee for a 
loan of eight solidi and 1,200 myriads of silver denari; fi nally, in 513 he sells 
(back?) the cell to Ioulios and Paphnoutios, this time for real.
I suggest that the situation could have been more complex. As we well 
know from later land sales, the owner usually handed over to the buyer all 
the deeds that proved his right to the property sold. It is very surprising 
therefore not to fi nd the missing link in the chain of the owners, that is the 
deed of sale between Aioulios/Ioulios and Eulogios. Who was, therefore, the 
original owner of the monasterion in Labla? I think the mysterious clauses in 
the settlement found in P. Dubl. 34 might give a clue to that matter.
24 For this, doubtless correct, understanding of δίχα Εὐλογίω, see McGing (1990), commentary 
on line 7.
25 See McGing (1990), p. 87.
26 I have adopted here Ewa Wipszycka’s argument (Wipszycka (2009), p. 241); differently 
McGing (1990), p. 87.
27 Montevecchi (1941), pp. 105–16, 117–18.
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Let me recapitulate: Aioulios occupies the cell but practically deprives 
himself of his rights as the owner, being only guaranteed his title to live in his 
own place; Eulogios’ consent is a sine qua non for the introduction of any new 
inhabitants into the hermitage. Yet there is nothing in the document that 
may imply that Eulogios would actually share the dwelling with Aioulios; 
less than a year later, he certainly lives elsewhere. I think therefore that the 
fi rst loan is granted by Eulogios to Aioulios. Being brethren of the same 
denomination, they do not feel the need to secure it any further except by 
creating a specifi c right of the creditor to the property of the debtor, under 
a type of cession or gift mortis causa. Eulogios stipulates that the debtor will 
remain in his home. Eulogios then ‘sub-mortgages’ the cell by means of a 
fi ctitious sale to Pousi, getting eight solidi and 1200 myriad denarii as a loan. 
This liberty should not surprise us in light of the late Antique documents 
of real securities: the pledgee/hypothecary obtained virtually the full rights 
over the thing pledged. Subsequently, Eulogios pays off the debt and is given 
back the deed, and a year later disposes of the cell again. The lack of a re-sale 
agreement between Pousi and Eulogios should not surprise us: the very fact 
of handing back the deed has the same effect, the debt becoming equally 
un-actionable in court. When in 513, Aioulios, the former owner of the cell, 
gets it back by paying ten solidi to Eulogios, what he actually does may be 
nothing less than repayment of the original loan taken in 511. This time the 
deed is made, as (A)ioulios regains all his rights to the cell and will share them 
with Papnoutios son of Isak.
If this – potentially dangerous – reconstruction is correct, I think I might 
provide an answer to Wipszycka and McGing’s question: who lived in the 
monasterion in all that time? It was the original – ‘true’ if you like – owner, 
Aioulios son of Aranthios. And it was indeed he, who having rolled the three 
papyri, bound them with red string, wrapped them with linen and wool, and 
packed them into a jar to be discovered 1,400 years later by Flinders Petrie.
This tiny archive of only three papyri seems to provide information of 
no less than three loans secured with collaterals that are anything but the 
standard pledge or mortgage: the possible fi rst loan granted by Eulogios in 
511, the second loan that Eulogios took in 512, and most probably another 
transaction of the same kind between Aioulios and Isak (declared void by the 
former in P. Dubl. 34).
3. TAPIA’S BANQUET HALL AND OTHER ‘FICTITIOUS’ SALES 
IN THE ARCHIVE OF KAKO AND PATERMOUTHIS
My second set of cases comes from the famous Archive of Patermouthis 
and Kako.28 They concern affairs of the main fi gures of the set of the papyri, 
28 The archive has been studied extensively since its publication in P. Lond. V and P. Mon. I. 
For the latest update of the bibliography, see the Leuven Trismegistos database of the papyrus 
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Patermouthis and his quarrelsome mother-in-law Aurelia Tapia. The two 
transactions I shall present here refl ect the troublesome fi nancial situation 
of the Patermouthis’ family members, their common entanglement in loans, 
disputes, settlements and inheritance divisions.29
A deed of sale executed in Syene on 30 May 585 CE (P. Münch. I 9 + P. 
Lond. V 1734 – protocol = Pap. Eleph. Eng. D40) informs us that Aurelia 
Tapia has sold fi ve pieces of her property in Syene for ten gold solidi. The 
purchasers are her daughter Kako and her son-in-law Patermouthis:
I, the aforesaid Tapia acknowledge by this my written security of purchase, 
willingly and convinced apart from any guile or fear or force or compulsion 
or deceit or fl attery or contrivance or malice or maliciousness or any defect 
or any mean intention or any circumvention of the law, but of free will and 
self-chosen volition and sound understanding and pure purpose and fi xed cal-
culation and unchangeable design and clear conscience and at the same time 
swearing the dreadful and awesome oath by Almighty God and by the victory 
and permanence of our most pious masters, Flavi Tiberius Mauricius and Aelia 
Constantina, the eternal Augusti and Emperors and the greatest benefactors, that 
I have sold to you today, the aforesaid Patermouthis and Kako, his spouse, by 
the law of purchase and for eternal possession and total authority and every most 
complete right of ownership, and that I have transferred to you from now for all 
on-going time to come belonging to me [the list of pieces of property follows]. 
(lines 12–30)30
archives, and its description by Karolien Geens (2005). It is always useful, however, to get 
back to the original commentaries by Heisenberg/Wenger in P. Mon. and to Idris Bell’s article 
(1913). See also the studies of Joel J. Farber and Bezalel Porten devoted to the Archive: Farber 
and Porten (1986); Farber (1990). Cf. also the same authors in Pap. Eleph. Eng.: pp. 395–9, 
with a detailed family tree. On the Coptic documents of the archive, see Clackson (1995). For 
an overview of various issues relating to house ownership and sales in the archive, cf. Husson 
(1990) and Dijkstra (2007) for the topographical observations on the houses in Syene.
29 For an overview of the dispute resolution through arbitration, with the use of Patermouthis 
and Kako’s Archive, see Urbanik (2007) with Palme (2007) and Kreuzsaler (2010), with 
resumés of the earlier literature.
30 ὁμολογῶ ἐγὼ ἡ προγεγραμμένη Ταπία διὰ ταύτης |13 μου τῆς ἐγγράφου ὠνιακῆς ἀσφαλείας 
ἑκοῦσα καὶ |14 πεπεισμένοι (l. πεπεισμένη) δίχα παντὸς δόλου καὶ φόβου καὶ βίας |15 καὶ 
ἀνάγκης καὶ συναρπαγῆς καὶ κολακίας (l. κολακείας) καὶ μηχανῆς |16 καὶ κακονοίας καὶ 
κακοηθείας καὶ ἐλαττώματος παντὸς |17 καί τινος φαύλου διανοήματος καὶ πάσης νομίμου 
|18 περιγραφῆς, ἀλλ’ ἑκουσίῳ γνώμῃ καὶ αὐθαιρέτῳ βουλήσει |19 καὶ ὀρθῇ διανοίᾳ καὶ 
καθαρῷ σκοπῷ καὶ ἀμετατρέπτῳ λογισμῷ |20 καὶ ἀμεταθέτῳ βουλήματι καὶ εἰλικρινεῖ 
συνειδήσει, ἅμα δὲ |21 καὶ ὀμνύουσα τὸν φρικτὸν καὶ σεβάσμιον ὅρκον τοῦ |22 παντοκράτορος 
θεοῦ καὶ τὴν (l. τῆς) νίκην (l. νίκης) καὶ διαμονὴν (l. διαμονῆς) τῶν |23 εὐσεβεστάτων ἡμῶν 
δεσποτῶν Φλαυί(*)ων Τιβερίου Μαυρικίου |24 καὶ Αἰλείας Κωνσταντίνης τῶν αἰωνίων 
Αὐγούστων |25 καὶ Αὐτοκρατόρων καὶ μεγίστων εὐεργετῶν, πεπρακέναι |26 ὑμῖν σήμερον 
τοῖς προγεγραμμένοις Πατερμουθείῳ καὶ |27 Κακῶτι· συμβίῳ αὐτοῦ ὠνιακῷ νόμῳ καὶ 
αἰωνίᾳ κατοχῇ |28 καὶ ἐξουσίᾳ πάσῃ καὶ παντὶ πληρεστάτῳ δεσποτείας |29 δικαίῳ καὶ 
καταγεγραφέναι ἀπὸ τοῦ νῦν ἐπὶ τὸν ἑξῆς |30 ἅπαντα διηνεκῆ χρόνον τὸ ὑπάρχον μοι, κτλ.
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We know that Tapia had left Syene within the previous two years, in order 
to settle down in Antinoopolis, where her brother also resided,31 possibly 
wishing for some fresh air after long hereditary disputes with her son Ioannes 
and daughter Aurelia Tsone, a nun, fathered by Tapia’s (possibly divorced) 
fi rst husband Menas. She seems therefore to be willing to close down her 
business in her native town. What should leave us a little suspicious about 
the nature of our sale is the fact that Tapia had not only already received the 
price for the immovables but had also used it partly for her living expenses 
in the capital, and partly for paying off a fi ne (ζημία) that had befallen her 
somehow in connection to her brother Ioannes:
the price mutually agreed upon and approved being gold, ten solidi in the weight 
of Syenians, namely g(old) 10 so(lidi) in the w(eight) of the Syenians, which full 
price I have here received in full from you, the purchasers – part of it I have spent 
for my essential needs or upkeep in the city of the Antinoëans and part I have 
given towards the remaining incurred by me by reason of my brother Ioannes 
in the same city – on the present day, from your hand to my hand, from your 
cashbox, in number and weight complete. (lines 62–70)32
It seems therefore reasonable to believe that P. Münch. I 9 is not a regular 
deed of sale, but rather constitutes a datio in solutum: a sale of the buildings 
in lieu of the debt-repayment. This supposition seems to be corroborated by 
the wording of the ‘price-clause’. Tapia declares she has received the money 
for her ἀνακαία χρεῖα – necessary needs, an expression typical for loans.33
The complications do not end here: as the fi rst ones of the sold proper-
ties, there appear two shares in a house in Syene located in the southern part 
of the fortress: a part of the terrace and half of a banquet hall, or dining-
room (symposion). Aurelia Tapia inherited a half-share of these spaces from 
her mother and the other half-share she bought from her brother Georgios:
the half-share of the symposion belonging to me in the house of my mother, 
the other half of which belongs to Menas and Tselet, my siblings, facing north 
31 Cf. P. Münch. I 9, ll. 66–8. The assumption of Farber (1990), p. 117 that she had already lived 
there for two years may be true but does not fi nd a solid textual evidence in the cited papyri: 
contrary to what he says, Tapia does not appear in P. Münch. I 7. 
32 τιμῆς τῆς πρὸς ἀλλήλους συμπεφωνημένης καὶ συναρεσάσης |63 χρυσοῦ νομισματίων δέκα 
ζυγῷ τῆς Συηνιτῶν |64 γί(νονται) χρ(υσοῦ) νο(μισμάτια) ι ζ(υγῷ) Συήν(ης), ἥνπερ τὴν 
τελείαν τιμὴν μὴν αὐτόθι |65 ἀπέσχον παρʼ ὑμῶν τῶν ὠνουμένων μέρος μὲν ἀνήλωσα |66 
εἰς τὴν ἀναγκαίαν χρεῖάν μου ἢ διατροφὴν ἐν τῇ Ἀντινοέων, |67 μέρος δὲ δέδωκα εἰς τὴν 
ὑπερβαίνουσάν μοι ζημίαν ἐν τῇ |68 αὐτῇ πόλει προφάσει Ἰωάννου τοῦ ἐμοῦ ἀδελφοῦ ἐν τῇ 
ἐνεστώσῃ |69 ἡμέρᾳ διὰ χειρὸς εἰς χεῖρά μου ἐξ οἴκου ὑμῶν ἀριθμῷ καὶ σταθμῷ |70 πλήρη. 
33 Cf., for example, some contemporary examples: P. Laur. III 75, l. 17 (Oxyrhynchos, 574 CE); 
BGU XII 2206, l. 11 (Hermoupolis, 591–602 CE); P. Köln. III 158, ll. 18–19 (Herakeopolis, 18 
October 599 CE); likewise in some loan-deeds made in Syene: P. Lond. V 1723, l. 8 (Syene, 7 
September 577 CE); P. Lond. V 1736, ll. 10–11 (Syene, 25 February 611 CE); P. Lond. V 1737, 
l. 8 (Syene, 9 February 613 CE). 
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towards the stair, on the second fl oor and also my share of the terrace on the 
fourth fl oor above the bedroom of Talephantis with my share of all the appur-
tenances. The house of which I have sold you half the living room is in Syene in 
the southern part of the fortress in the Quarter of the Oratory of the Holy and 
Triumphant Victor, having come around to me in this way: one quarter-share 
from a legacy from my mother, another quarter by purchase from Georgios, my 
brother. (lines 30–9)34 
This very same half of the symposion and a quarter share of the terrace is again 
sold by Aurelia Tapia some nine years later, on 6 March 594 CE (P. Lond. V 
1733 = Pap. Eleph. Eng. D49), to Flavius Apadios, son of Sourous, a soldier 
of the regiment of Syene:
the half share belonging to me and falling to me of the symposion on the second 
fl oor and the quarter share of the roof-terrace above the bedroom is above the 
symposion which belongs jointly to me and my siblings Menas and Tselet, and 
my share of appurtenances, (consisting) of the vestibule and gateway and stair and 
gallery and little oven, with entrance and exit and passage up and passage down, 
the same house lying in the same Syene in the southern part of the fortress and in 
the Quarter of Saint Apa Victor, triumphant martyr.35 The same half-share of the 
symposion and the quarter-share of the terrace came to me in this way: one- quarter 
share of the symposion and the eighth-share (of the terrace) from the inheritance 
of my mother Mariam, and the other quarter-share and the eighth-share of the 
above-named places just as has been said above from a rightful purchase through 
a written document of purchase from Georgios my brother those that came to me 
and to my siblings Menas and Tselet, in common and undivided. And they came 
to the aforesaid Mariam herself though legitimate inheritance from her parents, 
Papnouthios and Thekla in force of their shares.36
34 τὸ ὑπάρχον μοι ἥμισυ μέρος |31 τοῦ συμποσίου ἐν τῇ οἰκίᾳ τῆς μητρός, οὗ καὶ τὸ ἄλλο ἥμισυ 
μέρος |32 ἀνήκειν Μηνᾷ καὶ Τσελὲτ τοῖς ἀδελφοῖς μου, νεύοντος εἰς βοῤρᾶ(l. βορρᾶν) |33 εἰς 
τὸν πεσσὸν ἐν τῇ δευτέρᾳ στέγῃ, καὶ τὸ μέρος μου ἀπὸ δώματος ἐν τῇ τετάρτῃ |34 στέγῃ τοῦ 
ἐπάνωθεν τοῦ ἀκουβίτου Ταλιφάντις, σὺν τῷ μέρει μου |35 τῶν ὅλων χρηστηρίων τῆς οἰκίας, 
ἀφʼ ἧς πέπρακα ὑμῖν τὸ ἥμισυ |36 <μέρος> τοῦ συμποσίου, οὔσης ἐν τῇ Συήνῃ περὶ τὸ νότινον 
μέρος το[ῦ] φρουρίου |37 ἐπὶ λαύραν τοῦ εὐκτηρίου τοῦ ἁγίου καὶ ἀθλοφόρου Βίκτορος 
περιελθὸν |38 εἰς ἐμὲ οὕτως· τέταρτον μὲν μέρος ἀπὸ κληρονομίας τῆς μητρός μου, |39 ἕτερον δὲ 
τέταρτον ἀπὸ ἀγορασίας παρὰ Γεωργίου τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ μουo.
35 For the location of the shrine, see Dijkstra (2007), pp. 194–5 and 208.
36 τὸ ὑπάρχον μοι |18 καὶ ἐπιβάλλον ἥμισυ μέρος ἀπὸ τοῦ συμποσίου τοῦ ἐν τῇ δευτέρᾳ στέγῃ 
|19 καὶ τὸ τέταρτον μέρος ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀέρος ἐπάνω τοῦ ἀκουβίτου (l. ἀκκουβίτου) τοῦ ὄντος |20 
ἐπάνω τοῦ συμποσίου τοῦ καὶ ἀδιαιρέτου ὄντος μοι καὶ τῶν ἀδελφῶ̣ν̣ |21 μου Μηνᾶ καὶ Τσελετ 
καὶ τὸ μέρος μου ἀπὸ πάντων τῶν χρηστηρίων |22 τοῦ τε προθύρου κ̣[α]ὶ πυλόνος (l. πυλώνος) 
καὶ πεσσοῦ παραδρομίδος καὶ |23 κλιβανίου σὺν εἰσόδῳ καὶ ἐξόδῳ καὶ ἀνόδῳ καὶ καθόδῳ 
τῆς αὐτῆς οἰκίας |24 διακειμένης ἐπὶ τῆς αὐτῆς Συήνης περὶ τὸ νότινον μέρος τοῦ Φρουρίου 
|25 καὶ περὶ λα̣ύραν τοῦ ἁγίου ἀθλοφόρου Ἄπα Βίκτορος μάρτυρος |26 ἐλθὸν εἰς ἐμὲ τὸ αὐτὸ 
ἥμισυ μέρος συμποσίου καὶ τὸ τέταρτον μέρος |27 ἀπὸ τοῦ δώματος οὕτως· τέταρτον μὲν 
μέρος ἀπὸ τοῦ συμποσίου |28 καὶ τὸ ὄγδοον μέρος ἀπὸ κληρονομίας τῆς μητρὸς μου Μαρίας, 
|29 τὸ δὲ ἄλλο τέταρτον μέρος καὶ τὸ ὄγδοον μέρος ἀπὸ τῶν προδεδηλουμέ(νων) |30 τόπων 
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The price of the property was set at three solidi. How was it possible that 
Aurelia Tapia could sell the same piece of property twice within less than a 
decade? Porten and Farber suggest Tapia’s daughter and her husband have at 
some point transferred the property back to their mother (-in-law).37 There 
is no indication, however, that such a thing happened. I would rather follow 
Montevecchi’s original idea that the fi rst sale served only as a security for a 
loan.38 In my opinion, also the second sale of the property to Apadios may 
have served the same purpose: otherwise we would not understand why both 
deeds found their place in Patermouthis and Kako’s Archive. It is a clear 
indication, that it was they who eventually gained dominion over the quarter 
of the terrace and half of the banquet hall.
It seems likely – though it cannot be ascertained with complete certainty 
– that another piece of the fi ve properties ‘sold’ (or transferred in lieu of 
repayment of the debt) by Tapia to her daughter and son-in-law is sold again 
by her only a year later. The asset in question is described in lines 49–57 of 
P. Münch. 9 (= D40) as
the half share of a house that belongs to me, the one having come around to me 
by rightful purchase from Ioannes son of Paterchnoumios and its other half-share 
belonged to my late husband as a result of a purchase from the same Ioannes, the 
same house lying in Syene in the southern part of the fortress and in the Quarter 
of the Camp. The boundaries of the same house are: on the south the house of the 
heirs of Apadios; [. . .] of Abraam [blank line].39 
The original acquisition-deed of the house by Tapia and her husband has not 
been preserved. Yet it is certain that this purchase is mentioned in P. Lond. 
V 1729 (= FIRA III 68, 12 March 584 CE), a curious deed by which Ioannes, 
son of Patechnoumios, ‘the most humble monk’, declares to have donated 
to Patermouthis a half share of another house as a token of gratitude for the 
καθὼς ἀνωτέρω εἴρηται ἀπὸ δικαίας ἀγορασίας ἐξ ἐγγράφου |31 ὠνιακῆς <ἀσφαλείας> παρὰ 
Γεωργίου τοῦ ἐμοῦ ἀδελφοῦ κοινῶν ὄντων |32 καὶ ἀδιαιρέτων εἴς τε ἐμὲ καὶ τοὺς ἀδελφούς μου 
Μηνα (l. Μηνᾶν) καὶ Τσελετ |33 καὶ εἰς αὐτὴν τὴν προγεγραμμένην Μαριὰμ · ἀπὸ δικαία[ς] 
κληρο̣ν̣ο̣μ̣ίας̣ |34 τῶν γονέων αὐτῆς Παπνουθίου καὶ Θέκλας πρὸς τὴν δύναμιν τοῦ |35 κλήρου 
αὐτῶν. My translation of the last clause diverges from the one proposed in D49 and Bell’s 
commentary, where kleros is understood as ‘will’. Such a translation does not make sense. 
Mariam did not leave a will, her estate was passed over to her four children and then 
divided in equal shares between them. There is, therefore, no need either to read kleros as 
Erbteilingsurkunde, as Wenger did (cf. the translation of line 61 of P. Münch. I 9). 
37 Porter and Farber (1996), p. 540.
38 Montevecchi (1941), p. 106.
39 προσομολογῶ δὲ καὶ |50 πεπρακέναι τὸ αἱροῦν μοι ἥμισυ μέρος · οἰκίας, τὸ περιελθὸν |51 εἰς 
ἐμὲ ἐκ δικαίας ἀγορασίας παρὰ Ἰωάννου Πατεχνουμίου, οὑ (l. ἧς) καὶ |52 τὸ ἄλλο ἥμισυ 
μέρος ἀνήκειν τῷ εὐμοίρῳ μου ἀνδρὶ ἐξ ἀγορασίας |53 παρὰ τοῦ αὐτοῦ Ἰωάννου, τῆς αὐτῆς 
οἰκίας διακειμένης ἐν τῇ |54 Συήνῃ περὶ τὸ νότινον μέρος τοῦ φρουρίου καὶ περὶ λαύραν τῆς |55 
παρεμβολῆς. εἰσὶ δὲ γείτονες τῆς αὐτῆς οἰκίας νότου οἰκία |56 τῶν κληρονόμων Ἄ̣π̣α̣ ∆̣ί̣ο̣(υ) . . 
. . . . . . . . Ἀ̣β̣ρ̣[ααμίο]υ ̣| (vac.)
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care and provisions that the latter had undertaken for him. Interestingly, 
the deed was originally most probably addressed to Tapia, and only later 
re-addressed to her son-in-law.40 And so in lines 9–13, the monk originally 
acknowledges himself to
have sold (erased: to you and) to your late (erasure: husband) Iakobos by a written 
deed of sale the parts of houses remaining to me and to have got their price from 
you in accordance with the power of the deed of sale done by me and to have spent 
(the price) for my essential needs) . . . 41
I daresay it would not be too hazardous to assume that this sale of the 
monk’s house was also originally intended to be a security one (we have 
again a mention –similar to Tapia’s declaration in P. Münch. I 9; cf. above 
fn. 29 – that the price was used for the ‘seller’s’ necessities), but as Ioannes 
did not recover fi nancially before his death, it eventually turned out to be a 
defi nitive transfer.
A deed executed nineteen months later informs us that Tapia transfers 
to Flavius Kyriakos, son of Menas, soldier, caballarius of the regiment of 
Syene, the dominium over the half-share of a house which ‘has come around 
to me through rightful purchase from Ioannes also called Paptsios and to him 
from the paternal inheritance’.42 The woman mentions that the other half 
belongs43 to her late husband Iakobos. The seller, from whom the couple 
had acquired the house, may very well be identifi ed with the monk Ioannes, 
son of Patechnoumios.44 It seems unlikely that Tapia and her husband could 
have bought an entire house from two different Ioannes. There is a problem, 
however, with the certain identifi cation of the properties in P. Münch. I 9 and 
11: their exact descriptions, prima facie, do not correspond. The property in 
P. Münch. 11 is
40 See Bell’s introduction to P. Lond. V 1729 and commentary ad h. l. 
41 ἐπράθην 〚σο̣ι̣ κα̣ὶ〛 τῷ μακαριωτάτῳ {σοῦ} 〚ἀ̣[νδ]ρ̣ὶ̣〛 Ἰακώβῳ τὰ |10 ὑπάρχοντά μοι μέρη 
οἰκημάτων ἐξ ἐγγράφο(υ) πράσεως καὶ τῆς |11 τούτων τιμῆς ἔσχηκα παρʼ ὑμῶν πρὸς τὴν 
δύναμιν τῆς |12 γεναμένης (vac.?) παρʼ ἐμο(ῦ) πράσεως τὴν τούτων τιμὴν καὶ |13 ἀνήλωσα εἰς 
τὰς ἀναγκαίας μου χρείας, κτλ.
42 περιελθὸν εἰς ἐμὲ ἀπὸ δικαίας ― |37 ἀγορασίας παρὰ Ἰωάννου τοῦ καὶ Παπτσίου κἀκεἰνου 
(l. καὶ ἐκείνου) ἀπὸ γονικῆς διαδοχῆς |38 πρὸς τὴν δύναμιν τῆς παλαιᾶς πράσεως,
43 Still in present tense: ἀνήκει – J[ohn] S[helton] supposes that the house ‘is still offi cially reg-
istered in his name’, cf. Pap. Eleph. Eng. p. 523 fn. 5. This may be true as we do not fi nd any 
mention of the house in the succession settlement made between Aurelia Tapia and her son 
Ioannes (P. Münch. I 6 + P. Lond. V 1849 = Pap. Eleph. Eng. D53, 7 June [?] 583 CE), in which 
Iakobos’ estate was divided between them.
Porten and Farber’s idea (Pap. Eleph. Eng. p. 522) that Tapia in 585 sold her share and 
now is selling the share that once belonged to her husband cannot be accepted: in all three 
papyri, the object of sale is the share in the house in which the other half ‘belongs to late 
Iakobos’.
44 Cf. Pap. Eleph. Eng. p. 555, s.v. Ioannes, son of Paternoumios, as well as Bell’s introduction 
to P. Lond. 1724, p. 174 and Heisenberger and Wenger’s commentary in P. Münch (p. 11), 
who think it is the great-uncle of Tsone and Tsere, the vendors in P. Lond. V 1724.
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lying in Syene in the southern part of the fortress and in the Quarter of the Public 
Camel Yard of the transfer from Philae and of the house of Abraamios son of 
Pachymios (lines 21–4)45 
and its boundaries are
on the south the blind and narrow road and the house of Abraamios son of 
Pachymios; on the north the public road, on the east the house of Abraamios son of 
Pachymios; on the west the house of Allamon son of Paterchnoumios. (lines 31–3)46
Yet, I think the issue of the inexactitude in the topographical account may 
be overcome. The general location of the house, the southern part of the 
fortress, links to the one in P. Münch. I 9. The Quarter of the Public Camel 
Yard and Quarter of the Camp are defi nitely not the same, and the bounda-
ries do not match, but let us notice that in the former document the scribe 
was by no means certain about them: he actually deleted the description he 
had made and left a blank space to fi ll the exact position later.47 It seems as 
if the parties were not sure where the property really lay.48 Finally, it looks 
unlikely that the monk Ioannes sold two of his estates to the couple Tapia-
Iakobos, just days before the latter’s death. Given all the above, I assume that 
we are dealing here with the same half-share of the same house.
The price in P. Münch. I 11 was set to fi ve solidi. The fact that the 
amount is as much as 50% of the joint price of fi ve estates sold by Tapia 
to Patermouthis and Kako in P. Münch. I 9 contributes once again to the 
assumption that the sale of 584 CE was indeed a fi ctitious one.
The half of the house originally belonging to Ioannes alias Paptsios is the 
object of sale again in P. Münch. I 12 (= Pap. Eleph. Eng. D46, 13 August 590 
CE). Now it is Kyriakos who sells it back to Patermouthis and Kako (spelled 
in this document as ‘Koko’), for the same price. The seller declares to have 
bought the property from Tapia and that the other part belongs to the late 
father of Kako.49 It may be a true sale, this time, but it is also possible that 
45 διακειμένην |22 τὴν αὐτὴν οἰκίαν ἐπὶ τὴν Συήνην περὶ τὸ νότινον μέρος τοῦ φρουρίου καὶ |23 
περὶ λαύραν τοῦ δημοσίου καμηλῶνος τῆς βασταγῆς Φιλῶν καὶ τῆς οἰκίας |24 Ἀβρααμίου 
Παχυμίου. 
46 νότου ἡ τυφλὴ καὶ στενὴ ῥύμη καὶ ἡ οἰκία Ἀβραμίου Παχυμίου, |32 βοῤρᾶ ἡ ῥύμη δημοσία, 
ἀπηλιώτου ἡ οἰκία Ἀβρααμίου Παχυμίου, λιβὸς |33 ἡ οἰκία Ἀλλάμονος Πατεχνουμίου.
47 Cf. P. Münch., Tafel XVIII and Heisenberg/Wenger’s commentary on lines 56–7 of P. 
Münch. I 9.
48 Porten and Farber (1996), p. 511 fn. 21 suppose that Tapia simply did not remember the 
exact boundaries of her properties, and indeed all fi ve estates sold in P. Münch. 9 are 
described with fewer details than was customary. 
49 Cf. ll. 13–15: τὸ ὑπάρχον μοι ἥμισυ μέρος ἀπὸ πάσης ὁλοκλήρου οἰκίας, οἵας ἐστὶν |14 
διαθέσεως ἀπὸ ἐδάφους ἕως ἀέρος, οὑ (l. ἧς) καὶ τὸ ἄλλο ἥμισυ ἀνήκει Ἰακώβου ἀποιχομένου 
|15 πατρός σου Κοκὼ τῆς ὠνουμένης, ‘the half-share belonging to me of a whole, entire house, 
in the condition it is in, from foundation to air, the other half of which belongs to Iakobos, 
the departed father of you, Koko, the purchaser’ and ll. 29–30: περιελθὸν εἰς ἐμὲ ἀπὸ δικαίας 
ἀγορασίας |30 παρὰ Ταπίας θυγατρὸς Τσίου κ(αὶ) εἰς αὐτὴν παρὰ Ἰωάννου τοῦ καὶ Παπ\τ/σίου 
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the son-in-law and daughter of Tapia simply paid back her original debt 
of 5 solidi and regained the ownership of the half-share of the house given 
 originally by Tapia as security.
If my reconstruction is true, then we would have the same property used 
three times as a security for credit (Ioannes → Tapia and Iakobos, Tapia → 
Patermouthis and Kako, Tapia → Fl. Kyriakos)
Another example from the very same archive shows even better the 
mechanism of the mock-sales, and I think provides very convincing proof of 
how they actually functioned.
Some time between 578 and 582, two sisters, Aureliai Tsone and Tsere, 
daughters of Apadios and Rachel, sold50 for ten solidi to Patermouthis and 
Kako, their relatives, their share consisting of three rooms in a house located 
between
on the south: the house of Dios son of Kelol, on the north: the public street into 
which the main door opens; on the west: the house of Dios son of Takares on the 
east of the house of Pateröous. (Syene, P. Lond. V 1724 = Pap. Eleph. Eng. D32, 
ll. 35–7)51
The same property along with a share in a boat seems to be the subject of 
a controversy arising from division of the remaining parts of the estate of 
the late Iakobos, the father of Kako and Ioannes, and Tapia’s husband.52 
The dispute found its solution in an arbitration, P. Münch. I 7 + P. Lond. V 
1860 (23 June 583 CE, Antinoopolis = Pap. Eleph. Eng. D36). Ioannes, Kako’s 
brother, contested the ownership of the house, which ‘came around to 
him (Patermouthis) by right of purchase from Isakos and Tsone’.53 Ioannes 
apparently had found a deed transferring its ownership to his late father. If 
Patermouthis and Kako had indeed sold the house to Iakobos, the property 
should have been part of the inheritance, and thus part of it should have 
been divided between the siblings after their father’s death. Yet the parties 
fi nally decide, thanks to the help of some mediators (cf. l. 34), that Ioannes 
has no rights to the house formerly belonging to Tsone and Tsere, and shall 
therefore return the deed of sale to Patermouthis and Kako and recognise 
the validity of P. Lond. V 1724. What seems to have happened is as follows: 
κακεινου (l. καὶ εἰς ἐκεῖνον) ἀπὸ γονικῆς δι[αδοχ]ῆς ‘having come to me through rightful 
purchase from Tapia daughter of Tsios a(nd) to her from Ioannes alias Paptsios, and from 
him (read: to him) through inherited succession’.
50 On this sale and the history of the property, as well as its identifi cation with the house–object 
of sale in the earliest document in the Patermouthis Archive, P. Lond. V 1722, see Porten and 
Farber (1985), pp. 87–90. 
51 νότου ἡ οἰκία ∆ίου Κελώλ, βορρᾶ ἡ δημοσία |36 λαύρα εἰς ἣν ἠνέῳκται ἡ αὐθεντικὴ κύρα, 
λιβὸς ἡ οἰκία ∆ίου |37 Τακαρῆς, ἀπηλιώτου ἡ οἰκία Πατεροοῦτος 
52 The rest was divided earlier between all of the parties, the widow and her two children in 
P. Münch. I 6 + P. Lond. V 1849 = Pap. Eleph. Eng. D53, 7 June [?] 583 CE).
53 περιελθόντος εἰς αὐτὸν |31 ἀπὸ ἀγοραστικοῦ δικαίου παρὰ Ἰσακίου καὶ Τσώνη.
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Patermouthis and Kako who, as their archive clearly shows, were in constant 
need of ready money, fi ctitiously sold the recently acquired house of Tsore 
and Tsere to secure the loan that their father/father-in-law, a very wealthy 
man, had granted them. Later, the loan was repaid, but the deed never 
returned.54 However, there must have been something not recorded in our 
documentation, that convinced the mediators that the sale was a fi ctitious 
one, and allowed them to award the contented house to the married couple 
and not to their brother(-in-law), Ioannes.
4. CONCLUSIONS: PURPLE-MERCHANT’S WIFE AND 
SISTER-IN-LAW
Why would Eulogios and his brethren, Tapia and other members of 
Patermouthis’ clan choose for their fi nancial affairs the form of a fi ctitious 
sale, rather than an ordinary loan secured by an ordinary pledge, a transac-
tion still very well attested in the later Byzantine papyri (even in the same 
archive, we fi nd examples of a typical mortgage)?55
We may of course only speculate as to their intentions. Obviously the 
creditor in our case is much better secured. My fi rst guess was that when 
Constantine banned lex commissoria, obviously the lenders still wanted to 
have a strong security versus insolvent debtors, and thus they coined fi cti-
tious sales that dissimulated pledges. This may well have been so, but one has 
to observe that, notwithstanding the emperor’s prohibition, later repeated 
in the Theodosian and then Justinian’s Code (respectively, CTh.3.2.1 and 
C.8.34.3, 320 CE), the legal practice continued to include forfeiture clauses 
in the documents constituting pledges.56 This usage is even more evident in 
some Coptic deeds, temporally closer to our documents.57 In some other 
54 Cf. as well, the personal communication of John Shelton recorded in Pap. Eleph. Eng. 
pp. 496–7, fn. 9, and in Farber (1990) p. 112, fn. 32. Shelton thinks that the deed mentioned 
in P. Münch. I 7, ll. 52–4 was a fi ctitious deed of sale which was to secure a loan Patermouthis 
got from his father-in-law, Iakobos.
55 P. Lond. V 1737 (= Pap. Eleph. Eng. D52, 9 February 613 CE): loan of three and one third 
solidi by Patermouthis secured with a pledge of articles of copper. For other examples, see 
above, footnote 33.
56 Even if these are quite rare, cf., for example, P. Lond. III 870 (p. 235, fourth century CE), 
P. Flor. III 313 (449 CE), with Taubenschlag (1959), pp. 250–1 and (1955), pp. 279–80, cf. as 
well Kaser (1975), § 252, 2b. 
57 A good example of such practice is, for instance, P. KRU 30 (Thebes, mid-eighth century 
CE), in which most probably Demetrios mortgages to his ex-wife a house as a security of her 
still unreturned bridal gift. The woman, who receives the deed for her and her children’s 
security, will have the right to live in the house and, if the gift should not be returned within 
a year, will become the full owner of the house. See also O. Medinet Habou 67, ll. 5–8: ‘If it 
should happen that the appointed time passed without my having paid them to you it is you 
who are the owner of my pledges (ἐνέχυρον) so that I cannot seek them from you ever’ (trans. 
M. Lichtheim); cf. as well Steinwenter (1954), p. 500 and (1955), pp. 29–30.
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Coptic ostraka, the ownership of the pledged thing is openly transferred to 
the creditor and rests with him or her until the repayment.58 So this may 
have not been a good enough reason to make the parties choose a fi ctitious 
sale over the conventional pledge.
Before an attempt at conclusion, let me have a look at just two instances, 
very late Greek and Coptic, of these ‘conventional’ pledges.
One of the fi rst editions of papyri, P. Paris, offers under nos 20, 21, 21bis 
and 22ter and on the following pages seven documents related to the same 
person, a purple-merchant Aurelios Pachymios, son of Psates.59 P. Paris 
21ter is a deed of sale concluded in Panopolis on 13 July 599 between the 
protagonist of the archive, Pachymes and his wife Aurelia Maria, on one 
side, and his brother-in-law Arsenios, on the other.60 The couple acquire 
from their brother (-in-law) a third share in the house, formerly belonging to 
Kallinikos and Eugenia, the late parents of Arsenios and Maria, for 2 solidi. 
Aurelia Maria already owns one third of the estate, and the remaining share 
rests with Aurelia Ioanna, the third sibling born to Kallinikos and Eugenia. 
Ioanna mortgages this share on 31 October 607 to her sister Maria, having 
received from her as a loan two thirds of a solidus, i.e. 15½ keratia (SB I 
5285.ll. 22–7). The house is perfectly described, its boundaries are set by the 
great holy church, Panopolitan road and the estate of the heirs of the late 
Timotheos. Ioanna undertakes on her own and her future successors’ behalf 
not to alienate, change anything within the house or further mortgage it.61 
Moreover, in lieu of interest, she allows her sister to use the house and to 
live in it.62 So far, nothing strange: we have a typical antichretic loan in front 
of us.63
58 See, for instance, P. KSB 937 (= P. KRU, p. 13, originally published in Crum (1922), p. 
280; no 9; Thebes sixth/seventh century CE): ‘Now I (Joseph, the debtor – JU) cede to you 
the above-named house, which is in the midmeadow. You are the lord of the above-named 
house, in return for your 2 tremisia. No man shall be able to dispute with you respecting it. 
You are its lord, until you shall be paid your 2 tremissia)’ (lines 10–15, Crum’s translation); 
cf. Steinwenter (1954), p. 500 and (1955), pp. 29–30. 
59 The only study particularly devoted to this small archive consisting of twelve documents, 
two of which are Coptic, is a brief description at the Trismegistos site, authored by Karolien 
Geens (2003); it contains as well a family tree. The compound of the papyri is a title-deed 
archive relating to Pachymes, a purple-dealer, his worker, who later became engaged to his 
master’s daughter, and Pachymes’ wife and her siblings, and possibly also their father. 
60 Geens (2003), pp. 1–2, fn. 5 argues rightly that P. Jomard published by W. Brunet de Presle in 
P. Paris, pp. 257–60 certainly belongs to this papyrus and they should be read together. Cf. as 
well the minor corrections to the original editions as listed in Berichtigungsliste X 159; XI 176.
61 Lines 36–40: καὶ μὴ ἐξεῖναί |37 μοι μήτε κληρονόμοις ἐμοῖς |38 τὸ αὐτὸ μέρος τρίτον οἰκίας ἢ 
μέρος |39 τούτου μεθυποθέσθαι ἢ διαπωλ(ῆσαι) |40 ἢ ἄλλην τινὰ οἰκομίαν (l. οἰκ<νο>μίαν) 
θέσθαι κατʼ αὐτοῦ ἄχρις ἀποδόσεως καὶ συμπληρώσεως τοῦ αὐτοῦ χρέου[ς] κινδύνῳ ἐμῷ, 
κτλ.
62 Lines 33–6: πρὸς τῷ σε ἔχειν |34 τὴν τούτου χρῆσίν τε καὶ |35 οἴκησιν ἀντὶ τῆς παραμυθείας |36 
τοῦ αὐτοῦ χρέους, κτλ.
63 See Kaser (1975), § 111. I; Kupiszewski (1974) and (1985); and Rupprecht (1992).
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On the very next day Aurelia Maria rents the whole house to Theodoros, 
a purple-dyer, like her husband, for four gold keratia per year (SB I 5286). 
The object of rent is described as belonging to her: ‘the whole house belong-
ing to you with the upper and lower part and with its rightly befalling to 
it’.64 Aurelia Maria behaves as if she were the real owner of the house; 
furthermore, the antichresis terms allow her to live and to use the house but 
do not specify the right to let it. Karolien Geens suggests that Ioanna’s loan 
is a hidden sale.65 I do not fi nd this convincing. First of all, the price is way 
too low.66 It is only the two thirds of a solidus as opposed to two solidi paid 
to their common brother seven years earlier for exactly same share of the 
house. Secondly, why would the parties want to hide a sale? In fact, in order 
to be able to sell the place further, Maria would have had to present the pur-
chaser the deed confi rming her property rights, and this she had not done. 
These two documents, I presume, prove something else: it seems that in 
these very late deeds the constitution of a pledge vested in the pledgee quasi 
owner-like rights, among them the right to dispose.67
Let us turn now to the practice of pledges in Coptic documents. A typical 
deed constituting a pledge would transfer detention of the thing pledged, and 
include sale and forfeiture clauses68 as well as a penalty clause, often set at 
three holokottinoi, to be paid should the pledgor take the things away. Such 
is also the case of a document that is of particular interest in this instance. P. 
KO 28 (Koptische Ostraka der Papyrussammlung) prima facie seems to be a pos-
sessory pledge by which the debtor hands over to the creditor some arable 
land (Besitzpfand).69 Yet, he also undertakes to do the fi eld work and – which 
64 Lines 17–21: τὴν διαφέρουσ(άν) |18 σοι οἰκίαν ὁλόκληρον |19 σὺν ἀνωγείοις καὶ κατωγείῳ |20 
καὶ σὺν παντὶ αὐτῆς τῷ |21 δικαίῳ κτλ.
65 Geens (2003), p. 2.
66 Cf. the list of prices assembled by Montevecchi (1941), pp. 122–6 and Husson (199), pp. 
132–5, they vary from one solidus up to eighteen (for a very big house), most frequently they 
are set between one and a third and fi ve nomismata. 
67 In many documented cases, the pledgor eventually ceded his or her rights to the pledge to the 
pledgee in lieu of payment: cf., for example, Coptic O. Medinet Habou 70; 72–3 and Greek P. 
Lond. V 1720 + ST 439 = Pap. Eleph. Eng. D24 (3 February 549 CE). In this document Aurelia 
Nonna acknowledges to have received from her creditor, Aurelia Maria, eight solidi for a 
pair (and not just one; cf. Porten and Farber (1996), p. 459 fn. 4, following Shelton’s sugges-
tion) of earrings which the latter had received in mortgage; the debtor renounces her claims 
to her former property.
68 See, for example, P. KTM 42 ‘wenn der Termin versreicht, ohne daß ich dir die 6 Artaben 
und 1 Mnt Weizen (zurück)gegeben habe, hast du das Recht (ἐξουσία), die Pfänder die in 
deiner Hand sind, zu verkaufen (oder) dir zu behalten. Niemand wird gegen dich vorgehen 
können’ (trans. W. C. Till (1954), p. 201); cf. as well Steinwenter (1955), pp. 29–30.
69 Till’s translation: Ich Isak, der Sohn des [-- aus dem χω]ίον Patubastn im [Bezirk ---] ich schreibe 
an Patermuthis, den Sohn [des – aus dem Kas]tron Tschême. Ἐπειδή du bist zu [mir] gegangen 
[und hast] mir einen hablen holottinos zu meinem Bedarf (χρεία) [für meine Steuer ] [gebracht]. 
Nun δὲ, so Gott will, bin ich bereit (ἐτοίμος) dir dafür ein Rerme Land zu bestellen . . . auf dem 
Rerme Land außerhalb des Weges .. Land des Pesnthios. Ich stehe dir dafür gut (κινδυνεύειν) 
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was particularly important – to take care of the canal system of the plot.70 
Who actually had the land plot then? And to whom did the revenue of the 
crops go?71 We clearly see that the borders between ownership and pledge 
had become very murky.
What does it all lead to? Firstly, we may have observed that the form 
of the pledge in late Antique times did not really follow the pure pattern 
of the classical Roman law forms of pignus and hypotheca. The boundaries 
between property rights and the rights vested with the pledgee became less 
and less visible, and they became more and more alike. Secondly, in our 
examples, the family relations of Aurelia Tapia, the special character of the 
monastic communities, made for an important factor of trust between the 
parties that possibly induced the debtors to agree to what would otherwise 
be considered harsh conditions of their loan securities. This trust founda-
tion, moreover, seems to have worked fi ne, notwithstanding the tempestu-
ous litigations between Tapia and her son. In these contexts, such securities 
must have safeguarded not just the repayment of the money but possibly the 
personal relationship between the parties involved. And thirdly, also given 
the above, the economic reality of money buying and lending led people to 
search for more forms of securing debts. In each particular case, the interest 
of the creditor and debtor was weighted, in order to tailor the form of real 
security that suited them best. Ordinary people do not follow the well estab-
lished theoretical dogmatic legal patterns, they want to protect their transac-
tions in the seemingly most secure way, and they sometimes tend to invent 
ohne Gottes Einfl uß auf die Landarbeit (?), ich besorge dir ohne jedes Sträuben und ohne jeden 
Einwand (ἀμφιβολία) seine (d.h. Grundstückes) Bewässerungen. Ich, Ioseph, schreibe dir: wenn 
du zu mir kommst wegen irgend etwas, das dazu gehört, so werde ich es dir besorgen. Ich Isak 
schreibe dir: ich werde nichts weiter von dir dafür verlangen, da du mir seinen Preis (τιμή) gegeben 
hast. Ich, Isak, der schon erwähnte, stimme dieser Urkunde (ἀσφάλεια) zu (στοιχεῖν). Ich, 
Petros, der Sohn des Eustachios, bin Zeuge. Ich, Samu[el, der Sohn des –]ousios bin Zeuge. Ich, 
Athan[asios, der Sohn des] Ioannes aus Patubas[tn, bin gebeten worden und] habe diese Urkunde 
geschrieben.’
70 Such an undertaking may have been quite risky: obviously it relieved the creditor from the 
burden of taking care of the pledge, but what if debtor could not pay the debt and decided 
to forsake his property? Elżbieta Krakowiak, manager of the legal department working for 
a large Polish bank, has told me about quite a few cases in which the bank has mistakenly, 
having obtained the ownership of the security, let the debtor take care of it. One of these 
cases ended up in a substantial fi nancial and reputational loss as the debtor was not eager to 
look after a herd of cows he thought he was going to lose anyway: (http://gdynia.naszemiasto.
pl/archiwum/499666,bankowy-los-krowy,id,t.html?akcja=przejdz_nastepny).
71 Cf. also the analogous situation in P. KRU 57 by which Mena, son of Psaja of Pmiles in the 
District of Koptos, hands over to Ioseph, son of Petros from Romou in Ermont, one aroura 
of land for one and one third nomisma of gold that the latter had lent him to pay taxes 
(demosion). The debtor promises and guarantees to also take care of the fi eld work at his own 
risk, with force majeure excluded. There are two guarantors, Philotheos, son of Daniel, and 
Christophoros, son of Demetrios, who additionally provide security for Mena.
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things that are not dreamt of in legal philosophy just to feel more protected.72 
Even today – in the time and realm of codifi ed law of real securities – the 
parties would choose the Sicherungsübereignung as simply more secure than 
the traditional form of the pledge.73 The security of credit comes before the 
dogmatic disgust towards this legal form (in the famous M. Salinger’s dictum 
referring to Sicherungsübereigung as the bastard child of the legal practice),74 
until eventually the elegant legal dogmatic surrenders to the practicality of 
the institution. It is doubtful therefore if Paul Oertmann’s prophecy, that 
‘Fiducia geht und nimmer kehrt sie wieder’, will ever come true. Transfer of 
ownership as a security for credit seems to be and to have always been simply 
intrinsic to legal anthropology.75
POSTILLA
Only upon completion of this chapter did I receive a copy of the newly pub-
lished volume of the Petra papyri, extremely rich in legal problems. One of 
the longest papyri written transversa charta preserved to this day, P. Petra IV 
39, dated 8 August 574 CE, records a settlement of claims after an arbitration 
between Theodoros and Stephanos. One of the issues between the litigants 
was the question of the ownership of a courtyard and a refuse-pit located 
72 Cf., for instance, two ingenious creations found in the milieu of Dioskoros. The pair of 
documents, P. Michael. 42 a + b (30 December 566 CE, Aphrodites Kome, Antaiopolites), a 
mortgage and lease form together a very skilful marriage fi nancial settlement securing at best 
the interest of the bride. In the fi rst deed, the groom and his parents secure the bride’s dowry 
by conveying to her ten arurae (even if the document nominally calls the act ‘a mortgage’, the 
clauses employed show that it produces effective transfer of ownership of the land), whereas 
in the second, the bride leases the land back to her in-laws for a rent equalling the tax due on 
the fi eld. The second case , P. Cairo Masp. II 67158 (= FIRA III 158, Antinoopolis, 28 April 
[?] 568 CE) is a contract of partnership of fi ne-carpenters whose real purpose seems to be a 
marital fi nancial settlement between one party thereof (parents-in-law) and the other (their 
son-in-law); on this document, see further Urbanik (2012).
73 In Poland, transfer of ownership (either under suspensive or resolutive condition, whereas 
the latter is preferred) made its way into legal practice chiefl y thanks to bank loans and hence 
is only regulated in the Bank Law Act (Journal of Laws 2002, no. 72, item 665). Art. 101 allows 
the transfer of ownership of chattels and bills of exchange as security. The case of estates, 
on the other hand, is not regulated and has resulted in contradictory case law. German legal 
dogma, even if with some reservation, decided not to legislate the issue and to follow custom-
ary practice. Still, because of the existence in practice of the transfer of ownership as a form 
of security, German law does not admit the institution of a register bank pledge. See further, 
for example, Baur and Stuerner (2009), pp. 784–5.
74 Salinger (1912), p. 409 (cited after Kettler (2008), p. 309, fn. 1392). ‘Die Sicherungsübeignung 
ist ein Kind des Verkerhrs. Aber rein illegitimes, den es kann sich auf die Vaterschaft des 
Gesetzes nicht berufen. Das hat ihr zum Nachtteil gereicht. Einmal schon aus dem äußeren 
Grunden, weil ihr der Makel unechter Geburt anklebt. Mehr aber noch deshalb, weil der 
Manger der gesetzlichen Regelung sie wild hat aufwachsen lassen’. See also Hromadka 
(1980), p. 89.
75 For a general historical panorama, see Thiesen (2001).
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between their houses. Unfortunately, the state of conservation of the deed 
does not allow a safe reconstruction of the facts, and both parties claimed 
that their fathers had bought the property a long time before the dispute. 
Surprisingly, Theodoros also claimed to have acquired the courtyard from 
Kassisaios and Gregoria, who, in turn seem to have mortgaged the property 
to Gregoria’s brother, Stephanos. The editor suggests that Stephanos’ family 
have secured the ownership of the contended yard through longi temporis 
praescriptio,76 but there seems to be no ground for such an interpretation. I 
suggest the argument may have arisen because of the original fi duciary sale 
of the courtyard by Gregoria and Kassisaios fi rst to her brother and then to 
the neighbour Theodoros. This would only prove that the problem I have 
described in this chapter may have been much more common than the exam-
ples I have collected might suggest. We have only not been lucky enough to 
know the exact context of all the late Antique deeds of sale.77
APPENDIX
A. The abridged family tree of Patermouthis and Kako (after Geens (2005))
B. The abridged family tree of Aurelios Pachymios (after Geens (2003))
       Kallinikos ∞ Eugenia
Pachymios ∞ Maria  Arsenios  Ioanna
76 P. Petra IV, pp. 52–3.
77 A thorough legal analysis of the papyrus is currently being prepared by Marzena Wojtczak 
(Warsaw) as part of her doctoral dissertation. Maria Nowak kindly informed me by email 
on 30 April 2012 that she has detected the same pattern of a ‘mock’ sale in P. Lond.Copt. 447 
and 448 of unknown provenance published by Crum and in a Nubian deed from Qasr Ibrim 
she is presently studying (Old Nubian Texts from Qas·r Ibrı̄m III 34).
Mariam ∞ Tsios
2. 1.
5 children, among them Ioannes Iakobos/Iakybis ∞ Tapia ∞ Menas
Tsone, a nun
Patermouthis ∞ Kako  Ioannes
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Chapter 9
Law, Agency and Growth in the Roman Economy
Dennis P. Kehoe
1. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, scholars have increasingly recognised the signifi cant role 
that law and legal institutions could play in the Roman economy. Although 
population and technology, as in all pre-industrial economies, posed basic 
constraints on the possibilities for growth, law and legal institutions could 
play a decisive role in the organisation of economic activity and the distri-
bution of wealth across society.1 In several recent studies, I have sought to 
analyse how Roman law and legal policies affected the Roman Empire’s rural 
economy.2 I argued that, in formulating policies affecting various aspects of 
land tenure, the Roman legal authorities, including the classical jurists and 
the Roman chancery when it responded to petitions, were concerned with 
the economic consequences of the rules they formulated for land tenure. 
Above all, they recognised the importance of the long-term occupation of 
the land to the economic interests of both large landowners and the state. 
The rules they formulated tended to foster this, as they endeavoured to curb 
the worst effects of opportunistic behaviour, especially on the part of large 
landowners, who might take advantage of the precarious position of small 
farmers and tenants. The concern that the legal authorities government dem-
onstrated in the rural economy raises the question whether they exhibited 
similar concerns in other key areas of the law affecting private property.
One area of the law that is likely to have had widespread economic con-
sequences is agency, in the sense of people carrying out fi nancial functions 
on behalf of others.3 The most obvious form of agency in the Roman world 
involved business agents, such as freedmen managing businesses or commer-
cial ventures on behalf of wealthy property owners, and it seems clear that the 
social and legal institutions surrounding this form of agency had important 
implications for the organisation of commerce in the Roman Empire, and, 
1 The importance of population and technology in setting the parameters for economic 
 development is emphasised in many chapters in the new Cambridge Economic History of the 
Greco-Roman World (2007).
2 Kehoe (2007); Kehoe (forthcoming).
3 On agency issues, see in general Furubotn and Richter (2005), pp. 162–70.
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by extension, for the possibilities for economic development.4 I will focus, 
however, on another form of agency important for the Roman economy, 
namely, the role that guardians, or tutors, played in managing the property 
of fatherless children, wards, or pupils.5 Tutorship was certainly an institu-
tion that affected a signifi cant portion of the property in the Roman Empire. 
In his model of the demographic structure of Roman society, Richard Saller 
posits that about one third of Roman children would have lost their fathers 
by the age of fourteen.6 In addition, many of the same rules that Roman law 
developed for tutors who managed the property for underage orphans also 
applied to minors (males under the age of twenty-fi ve), who were commonly 
represented in their business dealings by curators. In Saller’s reconstruc-
tion, another third of the children would have lost their fathers by the age 
of twenty-fi ve. In view of this situation, an analysis of agency relationships 
connected with tutorship had potentially important economic consequences, 
since the rules surrounding this institution affected the disposition of a 
considerable portion of the Empire’s property. In formulating rules for 
tutorship, as I will argue, the Roman legal authorities faced an immediate 
challenge, but the rules they developed to respond to it had wider implica-
tions for society. On the one hand, pupils required protection against any 
threat to their property. The problem was that, as agents, tutors operated 
largely autonomously. So the Roman legal authorities had to develop rules, 
and sanctions for violating them, that aligned the tutor’s incentives with the 
interests of the pupil. On the other hand, these rules could be too stringent 
if they gave the tutor a positive disincentive to invest the pupil’s property in 
potentially lucrative economic activities. The result would be that the pupil’s 
property would be used ‘ineffi ciently’ (as defi ned below), at a loss to society. 
The rules for tutorship, then, could have a very real effect on the ways in 
which property in the Roman world was used, and so would represent part of 
the broad institutional constraints to which the Roman economy was subject.
The diffi culty, of course, is to develop a methodology to analyse the eco-
nomic ramifi cations of Roman agency law. In what follows, I will examine 
the likely economic consequences of the Roman legal rules surrounding 
agency by drawing from the contemporary debate on the relationship 
between law and the economy in the fi elds of law and economics and the 
New Institutional Economics (NIE). One particular advantage to this debate 
is that it presents a useful methodology for understanding the economic 
incentives arising from various defi nitions of property rights, as well as the 
4 Agency in business relationships is addressed in Frier and Kehoe (2007), pp. 122–34, and in 
Kehoe (forthcoming).
5 An analysis of agency relationships can be extended to cover many other activities, including 
lease relationships, the contract of mandate, and even dowry; see Frier and Kehoe (2007), 
pp. 122–6.
6 Saller (1994), pp. 189–90.
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diffi culties involved in changing such defi nitions to more productive ones. 
An analysis of the Roman legal institutions surrounding agency suggests the 
diffi culties that the Roman legal authorities faced in adapting long-standing 
social institutions to the changing needs of Roman society. As I will argue, 
to protect the interests of orphans and minors, the Roman legal authori-
ties imposed restrictions on tutors’ scope for action as well as devastating 
penalties when they failed in their duties. These policies were designed to 
overcome the diffi culties involved in monitoring agents, but at the same time 
the restrictions they imposed on the management of pupils’ property dimin-
ished the possibilities for aggressive investment in entrepreneurial activities 
that could enhance economic growth.
It will be useful at the outset to sketch out some important theoretical per-
spectives offered by the fi elds of law and economics and NIE. These provide 
a starting point to analyse the likely effects on the Roman economy of 
‘institutional arrangements’, which include laws and property rights, court 
systems, and the like, as well as informal institutions, such as social norms 
and customs, that establish the ‘rules of the game’ under which individuals 
engage in economic activity.7 NIE takes into account basic constraints that 
affect economic activity and decision-making. These constraints include 
‘transaction costs’, a concept that encompasses all the costs associated 
with creating and maintaining property rights, such as the costs of obtain-
ing information, negotiating and enforcing contracts. A second constraint 
can be understood as ‘bounded rationality’, a term denoting constraints on 
our knowledge that limit our ability to make optimising decisions. In other 
words, knowledge is costly, so any analysis of the development and perform-
ance of economic institutions has to take into account the costs of acquiring 
information and the diffi culty of evaluating, say, one approach to investing 
wealth against another.8 Economic institutions are considered ‘effi cient’ 
when they allow resources to be put to their highest valued use.9 In theory, 
institutions that are ineffi cient, in that they prevent people from making 
more remunerative use of available resources, eventually fail, to be replaced 
by more effi cient ones. In the case of tutorship, the evolution of institutions 
is not likely to be so straightforward, since it was an institution that was not 
primarily oriented towards profi t. Instead, the institutions imposed restric-
tions on tutors as managers of private property to which other Roman prop-
erty owners were not subject. Since the purpose of these restrictions was to 
protect the fi nancial interests of a key social group, they would remain in 
effect as long as society valued this protection.
7 For an introduction to NIE, see Mercuro and Medema (1997), pp. 130–56, and Klein (2000); 
for further discussion, see Frier and Kehoe (2007); Kehoe (2007), pp. 29–39, and Kehoe 
(forthcoming). For ‘the rules of the game’, see North (1990).
8 For ‘bounded rationality’, see Simon (1983) and Simon (1986); as well as Williamson (1985).
9 For this concept of effi ciency, see Coase (1960). 
DU PLESSIS PRINT.indd   179 19/12/2012   16:49
180 New Frontiers
2. TUTORSHIP AND AGENCY
Tutors can be usefully analysed as agents working on behalf of pupils, since 
they were responsible for managing pupils’ property in such a way as to 
protect their long-term interests, and enforcing their obligations as agents was 
a thorny problem for the Roman legal authorities. The tutorship of orphans 
was an institution basic to Roman society.10 In Roman law, fatherless chil-
dren, up to the age of fourteen for boys and twelve for girls, were subject to 
the supervision of tutors, tutores. Tutors might be named by the father in his 
will (tutores testmentarii), gain this position because of their agnatic relation-
ship with the child (tutors by law, or tutores legitimi), or, in the event that no 
candidates for these two categories were available, be appointed by a magis-
trate (tutores dativi). The tutor was responsible for managing the property of 
the ward, or pupil, as well as for providing for the pupil’s support including 
education, food, clothing, and housing, and other expenses associated with 
the pupil’s social class and resources, such as slaves and, for a female pupil, 
a dowry. For understanding agency relationships in the Roman economy, 
the most important duty for the tutor was his man agement of the pupil’s 
fi nances. In this area of the law, the overriding concern of the legal authori-
ties was to protect the resources of a vital and vulnerable social class against 
any threat to the loss of their property, and so they imposed stringent rules 
on the tutors who were responsible for administering the pupils’ property. 
Surely one motivation for these rules was to protect the resources of a class 
of people who in the future would be called upon to hold municipal offi ces 
and perform liturgical duties for their home towns. Many of the same rules 
imposed on the property belonging to pupils also affected the property of 
minors, fatherless men under the age of twenty-fi ve, who were also con-
sidered vulnerable to ill-considered fi nancial decisions, in particular, the 
 restrictions on alienating land, to be discussed below.11
The major problem that exists in all agency relationships, the asymmetries 
of information between principal and agent, was especially acute in tutor-
ship. In agency relationships, the agent commonly has greater knowledge of 
the business he is conducting than the principal, and so is in a position to 
engage in opportunistic behaviour at the principal’s expense. In theory, the 
tutor as agent had complete power over the pupil’s property. The tutor pur-
chased property for the pupil, managed his or her income, lent the pupil’s 
10 For basic discussion of the duties of tutors and curators, see Saller (1994), pp. 181–203, as 
well as Kehoe (1997), pp. 22–76, and Kaser (1971), pp. 85–91, 352–72.
11 Although a curator’s authority was not strictly required for a minor to complete a signifi -
cant fi nancial transaction, a transaction was subject to being rescinded, that is, a restitutio in 
integrum, if the minor could show that it was to his fi nancial disadvantage. For this reason, it 
was easier to transact business with a minor when he was aided by a curator. See Lenel (1914), 
pp. 132–5.
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money out at interest, and spent money on the pupil’s behalf. An unscrupu-
lous tutor was in the position to take advantage of his responsibilities and 
use the pupil’s property for his own purposes, or, in the worst-case scenario, 
steal from it. The question is whether Roman law developed adequate 
 oversight mechanisms to protect the interests of the pupil.
Monitoring agents was a basic problem in commercial relationships in the 
Roman world, and in this sector of the economy, Roman society developed a 
combination of formal legal institutions and social values to maintain a work-
able system of agency. The greater integration of Roman commercial markets 
in the Mediterranean world would not have been possible without adequate 
means of enforcing contracts between trading partners, as well as mecha-
nisms by which Roman property owners could exercise reasonable oversight 
over their employees or agents in far-fl ung locations.12 Any solution to this 
problem involved aligning the interests of business agents with those of the 
property owner by providing the former group with incentives to work pro-
ductively for their principals, while also reserving for the principal the means 
to sanction an unsatisfactory agent. The Romans approached this problem by 
relying on social dependants, slaves or freedmen, as agents. The use of social 
dependants as agents fi nds its origin, to a large extent, in the institutions of 
a society largely dependent on the ownership and employment of slaves.13 
The familia provided a ready-made structure around which to organise busi-
ness activities, just as it did in the Empire to organise the bureaucracy of the 
Roman government, as represented by the familia Caesaris.14 A slave operat-
ing with a peculium became an independent businessman in his own right. As 
a kind of ‘residual claimant’, the slave had many of the same incentives as 
an owner of the business, so it would be in his interest to operate the busi-
ness properly, since, unless there was some catastrophic falling out with his 
owner, he could be confi dent of retaining the profi ts that he generated. The 
agent also would take on much of the responsibility of running the business, 
including the monitoring of employees, many of whom were also slaves, and 
in many circumstances it seems clear that agents could act quite independ-
ently of their employers. This pattern of organising business was common 
in many areas of the Roman economy, not just in the business affairs of the 
wealthiest Romans, but also in much more modest levels of production and 
commerce, and its advantages are well known. By using slaves operating with 
a peculium as business managers, Roman property owners were in a position 
to provide specialised training to certain highly skilled individuals while 
12 For this section I have drawn on some of the conclusions from Frier and Kehoe (2007), 
pp. 126–34, which discusses some additional examples. I address the subject more briefl y in 
Kehoe (2011).
13 For Rome as a slave society, see Bradley (1994), pp. 10–30. For an overview of slavery in the 
Roman Empire, see now Bradley (2011).
14 Weaver (1972).
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also being more assured of reaping the benefi t of their investment in human 
capital. Such a pattern of training and employing social dependants was an 
essential feature in many types of commercial activity in the Roman world; 
Gunnar Fülle’s detailed analysis of the Arretine ceramic industry indicates 
how this system worked in the training of highly skilled artisans producing 
products of considerable commercial importance.15
To the extent that this system of employing social dependants as agents 
solved problems of monitoring, it did so by making the agent as independent 
from the principal as possible, and limiting the involvement of the principal 
in the slave (or freed) agent’s activities. This limitation fi nds an expression 
in the remedies that Roman law created to allow people doing business with 
slave agents to sue their owners to enforce obligations. Originally in Roman 
law, a property owner would assume no liability for obligations assumed 
by third parties. In the third or second centuries BCE, however, a series of 
six remedies was introduced, later called the actiones adiecticiae qualitatis.16 
These remedies afforded some protection to people engaging in contracts 
with agents representing principals, such as sons in power or slaves who dis-
posed over peculia with which they operated their businesses. Through these 
actions, the praetor granted people who were owed money by agents or who 
had otherwise entered into contractual relationships a way to recover their 
losses by suing the principal, the pater familias or the slave-owner. In many 
cases, the liability of the principal was limited to a slave agent’s peculium, or 
the agent, functioning as an institor, had to have the principal’s permission 
to obligate the latter party (although it seems that this permission was com-
monly assumed). Certainly it would be an oversimplifi cation to see these 
legal remedies as directly serving the needs of a society in which commercial 
life was highly decentralised, with agents working mostly independently with 
funds provided by a principal, whose chief interest in the activities of his 
agent was simply to be paid some return on the money he invested in him. In 
complex commercial undertakings, no matter what the strict requirements 
of the law were, property owners would have every incentive to make good 
on the obligations entered into by their agents, since failing to do so would 
impede their ability to do business in the future.
The control that the property owner exercised over a slave or freedman 
working as an agent would give him considerable leverage to protect against 
the agent’s opportunistic behaviour, but the sanctions that the owner could 
impose, such as revoking a promise of freedom, removing fi nancial support 
from a freedman, or even returning a freedman to slavery, would prob-
ably only work as a last resort. They would not allow the property owner 
to recover losses, and they would effectively tend to end any cooperation 
15 Fülle (1997).
16 On the actiones adiecticiae qualitiatis, see de Ligt (1999); Aubert (1994), pp. 46–91; Plescia 
(1984).
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between the principal and agent. Crucially important for enforcement, as 
Henrik Mouritsen argues, in his recent study of the role that freedmen 
played in Roman society, was an ideology that praised slaves and freedman 
for virtues such as probitas and fi des.17 This ideology emphasised the freed-
man’s continuing loyalty. The freedman lived in accordance with a substan-
tially different code of virtue from that of a freeborn citizen. The ideology 
that Mouritsen analyses seems designed to enforce trust precisely in those 
situations in which it was very diffi cult for a patron or principal to exercise 
any kind of meaningful control over an agent, because of the asymmetries of 
information involved.
Monitoring tutors
Tutorship as a system of agency posed perhaps even more complicated 
problems of enforcement, because the relationship between the tutor and 
pupil represented an extreme in the asymmetries of information between 
an agent and a principal. Certainly avenues existed to enforce the removal 
of a tutor who was suspected of malfeasance while managing the affairs of a 
pupil. The actio suspecti tutoris provided a procedure for sanctioning a tutor 
appointed in the will. This action, which could be brought by anyone, was 
a criminal procedure.18 A testamentary tutor who was found to have acted 
in a fraudulent manner would be removed from his post and replaced by 
another, and at the same time would be declared infamis (see below). Tutors 
by law were subject to the actio rationibus distrahendis; if they were found to 
have acted fraudulently, they were subject to a double penalty of the prop-
erty taken. This measure was apparently available only after the end of the 
tutorship, however. A further protection consisted in the requirement that 
tutors provide a stipulation that the property of the pupil would be secure, 
as well as offering sureties to support this undertaking. The provision of 
sureties was demanded of tutors by law and those appointed by magistrates, 
but not of tutors appointed in the will or by high-ranking magistrates such 
as the consuls, since in these circumstances the reputation of the tutor 
was deemed to be beyond reproach. Notwithstanding the occasional legal 
intervention when a tutor was suspected of malfeasance, the pupil’s main 
opportunity to recover from a tutor for mismanagement was to sue him in 
the actio tutelae, a remedy that was only available after the tutor’s service was 
over. Bringing this action against the tutor after the fact, however, might be 
cold comfort for the pupil whose property had been raided, if the tutor had 
become insolvent. To protect against this possibility, Roman law made co-
tutors all liable in full for whatever losses the pupil suffered. Certainly the 
vigilance of close connections of orphaned children, especially the mother, 
17 Mouritsen (2011), pp. 206–47.
18 On these procedures, see Kaser (1971), pp. 363–7; Saller (1994), pp. 185–7.
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could be crucial in monitoring the actions of tutors, but the asymmetries of 
information remained.
The Roman legal authorities seem to have been well aware of the vulner-
able position of pupils, and accordingly they developed rules that sought 
to protect the pupil’s interests by carefully defi ning the tutor’s responsibili-
ties in managing the property and also circumscribing the tutor’s freedom 
of action. Tutors had a positive responsibility to invest the pupil’s money 
appropriately so as to provide a stable income. They could not allow the 
pupil’s money to lie idle, and they could be required to pay interest for the 
period in which they failed to invest the pupil’s funds. Whenever possible, 
the tutor was to use these funds to purchase land. Previously, I have argued 
that the responsibilities that the Roman legal authorities imposed on tutors 
in administering the property of pupils stemmed from a cautious approach 
to fi nancial decision-making characteristic of upper-class Romans.19 From 
this perspective, land was privileged over all other forms of investment, and 
the tutor could be interpreted as fulfi lling his responsibilities by purchasing 
land and leasing it out. In the understanding of the Roman jurists, it would 
not be diffi cult to determine whether the tutor had acted prudently in man-
aging the pupil’s property when he took this step, since the price of the land 
was a function of the rent that it provided. Tutors of course could be liable 
when they purchased unsuitable land through fraud, but otherwise they were 
liable only for broad negligence in purchasing land (D.26.7.7 2–3) (Ulpian. 35 
ad Ed.). Only when it was not possible to purchase land – say, when insuffi -
cient funds were available – was the tutor expected to lend the pupil’s money 
out at interest; such loans could presumably cover a wide range of purposes, 
from consumer loans to investment in businesses. In enforcing such loans, 
the tutor was expected to display the same care and energy with the pupil’s 
money as he would with his own.
The important point is that the law imposed restrictions on the tutor that 
in some cases could have sacrifi ced income for the pupil, but these restric-
tions provided clear guidelines for the tutor, and also mitigated the effects 
on the fi nances of pupils as a class that might be caused by incompetent 
or unenergetic management on the part of the tutor. Thus the tutor was 
discouraged from alienating any land that the pupil might own. One could 
imagine circumstances in which this might be fi nancially advantageous for 
the pupil, say, when selling property in an inconvenient location to purchase 
something more easily managed might actually reduce costs for the pupil. 
In some circumstances, mortgaging land to undertake a potentially lucrative 
business venture might provide profi ts to the pupil unavailable through his 
or her landed property. None of this was legally permissible, and the Roman 
legal authorities’ preference for caution reached its fullest expression with 
legislation enacted by the emperor Septimius Severus in 195, the so-called 
19 Kehoe (1997).
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Oratio Severi (D.27.9.1) (Ulpian. 35 ad Ed.). This law made it unlawful for 
the tutor to sell, mortgage, or otherwise alienate the pupil’s land, except 
to pay off debts; its provisions were also applied to curators managing the 
property of minors.20 Even to sell property to pay off a debt, tutors had to 
gain permission from the provincial governor. The basic premise behind 
this legislation is that land represented the best assurance of long-term fi nan-
cial security, and so protecting pupils against any possible threat to their 
 continued ownership of land was the best means to look after their interests.
The Roman government would apply this conception of land as a form 
of economic security in other areas of the law, especially in late Antiquity. 
Thus the late imperial government was concerned to maintain the resources 
of a group vital for local offi ce holding and the performance of liturgies, and 
so it discouraged the alienation of land by members of town councils across 
the empire.21 To ensure the continued provision of ships to serve the annona 
at Rome and Constantinople, it linked the ownership of land with the duty 
to invest in cargo ships. In effect, the government designated the lands 
belonging to the shipowners as security for their continued investment in 
shipping.22 As the ownership of ships serving the annona, like other key pro-
fessions, became hereditary, the duty to invest in ships came to be imposed 
as a kind of lien on certain lands.
Penalties for tutors
Tutors served as agents responsible for managing a considerable portion of 
the private property in the Roman Empire. To understand the economic 
implications of this service, it will be helpful to consider it from the perspec-
tive of a contractual relationship with their pupils, although Roman law did 
not defi ne tutorship in this way. There are two signifi cant aspects of contract 
law that are important for understanding the role of the tutor as agent, the 
notion of ‘default rules’ in a contract, and the penalties imposed for breach 
of contract.
In any system of contract law, a key element in defi ning the property rights 
of the parties involved the enforcement of default rules. Default rules serve 
to fi ll in ‘gaps’ in the contract, that is, contingencies that the parties could not 
take the time to negotiate at the outset of their relationship, either because 
they were unforeseen or because it would simply be too costly to  negotiate 
20 For full discussion of the Oratio Severi, see Kehoe (1997), pp. 54–67.
21 See, for example, the decree of the emperors Valentinian, Theodosius and Arcadius making 
it unlawful for a decurion to sell rural or urban properties without the intervention of a 
judge (C.10.34.1, CTh.12.3.1, 386 CE). The emperors Honorius and Theodosius II required 
that the approval be gained from the provincial governor rather than simply from a judge 
(CTh.12.3.2, 423 CE).
22 See, for example, C.11.3.1 (CTh.13.6.5, 367 CE), 11.3.2 (CTh.13.6.7, 375 CE), 11.3.3 
(CTh.13.6.8, 399 CE). 
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all possible ones.23 Modern courts, at least in the US, tend to impose default 
rules that are termed ‘majoritarian’ or ‘market-mimicking’, in that they 
would represent the preference of what most contracting parties would have 
negotiated had they taken the time to do so, and not what the individual 
people in the contract might have preferred. The other type of default rule 
would be ‘tailored’ toward the preferences of the parties involved in the 
contract under dispute. As we will see, the Roman legal authorities tended to 
follow majoritarian default rules, which offer the advantage that the courts 
are spared the often diffi cult task of fi guring out the intentions of the parties. 
At the same time, the treatment of contracts in courts will be predictable, so 
parties will have a baseline against which to negotiate before a dispute ever 
ends in court. In the Roman consensual contract, sale, lease, partnership, 
and mandate, the default rules depended on the good faith of both parties, 
which in turn revolved around the common meaning of the terms that might 
be part of a contract.24
From the perspective of tutorship as an agency contract, Roman law 
ruled out any deviation from a ‘majoritarian’ default rule, imposing the same 
stringent set of rules on all tutors. Before the promulgation of the Severan 
legislation that imposed severe restrictions on tutors, the legal validity of 
transactions involving the property of pupils would have been subject to 
a great deal of uncertainty. The law protected the pupil against the tutor’s 
mismanagement of his or her property, but the relief often came only after 
the completion of the tutorship, when the former pupil could sue the tutor 
to recover any losses that his faulty management of the pupil’s property 
might have caused. With the promulgation of the Severan legislation that 
imposed severe restrictions on tutors in managing pupils’ property, the 
rules became more clear-cut for both people entering into fi nancial relation-
ships with tutors, and for the tutors themselves. To address the interests of 
the former group, for someone seeking to purchase property belonging to 
a pupil or to lend money against the security of the pupil’s property, the 
rules surrounding such a transaction became transparent and predictable. 
The requirement to obtain the approval of the provincial governor before 
entering into a contract involving the pupil’s real property would provide 
a strong disincentive for people to make unauthorised purchases of pupil’s 
property, since such contracts could not be enforced in court and would be 
subject to being rescinded. Likewise, the same rule would deter tutors from 
entering into such contracts. At the same time, the strict rules imposed on 
tutors would provide them with some protection, since they could follow a 
prescribed set of norms in managing their pupils’ property and avoid civil 
23 For default rules, see Craswell (2000), as well as Schwartz (1992), and Ayres and Gertner 
(1989), and Katz (1990), p. 217, among a great deal of literature.
24 I plan to address this issue further in a paper called ‘Contracts, agency, and transactions costs 
in the Roman economy’.
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and criminal liability. Thus a tutor would be interpreted as having fulfi lled 
his duty if he maintained his pupil’s agricultural property and leased it out 
for a conventional rent, one that represented a commonly accepted return 
on the property’s nominal value (see above).25 When the tutor loaned the 
pupil’s money at interest, he would be protected from liability if he showed 
that he demonstrated the same diligence in enforcing these loans as he did 
with loans of his own money.26 The tutor would not be liable simply because 
the loan turned out badly. The carefully crafted and stringent ‘default’ rules 
limited the tutor’s discretion in managing the pupil’s property and so helped 
to overcome some of the disadvantages arising from the asymmetries of 
information inherent in the tutor’s service.
From the perspective of an agency contract, another important issue 
concerns the penalties that might be imposed on the tutor if he failed in his 
fi duciary obligations toward the pupil. The restrictions on the tutor’s scope of 
action provided one means of protecting the pupil’s interests, but the diffi culty 
of monitoring the tutor remained, since generally the full scope of the tutor’s 
actions could only be known after his service was over, at the actio tutelae (see 
above). In this type of lawsuit, Roman law did require the tutor to compen-
sate the pupil for any losses from his property resulting from negligence. In 
so doing, Roman law made the tutor liable to something akin to ‘expectation 
damages’ in modern contract law.27 Expectation damages provide greater 
compensation to a party to a contract that has been breeched than ‘reliance’ 
or ‘restitution’ damages. Restitution damages compensate the party suffering 
a breach for only what he has provided to the party who has breached the 
contract. With reliance damages, the party suffering the breach is better pro-
tected, since he is owed any investment that he has made in connection with 
the contract whereas expectation damages restore lost profi ts.28 This degree of 
liability corresponds to that of the tutor toward the pupil, since the tutor was 
not only required to restore any property lost to the pupil through his negli-
gence, but also to pay interest if he failed to enforce loans of the pupil’s money 
or otherwise failed to collect money owed to the pupil. The tutor was gener-
ally expected to display the same standard of care with the pupil’s property 
as with his own. But this degree of liability could only provide the pupil with 
meaningful protection if the tutor had suffi cient property. As we have seen, 
Roman law addressed this issue by requiring certain tutors to provide sureties 
for their performance, and magistrates who appointed insolvent tutors could 
themselves be held liable for losses resulting from the tutor’s failure.29
25 For the tutor’s purchasing land on behalf of the pupil, see Kehoe (1997), pp. 38–42.
26 For discussion of the relevant legal texts on lending the pupil’s money, see Kehoe (1997), 
pp. 49–54.
27 Craswell (2000), p. 3; Mahoney (2000); De Geest and Wuyts (2000), p. 143.
28 Mahoney (2000), p. 121.
29 Kaser (1971), p. 364.
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Perhaps the penalty resulting from an unfavourable judgment in the actio 
tutelae that provided the strongest deterrence against the tutor’s malfeasance 
was infamia. Since tutorship was one of several legal relationships involving 
bona fi des, or good faith, an adverse judgment involved infamia, which meant 
that the tutor, as infamis, was removed from Rome’s ‘community of honor’, 
or ‘meritocracy of virtue’, to use the formulation of Thomas McGinn. Being 
infamis barred a person from many aspects of Roman social and political life 
involving honour. At fi rst, the tutor would incur infamia only for deliberate 
misconduct, or dolus, but this sanction was extended to cover broad negli-
gence on the part of the tutor.30 The penalty of infamia, which did nothing 
to restore the pupil’s property, functioned to some degree like the penalties 
that could be imposed on freedmen who failed in their role as agents for 
Roman property owners, such as being forced back into slavery, or even 
being cut off from the patron’s fi nancial and social support. Infamia was a 
severe penalty that in theory induced tutors, as members of Rome’s elite 
classes, to act in accordance with norms essential to the orderly functioning 
of society, but not fully enforceable by the courts. From another perspec-
tive, the severe penalty of infamia could be viewed as comparable to penalty 
clauses in contracts. These clauses tend to overcompensate one side for 
breach of contract, but they are included to induce both parties’ compliance 
with the agreement. In the law of tutorship, the issue was not compliance 
with a contract, but deterring fraud (and negligence), which can be hard to 
detect until it is too late. From a theoretical perspective, when violations are 
diffi cult to detect, severe penalties, imposed in rare cases, can be an effective 
means of enforcement.31
The expectations about the tutor’s duties as an agent for the pupil and the 
penalties for his failing to meet them imposed considerable costs on society. 
As mentioned previously, given likely ancient life expectancies, a very sub-
stantial portion of the empire’s private property was under the management 
of tutors or curators. The restrictions on alienating pupils’ land, like the 
late imperial restrictions on land belonging to decurions and ship owners, 
certainly must have imposed signifi cant limits on the market for agricultural 
land. To the extent that pupils or minors could not alienate land, even when 
it was in their interest to do so, this must have discouraged potentially profi t-
able commercial ventures, while also distorting the market for agricultural 
land by creating an artifi cial scarcity.32 But to protect themselves against 
liability in an actio tutelae, it seems logical that many tutors would have exer-
cised extreme caution in managing the pupil’s property, say, by purchasing 
land but taking no steps to invest the pupil’s money in improving it to gain 
30 For the penalty of infamia in the actio tutelae, see Kaser (1971), p. 510. For the notion of 
Rome’s ‘community of honor’, see McGinn (1998), pp. 21–69, 213.
31 See De Geest and Wuyts (2000), pp. 152–3.
32 Saller (1994), pp. 181–203; Crook (1976).
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a larger return, or avoiding risk at all costs when lending the pupil’s money 
out at interest.
3. CONCLUSION
In this chapter, I have sought to show how an economic analysis of agency 
in an area of the law of undeniable importance to Roman society can help 
us come to a better understanding of the complex relationship between law 
and the economy of the Roman Empire. The institution of tutorship arose 
out of a basic concern to protect the property of underage orphans. But 
the legal regulations shaping the institution of tutorship seem designed to 
protect pupils in a relationship characterised by substantial asymmetries 
of information between principal and agent. Viewed in this way, the legal 
institutions surrounding these forms of agency, like the institutions sur-
rounding agents serving as business managers for wealthy property owners, 
can be regarded as ‘instrumental,’ in the sense that they were established or 
developed by policy-makers to achieve particular goals, in these two cases to 
protect the interests of important constituencies in the Roman world.33 The 
forms of agency that I have discussed in this chapter were the products, then, 
of both the basic structures of Roman society and upper-class economic 
interests. They fulfi lled basic goals, and so can be seen, from the perspec-
tive of bounded rationality, as ‘satisfi cing’ solutions, even if they were not 
‘effi cient’, in the sense of promoting the most valued use of resources and 
fostering economic growth.
The development and maintenance of legal institutions designed to protect 
the interests of pupils had broader implications for the Roman economy. In 
developing rules for this type of agency, the Roman legal authorities were 
guided by a basic understanding of the Roman economy that they shared 
with other members of their class, and so to this extent it can be argued that 
they were aware of the economic implications of their policies. But the law 
of tutorship was not developed to serve an economic policy, but to achieve 
a social goal, with costs imposed on the economy as a whole.34 To the extent 
that the law of tutorship had consequences for the distribution of wealth 
in Roman society, it supported efforts to maintain the economic viability 
of a broad class of property owners in the Roman Empire, not simply the 
wealthiest members of the elite, but property owners who would eventu-
ally serve on town councils around the Empire. The law of tutorship, then, 
represented an institution that promoted stability and thus the efforts of the 
Roman government to maintain the broad social structure essential to its 
policies in ruling the empire.
33 For this concept of ‘instrumental’ institutions, see Greif (2006), pp. 40–1.
34 For discussion of this problem, see Ogilvie (2007), and earlier Rutherford (1994).
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Chapter 10
Dumtaxat de peculio: What’s in a Peculium, or 
Establishing the Extent of the Principal’s Liability
Jean-Jacques Aubert
1. INTRODUCTION
In contrast with modern slave systems, the Graeco-Roman world used 
slaves in all kinds of ways and functions. Besides what we consider liberal 
trades, such as medicine or banking, there is plenty of evidence for slaves 
being involved in business activities, producing and distributing goods and 
services, or in public administration at all levels of government. Roman law 
regards slaves as things (res), which implies that they could avail themselves 
of no legal rights, no juristic personality and no patrimonial capacity. Their 
condition was, however, no obstacle to their participating in management, 
as shown by the case of one Midas in charge of a perfumery in late fourth-
century BCE Athens, recorded by the speechwriter Hyperides. We will return 
to this case shortly.1
Craftsmen, traders and businessmen (and businesswomen) of servile 
status had many an opportunity to enter into contractual relationships with 
others, be they citizens, resident aliens and foreign travellers, freedmen, or 
slaves. In Athenian law, just like in archaic Roman law, contracts made by 
slaves apparently entailed no legal sanctions, social or religious pressure 
being presumably suffi cient to enforce their provisions through fulfi lment of 
obligations by both parties, whatever their respective social, economic and 
legal status.2 In pre-classical Roman law, all acquisitions by a slave benefi t-
ted the master’s patrimony exclusively, while conveyances were considered 
legally void, according to the twofold principle that slaves were entitled to 
better, meaning increase, their master’s patrimony, though not to worsen, 
meaning decrease, it. Such an imbalance was detrimental to those who 
wanted, needed, or were compelled to do business with slaves, while lowering 
the latter’s practical effi ciency and therefore economic value. Consequently, 
Roman praetors devised ways of correcting this situation during the mid or 
late Republican period (at some point between the late third and early fi rst 
centuries BCE) by granting business people a set of legal remedies (actiones) 
1 Hyperid., c. Athenog. Cf. Aubert (2007), pp. 215–30.
2 For religious sanctions against patrons convicted of deceiving their clients, cf. XII Tables 
8.10 (Crawford 1996) = 8.21 (FIRA I2, p. 62): ‘Si patronus clienti fraudem fecerit, sacer esto’.
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establishing, under specifi c conditions, various levels of contractual liability 
for the principal with regards to his dependant’s transactions.3
In the ninth book of his commentary on the provincial edict, Gaius notes 
that
a proconsul does everything in order that anyone who enters into a contract with 
a person in power (alieni iuris, in potestate) gets his due in so far as circumstances 
allow it, based upon fairness, even though previously mentioned remedies, 
namely the actiones exercitoria, institoria, and tributoria, do not apply.4 
Gaius goes on, mentioning three separate remedies, one calling for total 
liability (in solidum), equivalent to the amount of the debt incurred through 
the contract, on the part of the principal on the ground of an invitation 
(iussum) pre-emptively addressed to potential contracting parties to deal 
with the dependant.5 The other two remedies call for the principal’s limited 
liability, up to the amount of the principal’s enrichment (versum) from his 
dependant’s transaction, or up to the amount of the dependant’s peculium, 
even in the absence of invitation or enrichment on the part of the principal.
Those six remedies were created by one or more praetors by the late 
Republican period. Later commentators labelled them actiones adiecticiae 
qualitatis, to refl ect a change of names within the formula. All of these rem-
edies apply to obligations arising from contracts made by dependants in the 
context of economic activities carried out with various levels of autonomy 
that were instrumental in defi ning the extent of the principal’s liability. 
Unlike contracts, delicts called for total liability.6
Not much will be said here about those three remedies calling for the 
principal’s total liability. The actio quod iussu implies the awareness (scientia) 
and will (voluntas) of the principal to let third contracting parties deal with 
his dependant(s). Will and awareness are also implicit in the appointment 
(praepositio) by the principal of an agent as business manager or shipmas-
ter, whose legal transactions carried out in connection with this specifi c 
activity (negotiatio) give rise, respectively, to an actio institoria or exercitoria. 
In all three cases, the principal unambiguously retains control over his 
3 Inst.Gai.4.69–74a. For an overview, cf. Aubert (1994), ch. 2, pp. 40–116; Wacke (1994), 
pp. 280–362; and Miceli (2001).
4 D.14.5.1 (Gaius 9 ad Ed. Prov.): ‘Omnia proconsul agit ut qui contraxit cum eo qui in aliena 
potestate sit, etiamsi defi cient superiores actiones id est exercitoria institoria tributoriave, 
nihilo minus tamen in quantum ex bono et aequo res patitur suum consequatur. Sive enim 
iussu eius, cuius in potestate sit, negotium gestum fuerit, in solidum eo nomine iudicium 
pollicetur: sive non iussu, sed tamen in rem eius versum fuerit, eatenus introducit actionem 
quatenus in rem eius versum fuerit: sive neutrum eorum sit, de peculio actionem constituit’.
5 Cf. D.14.5.7 (Scaev. 1 Resp.), on a similar case involving a son in power (fi lius familias) and 
an alternative juristic response owing to particular circumstances (the father’s death).
6 D.14.5.4.2 (Ulpian. 29 ad Ed.): ‘Quamquam autem ex contractu in id quod facere potest 
actio in eum datur, tamen ex delictis in solidum convenietur’.
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dependant’s activity, the nature of which is clearly defi ned at the outset. In 
exchange, he stands surety for all debts arising from the dependant’s transac-
tions. Litigation bears on simple, binary questions: is the slave indebted or 
not? Does the transaction fi t the principal’s intention, expressed through 
iussum or implied in the praepositio, or not? If the answer to any of these 
 questions is negative, the principal is not liable.
With regard to the other three remedies, namely the actiones de peculio, 
tributoria or de in rem verso, things are not so clear-cut, because the principal’s 
liability must not only be established, but also quantitatively estimated, on 
the basis of a sophisticated analysis of the assets and liabilities of the prin-
cipal’s and/or agent’s property. Such an estimate requires the examination 
of account books and inventories, provided that they exist and are reliably 
kept. The purpose of this chapter is to identify and list the main obstacles 
a creditor could and undoubtedly would meet in fi guring out what is in a 
slave’s peculium, and to ponder the consequences of this.
2. ACTIO DE PECULIO
Unfortunately, the chapters dealing with the actio de peculio in Gaius’ 
Institutes (4.72–72a) are partly lost or badly damaged, both in the Verona 
palimpsest and in the Oxyrhynchite papyrus (P.Oxy. XVII 2103) that miracu-
lously supplements it in this part of book 4. On the other hand, thanks to the 
compilers’ diligence, a large collection of juristic opinions from the classical 
period of Roman law is preserved in title 15.1 of Justinian’s Digest. Ulpian 
reports that the actio de peculio had been created after – meaning, possibly 
but not necessarily much later than – the above-mentioned remedies calling 
for the principal’s total liability (in solidum).7 The actio de peculio is available 
if the peculium has seen an increase due to the transaction under litigation,8 
thus benefi tting the principal, whatever his legal relationship (ownership, 
possession, usufruct, and so on) with the slave.9 The question is how would 
such an increase be traced? What evidence would a creditor resort to in 
order to establish and quantify it? Pomponius regards the peculium as a sub-
account, created by the slave’s master and likely to grow or shrink, to be 
7 D.15.1.1pr (Ulpian. 29 ad Ed.): ‘Ordinarium praetor arbitratus est prius eos contractus 
exponere eorum qui alienae potestati subiecti sunt, qui in solidum tribuunt actionem, sic 
deinde ad hunc pervenire, ubi de peculio datur actio’. The standard work on the peculium is 
Micolier (1932). Cf. also Buti (1976); and Pesaresi (2008). More recently, in an historical per-
spective, Roth (2005), pp. 278–92; Grotkamp (2005), pp. 125–45; Aubert (2009), pp. 167–85; 
Rosafi o (2009), pp. 287–302.
8 D.15.1.1.4 (Ulpian. 29 ad Ed.): ‘Si cum impubere fi lio familias vel servo contractum sit, ita 
dabitur in dominum vel patrem de peculio, si locupletius eorum peculium factum est’.
9 D.15.1.2 (Pompon. 5 ad Sab.): ‘Ex ea causa ex qua soleret servus fructuarius vel usuarius 
adquirere, in eum cuius usus fructus vel usus sit actio dumtaxat de peculio ceteraeque 
 honorariae dantur, ex reliquis in dominum proprietatis’.
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eventually cancelled at the master’s will. In legal terms, a peculium requires 
the master’s initial permission.10 Thus Q. Aelius Tubero, a late Republican 
jurist quoted by Ulpian through P. Iuventius Celsus of Hadrianic time, 
defi nes the peculium as ‘what a slave keeps separate from the master’s 
accounts with the latter’s permission, after deduction of what the slave owes 
his master’.11 The master’s permission rests less on his will (volente domino) 
than on his acceptance (patientia) with regard to his awareness (scientia) of the 
very existence of the peculium. To have a peculium does not imply the right to 
dispose of it, by transfer of some or all of its parts, because it would worsen 
the economic position of the principal. Consequently, more is required to 
do so, such as the concessio liberae administrationis,12 a special permission 
whereby the slave is enabled to do on a regular basis what should have been 
allowed only on a case-by-case basis, according to Paul who implicitly refers 
to some kind of iussum.13 In so far as the peculium can be shown to exist, the 
principal becomes liable for his dependant’s transactions in spite of specifi c 
restrictions or prohibitions to deal with the latter. The same Paul refers to a 
shop employee whose status has been clarifi ed by a written sign (proscriptio) 
– he is not to be considered a business manager14 – but whose transactions 
nevertheless give rise to an actio de peculio: the standard of liability is admit-
tedly restricted with regard to the actio institoria, but nonetheless potentially 
signifi cant.15
3. ACCOUNTING AND BOOK-KEEPING
The peculium cannot exist without the master’s knowledge and agreement. 
He, however, may be unclear about its content and components, both 
10 D.15.1.4pr (Pompon. 7 ad Sab.): ‘Peculii est non id cuius servus seorsum a domino rationem 
habuerit, sed quod dominus ipse separaverit suam a servi rationem discernens: nam cum 
servi peculium totum adimere vel augere vel minuere dominus possit, animadvertendum est 
non quid servus, sed quid dominus constituendi servilis peculii gratia fecerit’.
11 D.15.1.5.4 (Ulpian. 29 ad Ed.): ‘Peculium autem Tubero quidem sic defi nit, ut Celsus libro 
sexto digestorum refert, quod servus domini permissu separatum a rationibus dominicis 
habet, deducto inde si quid domino debetur’.
12 Marcellus, according to Iulianus, quoted by Ulpian (D.15.1.7.1 (Ulpian. 29 ad Ed.): ‘[. . .] 
si (ut quidam, inquit, putant) peculium servus habere non potest nisi concedente domino. 
Ego autem puto non esse opus concedi peculium a domino servum habere, sed non adimi, 
ut habeat. Alia causa est peculii liberae administrationis: nam haec specialiter concedenda 
est’.
13 D.15.1.46 (Paul. 60 ad Ed.): ‘Qui peculii administrationem concedit videtur permittere 
 generaliter quod et specialiter permissurus est’.
14 D.14.3.11.2–4 (Ulpian. 28 ad Ed.) on the practical aspects of proscriptio.
15 D.15.1.47pr (Paul. 4 ad Plaut.): ‘Quotiens in taberna ita scriptum fuisset “cum ianuario 
servo meo geri negotium veto”, hoc solum consecutum esse dominum constat, ne insti-
toria teneatur, non etiam de peculio’. This is already attested in Gaius D.15.1.29.1 (Gaius 
9 ad Ed. Prov.): ‘Etiamsi prohibuerit contrahi cum servo dominus, erit in eum de peculio 
actio’.
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in terms of nature (or quality) and quantity.16 Ulpian approvingly cites 
Pomponius who considers that the principal is not bound to know in detail 
what the peculium is made of: a rough idea (pachymeresteron) would suffi ce.17 
In addition, the late second-century CE jurist Papirius Fronto compares the 
peculium with a human being, a statement explained by Marcian, possibly in 
reference to Polybius’ thought (Hist. 6.5) about the natural cycle of political 
regimes: a peculium is born, grows, declines, and dies. This evolution is not 
straightforward, since a peculium can be totally empty without losing its legal 
status and existence.18
Concerning the ‘birth’ or establishment of the peculium, it can be ascribed 
to various causes and origins. Florentinus lists the slave’s personal savings 
out of his daily rations, and all incomes and rewards that his master allows 
him to keep for himself.19 To be added are whatever the slave is about to 
acquire: returns from pending litigation, inheritance, legacies, damages, 
refunds and other payments.
Just as the peculium arises from the master’s will, it is cancelled in the 
same way.20 The praetor’s edict provides that the peculium ceases to exist 
at the time of the slave’s death, manumission, or conveyance, through sale, 
gift, or legacy. However, creditors can bring an action on the peculium for a 
whole year after that, because, according to Pomponius, the peculium may 
still change over that period of time, through increase (gains) or decrease 
(losses).21 By contrast, the slave’s escape or kidnapping brings the autono-
16 D.15.1.4.1–6 (Pompon. 7 ad Sab.): ‘Sed hoc ita verum puto, si debito servum liberare voluit 
dominus, ut, etiamsi nuda voluntate remiserit dominus quod debuerit, desinat servus 
debitor esse: si vero nomina ita fecerit dominus, ut quasi debitorem se servo faceret, cum re 
vera debitor non esset, contra puto: re enim, non verbis peculium augendum est. 2. Ex his 
apparet non quid servus ignorante domino habuerit peculii esse, sed quid volente: alioquin et 
quod subripuit servus domino, fi et peculii, quod non est verum. 3. Sed saepe fi t, ut ignorante 
domino incipiat minui servi peculium, veluti cum damnum domino dat servus aut furtum 
facit. 4. Si opem ferente servo meo furtum mihi feceris, id ex peculio deducendum est, quo 
minus ob rem subreptam consequi possim. 5. Si aere alieno dominico exhauriatur peculium 
servi, res tamen in causa peculiaria manent: nam si aut servo donasset debitum dominus aut 
nomine servi alius domino intulisset, peculium suppletur nec est nova concessione domini 
opus. 6. Non solum id in peculio vicariorum ponendum est, cuius rei a domino, sed etiam id 
cuius ab eo cuius in peculio sint seorsum rationem habeant’.
17 D.15.1.7.2 (Ulpian. 29 ad Ed.): ‘Scire autem non utique singulas res debet, sed pachymer-
esteron [id est: magis in universum], et in hanc sententiam Pomponius inclinat’.
18 D.15.1.40pr (Marcian. 5 Reg.): ‘Peculium nascitur crescit decrescit moritur, et ideo eleganter 
Papirius Fronto dicebat peculium simile esse homini’.
19 D.15.1.39 (Florent. 11 Inst.): ‘Peculium et ex eo consistit, quod parsimonia sua quis paravit 
vel offi cio meruerit a quolibet sibi donari idque velut proprium patrimonium servum suum 
habere quis voluerit’.
20 D.15.1.8 (Paul. 4 ad Sab.): ‘Contra autem simul atque noluit, peculium servi desinit peculium 
esse’.
21 D.15.2.1pr -1 (Ulpian. 29 ad Ed.): ‘Praetor ait: “Post mortem eius qui in alterius potestate 
fuerit, posteave quam is emancipatus manumissus alienatusve fuerit, dumtaxat de peculio et 
si quid dolo malo eius in cuius potestate est factum erit, quo minus peculii esset, in anno, 
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mous management of the peculium to an end. So does any doubt about the 
slave’s survival.22
I would like to suggest here that no one except the slave in charge of the 
peculium may actually know with precision and accuracy what it is made of. 
The slave’s master – not to say third contracting parties – is, at best, able to 
acknowledge the existence of a peculium, the content of which is revealed in 
inventories and account books. Provided that such documents exist, that 
they are kept diligently up-to-date, and that they can be produced, con-
sulted, deciphered and understood, it is possible to get an idea – however 
 impressionistic – of the nature of the peculium, therefore of its value and 
volatility.
4. THE MAKE-UP OF THE PECULIUM
Classical Roman jurists surmise that the peculium was originally a small and 
simple entity. Ulpian provides an etymological defi nition of the word pecu-
lium: ‘quasi pusilla pecunia sive patrimonium pusillum’.23 Elsewhere, the 
same author and others specify that a peculium can contain all sorts of goods 
and commodities:
• movables, such as clothes, as long as they are kept for regular and 
 personal use:24
• real estate, be it agricultural land and buildings, or urban property;25
quo primum de ea re experiundi potestas erit, iudicium dabo”. 1. Quamdiu servus vel fi lius 
in potestate est, de peculio actio perpetua est: post mortem autem eius vel postquam eman-
cipatus manumissus alienatusve fuerit, temporaria esse incipit, id est annalis’. Pomponius 
D. 15.2.3 (Pompon. 4 ad Quint. Muc.): ‘Defi nitione peculii interdum utendum est etiam, 
si servus in rerum natura esse desiit et actionem praetor de peculio intra annum dat: nam 
et tunc et accessionem et decessionem quasi peculii recipiendam (quamquam iam desiit 
morte servi vel manumissione esse peculium), ut possit ei accedere ut peculio fructibus vel 
pecorum fetu ancillarumque partubus et decedere, veluti si mortuum sit animal vel alio quo-
libet modo perierit’.
22 D.15.1.48pr (Paul. 17 ad Plaut.): ‘Libera peculii administratio non permanet neque in fugi-
tivo neque in subrepto neque in eo, de quo nesciat quis vivat an mortuus sit’.
23 D.15.1.5.3 (Ulpian. 29 ad Ed.): ‘Peculium dictum est quasi pusilla pecunia sive patrimonium 
pusillum’.
24 D.15.1.25 (Pompon. 23 ad Sab.): ‘Id vestimentum peculii esse incipit, quod ita dederit 
dominus, ut eo vestitu servum perpetuo uti vellet eoque nomine ei traderet, ne quis alius 
eo uteretur idque ab eo eius usus gratia custodiretur. Sed quod vestimentum servo dominus 
ita dedit utendum, ut non semper, sed ad certum usum certis temporibus eo uteretur, veluti 
cum sequeretur eum sive cenanti ministravit, id vestimentum non esse peculii’.
25 D.15.1.22 (Pompon. 7 ad Sab.): ‘Si damni infecti aedium peculiarium nomine promiserit 
dominus, ratio eius haberi debet et ideo ab eo qui de peculio agit domino cavendum est’. 
Idem D.15.1.23 (Pompon. 9 ad Sab.): ‘Aedium autem peculiarium nomine in solidum damni 
infecti promitti debet, sicut vicarii nomine noxale iudicium in solidum pati, quia pro pignore 
ea, si non defendantur, actor abducit vel possidet’.
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• living beings, such as slaves’ slaves (vicarii) or animals;
• assets (credit, damages to be collected as a result of litigation, inheritance 
and legacies to come, peculia entrusted to vicarii) and liabilities (mostly 
debts = nomina).26
The peculium can be empty of any or all of the above27 or consist exclusively 
of debts owed by the slave to his master.28 In the books, it also contains 
whatever the latter has deceivingly withdrawn from it.29 Last, it includes 
everything the slave has acquired and kept hidden from his master, insofar 
as it can be assumed that the latter would have let him have it, had he known 
about it.30
5. LITIGATION WITH SEVERAL CREDITORS: FIRST COME, 
FIRST SERVED
A slave in business entrusted with a peculium may owe money to several 
creditors. When one of them wants to sue the master, he introduces an 
action on the peculium and can expect to be compensated up to the amount 
of the peculium. His position is obviously advantageous with regard to other 
creditors who would sue later, provided that a decision is made about his 
case fi rst. Consequently, the timing of the judicial decision matters more 
than the chronological order of litigation, as Gaius clearly states in his com-
mentary to the provincial edict.31 A pending decision, which may drastically 
change the content of the peculium, is irrelevant.
26 D.15.1.7.4 (Ulpian. 29 ad Ed.): ‘In peculio autem res esse possunt omnes et mobiles et soli: 
vicarios quoque in peculium potest habere et vicariorum peculium: hoc amplius et nomina 
debitorum’. Cf. also D.15.1.17 (Ulpian. 29 ad Ed.).
27 D.15.1.30pr (Ulpian. 29 ad Ed.): ‘Quaesitum est, an teneat actio de peculio, etiamsi nihil sit 
in peculio cum ageretur, si modo sit rei iudicatae tempore. Proculus et Pegasus nihilo minus 
teneri aiunt: intenditur enim recte, etiamsi nihil sit in peculio. Idem et circa ad exhibendum 
et in rem actionem placuit, quae sententia et a nobis probanda est’.
28 D.15.1.16 (Iulian. 12 Dig.): ‘Marcellus notat: est etiam ille casus, si alter ademerit: vel si omni 
quidem modo concesserit dominus sed in nominibus erit concessio’.
29 D.15.1.21pr (Ulpian. 29 ad Ed.): ‘Summa cum ratione etiam hoc peculio praetor imputavit, 
quod dolo malo domini factum est, quo minus in peculio esset. Sed dolum malum accipere 
debemus, si ei ademit peculium: sed et si eum intricare peculium in necem creditorum 
passus est, Mela scribit dolo malo eius factum. Sed et si quis, cum suspicaretur alium secum 
acturum, alio peculium avertat, dolo non caret. Sed si alii solvit, non dubito de hoc, quin 
non teneatur, quoniam creditori solvitur et licet creditori vigilare ad suum consequendum’.
30 D.15.1.49pr (Pompon. 4 ad Quint. Muc.): ‘Non solum id peculium est, quod dominus servo 
concessit, verum id quoque, quod ignorante quidem eo adquisitum sit, tamen, si rescisset, 
passurus erat esse in peculio’.
31 D.15.1.10 (Gaius 9 ad Ed. Prov.): ‘Si vero adhuc in suspenso est prius iudicium de peculio et ex 
posteriore iudicio res iudicaretur, nullo modo debet prioris iudicii ratio haberi in posteriore 
condemnatione, quia in actione de peculio occupantis melior est condicio, occupare autem 
videtur non qui prior litem contestatus est, sed qui prior ad sententiam iudicis pervenit’.
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6. TIME OF ESTIMATE
Like modern fi nancial portfolios, peculia may fl uctuate widely and quickly. 
In case of litigation on the peculium, it is vital for the plaintiff(s) to establish 
when the peculium must be taken into consideration, because the time is 
instrumental in defi ning the level of the master’s liability. Whether the pecu-
lium incurs major losses after the estimate is irrelevant, because the master’s 
other assets – outside the peculium – can be called upon for compensation. 
Theoretically, various moments can be envisaged:
• the initial establishment of the peculium (= concessio peculii), or any time 
the peculium has been re-evaluated or recapitalised, assuming that the 
master has then a precise and accurate knowledge of its content;
• the time of the transaction, assuming that the contracting party would 
check the state of the peculium standing as a kind of surety;
• the time when the plaintiff introduces his claim in iure, thus starting 
litigation;
• the time when the joinder of issue (litis contestatio) is pronounced, before 
sending the case to a judge (apud iudicem);
• the time when the judge makes his decision (iudicium);
• outside of the proceedings, whenever the peculium is cancelled because of 
the slave’s death, manumission or conveyance, or at any given moment 
within one year of the event, while the actio de peculio is still available.
Classical jurists are rather discreet about this fundamental issue, and occa-
sionally make ambiguous and somewhat contradictory statements. Following 
Proculus and Pegasus, Ulpian considers that a peculium may be empty at the 
start of litigation, but rebuilt later on by the time of the judicial decision, 
thus making the actio de peculio valid.32 Along the same lines, if the pecu-
lium is insuffi cient to repay a debt at the time of judgment, complementary 
proceedings can start anew for the balance if the state of the peculium subse-
quently improves.33 Whoever makes a contract with a slave is bound to pay 
attention to changes in the value of the peculium, which does not preclude a 
certain amount of speculation.34 Paul denies any guarantee (cautio) bearing 
32 D.15.1.30pr (Ulpian. 29 ad Ed.): ‘Quaesitum est an teneat actio de peculio, etiamsi nihil sit 
in peculio cum ageretur, si modo sit rei iudicatae tempore. Proculus et Pegasus nihilo minus 
teneri aiunt: intenditur enim recte, etiamsi nihil sit in peculio. Idem et circa ad exhibendum 
et in rem actionem placuit, quae sententia et a nobis probanda est’.
33 D.15.1.30.4 (Ulpian. 29 ad Ed.): ‘Is, qui semel de peculio egit, rursus aucto peculio de 
residuo debiti agere potest’.
34 D.15.1.32pr – 1 (Ulpian. 2 Disp.): ‘Sed licet hoc iure contingat, tamen aequitas dictat iudi-
cium in eos dari, qui occasione iuris liberantur, ut magis eos perceptio quam intentio liberet: 
nam qui cum servo contrahit, universum peculium eius quod ubicumque est veluti patri-
monium intuetur. 1. In hoc autem iudicio licet restauretur praecedens, tamen et augmenti 
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on a possible, though hypothetical, increase of the peculium, no matter how 
insuffi cient it was at the time of judgment.35 In some – admittedly far-fetched 
– cases, the estimate must take place at a given moment, for instance when the 
principal becomes the heir of a creditor of the peculium36 or is kidnapped:37 
an estimate is made at the very moment when the principal’s status is altered. 
The same opportunity occurs when the slave dies during litigation on his 
peculium, or when the late principal’s estate includes a legacy of the peculium, 
either to the slave to be manumitted by will or to an outsider.38
Because any peculium is potentially volatile, depending on its components 
and its management, it is diffi cult for would-be contracting parties to foresee 
future developments in the value of the peculium.
7. DEDUCTIONS FROM THE PECULIUM
Title 15.1 of Justinian’s Digest displays several excerpts dealing with deduc-
tions from the peculium on behalf of the principal prior to its estimate. Aelius 
Tubero’s defi nition discussed above specifi es that the peculium does not 
include what the slave owes his master.39 Ulpian, who cites Tubero through 
Celsus, specifi es elsewhere that those deductions are based on the assump-
tion that the master was the fi rst creditor to sue on the peculium and that his 
claim is valid, thus forestalling all others. This principle goes back a long 
way, as Ulpian also cites Cicero’s contemporary, Servius Sulpicius Rufus, 
et decessionis rationem haberi oportet, et ideo sive hodie nihil sit in peculio sive accesserit 
aliquid, praesens status peculii spectandus est. Quare circa venditorem quoque et emptorem 
hoc nobis videtur verius, quod accessit peculio posse nos ab emptore consequi, nec retrorsus 
velut in uno iudicio ad id tempus conventionem reducere emptoris, quo venditor conventus 
sit’.
35 D.15.1.47.2 (Paul. 4 ad Plaut.): ‘Si semel actum sit de peculio, quamvis minus inveniatur rei 
iudicandae tempore in peculio quam debet, tamen cautionibus locum esse non placuit de 
futuro incremento peculii: hoc enim in pro socio actione locum habet, quia socius univer-
sum debet’.
36 D.15.1.50.1 (Papinian. 9 Quaest.): ‘Si creditor patrem, qui de peculio tenebatur, heredem 
instituerit, quia mortis tempus in Falcidiae ratione spectatur, illius temporis peculium 
considerabitur’.
37 D.15.1.55 (Nerat. 1 Resp.): ‘Is cum quo de peculio agebam a te vi exemptus est: quod tunc 
cum vi eximeres in peculio fuerit, spectari’.
38 D.15.1.57 (Tryphonin. 8 Disp.): ‘Si fi lius vel servus, cuius nomine dumtaxat de peculio 
actum est, ante fi nitum iudicium decesserit, id peculium respicietur, quod aliquis eorum 
cum moriebatur habuit. 1. Sed eum, qui servum testamento liberum esse iubet et ei peculium 
legat, eius temporis peculium legare intellegi Iulianus scribit, quo libertas competit: ideoque 
omnia incrementa peculii quoquo modo ante aditam hereditatem adquisita ad manumissum 
pertinere. 2. At si quis extraneo peculium servi legaverit, in coniectura voluntatis testatoris 
quaestionem esse, et verosimilius esse id legatum quod mortis tempore in peculio fuerit ita, 
ut quae ex rebus peculiaribus ante aditam hereditatem accesserint debeantur, veluti partus 
ancillarum et fetus pecudum, quae autem servo donata fuerint sive quid ex operis suis 
adquisierit, ad legatarium non pertinere’.
39 D.15.1.5.4 (Ulpian. 29 ad Ed.): ‘[. . .] deducto inde si quid domino debetur’.
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who includes all debts owed by the slaves not only to the master, but also 
to all dependants attached to his household (familia).40 This is not the place 
to inventory and discuss at length the many types of deductions retained by 
classical jurists. Let us note, however, that no less than fourteen passages, 
out of all fi fty-eight included in the title De peculio, deal with this issue.41 The 
ratio underlines the advantageous position enjoyed by the principal by com-
parison with all other creditors, who are left with the diffi cult task of fi guring 
out to what extent the peculium is burdened with internal debts, either when 
the contract is concluded or when litigation starts or ends.
8. ACTIO TRIBUTORIA
A comparison of the respective modalities of application and effects of the 
three remedies in solidum (actiones quod iussu, institoria and exercitoria) with 
those of the actio de peculio suggests that the set of three remedies aims at 
protecting third contracting parties while the latter is more advantageous to 
the principal while limiting his liability for his dependant’s transaction. Since 
the explicitly acknowledged purpose of all these remedies is to promote 
those economic activities carried out by dependants in order to maximise 
their principal’s profi t (quaestus), it is obvious that the actio de peculio is 
lacking in this respect because of its bias toward the latter. The Roman 
praetor obviously ended up noticing this shortcoming and came up with 
an analogous remedy, maintaining both the dependent’s autonomy in his 
economic activities and the principal’s limited liability for his dependant’s 
transaction, but cancelling, in specifi c conditions, the preferential treatment 
of the latter, now to be set on an equal footing with all other creditors with 
regard to the peculium, provided that he was aware of his dependant’s dealing 
with his peculium, or merx peculiaris, as surety.42 This additional remedy is the 
so-called actio tributoria, with which D.14.4 (a total of twelve excerpta, from 
Labeo to Ulpian) is concerned.43
Ulpian rightly underlines that this remedy is of signifi cant usefulness 
(‘edicti non minima utilitas’), because it stands halfway between the actiones 
40 D.15.1.9.2–3 (Ulpian. 29 ad Ed.): ‘Peculium autem deducto quod domino debetur com-
putandum esse, quia praevenisse dominus et cum servo suo egisse creditur. 3. Huic defi ni-
tioni Servius adiecit et si quid his debeatur qui sunt in eius potestate, quoniam hoc quoque 
domino deberi nemo ambigit. 4. Praeterea id etiam deducetur, quod his personis debetur, 
quae sunt in tutela vel cura domini vel patris vel quorum negotia administrant, dummodo 
dolo careant [. . .]’
41 D.15.1.9, 11, 13, 14, 15, 17, 19, 27, 30, 37, 38, 47, 52 et 56, based on a search for ‘deduc’.
42 D.14.4.1pr (Ulpian. 29 ad Ed.): ‘Huius quoque edicti non minima utilitas est, ut dominus, 
qui alioquin in servi contractibus privilegium habet (quippe cum de peculio dumtaxat tene-
atur, cuius peculii aestimatio deducto quod domino debetur fi t), tamen, si scierit servum 
peculiari merce negotiari, velut extraneus creditor ex hoc edicto in tributum vocatur’.
43 The standard study is now Chiusi (1993). Cf. also Chiusi (2007), pp. 94–112.
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in solidum and the actio de peculio, in that it increases all creditors’ (other than 
the principal) protection, as they are no longer topped by the principal with 
regard to distribution of the peculium in case of bankruptcy. Both required 
conditions are fairly easy to meet: the principal’s knowledge (scientia) is 
passive, and calls not for an explicit show of willingness (voluntas) typical of 
the actiones quod iussu, institoria, and exercitoria – through iussum or praepositio 
– but for acceptance (patientia) on his part of his dependant’s creativity and 
dynamism, possibly, but not necessarily, within the context of a business 
(negotiatio) to which the merx peculiaris may be attached.
The very concept of merx peculiaris is controversial. Whether it represents 
some kind of capital investment attached to the dependant or a fi ctitious 
patrimony akin to the peculium after deductions, it bestows on the actio 
tributoria its commercial relevance.44 Like the peculium, the merx peculiaris 
must be estimated. Consequently, all diffi culties described in connection 
with the practical application of the actio de peculio remain well alive with the 
actio tributoria. Worse, the third contracting party acting as plaintiff on the 
actio tributoria must prove the principal’s awareness (scientia) – less traceable 
than his willingness expressed through iussum or praepositio – and establish 
a connection between the merx peculiaris and the transaction at the origin of 
litigation. In addition, the asset to be distributed needs clarifi cation. Ulpian 
unambiguously states that only what belongs to the merx peculiaris – as 
opposed to the peculium as a whole – is taken into account (‘sed id dumtaxat 
quod ex ea merce est’).45 The same author acknowledges that the principal 
may be in doubt of what belongs to it.46 Gaius suggests in his commentary 
of the provincial edict that the difference may be substantial enough for a 
plaintiff to choose the actio de peculio over the actio tributoria, since the merx 
peculiaris may consist at times of a small part only of the whole peculium or 
since the deductions to which the principal would have been entitled in con-
nection with the actio de peculio happen to be insignifi cant.47 The plaintiff’s 
choice of one or the other remedy will in any case extinguish his claim.48
44 Földi (2001), pp. 65–90.
45 D.14.4.5.11 (Ulpian. 29 ad Ed.): ‘Non autem totum peculium venit in tributum, sed id 
dumtaxat, quod ex ea merce est, sive merces manent sive pretium earum receptum conver-
sumve est in peculium’.
46 D.14.4.7.2 (Ulpian. 2 ad Ed.): ‘Si tamen ignorans in merce servum habere minus tribuit, non 
videtur dolo minus tribuisse, sed re comperta si non tribuat, dolo nunc non caret’.
47 D.14.4.11 (Gaius 9 ad Ed. Prov.): ‘aliquando etiam agentibus expedit potius de peculio agere 
quam tributoria: nam in hac actione de qua loquimur hoc solum in divisionem venit, quod 
in mercibus est quibus negotiatur quodque eo nomine receptum est: at in actione de peculio 
totius peculii quantitas spectatur, in quo et merces continentur. Et fi eri potest, ut dimidia 
forte parte peculii aut tertia vel etiam minore negotietur: fi eri praeterea potest, ut patri 
 dominove nihil debeat’.
48 D.14.4.9.1 (Ulpian. 29 ad Ed.): ‘Eligere quis debet, qua actione experiatur, utrum de peculio 
an tributoria, cum scit sibi regressum ad aliam non futurum’.
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9. ACTIO DE IN REM VERSO
For the sake of comprehensiveness, we should at this point have a look 
at the last remedy (actio de in rem verso)49 and examine how the principal’s 
enrichment (versum) as a result of his dependant’s activity shows in his 
own accounts (rationes dominicae), namely in his codex accepti et expensi50. 
However, this would bring us outside the context of the peculium.
There is undoubtedly a connection between the principal’s main account 
and his slaves’ sub-accounts (including peculia of vicarii). The jurists are 
mute about it, and there is no documentary evidence in spite of the wealth 
of surviving accounts in papyri and wooden tablets. We may assume that 
such documents did exist, and will be identifi ed as such in a nearby future.51 
The production, use and conservation of such documents require a rather 
high level of literacy and numeracy, and specifi c skills in fi nancial administra-
tion and business management. Whether such competencies are likely to be 
found among those slaves, aliens and have-nots who were involved in crafts 
and trade is debatable.52
10. CONCLUSION
What are the consequences of these observations? Those remedies calling for 
a limited liability on the part of the principal for his dependant’s transactions 
are diffi cult, if not impossible, to apply without a sophisticated system of 
book-keeping and accounting to be used at both levels on a day-to-day basis. 
Provided that accounts were indeed kept on either side – nothing suggests 
that it was a legal obligation – there is no guarantee that traders knew how to 
consult them.
People who were dealing with slaves in business were vulnerable at best. 
The situation alluded to by Hyperides in his speech Against Athenogenes, 
written in Athens between 330 and 324 BCE, must have been standard in the 
classical world. Short of being able to consult the accounts of the perfume 
shop managed by Midas, Epikrates, blinded by his love, was sold a bunch of 
slaves and a business crippled with debts. It took only a few weeks for the 
new owner to measure, from the inside, the extent of his disastrous purchase.
49 The standard work is Chiusi (2001).
50 D.15.3.3.5 (Ulpian. 29 ad Ed.): ‘Idem Labeo ait, si servus mutuatus nummos a me alii eos cre-
diderit, de in rem verso dominum teneri, quod nomen ei adquisitum est: quam sententiam 
Pomponius ita probat, si non peculiare nomen fecit, sed quasi dominicae rationis. Ex qua 
causa hactenus erit dominus obligatus, ut, si non putat sibi expedire nomen debitoris habere, 
cedat creditori actionibus procuratoremque eum faciat’. 
51 Cf. Bresson and Aubert, in a forthcoming chapter on accounting in the Oxford Handbook of 
Economies in the Classical World (2012). The standard book on Roman accounting is Minaud 
(2005).
52 Cf. Aubert (2004), pp. 127–47.
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In the Roman world, praetorian law, explained and enlarged by abun-
dant juristic opinions, allowed economic actors, including slaves and other 
dependants, to minimise the risks attached to contractual transactions by 
granting them legal remedies easy to use because they are resting on a simple 
question, to be answered by yes or no. These remedies called for total liabil-
ity on the part of the principal if his willingness to let his dependant enter 
into contracts with third parties could be established. The practical useful-
ness and commercial feature of the actiones institoria and exercitoria, accesso-
rily of the actio tributoria conceived as a lesser evil, may explain the label of 
superiores actiones adopted by Gaius,53 and underlines the lesser importance 
of those remedies included in triplex hoc edictum: possibly marginal in prac-
tice, the actiones de peculio, de in rem verso, or quod iussu retained all along 
their major legal interest.54
The very existence of legal remedies such as the actiones adiecticiae qualita-
tis does not imply that business people resorted to them on an equal, or even 
regular, basis. Like so many other legal institutions of praetorian law, the 
actiones adiecticiae qualitatis are products of the Republican period. Among 
them, the actio de peculio and, to a lesser extent, the actiones tributoria and 
quod iussu seem better adapted to a situation of relative proximity among 
economic actors, in the context of local or regional trade. On the other 
hand, the actiones institoria and, a fortiori, exercitoria are suited for a wider 
 commercial space, on an interprovincial, Mediterranean or even global scale.
The impracticality of the actio de peculio for reasons stated above and the 
trend toward simplifi cation, however tentative, started by the –  necessarily 
– later creation of the actio tributoria may have led to the development of 
the commercial features of the actiones adiecticiae qualitatis, thus bolstering 
the case for the posteriority of the actiones institoria and exercitoria, a com-
munis opinio which I have been trying to disrupt for many years.55 However, 
both Gaius and Ulpian unambiguously speak against it.
The main commercial feature of the actiones tributoria, institoria and exer-
citoria (the so-called actiones superiores) lies in the reduction and cancellation 
of the privileges of the dominus/paterfamilias, who eventually stands on an 
equal footing with other creditors of the peculium and must accept liability 
in tributum or in solidum for the debts contracted by his dependants/agents. 
To echo another Paul, the apostle and author of the Epistle to the Galatians 
53 D.14.5.1 (Gaius 9 ad Ed. Prov.): ‘Omnia proconsul agit, ut qui contraxit cum eo, qui in aliena 
potestate sit, etiamsi defi cient superiores actiones, id est exercitoria institoria tributoriave, 
nihilo minus tamen in quantum ex bono et aequo res patitur suum consequatur. Sive enim 
iussu eius, cuius in potestate sit, negotium gestum fuerit, in solidum eo nomine iudicium 
pollicetur: sive non iussu, sed tamen in rem eius versum fuerit, eatenus introducit actionem, 
quatenus in rem eius versum fuerit: sive neutrum eorum sit, de peculio actionem constituit’.
54 D.15.1.1.1 (Ulpian. 29 ad Ed.): ‘Est autem triplex hoc edictum: aut enim de peculio aut de in 
rem verso aut quod iussu hinc oritur actio’.
55 Best represented lately by De Ligt (1999), pp. 205–26.
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(3:28), it could be said that a ‘world’ economy cannot afford to make a 
distinction between freeborn and slaves, citizens and foreigners, men and 
women, adults and minors, Latin and non-Latin speakers.56 The actiones 
institoria and exercitoria celebrate the priority of businesses over individuals.
Lastly, let us stress that the picture we get about the history of the actiones 
adiecticiae qualitatis, from their creation in the mid or late Republic through 
the classical period until the time of the compilers, is based less on the 
reconstruction of the praetorian edict than on the classical jurists’ opinions, 
mostly in the second and third centuries CE. The chronological distance 
between the time of their conception and that of the legal controversies sur-
rounding them up to half a millennium later refl ects the perennial adequacy 
of the solutions offered by the Republican praetors to no less perennial 
problems raised by the organisation of trade. Obviously, both were still 
relevant enough in the sixth century to fi nd their way into Justinian’s Digest.
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Ancient Romans, like their modern counterparts, considered several factors 
when buying property. Amenities, productivity and, of course, location 
affected the decision.1 Cato urged potential buyers to visit the land more 
than once, inspecting it carefully, to determine whether its cultivation would 
repay the investment (On Agriculture, 1). Charm also mattered. Cicero, for 
example, exclaimed more over the elegant porticos than the meadows on 
Quintus’ recently purchased estate (Q. Fr. 3.1.3).2 Both agricultural produc-
tivity and enjoyment of amenities, however, depended on the property’s 
having appropriate equipment or accessories. How could the landowner 
enjoy a garden fountain if there were no pipes bringing water?3 Domestic 
tasks as well as farm work depended on a water supply. In general, produc-
tivity depended on equipment and materials and was increased when they 
were included with the property, eliminating the cost of procuring them. 
Pipes and plumbing were a key feature and could be costly to install. 4
Although Roman landowners had good reason to pay close attention 
to movable property or accessories connected with real estate, they may 
not always have done so; indeed there is some truth to the stereotype of 
1 Rawson (1976), p. 85, and on rural land, de Neeve (1985). 
2 To paraphrase Varro, no one pays more for unattractive land than for a charming estate with 
the same productivity (On Agriculture, 1.4.2; cf. Pliny, H.N. 14.51, 17.3–6).
3 See, for example, Pliny’s loving descriptions of fountains at his villa, Ep. 5.6.23, 36–37, 40, 
and more generally on the importance of water supply for the villa, Ep. 2.17.25–26. Compare 
also Seneca, Ep. 86.4–13 where baths are the focus of Seneca’s refl ections on the luxurious 
renovations to Scipio’s villa by its new owner.
4 Though materials for pipes (i.e., lead) might be inexpensive, construction was neither cheap 
nor easy: Hodge (1991), pp. 156–7. Cost varied depending on the type and extent of the work: 
for examples, though none with pipes specifi cally, see Duncan Jones (1982), pp. 160–1, for 
example no. 469 (HS 380,000, total rebuilding), no. 474 (HS 50,000, gilding the roof, marble 
pavement, new cement), no. 476 (HS 20,000 pavement); and for other repairs to baths, see 
nos 468, 469a, 470, 478, 479, 480. Cicero, Q. Fr., 3.1.3 describes a contract for building an 
aqueduct with a price per foot of three sesterces. For the slow pace of  construction work, see 
Martin (1989), p. 57.
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the absentee landlord.5 The jurist Celsus worked on similar assumptions, 
writing about the sale of land from the eighth book of his Digest. Celsus 
reported an earlier opinion by the jurist Proculus in which he replied to a 
question from a certain Firmus about underground pipes on a property.6 
Though Firmus cannot be identifi ed with certainty, the specifi city of the 
question suggests a real situation, rather than a hypothetical case.7 Celsus at 
any rate approached the problem with the realities of the real estate market 
in mind:
Firmus a Proculo quaesiit, si de plumbeo castello fi stulae sub terram missae 
aquam ducerent in aenum lateribus circumstructum, an hae aedium essent, ut 
vincta fi xaque, an ut ruta caesa, quae aedium non essent. ille rescripsit referre, 
quid acti esset. quid ergo si nihil de ea re neque emptor neque venditor cogi-
taverunt, ut plerumque in eiusmodi rebus evenisse solet, nonne propius est, ut 
inserta et inclusa aedifi cio partem eius esse existimemus? (D.19.1.38.2 (Cels. 8 
Dig.))8
Firmus inquired of Proculus whether pipes, leading underground from a lead 
cistern and bringing water into a basin built in around the sides, belonged to the 
buildings (aedium), like things bound and fi xed, or whether they were like things 
dug [or] cut (ruta caesa) that did not belong to the buildings. He wrote back that it 
depended on what was agreed. But really then, if neither the buyer nor the seller 
5 De Neeve (1985), p. 91; Kehoe (1997), pp. 17–18, 146.
6 Celsus’ Digest was his own collection of comments, letters and questions; on the nature of 
Celsus’ Digest, see Hausmaninger (1991), p. 384; Scarano-Ussani (1989), pp. 90–1. The older 
part of the case, Firmus’ question and Proculus’ reply, may have been included in Proculus’ 
letters, though its original source is not known; see Stella Maranca (1915), p. 59 fn. 17.
7 Firmus may have been one of the parties to the sale, or a magistrate or iudex involved in 
resolving the dispute. It is tempting to connect him with M. Obellius Firmus who was both 
aedile and duovir at Pompeii before 54 CE: see Jongman (1978–9), pp. 63–4. An A. Vettius 
Firmus also stood for the aedileship in Pompeii: see Franklin (1979), p. 406. It would make 
sense if Firmus was a Pompeian magistrate with jurisdiction over civil law. The plumbing 
arrangements are also consistent with archaeological evidence from Pompeii (see below).
8 The Latin text of Firmus’ question here differs from Mommsen’s edition. Mommsen prints: 
‘an hae aedium essent, an ut ruta caesa vincta fi xaque quae aedium non essent’. The text 
above adopts corrections printed in two early editions that I have not been able to inspect: 
Gebauer and Spangeberg (1776), cited by Marrone, 1971, p. 216 fn. 10, and Gregorium 
Haloandrum Meltzer (1529), cited by Stella Maranca (1915), p. 59 fn. 20. Mommsen’s text 
is confusing because the second pair of participles (vincta fi xaque) illustrates the fi rst alterna-
tive (an hae aedium essent), while the fi rst pair of participles (ruta caesa) illustrates the second 
alternative (quae aedium non essent). In these early editions, the order of the pairs is reversed 
and an ‘ut’ is added to restore a parallel, chiastic arrangement of the alternatives and the 
illustrative phrases. In addition, Celsus’ comment, the last part of the case from ‘quid ergo 
si nihil . . .’ to the end of the case was labelled an interpolation by Riccobono (1922), p. 286 
fn. 2, and Levy and Rabel (1929–35), I, p. 351. It is now accepted as genuine by Marrone 
(1971), p. 216 fn. 10, and Hausmaninger (1991), pp. 59–60. The tone and style match Celsus’ 
in other fragments, especially where he rejects Proculus’ opinions: see Hausmaninger (1991), 
pp. 59–61; see also Hausmaninger (1976), pp. 394–5; Scarano-Ussani (1989), pp. 96–8.
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thought about his matter, as is often accustomed to happen in dealings of this sort, 
it is more appropriate that we consider things inserted and built into a building to 
be part of it (partem eius), isn’t it? 
Firmus asked whether the pipes should be treated as part of the property 
and thus belong to the buyer, or whether they should be classifi ed as ruta 
caesa, an old term for property that belonged to the seller after the sale. 
According to Proculus, the problem should be resolved on the basis of 
contracts between the parties (quid acti est) which, he assumes, specifi ed how 
the pipes were to be treated. This is all well and good if the parties have paid 
attention to underground plumbing and added appropriate agreements to 
their sale contract. But, Celsus remarks, underground pipes should belong 
to the buyer because they are built into the structure for, after all, buyers and 
sellers often disregarded such details, ut plerumque in eiusmodi rebus evenisse 
solet, nonne propius est.
Despite the apparent ease of Celsus’ conclusion, there was no overall rule 
about accessories in the law of sale.9 In the early form of sale by mancipatio, 
real property was sold with everything that was connected with it, though 
there was no specifi c treatment of accessories.10 The buyer could expect 
vacant possession and continued enjoyment of the property, but otherwise 
only limited protection. In general, buyers were expected to look out for 
their own interests, quite literally, as the assumption was that the buyer 
could see any defects or problems before he agreed to the sale.11 But even 
a buyer who followed Cato’s advice might make a mistake with unhappy 
consequences. Starting in the late Republic, protections of the buyer were 
expanded with the development of consensual sale (emptio venditio) under 
the infl uence of the Curule Aediles’ edict, which regulated market sales.12 
From the beginning, the seller was liable for outright fraud, deliberate 
misrepresentation of the sale property, if not for real estate hype.13 Over 
time, the jurists expanded liability, though at the time when Celsus gave 
9 Meincke (1971), pp. 175–7. The problem is recognised but not explored by Crook (1976), 
p. 77; and briefl y mentioned in Watson (1965), pp. 91–2. There are two common law terms 
for such things, as defi ned in Black’s Law Dictionary (2009) and Ballentine’s Law Dictionary 
(2010). Appurtenances, the older and broader term, refers to corporeal or incorporeal things 
that belong to the land. Fixtures are attached to land or building and are generally regarded as 
immovable. Because the Roman categories do not align with those in modern common law, 
I will use ‘accessories’ to refer generally to things that go with property and the Roman legal 
terms ruta caesa and ‘part of the property’ (aedium or pars aedium) as the jurists do in order 
to investigate the development and application of their ideas.
10 Marrone (1971), p. 221.
11 Caveat emptor was the rule, though the Romans did not use the phrase: see Zimmermann 
(1990), p. 307, cf. pp. 606–7 on mancipatio, warranty for title was a separate matter: see 
Zimmermann (1990), pp. 278–96.
12 Zimmermann (1990), pp. 311–19, cf. Jakab (1997), pp. 131–5.
13 D.21.1.19pr (Ulpian. 1 ad Ed. Cur. Aed.), D.18.1.43pr (Florian. 8 Inst.), with Zimmermann 
(1990), pp. 241–3, 308–9; Watson (1965), p. 89, on Cic. Off. 3.55.
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his opinion in D.19.1.38.2, protection of the buyer was ‘still somewhat 
patchy’.14
The buyer’s interest in accessories was addressed in Roman law in the 
same way as latent defects, that is, defi ciencies that were not apparent before 
the sale. Typically, contracts were used as express warranties to extend the 
seller’s liability for latent defects and they were also used to assign acces-
sories to one party or the other.15 In D.19.1.38.2, Proculus assumes that 
the parties have done so when he writes that they should settle the question 
on the basis of what they agreed. He may have in mind one of the standard 
contract clauses that sellers used to reserve ruta caesa after the sale, or an 
individual agreement refl ecting the specifi c circumstances of this case.16 Even 
without a specifi c contract, the seller could in some cases be liable, and this 
is the underlying issue in D.19.1.38.2. If the pipes are classifi ed as ruta caesa, 
they belong to the seller after the sale, and he is liable to deliver them to 
the buyer only if there is a contract to this effect. Alternatively, if the pipes 
are part of the property, the buyer acquires them through purchase and the 
seller is liable for their delivery without a contract. Of course, the parties 
would need to know whether the pipes were ruta caesa or part of the prop-
erty in order to frame an effective contract. It could, however, be diffi cult 
for buyers and sellers to know which items belonged in each category. Jurists 
disagreed about the defi nition of ruta caesa, and laymen might be confused; 
it was just the kind of legal language an orator could manipulate to his advan-
tage, according to Cicero (Part. Or. 107).17 The category ‘part of the property’ 
was not much easier to apply, as refl ected in the jurists’ discussions of the 
topic.18 Both categories were defi ned in terms of physical attachment, but 
this criterion was less clear-cut than it might at fi rst appear. The question 
in D.19.1.38.2 refl ects uncertainty about these categories, specifi cally their 
14 Zimmermann (1990), p. 319, cf. 319–21: when Celsus commented on D.19.1.38.2 around 
100 CE, the seller of land was liable only for outright fraud or overstating the acreage, and 
the buyer’s interests could be protected only by express warranties, as Proculus’ opinion 
assumes.
15 Zimmermann (1990), p. 309; Kaser (1971), I, pp. 557–8
16 The standard clause reserving ruta caesa was probably used fi rst in connection with manci-
patio; see Marrone (1971), p. 215 fn. 9, and Olde Kalter (1963), pp. 24–5 (thank you to M. 
Kramer-Hajos for translating the Dutch). This clause may have been used less frequently 
with emptio venditio because this form of consensual sale typically included contracts adapted 
to the specifi cs of individual transactions: see Marrone (1971), p. 222, cf. pp. 218–20. 
17 Ruta caesa relates only to sale, and it occurs in two forms with no difference in meaning, 
according to Marrone (1971), p. 213. Ruta caesa in D.19.1.38.2; and also in Var., L.L. 
9.104; Cic. Part. Or. 107; Cic. Top. 100; Fest. p. 320 L; D.50.16.241 (Quint. Muc. 1 ὅρων); 
D.18.1.66.2 (Pompon. 31 ad Quint. Muc.); D.10.4.5.2 (Ulp. 24 ad Ed.). Ruta et caesa in Cic., 
de Or. 2.226; D.19.1.18 (Iavolen. 7 ex Cass.); D.19.1.17.6 (Ulpian. 32 ad Ed.). Cicero’s use of 
the term also assumes the economic value of accessories so designated: see Top. 100 and de 
Or. 2.226.
18 The category ‘part of the property’ operates in various legal contexts, for example, sale, 
inheritance: see, generally, Meincke (1971). 
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application to underground pipes. The situation illustrates the incomplete 
correspondence between legal knowledge and commercial practice as well 
as the jurists’ attempts to address the problem. Celsus’ opinion and, even 
more, his rationale, recognised the problem and attempted to solve it.
This chapter traces the legal discussion of ruta caesa and part of the 
property in cases about sale, in order to contextualise Celsus’ opinion in 
D.19.1.38.2. Investigating these categories offers insight into the way the 
jurists changed law, both by responding to social need and by working within 
existing legal frameworks to systematise their approach to accessories.19 The 
analysis sheds light on the social adequacy of these legal responses: specifi -
cally, to what extent did they facilitate the use of law that supported the eco-
nomic interests of buyers and sellers? The jurists’ discussion of accessories 
is part of an overall response in the law of sale to the increasing complexity 
of economic transactions.20 In D.19.1.38.2, Celsus recognised that contracts 
gave insuffi cient protection because buyers and sellers often did not even 
think to use them. While his opinion may at fi rst seem extreme, perhaps 
because of its rhetorical fl ourish, it represents, in fact, an emerging consen-
sus about the treatment of pipes that is ultimately integrated into Ulpian’s 
rules about accessories.21 As the jurists addressed the realities of the real 
estate market, the legal categories became less analytically consistent, and 
yet, paradoxically, they provided more clarity and certainty to buyers and 
sellers as they contemplated the accessories to property.
2. RUTA CAESA (SELLER’S PROPERTY)
The category of ruta caesa was used in sale by mancipatio to designate accesso-
ries that belonged to the seller after the sale.22 The jurists explained ruta caesa 
in terms of physical attachment, and this criterion appears in two defi nitions 
of the term ascribed to the early jurist Q. Mucius (cos. 105 BCE). First, in his 
book of defi nitions:
in, rutis caesis, ea sunt, quae terra non tenentur quaeque opere structili tectoriove 
non continentur. (D.50.16.241 (Quint. Muc. 1 ὅρων)) 
Among things dug and cut are those which are not held in position by the earth 
and those which are not secured by concrete or plaster work. 
19 Typically, new legal rules are modelled on existing institutions, while the impetus for change 
comes from outside the legal system itself: Frier (1986), pp. 888–9. For the primacy of legal 
tradition, see Watson (2007), p. 9, and on contracts, pp. 31–5.
20 Zimmermann (1990), p. 604: ‘gradual development from a strictly objective, declaration 
oriented approach towards a more fl exible and individualistic one’.
21 Protection of the buyer was developed by Celsus’ near contemporaries, Julian and Pomponius 
during the reigns of Hadrian, Antoninus Pius, and Marcus Aurelius: Zimmermann (1990), 
pp. 320–1; von Lübtow (1955) pp. 493–4.
22 See references above at n. 16.
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Mucius gives a similar defi nition in what was probably a response to a 
 question from a litigant or magistrate:
Quintus Mucius scribit, qui scribsit ‘ruta caesa quaeque aedium fundive non 
sunt,’ bis idem scriptum: nam ruta caesa ea sunt quae neque aedium neque fundi 
sunt D.18.1.66.2 (Pompon. 31 ad Quint. Muc.) .
Quintus Mucius writes, the one who wrote ‘ruta caesa quaeque aedium fundive non 
sunt,’ wrote the same thing twice: for things dug or cut are those which belong 
neither to the buildings nor to an estate. 
In this passage, there are two layers of reporting, Pomponius quotes Mucius’ 
interpretation of a sentence from another source (qui scribsit . . .)23 Mucius’ 
opinion that the same thing was written twice (bis scriptum) endorses the defi -
nition of ruta caesa as quae aedium fundive non sunt that may have appeared 
in a sale contract or legal opinion. In both passages, Mucius defi nes ruta 
caesa by what they are not, namely, not attached to or not part of land or 
buildings. The fi rst defi nition specifi es the type of attachment that limited 
the category of ruta caesa: accessories that were attached to the land itself 
(quae terra continentur) or joined to the building by cement or plaster were 
excluded from ruta caesa, (opere structili tectoriove). His defi nitions depend on 
what could be observed in an inspection of the property, and they thus fi t 
the early legal approaches to the buyer’s responsibility, even though there is 
no mention of sale.
The term ruta caesa is connected with sale by the late Republican jurist 
Aquilius Gallus in a case that, like D.19.1.38.2, also involves agreements 
added to the sale contract. Though Aquilius’ opinion survives only in frag-
ments (reported at third hand, fi rst by Mela and then Ulpian), the outlines of 
the situation can be reconstructed. The case begins with Ulpian’s defi nition 
of ruta caesa which is illustrated by Aquilius’ opinion about a sale of land.24 
Before the sale, the seller used an additional agreement (in lege venditionis) to 
reserve for himself some accessories to the property, possibly earth materials 
or lumber, the examples in the defi nition of ruta caesa:
Si ruta et caesa excipiantur in venditione, ea placuit esse ruta, quae eruta sunt, 
ut harena creta et similia: caesa ea esse, ut arbores caesas et carbones et his 
similia. Gallus autem Aquilius, cuius Mela refert opinionem, recte ait frustra in 
lege venditionis de rutis et caesis contineri, quia, si non specialiter venierunt, ad 
exhibendum de his agi potest neque enim magis de materia caesa aut de caemen-
tis aut de harena cavendum est venditori quam de ceteris quae sunt pretiosiora. 
(D.19.1.17.6 (Ulpian. 32 ad Ed.))
23 The repetition of scribit has been taken as a sign of interpolation, but it is better taken as 
part of Mucius’ discussion, see Marrone (1971), p. 215 n. 9. On the authenticity of Mucius’ 
opinion in D.50.16.241, see Marrone (1971), p. 214 fn. 8.
24 Lenel (1889), I, p. 55.
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If ruta and caesa are reserved in a sale, it is understood that ruta are those things 
which are dug out, such as sand, clay, and the like; caesa are those things, such 
as cut trees and charcoal and things similar to these. But Aquilius Gallus, whose 
opinion Mela reports, rightly said that it was useless for a clause about ruta and 
caesa to be included in a sale [contract] because, if these things are not sold indi-
vidually, it is possible to bring a claim for them with the an actio ad exhibendum, 
for the seller need not give a promise about cut materials, either gravel or sand, 
any more than about other things that are more valuable. 
After the sale, the seller apparently wanted to compel the buyer to deliver 
the accessories, making a claim on the agreement reserving property. 
Aquilius determined that this was not possible because the contract was 
invalid, frustra in lege venditione de rutis et caesis contineri. There could be no 
contract for the buyer to deliver ruta caesa because by defi nition they already 
belonged to the seller. This point is made indirectly by Aquilius when he 
explains that the seller can use the actio ad exhibendum to claim them, ad 
exhibendum de his agi potest.25
Aquilius’ opinion contextualises the problem in D.19.1.38.2. In Aquilius’ 
case, the seller added a contract to the sale agreement, just as Proculus 
expects in D.19.1.38.2. The seller’s contract is, however, of no use because it 
specifi ed accessories that fell into the category of ruta caesa. In D.19.1.38.2, if 
the seller had made a contract about underground pipes and was trying to use 
it to claim them, he would need to know whether or not the pipes counted 
as ruta caesa, and this is just what Firmus asked. Proculus, as reported, disre-
gards this category; his emphasis on contracts may seek to change the prac-
tices described by Aquilius, who explains that sellers rarely make contracts 
about stone and sand or even about more valuable things, potest neque enim 
magis de materia caesa aut de caementis aut de harena cavendum est venditori 
quam de ceteris quae sunt pretiosiora. The examples – both Ulpian’s (timber, 
charcoal) and Aquilius’ (gravel, sand) – are all natural materials that are clas-
sifi ed as ruta caesa or not, based on their connection to the land, one of the 
criteria in Mucius’ defi nition (quae terra continentur). Because of the nature 
of these examples, it appears that connection to the land was interpreted 
to mean natural materials and not manmade structures that were attached 
to the land.26 For this reason, the classifi cation of underground pipes could 
seem ambiguous to buyers and sellers who were unfamiliar with the legal dis-
tinctions. Their location under the ground might seem to exclude them from 
25 Marrone (1971), p. 217; cf. Watson (1965), p. 95. Vindicatio was the standard mechanism for 
establishing ownership and the actio ad exhibendum was a special type of vindicatio used for 
movable property: see D.10.4.5.2 with Kaser (1971), I, p. 434, and Lemosse (1983), pp. 68–9.
26 Cassius takes a similar approach to reeds and willows in the legacy of a farm with equipment 
(fundus cum instrumento): they were part of the property before they were cut, but once cut 
they were instrumenta, D.33.7.12.11 (Ulpian. 20 ad Sab.), with Meincke (1971), pp. 137–8. 
Similarly Inst.Gai.2.73–75, with Maddalena (1971) p. 179.
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ruta caesa. Yet, because they were not natural materials, they would have to 
be ruta caesa unless they were connected by masonry or plaster. Such uncer-
tainty may have motivated Firmus’ question in D.19.1.38.2, though it is hard 
to know exactly what type of installation was involved or how the jurists 
understood it. Archaeological sources for pipes and plumbing installation, 
especially in the houses from Pompeii, offer some guidance about how legal 
categories might have been applied in this case.
3. FOUNTAINS AND UNDERGROUND PIPES
When water was delivered to a Roman house from a public supply in Italy, 
typically it arrived through underground lead pipes that were connected to 
a lead distribution box near the door. From there, lead pipes carried the 
water to other parts of the house, usually to the impluvium and fountains in 
the peristyle, where there might be a second distribution box.27 The castel-
lum plumbeum in D.19.1.38.2 could fi t into this arrangement in several ways. 
It could, for example, represent part of the municipal water distribution 
system, one of the neighbourhood reservoirs used in Pompeii to regulate 
pressure.28 Alternatively the lead basin could be a distribution box or a 
cistern on the property, possibly fed by roof run-off like the ones commonly 
found in Pompeian gardens.29 The bronze basin is likely to have been part 
of fountain or impluvium, a common feature of Roman houses, or possibly 
a tank for a bath. Pliny, Letters, 5.6.40, describes a courtyard with foun-
tains running underground and emerging here and there to charming effect 
(Letters, 5.6.40),30 whilst in a rural setting, the lead cistern could be a catch 
basin for a developed spring that supplied the house.31
27 Jansen (2000), pp. 115–19 for the typical arrangements, based on Ostia and Pompeii.
28 On neighbourhood reservoirs, see Hodge (1991), pp. 300–1; Bruun (1991), p. 125. According 
to Capogrossi Colognesi (1966), p. 37 fn. 61 and p. 43 fn. 77, the castellum in this case was in 
an urban settting, but may have been public or private; in either case, the pipes were owned 
by the landowner because they were located on the property.
29 For a castellum as reservoir: D 8.2.19pr (Paul. 6 ad Sab.); D.8.4.2 (Ulpian. 17 ad Ed.); 
D.18.1.78pr (Lab. 4 Post. a Iavolen. Epit.); D.19.1.7.8 (Ulpian. 32 ad Ed.); D.30.41.10 
(Ulpian. 21 ad Sab.); D.43.20.1.38–41 (Ulpian. 70 ad Ed.). Garden cisterns with lead pipes 
(fi stulae) are described by Vitr. 6.3.2, but it is all ceramic dolia at Pompeii, in Jashemski 
(1996), pp. 51–2, 54, 56. For lead tanks inside houses, see Hodge (1991), p. 301.
30 See Glaser (2000), pp. 432–6, for a description of domestic fountains with open basins, 
sometimes made of stone, for example Plin. Ep. 5.6.36–37. Jansen (2000), p. 111, thinks the 
evidence for fountains in houses under-represents their actual occurrence. For aenea for 
bronze tanks in a bath: Vitr. 5.10.1. More commonly in both literary sources and the Digest, 
aeneum (also spelled aenum and ahenum) refers to a portable cooking kettle; see, for example, 
Cato, On Agriculture, 13, 79; Varro, On Agriculture, 1.22; D.19.2.19.2 (Ulpian. 32 ad Ed.); 
D. 33.7.18.3 (Paul. 2 ad Vitel.). Built-in bath tubs are masonry, portable ones bronze, in de 
Haan (1996), pp. 59–61.
31 Bronze or lead basins for developing a spring: Vitr., 8.1.4, with Hodge (1991), p. 27 (exam-
ples from the Greek world, no metal reservoirs); Oleson (2000), p. 259 (spring house at Cosa 
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While the archaeological evidence helps to reconstruct the confi guration 
of the plumbing in D.19.1.38.2, it is not dispositive. The material that the 
pipes were made of – ceramic or lead –was key to applying Mucius’ defi ni-
tion of ruta caesa because it determined how they would be attached to the 
basin and its surrounding masonry. Either ceramic or lead pipes could have 
been used in all three possible confi gurations. If the pipes were ceramic, 
they would not be ruta caesa but part of the property, because this kind of 
pipe was usually attached by masonry.32 But the use of the term fi stula prob-
ably indicates that the pipes were made of lead and joined to the basin by 
soldering not masonry.33 According to Mucius’ defi nition, then, the pipes 
in D.19.1.38.2 were ruta caesa, and if the buyer wanted to buy them with the 
property, he would need to use a contract, as Proculus expected. The pos-
sibility that pipes could be excluded from the purchase of property seems 
counter-intuitive, considering that lead pipes were the usual technology, and 
also considering the desirability of running water. This mismatch between 
legal categories and social practices could have led to Firmus’ question in 
D.19.1.38.2 and may also have motivated the continued legal discussion of 
ruta caesa and its application to different situations at the time when Celsus 
considered underground pipes.
4. IAVOLENUS ON UNDERGROUND PIPES
In two legal cases, Celsus’ contemporary Iavolenus discusses building mate-
rials or accessories that are comparable to underground pipes. Though the 
term ruta caesa occurs in only one of these cases, both are important for 
reconstructing the debate that Celsus answered in D.19.1.38. The fi rst case 
posed a question about pipes and a reservoir, castellum, to which the pipes 
were attached: should the castellum be included with the pipes even though it 
was not mentioned in the contract (licet scriptura non continetur? D.18.1.78pr 
(Iavolen. 4 Post. a Labeo. Epit.)).34 The answer was ‘yes’, because the res-
ervoir was attached to the pipes. The use of a contract to specify the pipes 
is consistent with Proculus’ view in D.19.1.38.2, and assumes that pipes 
with a masonry cistern); Glaser (2000), pp. 416–31 (more Greek examples). Stone cisterns 
may be preserved in greater numbers because metal ones were melted down for re-use.
32 Vitr. 8.6.8 on joining ceramic pipes with quick lime, and 8.6.14 on construction of masonry 
reservoirs, with Hodge (1991), pp. 114–15.
33 Vitr. 8.6.1 with Hodge (1991), p. 420 fn. 47, and Bruun (1991), pp. 124–7. For lead pipes 
joined by soldering: Hodge (1991), pp. 156, 314–15, 466 fn. 15; and Jansen (2000), p. 119.
34 D.18.1.78pr (Lab. 4 Iavolen. Epit.): ‘fi stulas emptori accessuras in lege dictum erat: quaere-
batur, an castellum, ex quo fi stulis aqua duceretur, accederet. respondi apparere id actum 
esse, ut id quoque accederet, licet scriptura non continetur’. (It was stated in a contract that 
pipes belonged to the buyer: it was asked whether the buyer also got the reservoir, from 
which water was conducted by pipes. I answered that it seems to have been agreed that it also 
belonged [to the buyer] even though it was not included in the written document.) This is 
Iavolenus’ opinion not Labeo’s, according to Lenel (1889), I, p. 299 n. 4.
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were ruta caesa. But once the pipes are included with the property, anything 
attached to them is also included, viz. the castellum. Pipes may have been 
a special case when they were connected with a servitude for channelling 
water because they were necessary for exercising the right.35 Iavolenus folds 
functionality into the criterion of attachment to extend the meaning of the 
contract in a way that makes it possible for the landowner to use the water 
supply on the property.36
In the second case, Iavolenus contemplates two examples, grain bins 
and roof tiles, that each suggest a partial analogy with pipes. Grain bins 
were classifi ed as ruta caesa when they stood on the ground, but if they 
had underground foundations they should be included with the prop-
erty (D.19.1.18pr (Iavolen. 7 ex Cass.)). Iavolenus’ approach here recalls 
Aquilius’ opinion about earth materials, which excluded from ruta caesa 
things connected with the land itself. Because Iavolenus explicitly applies 
the rule to buildings, his opinion provides a clear analogy for the pipes 
in D.19.1.38.2. Iavolenus would include them with the property.37 His 
opinion on roof tiles complicates the picture because it essentially rejects 
the criterion of physical attachment. The case concerns roof tiles that are 
not installed on the roof but are piled up elsewhere on the property. If 
they had been removed and will be re-installed, they are ‘part of the prop-
erty’, but if they were delivered and not yet installed, they are ruta caesa, 
though this term is not used (D.19.1.18.1 (Iavolen. 7 ex Cass.)). Iavolenus’ 
discussion of roof tiles suggests an alternative rationale for excluding pipes 
from ruta caesa, namely, that they are permanent and functional parts of 
the property, an idea that was already in discussion in cases involving 
pipes and servitudes.38 The criterion of permanence does not originate 
with Iavolenus, as we will see shortly, in the  discussion of ‘part of the 
property’.
For the present discussion of ruta caesa, Iavolenus’ approach adapts the 
law to the expectations of buyers and sellers while working within the legal 
tradition. Iavolenus improves on Mucius’ defi nition, adding to the types of 
physical attachment that served as criteria. He also draws on the insights of 
Aquilius and Cassius about connection to the land, transferring this idea 
35 Meincke (1971), p. 168, assumes that the pipes were used to exercise a servitude to channel 
water; see also Maddalena (1971), p. 174, on functionality without mention of servitudes. 
In general when land was sold, servitudes were transferred automatically because they were 
considered to be permanent assets of the land: D.8.4.12 (Paul. 15 ad Sab.), with Grosso 
(1969), pp. 94–5. Pipes were necessary for exercising the right: D.18.1.47 (Ulpian. 29 ad Sab.), 
cf. Solazzi (1948), p. 48.
36 Scriptura shows there was a lex venditionis in this case: Capogrossi Colognesi (1966), p. 72 fn. 
140.
37 For underground structures as part of the property in general without reference to this case: 
Meincke (1971), p. 144.
38 For permanence or continuity as a requirement, see Meincke (1971), p. 145. 
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from natural materials to building components such as pipes and founda-
tions, suitably enough because Iavolenus’ opinion about grain bins comes 
from his commentary on Cassius. When it comes to roof tiles, Iavolenus 
invokes physical attachment but, paradoxically, his opinion undermines 
the traditional function of this criterion. Traditionally, roof tiles that are no 
longer attached to the building should be ruta caesa, regardless of whether 
they were once attached or not. Iavolenus, however, looks beyond strict 
physical attachment, arguing from a concept of the building that is at once 
more abstract and more practical: it is abstract in the sense that it requires 
a shared understanding of what parts or accessories belong to a building, 
and practical to the extent that the abstract idea conforms to expectations 
among laymen and landowners. His narrower defi nition of ruta caesa rec-
ognises variety in materials and methods of construction. In addition, his 
approach depends on more than a snapshot of the building at the moment 
of sale; rather, it envisions the property existing over time. In narrowing 
the category of ruta caesa, Iavolenus limits its usefulness, and also implicitly 
privileges its counterpart ‘part of the property’.
5. CELSUS ON UNDERGROUND PIPES
Where ruta caesa concerned property that the seller retained after the 
sale, the buyer acquired ownership of accessories that were classifi ed as 
part of the property, aedium or pars aedium. These categories were recog-
nised as alternatives in Firmus’ question about pipes in D.19.1.38.2, an 
hae aedium essent, an ut ruta . . . quae aedium non essent. While Proculus’ 
response ignores the categories, Celsus addresses them directly when he 
states that the pipes should belong to the buyer on the grounds that they 
were attached to the building, ut inserta et inclusa aedifi cio partem eius esse. 
His opinion is part of a larger juristic discussion of what belonged with a 
property, not just among contemporary jurists (for example, Iavolenus on 
grain bins, discussed previously) but also in the Republican era and later 
in the writings of Ulpian. In these discussions, the jurists broaden the 
category of part of the property, working with the traditional criteria of 
physical attachment to address the complexities of the real estate market, 
for example, by making the categories fl exible enough to cover the sale 
of an estate with many working parts and not just a building with part 
attached by masonry or plaster. Celsus’ opinion in D.19.1.38.2 both rec-
ognises these social needs and connects them with the legal dialogue about 
parts of the property.
Celsus urged that the pipes should be classifi ed as part of the property 
because they were built in and connected to the building, inserta et inclusa, 
though the two parts of this expression probably should not be taken 
together. The fi rst term, inserta, seems out of place because it is used of 
buildings and real property only in this passage of the Digest. Inserere usually 
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applies to writing, that is, inserting a phrase or clause into a legal document.39 
It seems likely, then, that the text was disrupted in compilation and that 
inserta was not originally part of Celsus’ description of the pipes. Instead, 
inserta shows that Celsus discussed contracts in a now lost part of his com-
mentary on this case. On this reconstruction, Celsus directly addressed 
Proculus, reconciling their views by recommending that the pipes be treated 
as if they had been specifi ed in a contract. In this reconstruction, Celsus 
adopts a similar strategy to Iavolenus in the case about the pipes and castel-
lum, where the castellum is included as part of the property even though it is 
not in the written contract.
The other part of Celsus’ description of the pipes, inclusa, resonates 
with the juristic discussion of ‘part of the property’, specifi cally with the 
issue of physical attachment that involves joining metal, like the pipes 
in D.19.1.38.2. The verb inclusa connects Celsus’ rationale to a case that 
tested the limits of part of the property, fi rst in relation to real estate and 
then movables (D.41.3.30.1 (Pompon. 30 ad Sab.)). This case was not about 
sale but more generally claims for ownership when different people owned 
different parts of an object that, when joined, were considered a unifi ed 
whole, a situation analogous to the division of accessories between buyer 
and seller. The fi rst part of the case involves columns and roof tiles owned 
by someone other than the landowner: could he claim them after they were 
built into someone else’s building? In general, the answer was ‘no’, not while 
the building was standing, but he could claim them back if at some point it 
was demolished.40 In the second part of the case, the rule was generalised 
from buildings to movable property through the example of a gemstone and 
its gold setting. Though the comparison between buildings and jewellery is 
made by Pomponius, a younger contemporary of Celsus, it may have already 
been in discussion at the time of D.19.1.38.2. Indeed, Celsus’ use of the term 
inclusa invokes the analogy because this verb is the usual word describing 
gems set in gold and silver in the Digest.41
39 Vocabularium, s.v. insero = ‘to put in’, most often fi guratively of inserting names/dates/clauses 
into legal documents.
40 Meincke (1971), p. 146; Riccobono (1915–17), pp. 468–9. This rule was explicitly set out in a 
senatus consultum of 139–140 that prohibited legacies that could be fulfi lled only by demolish-
ing a building: see Riccobono (1915–17), pp. 476–7.
41 For includo in descriptions of building materials: D.19.1.17.3 (Ulpian. 32 ad Ed.: wall paint-
ings and marble architectural details); D.24.1.63 (Paul. 3 ad Nerat.: wife’s property joined to 
husband’s structure); and possibly D.47.3.1.2 (Ulpian. 37 ad Ed.) where it is an emendation. 
For gems with includo to illustrate component parts: D.10.4.6 (Paul. 14 ad Sab.); D.19.2.13.5 
(Ulpian. 32 ad Ed.); D.33.10.9.1 (Papinian. 7 Resp.); D.34.2.19.13 (Ulpian. 20 ad Sab.); 
D.34.2.19.16 (Ulpian. 20 ad Sab.); D.34.2.20 (Paul. 3 ad Sab.); D.34.2.32.1 (Paul. 2 ad Vitell.). 
Includo is used most often in the Digest in the sense of shutting something or someone in, 
for example people in jail or animals in pens (for inclusos and vinctorum of prisoners in the 
quarries: D.4.6.9 (Callist. 2 Ed. Monit.)). Its use in the fi gurative sense for documents is least 
common.
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Soldering pipes may seem far from delicate welding in gold, and indeed 
the two processes are distinguished by jurists and laymen alike.42 But for 
Celsus, any kind of metal joining has the same legal outcome and, as a result, 
he classifi es the lead pipes as part of the building. Celsus may not have been 
the fi rst to take this approach to ‘part of the property’. Cassius considered 
an arm welded onto a metal statue as part of it, even if it originally belonged 
somewhere else because it seems the join was not visible, in contrast to lead 
soldering which leaves a seam.43 The same principle may have been applied 
to buildings as early as Labeo, whose opinion Iavolenus cites in a case about 
plant pots. Whether the pots were ceramic or lead, they were part of the 
property if they were permanently attached to it, ‘if they were bound to 
the buildings in such a way that that they were permanently installed, (si ita 
illigata sint aedibus, ut ibi perpetuo posita sint, D 33.7.26pr (Iavolen. 5 Post. 
Labeo.)).44 The type of attachment is vague – illigata can include tying with 
straps or soldering – and perhaps this is the point.45 By diversifying the type 
of attachment, the category ‘part of the property’ could take into account 
construction techniques and typical building features neglected by the early 
defi nitions of ruta caesa, just as in Iavolenus’ opinions on grain bins and 
roof tiles.46 Celsus takes a similarly expansive view of part of the property 
42 For ferruminare or ferruminatio for welding metals or fusing with heat or glue: for example 
Plin. N.H. 34.116 (gold), 34.136 (stones in a furnace), 36.176 (cement), 36.199 (glass and 
sulphur), 37.28 (crystals); D.6.1.23.5 (Paul. 21 ad Ed.) (no material specifi ed); D.41.27pr 
(Pompon. 30 ad Sab.) (silver to silver). For plumbare for soldering with lead only: Cato, On 
Agriculture, 21.5 (parts of the olive press); Tac. Ann. 2.69 (lead tablets); Plin., N.H. 34.161 
(silver is not joined with lead because of different melting points); Front. Aq. 124; D.41.27pr. 
(Pompon. 30 ad Sab.) (lead to lead); D.19.1.17.8 (Ulpian. 32 ad Ed.) (adplumbare, faucets onto 
pipes). There is some slippage in D. 34.2.32.1 (Paul. 2 ad Vitell.), where joins of gems and fi ne 
metals are described with all three verbs: includo, illigo, and replumbo. 
43 D.6.1.23.5 (Paul. 21 ad Ed.): ‘Non idem in eo quod plumbatum sit, quia ferruminatio per 
eandem materiam facit confusionem, plumbatura non idem effi cit’. (It is not the same for 
something that has been soldered because welding makes a join with the same material, 
soldering does not do the same.) Even if the arm is removed, it does not revert to its prior 
owner. See Maddalena (1971) pp. 184–5.
44 D.33.7.26pr (Iavolen. 5 Post. Labeo.): ‘Dolia fi ctilia, item plumbea, quibus terra adgesta est, 
et in his viridiaria posita aedium esse Labeo Trebatius putant. ita id verum puto, si ita illigata 
sint aedibus, ut ibi perpetuo posita sint’. (Labeo [and] Trebatius think that ceramic jars, and 
likewise those made of lead, that are fi lled with dirt, in which plants are planted, are part of 
the property. I think that this is true also if they are attached to the buildings in such a way 
that they are installed permanently). Though the case concerns accessories in legacy rather 
than sale, the jurists compared these two legal contexts and attempted to apply the same 
rules in both: for example, for an explicit comparison, D.19.1.17.2 (Ulpian. 32 ad Ed.) (citing 
Trebatius). 
45 Labeo may have soldering lead in mind if D.50.16.242.2 (Iavolen. 2 Post. Labeo.) (lead on 
roof tiles) comes from the same context and, as assumed by Riccobono (1915–17), p. 482, 
was the opinion of Labeo not Iavolenus’.
46 As noted in Meincke (1971), p. 143, the superfi cies rule applied to materials and construc-
tion of all types.
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in D.19.1.38.2, and, if the analogy implied by inclusa was part of his original 
opinion, he also addresses the traditional legal categories in his rationale.47 
Yet his attitude towards these categories and the distinctions on which they 
depend seems decidedly untechnical, for example, when he treats jewellery 
and plumbing in the same way. In his rationale, Celsus explicitly recognises 
the inadequacy of a legal category that protected buyers only when they 
carefully inspected the property and knew how to apply the relevant legal 
categories. Some buyers and sellers might rise to the occasion, but Celsus 
is concerned to make the law more broadly effective by adapting it to the 
needs of typical Roman landowners, who were not often closely engaged in 
the management of their estates or well versed in the law.48
6. ULPIAN’S RETROSPECTIVE AND SOME CONCLUSIONS
Celsus’ opinion in D.19.1.38.2 prefi gures Ulpian’s treatment of pipes as 
‘part of the property’ in the sale of real estate. According to Ulpian, pipes 
were to be transferred with land even if there was no servitude because, he 
explains, they are comparable to part of the property, quasi pars aedium ad 
emptorem perveniunt (D.18.1.47 (Ulpian. 29 ad Sab.)). Though he equivo-
cates here, in other cases he emphasises their permanent functionality, and 
 maintains that pipes are part of the property even if they run far from the 
building or are laid underground.49 Furthermore, Ulpian’s category ‘part 
of the building’ understands accessories as part of the permanent fabric of 
a building even if not permanently attached, for example window panes or 
roof tiles (D.19.1.17.10 (Ulpian. 32 ad Ed.); D.33.1.12.25 (Ulpian. 20 ad 
Sab.)). Like roof tiles, pipes might be removed for repair or replacement, 
but they served a permanent function in providing water or drainage to 
the property and thus they should be included in ‘part of the property’. 
Ulpian’s opinions on pipes represent a move to treat at least plumbing 
47 Celsus may even respond to Proculus’ impractial solution of how to assign ownership of 
things welded together reported by Pomponius in D.41.1.27.2 (Pompon. 30 ad Sab.). When 
the welding (ferruminatio) obliterates the distinction between the two things, Cassius allows 
for monetary compensation, but Proculus, along with Pegasus, insists that each part belongs 
to its original owner. 
48 For typical landowners’ expertise in farm management: Kehoe (1997), pp. 144–6, 156–7; 
and their expertise in the law: Zimmermann (1990), p. 605. Expansion of protections for 
the buyer are based more on practical need than legal consistency: see Zimmermann (1990), 
p. 243.
49 D.19.1.13.31 (Ulpian. 32 ad Ed.) (well covers); D.19.1.15 (Ulpian. 32 ad Ed.) (pipes, basins, 
fountains, evn fr from the building); D.19.1.17.7 (Ulpian. 32 ad Ed.) (Permanent function, 
uae perpetui usus); D.19.1.17.8 (Ulpian. 32 ad Ed.) (reservoirs, well-covers, decorative foun-
tain spouts attached by soldering, adplumbata, underground even not attached); cf. D.18.1.47 
(Ulpian. 29 ad Sab.) (pipes and a servitude); and in legacy: D.30.41.10 (Ulpian. 21 ad Sab.) 
(pipes, reservoirs); D.33.7.12.24 (Ulpian. 20 ad Sab.) (pipes, channels, basins, fi xtures for 
fountains).
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accessories systematically as ‘part of the property’, yielding a fl exible cat-
egory that accounted for various methods of construction as well as the 
behaviour of buyers and sellers.
Looking back to the situation in D.19.1.38.2, Ulpian’s approach accom-
modates the practices in the real estate market described by Celsus.50 His 
fl exible defi nition of ‘part of the property’ expands protection for buyers 
who did not inspect the property carefully or were not able to use con-
tracts to pursue their interests, as Proculus expected. The two solutions to 
the problem in D.19.1.38.2 represent two perspectives on the relationship 
between law and society. Proculus takes an idealising view because his solu-
tion protects buyers’ and sellers’ interests only when they are well informed, 
honest, and proactive in using the legal system. Celsus, like Ulpian, recog-
nises that the real estate market rarely lives up to this ideal, and he explicitly 
aims to adapt law to these realities.51 Accessories like pipes were important 
to Roman landowners. Some Romans even bought property because of its 
valuable accessories, as Labeo recognised (D 18.1.34pr) (Paul. 33 ad Ed.)). 
Though Labeo’s opinion concerns a slave, probably the most valuable acces-
sory, the cases discussed in this chapter show that even humble items like 
gravel and pipes could be worth a trip to court.52 The law did not always 
provide clear guidance about accessories, and buyers and sellers might be 
ill informed and inexperienced. Such diffi culties could be interpreted as 
evidence that the jurists were out of touch with the real estate market, and 
that Celsus’ rationale is exceptional. The cases on accessories, however, 
show that the Romans tried to make the legal system work for them and that 
jurists addressed actual problems as they adapted legal traditions to the real 
estate market.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Ballentine’s Law Dictionary, 3rd edn (2010).
Black’s Law Dictionary, 9th edn (2009).
Bruun, C., The water supply of Ancient Rome: a study of Roman Imperial administration: 
Commentationes Humanarum Litterarum, vol. 93 (1991).
50 In fact, Ulpian uses the same verb, includo, to describe wall paintings that he classifi es as part 
of the property (D.19.1.17.3 (Ulp. 32 ad Ed.)): ‘quae tabulae pictae pro tectorio includuntur 
itemque crustae marmoreae aedium sunt’ (those pictures painted in wall frescoes and like-
wise marble panels are part of the property). The phrase pro tectorio may also connect this 
case with Mucius’ defi nition of ruta caesa which specifi ed attachment by plaster. 
51 A similar characterisation of Celsus’ approach in contrast to Proculus’ approach is in Frier 
(1994), pp. 136–7, and Hausmaninger (1991), p. 60. Celsus’ limited expectations of buyers is 
also in D.6.1.38 (Cels. 3 Dig.), where a buyer unknowingly (imprudens) purchased land and 
built on it without discovering that he had not bought it from the real owner, with de Neeve 
(1985), p. 90. More generally on Celsus’ awareness of the diversity among individuals, see 
Scarano-Ussani (1989), pp. 108–9.
52 Accessories to land were often more valuable: Maddalena (1971) pp. 179–80.
DU PLESSIS PRINT.indd   221 19/12/2012   16:49
222 New Frontiers
Capogrossi Colognesi, L., Ricerche sulla struttura delle servitù d’acqua in diritto romano 
(1966).
Crook, J. A., ‘Classical Roman law and the sale of land’, in M. I. Finley (ed.), Studies 
in Roman Property (1976), p. 71.
De Haan, N., ‘Die Wasserversorgung der Privatbäder in Pompeji’, in N. de Haan and 
G. C. M. Jansen (eds), Cura Aquarum in Campania (1996), p. 59.
De Neeve, P. W., ‘The price of agricultural land in Roman Italy and the problem of 
rationalism’, Opus, 4 (1985), p. 77.
Duncan-Jones, R. P., The Economy of the Roman Empire: Quantitative Studies, 2nd edn 
(1982).
Franklin, J. L., ‘Notes on Pompeian Prosopography’, PP, 34 (1979), p. 405.
Frier, B. W., ‘Why did the jurists change Roman law? Bees and lawyers revisited’, 
Index, 22 (1994), p. 135.
Frier, B. W., ‘Why law changes. Review of A. Watson, The Evolution of Law’, 
Columbia LJ, 86 (1986), p. 888.
Glaser, F., ‘Fountains and nymphaea’, in Ö. Wikander (ed.), Handbook of Ancient 
Water Technology (2000), p. 413.
Grosso, G., Le servitù prediale nel diritto romano (1969).
Hausmaninger, H., ‘Celsus gegen Proculus’, in Tradition und Fortentwicklung im Recht, 
Festschrift zum 90. Geburtstag von Ulrich von Lübtow am 21. August 1990 (1991), p. 53.
Hausmaniger, H., ‘Publius Iuventius Celsus: Persönalichkeit und juristische 
Argumentation’, ANRW, 15.2 (1976), p. 384.
Hodge, A. T., Roman Aqueducts and Water Supply (1991).
Jakab, É., Praedicere und cavere beim Marktkauf: Sachmängel im griechischen und römischen 
Recht. Münchener Beiträge zur Papyrusforschung und antiken Rechtsgeschichte, vol. 87 
(1997).
Jansen, G. C. M., ‘Urban water transport and distribution’, in Ö. Wikander (ed.), 
Handbook of Ancient Water Technology (2000), p. 103.
Jashemski, W., ‘The use of water in Pompeian gardens’, in N. de Haan and G. C. M. 
Jansen (eds), Cura Aquarum in Campania (1996), p. 51.
Jongman, W. M., ‘M. Obellius M. F. Firmus, Pompeian Duovir’, Talanta, 10–11 
(1978–9), p. 62.
Kaser, M., Das Römische Privatrecht, 2nd edn, 2 vols (1971).
Kehoe, D. P., Investment, Profi t, and Tenancy: The Jurists and the Roman Agrarian 
Economy (1997).
Lemosse, M., ‘Ad exhibendum’, Iura, 34 (1983), p. 67.
Lenel, O., Palingenesia Iuris Civilis. 2 vols (1889; reprint 2000).
Levy, E., and Rabel, E., Index Interpolationum quae in Iustiniani Digestis inesse dicuntur, 
3 vols (1929–35).
Maddalena, P., ‘Accedere e cedere nelle fonti classiche’, Labeo, 17 (1871), p. 169.
Marrone, M., ‘Considerazioni sui “ruta (et) caesa”’, in G. Falcone (ed.), Studi in 
onore di Edoardo Volterra, vol. I (1971), p. 213; reprinted in Scritti Giuridica (2003), 
p. 167.
Martin, S. D., The Roman Jurists and the Organization of Private Building in the Late 
Republic and Early Empire (1989).
DU PLESSIS PRINT.indd   222 19/12/2012   16:49
 Pipes and Property in the Sale of Real Estate 223
Meincke, J. P., ‘Superfi cies solo cedit’, ZSS (rom. Abt.) 88 (1971), p. 136.
Olde Kalter, A. L., Dicta et promissa de Aansprakelijkheid van der Verkoper wegens 
gedane toezeggingen betreffende de hoedanigheid van de verkochte zaak in het klassieke 
romeinse recht (Ph. D. dissertation, Utrecht) (1963).
Oleson, J. P., ‘Water-lifting’, in Ö. Wikander (ed.), Handbook of Ancient Water 
Technology (2000), p. 217.
Rawson, E., ‘The Ciceronean aristocracy and its properties’, in M. I. Finley (ed.), 
Studies in Roman Property (1976), p. 85.
Riccobono, S., ‘Dal diritto romano classico al diritto moderno’, in Annali del 
seminario giuridico della R. università di Palermo 3 & 4 (1915–17), p. 165, available 
at: http://openlibrary.org/works/OL7564319W/Dal_diritto_romano_classico_al_
diritto_moderno.
Riccobono, S., ‘Stipulatio ed instrumentum nel diritto giustinianeo’, ZSS (rom. Abt.) 
43 (1922), p. 262.
Scarano-Ussani, V., Empiria e dogmi. La scuola proculiana fra Nerva e Adriano (1989).
Solazzi, S., Specie ed estinzione delle servitù prediali (1948).
Steinwenter, A., Fundus cum instrumento: Eine agrar- und rechtsgeschichtliche Studie. 
Akademie der Wissenschaften in Wien. Philosopisch-historische Klasse, Sitzungsberichte, 
221, vol. 1. Abhandlung (1942).
Stella Maranca, F., Intorno ai frammenti di Celso (1915).
Vocabularium Iurisprudentiae Romanae (1903–87).
Von Lübtow, U., ‘Zur Frage der Sachmängelhaftung im römischen Recht’, in Studi in 
onore di Ugo Enrico Paoli (1955), p. 489.
Watson, A., ‘Law and society’, in J. W. Cairns and P. J. du Plessis (eds), Beyond 
Dogmatics: Law and Society in the Roman World (2007), p. 9.
Watson, A., The Law of Obligations in the Later Roman Republic (1965).
Zimmermann, R., The Law of Obligations: Roman Foundations of the Civilian Tradition 
(1990).
DU PLESSIS PRINT.indd   223 19/12/2012   16:49
DU PLESSIS PRINT.indd   224 19/12/2012   16:49
Part IV
Concluding Thoughts
DU PLESSIS PRINT.indd   225 19/12/2012   16:49
DU PLESSIS PRINT.indd   226 19/12/2012   16:49
Chapter 12
The Standpoint Determines the View: Jacques 
Barzun’s Theory of Aspect
Philip Thomas
1. INTRODUCTION
In E. M. Forster’s novel A Room with a View,1 the management of Pensione 
Bertolini does not provide the rooms with the promised views on the river 
to Lucy Honeychurch and her chaperone Charlotte Bartlett. Mr Emerson, 
another guest, interrupts the altercation, saying ‘I have a view, I have a 
view . . . This is my son . . . He has a view, too’. It can be argued that the 
text has a double meaning and that the novel deals with the philosophical 
view of life of the Emersons.2 Projected onto Roman law, the metaphor of 
the ivory tower3 is by now fl ogged to death, but the question may be asked 
whether this tower had windows and what views did the occupants have? 
Romanists and legal historians may have been unaware of Thomas Kuhn,4 
but his theory would hardly have come as a revelation to their ranks, as it 
has been common cause that since the days of the glossators the second life 
of Roman law has been characterised by a variety of paradigms, succeeding 
one another or co-existing.5 The common denominator of the majority of 
these ‘schools’ has been that Roman law played handmaiden to legal theory. 
1 E. M. Forster (1908). In 1958 the author published A View without a Room in the Observer, 
which is included in some Penguin editions.
2 R. Doll, www.emforster.info/pages/roomview.html (last accessed 3 January 2012). 
3 Song of Solomon, 7:4. French critic Charles Augustin Sainte-Beuve (1804–69) was the 
fi rst to use the expression in the fi gurative sense of a place or state of privileged seclusion, 
disconnected from practical matters and harsh realities of life: at wordsmith.org/words/
ivory_tower.html (last accessed 3 January 2012).
4 Thomas S. Kuhn (1922–96), American historian and philosopher of science. The Structure 
of Scientifi c Revolutions (1962) popularised the concept ‘paradigm’ and the idea that different 
paradigms competed for hegemony. Kuhn holds that a paradigm does not only relate to 
theory, methods, techniques and methodology, but also to assumptions, hypotheses and 
values.
5 The Glossators, Commentators, School of Orléans, Humanists, Antiquarians, Usus 
Modernus Pandectarum and the Historical School are discussed in textbooks on legal 
history. The Interpolationalists and the various directions Romanist studies have taken 
during the twentieth century are less clearly defi ned in the general literature and vary from 
country to country, and a discussion thereof falls outside the scope of this essay. Interesting 
is Wubbe (2003), pp. 512–16.
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This entailed that all rooms faced the same direction in the hope of lucre, 
appointments, relevance and utility. In consequence, the immediate purpose 
of Roman law from the late Middle Ages onwards has been to develop a 
coherent and logical legal system as well as the harmonisation of local law 
within this system. Achievement of this objective was possible on account of 
the dominant position of Roman law in academic legal education. The result-
ing development of Western-European legal science achieved communes opin-
iones on most essential points, which became codifi ed in the European and 
derivative codes. Internal contradictions had been argued away by fi nesses of 
the glossators or manipulation of texts. Much valuable research was labelled 
antiquarian by ruling dogma.
2. VOICES IN THE WILDERNESS: NEW PARADIGMS
At present the removal of Latin from the law curriculum and the con-
sequent disappearance of the classics from school curricula have made 
expertise in Roman law an elitist pastime, which in a culture of materialism 
and instant gratifi cation is no longer considered ‘relevant’. The voices of 
Romanists who have argued in favour of the essential role of Roman law in 
European legal studies6 have not convinced the marketplace, and I limit my 
references to the oratio pro domo of Paul du Plessis,7 whose well researched8 
and well argued thoughts on the topic deserve to be heard outside the choir. 
National and academic policymakers adhere to the belief that legal educa-
tion, legal science and harmonisation can be successful without Roman 
law,9 in spite of arguments against reinvention of the wheel. The pragmatic 
arguments relative to the development of a European legal system have 
been widely and excellently canvassed by Reinhard Zimmermann10 and 
it is obvious that the same arguments apply in respect of globalisation. 
More esoteric beliefs strive for wider following and the philosophical 
argument of this essay is that the genius of the Roman jurists has been 
widely acclaimed, but remains often misunderstood as the texts have been 
interpreted within a doctrinal perspective.11 Generations of dogmatists have 
6 Too many to mention as since codifi cation virtually every professor of Roman law has at 
some stage voiced his opinion. Some random examples: J. C. Naber (1858–1950), professor 
of Roman law at the University of Utrecht, whose inaugural lecture was titled De vormende 
kracht van het Romeinse recht (1885); Wubbe (2003), pp. 556–60; van Rhee and Winkel (2010), 
pp. 163–5. See also Hoffmeier (1995), pp. 19–22. 
7 Du Plessis (2010), pp. 64–72. 
8 The literature on the topic is copious and the main contributions are found in the footnotes 
of du Plessis’ article.
9 Du Plessis (2010), passim; Heirbaut (2005), pp. 136–53; van Rhee and Winkel (2010), p. 167; 
Martyn and Coppens (2008), pp. 19–24.
10 Heirbaut (2005), passim; du Plessis (2010), passim. In n. 9, du Plessis lists the books and 
articles by Zimmermann on the subject.
11 Thomas (1997), pp. 202–13.
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carefully selected texts from the sources in order to argue their cases with 
the Roman jurists as their media. Enlightened positivists have used vague 
references to social, economic and political factors such as class struggle,12 
infl ation,13 Christianity14 and absolutism. However, the over-riding ideas 
have been that the classical jurists reasoned within an established doctrine 
subject to steady development and always reached the correct legal solu-
tion.15 This chapter proffers the argument that, literally and fi guratively, 
where one stands determines the view, which in turn brings the idea of 
the correct legal solution under discussion.16 This also entails placing the 
individual texts into new perspectives. Authority for this relativism can be 
found in the work of the historian Barzun,17 who fl oated a theory of aspect. 
Thus, Barzun’s ideas will be briefl y set out and then illustrated on the basis 
of recent research on the Twelve Tables, and thereafter applied to several 
related texts from the Corpus Iuris Civilis. The contemporary doctrinal com-
munis opinio concerning these texts will be discussed, followed by a view 
from another room.
3. JACQUES BARZUN’S THEORY OF ASPECT
In his work From Dawn to Decadence. 500 Years of Western Cultural Life, the 
historian Jacques Barzun proffers the thesis that during the last 500 years, 
four main upheavals shook the West: the sixteenth-century religious, the 
seventeenth-century monarchical, the eighteenth-century liberal individual-
istic French, and the twentieth-century Russian social and collectivist revo-
lution. In the same book Barzun introduces his ideas of a theory of aspect, 
which is a recurring subtext.18 He proposes that no person, object or event is 
ever viewed in his/her totality.19 All present a variety of faces, and observers 
only take in one or a few of these faces or aspects and consider this to be the 
whole or at least the essence. Barzun accepts this partiality as a fact of life, 
namely the rule of spontaneous choice. In this rule, he fi nds the explanation 
for the surprising differences in value placed on the same thinker and for the 
12 Most descriptions of the Twelve Tables employ the existence of different orders and Livy’s 
narrative as such. Random examples: Sohm, Mitteis and Wenger (1926), p. 52; Jolowicz 
(1952), pp. 5–13; van Oven (1948), pp. 4–7; Söllner (1971), pp. 25, 39, 41; Hermesdorf (1972), 
pp. 123–31, also 49–50; Lokin and Zwalve (2006), pp. 58–60.
13 As an explanation for laesio enormis, Becker (1993), p. 13 fns 22 and 23 provide the literature.
14 Random references include: van Oven (1948), pp. 31–2, literature in fn. 62; Jolowicz (1952), 
pp. 521, 524, 535, on p. 584 a reference to further literature is found; Buckland and Stein 
(1963), pp. 32, 320, 338.
15 Thomas (1998), pp. 647–57; Thomas (1997), pp. 202–13.
16 Thomas (1998), pp. 649–51, 655–7; Thomas (1997), pp. 205, 207, 213. 
17 Jacques Barzun (1907– ), Franco-American historian. His last major work From Dawn to 
Decadence. 500 Years of Western Cultural Life 1500 to the Present was published in 2000.
18 Barzun (2000), pp. 46–7, 174, 246–7, 250, 253, 430–1, 435–7, 568–74, 652–6, 759–63, 768–9.
19 Barzun uses the simile of a mountain at p. 47.
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different pasts depicted by different historians.20 These ideas may fruitfully 
be applied to the fons et origo of Roman law, the codifi cation of the Twelve 
Tables, as the interest in and studies of this code were resuscitated by the 
humanists and thus coincide with the time frame of Barzun’s work.
The various interpretations of the events during the fi rst half of the 
fi fth century BCE show a number of recurring themes, such as secularisa-
tion of the law as the priests were forced into revelation of the law, the 
democratisation of the oligarchic rule of the aristocracy, equal rights, land 
reform and debt reform. It is not diffi cult to link these issues to points in 
the programmes of the four above-mentioned revolutions, which supports 
the hypothesis that the aspects that shine out of a particular historical event 
and grab the attention of researchers are to a large extent refl ections of their 
own Zeitgeist.
4. CEDANT21 AND THE TWELVE TABLES
The University of Pavia has facilitated access to new research with the launch 
of the Collegio di Diritto Romano, a series of seminars giving Romanists and 
classicists the opportunity to interact with the leading researchers in their 
disciplines. The topic in 2003 was the Twelve Tables and the contributions 
published in a volume offered new faces of the code.22 Michel Humbert 
reviewed the old, more fanciful theories, such as a complete law reform 
based on a Greek model, the revelation of religious secrets, and equality 
in law as the result of the threats of the proletarian masses.23 He concludes 
that textual authority is lacking for the underlying hypotheses, and offers 
an alternative objective of the statute, namely placing the administration 
of justice on an exhaustive legislative basis in order to eliminate the discre-
tion of the holders of imperium in this fi eld.24 In his analysis of the political 
events, he redefi ned the concepts plebs and patres from about 450 BCE and the 
nature of their confl ict. The traditional description of the plebeians as the 
marginalised, poor masses without political rights clamouring for equality 
and economic benefi ts is replaced by the view of the plebs as a political move-
ment of rich citizens opposed to the ruling oligarchy.25 He views the struggle 
between plebs and patres as not for power, nor for equality of law, but for 
equality before the law, to be effected by controlling the administration of 
20 A harbinger of this credo is found in the theoretical work of Hoetink and in the scientifi c 
work of Ankum, namely that every generation has a different Roman law, because they 
approach the texts with different scientifi c equipment and luggage: Hoetink (1982); van Rhee 
and Winkel (2010), p. 163.
21 Centro di studi e ricerche sui Diritti Antichi.
22 Humbert (2005).
23 Humbert (2005), pp. 4–25.
24 Humbert (2005), pp. 26–41. 
25 Humbert (2005), pp. 7–11.
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justice or, in other words, the imperium of the consuls.26 In this interpreta-
tion, the collaboration by the priests was an absolute necessity and Humbert 
considers the priests the intellectual fathers of the codifi cation.27 He argues 
that an analysis of the text of the Twelve Tables shows that the code does 
not provide the general public with access to the law, but necessitates learned 
assistance by an expert.28
The text of the Twelve Tables,29 or in particular the order thereof, is ques-
tioned by Diliberto,30 whose argument that it is highly improbable that the 
decemviri would have applied a system, which was developed centuries after-
wards, is rather suggestive. The paucity of solid beacons indicating the place 
of various fragments31 gives the argument a smack of deconstruction in spite 
of Diliberto’s argument that the fourth book of Gaius holds the key.32 He 
proposes an alternative non-dogmatic arrangement of the texts on the basis 
of the interests protected. Diliberto applied the methodology fi rst suggested 
and tried by Bona33 to the Noctes Attici,34 but the development of a theory 
for an alternative sequence of the verses is fraught with disappointments, as 
was illustrated by the attempt of Agnati35 to test the application of the law of 
Lindsay against the rhetorical tradition in the form of Cicero, De inventione 
and the Rhetorica ad Herrenium in respect of the position of the furiosus text 
in Table 5.36
26 Humbert (2005), pp. 49–50.
27 Humbert (2005), p. 22.
28 Humbert (2005), pp. 24–5. Thus, the Twelve Tables bear resemblance to the edict of the 
praetor, namely a catalogue of legal remedies. See also Talamanca (2005), pp. 331–75. 
29 For the reconstructions since 1515 and a critical analysis thereof: Ferrary (2005), pp. 503–56.
30 Diliberto (2005), pp. 217–38.
31 Cic. Leg. 2.23.59 and 2.25.64 (in ius vocatio and funerals); Fest. s.v. reus (dies diffusus); Dion. 
Hal. 2.27.3 (si pater); Ulpian. D.38.6.1pr (testamentary succession before intestate); and frag-
ments of the commentaries of Labeo and Gaius on the Twelve Tables. The fi rst are found 
in Gell. N.A. 1.12.18 (the vestals), 6.15.1 (furtum), 20.1.12–13 (iniuria), and the second in the 
Digest: see Lenel (1889), pp. 242–6.
32 Namely, the protection of land, the most important means of production in the economy of 
Antiquity. Diliberto (2005), pp. 225–9.
33 Bona (1990), p. 392, where he proposed application of the so-called law of Lindsay: Lindsay 
(1901), passim; Marcellus cited passages from earlier authors in the order of the original 
work. The application followed in Bona (1992), pp. 211–28.
34 Diliberto, ‘Contributo’ (1992), pp. 229–77; Diliberto, Materiali (1992); Diliberto (2005), 
pp. 229–35. In these publications, Diliberto illustrates how a number of texts could be re-
assigned to different tables.
35 Agnati (2005), pp. 239–64.
36 No indications were found that the authors in question adhered to a fi xed system in respect 
of their citations. The author explains this on the basis of the nature of the works and the use 
of the texts for the purpose of examples in forensic argumentation rather than lexicography 
or similar enterprises. More success was achieved by de Francesco (2005), pp. 415–40. In this 
contribution, fragments from Hor. (Sat. 1.9.74–78), Plaut. (Cur. 5.2.620–625) and Ter. (Phor. 
980–996) are analysed with the objective to relate the actio iniuriarum and the in ius vocatio. 
In terms of this analysis, iniuria and furtum are repositioned into the beginning of the code as 
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The theory of aspect which holds that the perspective from which an event 
is approached to a large degree determines its importance and meaning is cor-
roborated by the different socio-economic interpretations. Several authors 
have described how the picture of Roman society during the fi fth century 
BCE has been blurred by later sources, starting with Polybius’ Historiae and 
Cicero’s De re publica, which projected the problems of their own time – for 
example, land reform – or political theories back into reconstructions of 
the events revolving around the codifi cation.37 Thus the desire to illustrate 
an evolutionary model coupled with the desire to actualise the past as well 
as the unavoidability of anachronisms all play a role in the theory of aspect.
Dieter Nörr38 delved into his encyclopaedic knowledge to depict another 
view, which replaces the traditional description of Rome of the Twelve Tables 
as the market town of an isolated group of primitive agrarians, with an inter-
pretation integrating pre-Twelve-Tables Rome into a Mediterranean world 
of shipping and commerce. The fi rst treaty between Carthage and Rome39 
indicates that the Romans also participated in international relations.40 Nörr 
analyses this treaty and proposes that Rome of the Twelve Tables was already 
a maritime power and opts for a Rome with ships and international traders, a 
commercial centre, placed by him in a wide historical context.
Such a socio-economic landscape inevitably leads to new interpretations 
of the Twelve Tables. David Kremer41 argues that the foedus Cassianum42 
granted reciprocal commercium43 to citizens of the signatories. This would 
permit foreigners to participate in negotia per aes et libram, to acquire owner-
ship ex iure Quiritium, and access to the legis actiones.44 In terms of the foedus 
Cassianum, contractual litigation was to be conducted, and concluded within 
ten days, in the city where the contract had been entered into.45 Thus, the 
decemviri were obliged to take this provision of the treaty into account, 
which resulted in the redaction of verses 2.2 and 6.4. Litigation with a hostis46 
received priority in terms of verse 2.2, which introduced an excusatio for a 
Roman party and/or judge.47 Verse 6.4 is another consequence of the foedus 
the communal criterion is self-help and the application of the actio iniuriarum in cases where 
such self-help exceeded the boundaries of what was allowed.
37 Gabba (2005), pp. 117–24; Garrasco Garcia (2005), p. 125–45.
38 Nörr (2005), pp. 147–89.
39 Dated by Polybius in the fi rst year of the republic: Polyb. Hist. 3. 21–7; Nörr (2005), passim. 
40 Ziegler (2002), pp. 55–67.
41 Kremer (2005), pp. 191–207. 
42 The treaty concluded in 493 between Rome and the twenty-nine cities of the Latin league; 
Kremer (2005), p. 192. 
43 Liv. Hist. 8.14.10; Kremer (2005), pp. 193–6. 
44 Kremer (2005), p. 193.
45 Dion. Hal. 6.95.2. Kremer (2005), pp. 196–7.
46 A foreigner pari iure cum populo romano. Cic. Off. 1.37 and Fest. s. v. status dies; Kremer 
(2005), pp. 191, 205.
47 Kremer (2005), pp. 197–203.
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Cassianum, namely the granting of the duty of legal assistance for a period 
without defi ned limit.48 This matter is also addressed by Michel Humbert in 
his discussion of the homogeneity of usus in the codifi cation.49 He offers a 
coherent and convincing hypothesis50 restricting the meaning of usus in the 
code to the exercise of the right of ownership or patria potestas and to be 
distinguished from usucapio.51 Humbert argues that usus and auctoritas, the 
obligation placed by the mancipatio on the transferor to assist the recipient 
against a reivindicatio, are inextricably linked.52 Thus aeterna auctoritas is a 
non-defi ned period during which the obligation to provide assistance rests 
on the mancipio dans where the transferee had been a foreigner with commer-
cium.53 Selling by mancipatio to a foreigner incurred the duty to provide legal 
assistance for an unknown period, whether in Tibur, Rome or Praeneste, 
or wherever the buyer is threatened with eviction. This is the logical conse-
quence of international trade and the treaties accommodating the same by 
extension of commercium. However, the reciprocity provided for in the foedus 
Cassianum gave the Roman citizen who had bought a slave in Tibur dominium 
ex iure Quiritium in Rome.54
Although our present knowledge is built upon the results of our predeces-
sors, the theory of aspect encourages revisiting old sights from a different 
angle and explains why the demise of religion, the fall of communism and the 
advent of globalisation may change our views on Rome anno 450 BCE. The 
second application of the theory of aspect relates to some well known texts 
48 Kremer suggests that the Roman legislator was unaware whether usus would exist in the 
foreigner’s legal system and if so, what the duration thereof would be. Verse 6.4 serves the 
interests of the foreign buyer with commercium, who acquires a res mancipi object in Rome 
and has taken his purchase home, in other words outside Roman territory. Whenever this 
object is brought back into Roman territory, the possibility of a rei vindicatio must be taken 
into consideration. In terms of the foedus Cassianum, the Roman judge will have jurisdic-
tion and the seller will have to provide his assistance in the proceedings irrespective of the 
 question of how much time has expired since the mancipatio. Kremer (2005), pp. 203–6.
49 M Humbert, ‘Il valore semantico’ (2005), pp. 377–400. Usus appears in XII Tab. 6.3, 6.4, 
8.17, 7.4, 10.10, and 6.5.
50 Other theories can be found in the text and notes of Humbert’s article.
51 Usucapio was developed from usus at a much later stage by way of an audacious interpreta-
tion by the old jurists. Humbert (2005), p. 387. 
52 Humbert (2005), pp. 378–88.
53 Humbert proposes that commercium implied that the Roman judge had to take foreign law 
into account. He compares commercium to conubium and gives the example of a citizen of 
Tibur who marries a Roman woman. This union is subject to the law of Tibur and recog-
nised by Roman law. On Roman soil, a Roman judge will apply the law of Tibur to the 
offspring of this union, which law may well be different from Roman law. Humbert (2005), 
pp. 394–7.
54 Humbert’s theory in respect of mancipatio, usus and auctoritas falls outside the scope of this 
essay, but it suffi ces to mention that Humbert’s interpretation of verses 6.3, 7.4, 10.10, 6.5 
and 8.17 are clear and logical, follow the text and appear to fi t into the new context better 
than most alternative interpretations.
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from the Corpus Iuris Civilis. Included for dogmatic reasons and interpreted 
as such, an interpretation from a different perspective – namely, the world 
of usury – is proposed.
5. SAINT AMBROSE AND THE THEORY OF ASPECT
The texts to be discussed are D.12.1.11pr,55 D.19.5.19pr,56 D.17.1.34pr,57 
55 ‘Ulpianus libro vicensimo sexto ad edictum. Rogasti me, ut tibi pecuniam crederem: ego 
cum non haberem, lancem tibi dedi vel massam auri, ut eam venderes et nummis utereris. Si 
vendideris, puto mutuam pecuniam factam. Quod si lancem vel massam sine tua culpa perdi-
deris prius quam venderes, utrum mihi an tibi perierit, quaestionis est. mihi videtur Nervae 
distinctio verissima existimantis multum interesse, venalem habui hanc lancem vel massam 
nec ne, ut, si venalem habui, mihi perierit, quemadmodum si alii dedissem vendendam: quod 
si non fui proposito hoc ut venderem, sed haec causa fuit vendendi, ut tu utereris, tibi eam 
perisse, et maxime si sine usuris credidi’ (Ulpian in his twenty-sixth book of his commentary 
on the Edict. You asked me to lend you money; because I had no money I gave you a dish or 
a piece of gold so you could sell this and use the money. If you sold it, I think that the money 
made is owed as a loan. What is the position if the dish or the lump of gold was lost without 
your fault before you sold it, does the loss fall upon me or upon you. It is my opinion that 
the distinction made by Nerva is perfectly correct, namely that the point of importance is 
whether I had the dish or the lump of gold for sale or not. If I had had it for sale, the loss is 
mine in the same manner as if I had given it to someone else to sell; but if it has not been my 
intention to sell it, but the only reason of the sale was that you might use the proceeds, you 
must carry the loss, especially if I lent the money to you interest free).
56 ‘Ulpianus libro trigesimo primo ad edictum. Rogasti me ut tibi nummos mutuos darem: ego 
cum non haberem, dedi tibi rem vendendam, ut pretio utereris. Si non vendidisti aut ven-
didisti quidem, pecuniam autem non accepisti, tutius est ita agere, ut Labeo ait, praescriptis 
verbis, quasi negotio quodam inter nos gesto proprii contractus’ (Ulpian in the thirty-fi rst 
book of his commentary on the Edict. You asked me to lend you money: because I did not 
have any, I gave you a thing to sell so that you could use the price. If you did not sell it or 
sold it but did not accept the money as a loan, it is safer to proceed, as Labeo held, with the 
actio praescriptis verbis as if whatever transaction performed between us had been a special 
contract).
57 ‘Africanus libro octavo quaestionum. Qui negotia Lucii Titii procurabat, is, cum a debito-
ribus eius pecuniam exegisset, epistulam ad eum emisit, qua signifi caret certam summam 
ex administratione apud se esse eamque creditam sibi se debiturum eum usuris semissibus: 
quaesitum est, an ex ea causa credita pecunia peti possit et an usurae peti possint. respondit 
non esse creditam: alioquin dicendum ex omni contractu nuda pactione pecuniam creditam 
fi eri posse. nec huic simile esse, quod, si pecuniam apud te depositam convenerit ut creditam 
habeas, credita fi at, quia tunc nummi, qui mei erant, tui fi unt: item quod, si a debitore meo 
iussero te accipere pecuniam, credita fi at, id enim benigne receptum est. his argumentum 
esse eum, qui, cum mutuam pecuniam dare vellet, argentum vendendum dedisset, nihilo-
magis pecuniam creditam recte petiturum: et tamen pecuniam ex argento redactam periculo 
eius fore, qui accepisset argentum’ (Africanus in the eighth book of his Questions. When 
the procurator of Lucius Titius had collected money from the debtors, he sent him a letter 
informing him that he held a certain sum in terms of his administration and that if this was 
lent to him he would pay six percent interest. It was asked whether from such cause the 
money could be claimed as lent and whether the interest could be claimed. He (Julianus) 
opined that the money was not lent, because otherwise it could be said that money from any 
contract could be made into a loan by mere agreement. And this was not similar to the case
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C.4.2.8,58 and C.4.32.25.59 The last two texts lead60 to Saint Ambrose’s De 
Tobia, sermons on the story of Tobia, directed against usury.61
The facts in the Digest texts are briefl y that A asked B for a loan of money, 
but B had no money. Instead, B gave A a valuable object to sell so he could 
use the money from the sale.  The legal questions under discussion revolved 
 where money was lent if it had been agreed that you could borrow the money deposited with 
you, because in that instance the coins which were mine, became yours. The same applies in 
the case where money was lent, if I instruct you to receive money from my debtor, because 
that has been accepted benevolently. For these the argument is that he, who has given silver 
to sell when he wanted to lend money, would neither be correct in claiming for money owed; 
although the money realised from the sale of the silver will be at the risk of him who accepted 
the silver). The words his argumentum esse are rather inconclusive and therefore confusing. 
The Watson translation reads ‘[He went on to say that] from these [remarks] it could be 
argued that a man who, wishing to give money as a loan for consumption, had given silver 
to be sold would not, for all that, be right to claim the money as lent’. Compare the German 
translation (by C. Krampe): ‘Dafür diene als Argument, dass ebenso wenig derjenige zu 
Recht die Darlehensklage erhebe, der ein Gelddarlehen gewähren wollte und dem Empfänger 
Silber zum Verkauf gegeben hat’.
58 ‘Impp. Diocletianus et Maximianus AA. et CC. Proculo. Si pro mutua pecunia, quam a 
creditore poscebas, argentum vel iumenta vel alias species utriusque consensu aestimatas 
accepisti, dato auro pignori, licet ultra unam centesimam usuras stipulanti spopondisti, 
tamen sors, quae aestimatione partium placito defi nita est, et usurarum titulo legitima 
tantum recte petitur. Nec quicquam tibi prodesse potest, quod minoris esse pretii pignus 
quod dedisti proponis, quominus huius quantitatis solutioni pareas’ (Emperors Diocletianus 
and Maximianus to Proculus. If instead of the loan of money, which you asked from the 
creditor, you did accept silver or beasts of burden or other specifi c things the estimated 
value of which had been agreed upon by both of you, gold having been given in pledge, even 
though you promised the stipulator interest exceeding twelve per cent, nonetheless only the 
principal which was determined by the agreement of the parties, and as interest only the 
interest allowed by law can be claimed. And the fact that you declare that the pledge you gave 
was of lower value, cannot help you at all to avoid obeying the demand for payment of this 
amount).
59 ‘Imp Constantinus A ad populum. Pro auro et argento et veste facto chirographo licitas 
solvi vel promitti usuras iussimus’ (Emperor Constantine to the people. We have decreed 
that lawful interest be paid or promised on gold and silver and cloth owed in terms of a debt 
contained in a document).
60 Via the intercession of Noodt (1735), p. 178.
61 ‘Caput III. Ambrosius feneratorum inhumanitatem in pauperes, et eorum artes quibus illos sibi 
addicunt, oculia subjicit; ac demum in eosdem invehitur. 10. At ubi usurarum mentio facta 
fuerit, aut pignoris, tunc dejecto supercilio fenerator arridet, et quem ante sibi cognitum 
denegebat, eundem tanquam paternam amicitiam recordatus osculo excipit, haereditariae 
pignus charitatis appellat, fl ere prohibet. Quaeremus, inquit, domi si quid nobis pecuniae 
est, frangam propter te argentum paternum quod fabrefactum est, plurimum damni erit: 
quae usurae compensabunt emblematum? Sed pro amico dispendium non reformidabo, 
cum reddideris, refi ciam. Itaque antequam det, recipere festinat et qui in summa subvenire 
se dicit, usuras exigit. Kalendis, inquit, usuras dabis: fenus interim, si non habueris unde res-
tituas, non requiro. Ita semet det, frequenter exagitat, et semper sibi debere effi cit. Hac arte 
tractat virum. Itaque prius eum chirographis ligat, et astringit vocis suae nexibus. Numeratur 
pecunia, addicitur libertas, absolvitur miser minore debito, majore ligatur’ (But when inter-
est was mentioned, or pledge, the moneylender smiles with down-cast eye-brows, and with 
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around risk, in respect of the object prior to the sale, or the risk of the 
money after the sale, or how to get the object or the money back when A did 
not sell or use the money. The answer depends on the question of which con-
tract or contracts the parties had concluded, but since this was never directly 
asked, the texts are silent on this point. The questions addressed to the 
imperial chancery in C.4.2.8 were different,62 and indicate the context and 
purpose of such transactions. At last, a room with a view is offered by Saint 
Ambrose. His text clearly illustrates that moneylenders were in actual fact 
delivering goods rather than cash to their clients. It may be argued that his 
words are not completely logical, since the obvious translation of ‘Sed pro 
amico dispendium non reformidabo, cum reddideris, refi ciam’ is ‘But for a 
friend, I shall not shirk the loss, when you return it, I shall repair it’, which 
is not congruent with the fact that the debtor is to sell the object. However, 
the translation ‘For a friend I will shun the loss, when you pay me back, I 
will make it back’ may be open to philological debate, but is supported by 
the legal texts and reveals a stratagem to avoid the limits on lawful interest.63
6. HELPING A FRIEND?
At fi rst glance the facts relate to two friends, and it is indeed this benevolent 
interpretation that has prevailed. It does not surprise that during the Middle 
Ages Vivianus sidestepped explanations on usury,64 but it is a show of 
strength of the legal tradition that friendship continues to be mentioned in 
the interpretations of Koschaker,65 Kaser66 and Zimmermann.67 This raises 
a kiss welcomes the same man, whom he previously denied knowing, as if remembering a 
family friendship and invokes the pledge of hereditary affection, and tells him not to weep. 
We shall see, he says, whether we have any money at home; for you I shall break the beauti-
fully made family silver: the loss will be very great. What interest will compensate the value 
of the ornaments? But for a friend, I shall not shun the loss, when you pay me back, I shall 
have it repaired. Thus before he gives, he hastens to take back: and he who says that he is 
helping in the matter of a sum of money, demands interest. On the fi rst of the month, he 
says, you shall pay interest: in the meantime I do not seek the principal, if you do not have 
the means to pay back. Thus he gives once, but demands frequently, and always manages that 
he is owed money. In this way he plays the man. Thus before he binds him with IOUs, he ties 
him down with his voice. Money is paid, liberty is enslaved, the wretch is released of a small 
debt and bound for a bigger one).
62 The questions posed revolved around the quantum of both principal and interest, which 
becomes clear from the opinion ‘tamen sors, quae aestimatione partium placito defi nita est, 
et usurarum titulo legitima tantum recte petitur’.
63 Thomas (2012), pp. 101–12.
64 Vivianus, Casus on Rogasti me (D.12.1.11pr) Eram amicus tuus. Gloss Si quis nec causam ad 
D.12.1.4pr Vel amicitia eum esse motum ad mutuandum. For usury during the Middle Ages: 
Piron (2005), p. 73–101.
65 Koschaker (1923), p. X.
66 Kaser (1964), pp. 77–8.
67 Zimmermann (1990), p. 162.
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the question why the case of two ‘friends’, who do not have cash but are 
engaged in moneylending, keeps making the law reports.68
7. RISK AND TRANSFORMATION OF CONTRACT
The question concerning the risk and transformation of a contract had been 
addressed by Ulpian in D.12.1.4pr.69 In this case money was given in deposit 
with the arrangement that it could be used and the effect of this arrangement 
on the allocation of risk was discussed.70 Even prior to use, the deposit was 
held to be at the risk of the receiver, which deviation from the normal risk 
rule Ulpian motivated with the analogy that he who has received a thing to 
sell in order to use the money, holds the object at his own risk. However, in 
D.12.1.9.971 and D.12.1.10,72 similar situations were addressed along differ-
ent lines. In the fi rst text, a straightforward deposit is transformed in what 
68 ‘Law reports’ is used tongue in cheek. However, from the days of Labeo (ob. c. 10 CE; 
referred to by Ulpian in D.19.5.19pr), Nerva (either father (ob. 33 CE) or son (praetor desig-
nate 65 CE); referred to by Ulpian in D.12.1.11pr until Ulpian (c 170–223 CE; D.12.11.1pr 
and D.19.5.19pr) these ‘friends’ were consulting jurists, whose opinions were in writing and 
saved. C.4.2.8 dates from 293 CE.
69 ‘Ulpianus libro trigensimo quarto ad Sabinum. Si quis nec causam nec propositum faene-
randi habuerit et tu empturus praedia desideraveris mutuam pecuniam nec volueris creditae 
nomine antequam emisses suscipere atque ita creditor, quia necessitate forte profi ciscendi 
habebat, deposuerit apud te hanc eandem pecuniam, ut, si emisses, crediti nomine obligatus 
esses, hoc depositum periculo est eius qui suscepit. Nam et qui rem vendendam acceperit, ut 
pretio uteretur, periculo suo rem habebit’ (Ulpian in his thirty-fourth book of his commen-
tary on Sabinus. In the case of a person who has no reason or made no proposal to lend out 
money at interest, and you who are on the point of buying land and are desirous to borrow 
money; but you do not want to owe this money before you have bought the property; in con-
sequence, the creditor, who may have an urgent reason to leave, has deposited that money 
with you, with the arrangement that, if you should buy, you will be liable for the credit. This 
deposit is at the risk of the party who received it. Because anyone who has received an object 
in order to sell it so he can use the purchase price, holds that object at his own risk).
70 Thomas (2012) (forthcoming).
71 D.12.1.9 Ulpianus libro vicensimo sexto ad edictum: ‘Deposui apud te decem, postea 
permisi tibi uti: Nerva Proculus etiam antequam moveantur, condicere quasi mutua tibi 
haec posse aiunt, et est verum, ut et Marcello videtur: animo enim coepit possidere. Ergo 
transit periculum ad eum, qui mutuam rogavit et poterit ei condici’ (Ulpian in the twenty-
sixth book of his commentary on the edict. I deposited ten with you, and later I allowed 
you to use the money; Nerva and Proculus hold that I can claim the money with a condictio 
from you, even before it was used, as if it had been lent. And this is correct and Marcellus is 
of the same opinion; because you had already become the possessor with your intention, in 
your mind. Therefore the risk passes on him, who asked for the loan, and the condictio lays 
against him).
72 D.12.1.10 Ulpianus libro secundo ad edictum: ‘Quod si ab initio, cum deponerem, uti tibi si 
voles permisero, creditam non esse antequam mota sit, quoniam debitu iri non est certum’ 
(Ulpian in his second book of his commentary on the edict 10. If I allowed you from the 
beginning when I deposited the money with you to use it, if you wanted to, the money is not 
owed before the money is used, because it is not certain that anything will be owed).
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later would become known as a depositum irregulare.73 Ulpian follows Nerva 
and Proculus who held that the condictio74 became available as soon as the 
parties agreed that the deposited money could be used. Thus, before usage 
the contractual relationship between the parties changed from depositum 
into mutuum. Marcellus held the same opinion and motivated this with the 
argument that he who held the money had already become possessor animo. 
In the following text, Ulpian holds that if the depositor had allowed use of 
the money from the beginning, the money only becomes owed in terms of 
mutuum, once it has been used, arguing that it is not certain whether it will 
be owed. Why this argument was not applied in the previous text and in 
D.12.1.4pr is not made clear. Furthermore, in D.12.11.1pr, Ulpian on the 
authority of Nerva introduced the distinction whether the object had been 
for sale or not.75 Another inconsistency is found where his opinion that 
if the object is sold, the money made is owed as a loan76 was changed in 
D.19.5.19pr.
8. TWENTIETH-CENTURY ROMAN LAW
Sohm-Mitteis-Wenger77 considered the so-called contractus mohatrae78 
another relaxation of the direct transfer requirement.79 Kaser80 confi ned 
himself in his textbook to stating that D.12.1.11pr shows that since Nerva 
these facts81 were considered to be mutuum. In Synteleia Vicenzo Arangio-
Ruiz,82 he analysed an essay by Koschaker83 and rejected the earlier inter-
pretation as well as the older secondary sources on this topic on account 
of the interpolation method employed. In his essay, Kaser suggests that the 
recognition of mutuum in the circumstances described in D.12.1.11pr was 
73 Recognised by Justinian; named by Jason de Mayno. Zimmermann (1990), pp. 218–19.
74 The action from mutuum.
75 ‘(V)enalem habui hanc lancem vel massam nec ne, ut, si venalem habui, mihi perierit, 
 quemadmodum si alii dedissem vendendam: quod si non fui proposito hoc ut venderem, sed 
haec causa fuit vendendi, ut tu utereris, tibi eam perisse, et maxime si sine usuris credidi’.
76 Si vendideris, puto mutuam pecuniam factam.
77 Sohm, Mitteis and Wenger (1926), p. 392.
78 A misnomer, this term was coined during the fourteenth century, derived from the Arabic 
mohatra, and involved a sale with immediate delivery and resale at a future higher price 
with concomitant delivery, in order to evade the prohibition of usury. Kaser (1964), p. 75; 
Zimmermann (1990), p. 163; al-Mujahid (2008).
79 Comparable to D.12.1.15. In the same vein: van Oven (1948), p. 229; Spruit (2003), p. 322–3. 
The authors do not indicate at what moment mutuum is concluded, and remain silent on the 
quantum of the amount due. 
80 Kaser (1971), p. 531.
81 A asked B for a loan of money. B had no money, but gave him a valuable object to sell and 
use the money from the sale. Ulpian was of the opinion that if the object was sold, the money 
was owed on the basis of a loan of consumption.
82 Kaser (1964), pp. 74–83. 
83 Koschaker (1923), IX-XI.
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not unanimous,84 and considers Nerva’s solution of the risk-allocation rep-
resentative of the proper classical interest theory.85 He considered C.4.2.8 
a step forward because an action86 became immediately available, which 
represented an extension of recognition of indirect provision of money 
in mutuum.87 Zimmermann88 follows Kaser and discusses D.12.1.11pr and 
C.4.2.8 as steps within the evolution towards a consensual loan for con-
sumption. Without derogating the value of this approach, this essay argues 
in favour of viewing these texts from another perspective, in casu the world 
of usurious moneylending.
9. COMMON PRACTICE
The fi rst striking fact is that the practice of giving a thing to sell when asked 
for a loan of money was well known among jurists. D.19.5.19pr dates from 
the early Empire and Labeo is not surprised at the facts, but could not 
place a label on the legal construct. He accepted that some type of contract 
had been entered into and presumably advised to proceed with an actio in 
factum.89 Ulpian concurred with this argument and neither jurist distin-
guished whether the object had been sold or not.90 In D.17.1.34pr, Africanus 
relies on his mentor Julianus91 to confi rm that a loan of money cannot be 
concluded by mere agreement.92 In the motivation, a distinction is made 
between this case and other instances in which the requirement of delivery 
had been relaxed, such as the agreement that deposited money could be 
borrowed,93 or the instruction to receive money from another’s debtor.94 
84 Kaser (1964), pp. 75 fn. 4 and 80 fn. 25.
85 Kaser (1964), p. 81: ‘Und Nerva fand dieses (ein Kriterium) darin, ob der Verkauf im 
Interesse auch des Gebers lag, weil er die Sache ohnehin verkaufen wollte, oder auss-
chliesslich in dem des kredit-suchenden Nehmers. [. . .] Diese Unterscheidung [. . .] beruht 
auf gut klassischer Interessenabwägung’.
86 Kaser (1964), p. 82, holds that the principal determined by the valuation by the parties can 
be claimed ‘mit der Klage aus dem Darlehen’; in fn. 33 he adds ‘Allenfalls aus Stipulation’. 
Zimmermann (1990), p. 162.
87 Kaser (1964), p. 82.
88 Zimmermann (1990), pp. 160–3. D.12.1.15 and 12.1.11pr are viewed as precursors to 
C.4.2.8.
89 Kaser (1964), p. 79; Kaser (1971), pp. 486, 580–3. There is controversy whether the actio 
praescriptis verbis was available in classical law. Van Oven (1948), pp. 296–302; Zimmermann 
(1990), p. 534. 
90 The borrower had either not sold the object ‘lent’ to him or had not, after selling the thing, 
accepted the money realised by the sale as a loan. The legal question was thus how to get back 
the object or the price thereof.
91 In c 110–c 170 CE.
92 A procurator asked his principal in a letter whether he could borrow the money collected for 
the latter.
93 Cf. D.12.1.9.9.
94 Cf. D.12.1.15 and D.24.1.3.12 and 13.
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The moneylender who gave silver instead of money was also mentioned and 
neither jurist considered the possibility of mutuum even after the sale, but 
agreed that the risk was on the ‘borrower’.
10. C.4.2.8: ESTIMATED VALUE
This rescript imparts important information: prior to delivery of the object 
the parties had agreed upon its value, the borrower had delivered gold in 
pledge, and the lender had stipulated interest of more than 12 per cent. The 
imperial chancery was of the opinion that the debtor owed the estimated 
value of the objects as principal and 12 per cent interest on this amount.
The salient fact that the parties had placed an estimated value on the 
object, which amount would be claimable, has been hailed as an important 
step within legal development. It is submitted that it is diffi cult to visualise 
the transaction under discussion without such valuation, because in that case 
the lender would be at the mercy of the borrower. The latter would be in the 
position to sell below the value and would only be liable for the realised 
price.95 In reality, the borrower is at the mercy of the lender, and the text 
indicates that the petitioner objected to both the amount of the principal96 
and the rate of interest. The petitioner’s argument that the pledged gold was 
worth less than the estimated value of the delivered object may be an indica-
tion that the estimate exceeded the proceeds. The construct reeks of usury, 
as the borrower is indebted for much more than he actually received and 
pays 12 per cent on this fi ctitious amount. Viewed from this perspective, a 
meaningful interpretation of C.4.32.25 becomes possible.97
95 To believe that valuation of the object represents a later development is naive. Omission to 
place an estimated value on the object from the start would leave the lender at the mercy 
of the borrower. The latter could and would offer the object at a bargain price to realise a 
quick sale and get his hands on some money. Moreover, he would only be liable to repay the 
amount realised by the sale.
96 There is no indication how much the borrower actually received as price for the borrowed 
objects.
97 C.4.32.25 Imp. Constantinus A. ad populum: ‘Pro auro et argento et veste facto chirogra-
pho licitas solvi vel promitti usuras iussimus’ (Emperor Constantine to the people: ‘We 
have decreed that lawful interest be paid or promised on gold and silver and cloth owed in 
terms of a debt contained in a document’). This constitution addresses two points of law. 
First, whether interest only applies to money, and then the amount of interest payable when 
instead of money, objects have been given to the debtor. The emperor decreed that lawful 
interest, that is 12 per cent per year, may be paid or promised on the basis of the valuation of 
the goods. The constitution requires that a document is drawn up and it is obvious that the 
valuation had to be made before or when the IOU was drafted. The widespread belief that 
interest relates only to money was also addressed in C. 4.32.23 and 4.32.11.(12). Also Saint 
Hieronymus (c 340–420 CE) Ezekiel, 6.8.206; Noodt (1735), pp. 177–80. 
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11. CONCLUSION
It is probable that the texts under discussion were included in the Digest for 
dogmatic reasons, for example the relationship between the utility principle 
and the allocation of risk, and drawing the boundaries for traditio fi cta.98 It 
is, however, remarkable that the classical Roman jurists did not address the 
doctrinal question whether the handing over of the object established a con-
tract and if so, which contract or contracts. There appears to be a wide variety 
of choice, such as a conditional or unconditional mutuum,99 or precarium100 
or mandatum101 or aestimatum102 or do ut facias,103 which was changed into 
mutuum, if and when the dish was sold. The Codex texts indicate that in post-
classical law, the described relationship between the usurer and his client was 
classifi ed under mutuum, but the responsa show the wide variety of Roman 
casuistry. It is submitted that a change of perspective gives insight into the 
original function of the opinions, in other words law in action as opposed 
to law in the books. These texts dealt with an age-old practice of avoidance 
of interest limits. When the client approached the moneylender, the latter 
pretended not to have cash available. Instead of money, one or more objects 
were offered with the arrangement that the debtor should sell the goods and 
use the price realised as a loan. Before delivery of the object, an estimated 
value was agreed upon. Thus, from the beginning, valuation of the object was 
an integral part of the transaction and the ‘borrower’ was liable to repay the 
amount agreed upon and not the price he received as the result of the sale. 
In this manner usurious interest could be realised. If an object was valued 
at one 100, the principal was 100. Twelve per cent interest was calculated. 
The object was sold for seventy-fi ve. After one year, the debtor owed 112, of 
which in reality thirty-seven was interest, which is nearly 50 per cent of the 
seventy-fi ve he had received.
In this essay, Barzun’s theory was applied to widely diverging topics. 
The essence of his idea that the topic of research appears like a mountain 
in front of the researcher is an a posteriori. His assertion that the researcher 
takes a few of the faces for the whole is hard to contest, but the explana-
tion of such partiality as spontaneous choice exaggerates freedom of the 
individual. This theory promotes diversity of opinion and stimulates a new 
look at many texts, and an excellent example is found in the project of 
Nikolaus Benke at the University of Vienna, which approaches texts from 
98 See, for example, the interpretation by Voet (1731), 12.1.4, 5 and 6.
99 A loan for consumption subject to the suspensive condition that the object is sold (within a 
certain time); an unconditional loan for consumption would be a possibility if the handing 
over of the object were to be accepted as a datio in solutum.
100 D.43.26.2.2; D.43.26.14; and D.43.26.19.2.
101 Inst.Gai.3.155–6; D 17.1.2 passim; Inst 3.26.pr.-6. Kaser (1964), pp. 77 and 79.
102 Kaser (1964), pp. 79–80, in particular p. 80 fn. 22.
103 Accursius in gloss Si vendideris ad D.12.1.11pr.
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the perspective of gender. However, in spite of the promise ‘In my Father’s 
house are many rooms’,104 the study of law herds most students into the 
same room,105 while anonymous peer review discourages coming out of 
this room. Furthermore, every person remains a product of his upbringing, 
education and time. However, the argument that it will be diffi cult if not 
impossible to ascertain from which perspective a Roman law text or texts 
should be approached can be rebutted with the replicatio that although 
these texts have been exclusively studied from a dogmatic point of view, it 
is common ground that they were never written for that purpose. Thus, a 
third life of Roman law as a methodological and philosophical instrument 
in legal education could promote independent and nuanced thought. This 
may be considered irrelevant in today’s age, but to paraphrase the doyen of 
Romanists, Hans Ankum: you never know what will be considered useful 
in a 100 years.106 The fi nal words of this essay come from the same maestro, 
whose answer to the question  concerning the relevance of Roman law is: to 
learn to think.107
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Agnati, U., ‘Sequenze decemvirali. Analisi di Cicerone De Inventione 2. 148 e Rhetorica 
ad Herrenium 1. 23’, in M. Humbert (ed.), Le Dodici Tavole: Dai Decemviri agli 
Umanisti (2005), p. 239.
Barzun, J., From Dawn to Decadence. 500 Years of Western Cultural Life 1500 to the 
Present (2000).
Becker, C., Die Lehre von der laesio enormis in der Sicht der heutigen Wucherproblematik 
(1993).
Bona, F., ‘Intervento’, Index, 18 (1990), p. 392.
Bona, F., ‘Il “de verborum signifi catu” di Festo e le XII Tavole. I. Gli “auctores” di 
Verrio Flacco’, Index, 20 (1992), p. 211.
Buckland, W. W., and Stein, P., A Textbook of Roman law from Augustus to Justinian, 
3rd edn (1963).
de Francesco, A., ‘Autodifesa privata e iniuria nelle Dodici Tavole’, in M. Humbert 
(ed.), Le Dodici Tavole: Dai Decemviri agli Umanisti (2005), p. 415.
Diliberto, O., ‘Contributo alla palingenesi delle XII Tavole. Le “sequenze” nei testi 
gelliani’, Index, 20 (1992), p. 229.
Diliberto, O., Materiali per la palingenesi delle XII Tavole, vol. I (1992).
Diliberto, O., ‘Una palingenesi “aperta”’, in M. Humbert (ed.), Le Dodici Tavole: Dai 
Decemviri agli Umanisti (2005), p. 217.
104 John, 14:2.
105 Kennedy (1982), pp. 38–58.
106 Van Rhee and Winkel (2010), p. 167: ‘Je weet nooit wat er over honderd jaar nuttig wordt 
gevonden. Dat vind ik ook zo gevaarlijk met dat nut’.
107 Van Rhee and Winkel (2010), p. 164: ‘Als je mij vraagt wat de relevantie is van het Romeinse 
recht, dan zou ik zeggen: leren denken’.
DU PLESSIS PRINT.indd   242 19/12/2012   16:49
 The Standpoint Determines the View 243
Doll, R., An Interpretation of E. M. Forster’s A Room with a View, at www.emforster.
info/pages/roomview.html (last accessed 3 January 2012).
Du Plessis, P., ‘Legal history and method(s)’, in R. Van den Bergh and G. van Niekerk 
(eds), Libellus ad Thomasium: Essays in Roman Law, Roman-Dutch Law and Legal 
History in honour of Philip J. Thomas (2010), p. 64.
Ferrary, J.-L., ‘Saggio di storia della palingenesi della Dodici Tavole’, in M. Humbert 
(ed.), Le Dodici Tavole: Dai Decemviri agli Umanisti (2005), p. 503.
Forster E. M., A Room with a View, 1st edn (1908).
Gabba, E., ‘Proposta per un quadro storico di Roma nel V sec. a. C.’, in M. Humbert 
(ed.), Le Dodici Tavole: Dai Decemviri agli Umanisti (2005), p. 117.
Garrasco Garcia, C., ‘Res publica come costituzione mista e decemvirati; Polibio e 
Cicerone’, in M. Humbert (ed.), Le Dodici Tavole: Dai Decemviri agli Umanisti 
(2005), p. 125.
Heirbaut, D., ‘Comparative law and Zimmermann’s new ius commune: a life line or 
death sentence for legal history? Some refl ections on the use of legal history for 
comparative law and vice versa’, in R. van den Bergh et al. (eds), Ex Iusta Causa 
Traditum: Essays in Honour of Eric H. Pool (2005), p. 136.
Hermesdorf, B. H. D., Schets der uitwendige geschiedenis van het Romeins recht, 7th edn 
(1972).
Hoetink, H. R., Rechtsgeleerde Opstellen (1982).
Hoffmeier, M. H., Eduard Gans and the Hegelian Philosophy of Law (1995).
Humbert, M. (ed.), Le Dodici Tavole: Dai Decemviri agli Umanisti (2005).
Humbert, M., ‘Il valore semantico e giuridico di usus nelle Dodici Tavole’, in 
M. Humbert (ed.), Le Dodici Tavole: Dai Decemviri agli Umanisti (2005), p. 377.
Humbert, M., ‘La codifi cazione decemvirale tentativo d’interpretazione’, in 
M. Humbert (ed.), Le Dodici Tavole: Dai Decemviri agli Umanisti (2005), p. 4.
Jolowicz, H. F., Historical Introduction to the Study of Roman Law, 2nd edn (1952).
Kaser, M., ‘Die Verteilung der Gefahr beim sogenannten “Contractus mohatrae”’, 
in A. Guarino and L. Labruna (eds), Synteleia Vincenzo Arangio-Ruiz (1964), p. 77.
Kaser, M., Das römische Privatrecht (1971).
Kennedy, D., ‘Legal education as training for hierarchy’, in D. Kairys (ed.), The 
Politics of Law. A Progressive Critique (1982), p. 54.
Koschaker, P., ‘Die Verteilung der Gefahr beim sogenannten “contractus mohat-
rae”’, Gerichts-Zeitung, Sondernummer J. Schey (1923).
Kremer, D., ‘Trattato internazionale e legge delle Dodici Tavole’, in M. Humbert 
(ed.), Le Dodici Tavole: Dai Decemviri agli Umanisti (2005), p. 191.
Kuhn, T. S., The Structure of Scientifi c Revolutions (1962).
Lenel, O., Palingenesia Iuris Civilis, vol. I (1889), p. 242.
Lindsay, W. M., Nonius Marcellus’ Dictionary of Republican Latin (1901).
Lokin, J. A. H., and Zwalve, W. J., Hoofdstukken uit de Europese Codifi catie-geschiedenis, 
3rd edn (2006), p. 58–60.
Martyn, G., and Coppens, E. C., ‘Het geschiedt zoals het geschiedt: Rechtshistorici 
uit de Lage Landen (10): Interview met Paul Nève’, Pro Memorie: Bijdragen tot de 
rechtsgeschiedenis der Nederlanden, 10 (2008), Afl evering 1, p. 19.
al-Mujahid, M., ‘In the shadows of Deuteronomy: approaches to interest and 
DU PLESSIS PRINT.indd   243 19/12/2012   16:49
244 New Frontiers
usury in Judaism and Christianity’ (2008), at http:/www.ikhwanweb.com/article.
php?id=15717 (accessed 7 February 2012).
Noodt, G., ‘De foenore et usuris libri tres’, in Opera Omnia, vol. I (1735).
Nörr, D., ‘Osservazioni in tema di terminologia predecemvirale e di ius mercatorum 
mediterraneo: il primo trattato cartaginese-romano’, in M. Humbert (ed.), Le 
Dodici Tavole: Dai Decemviri agli Umanisti (2005), p. 147.
Piron, S., ‘Le devoir de gratitude: Émergence et vogue de la notion d’antidora au xiii 
siècle’, in D. Quaglione et al. (eds), Credito e usura fra teologia, diritto e amministrazi-
one. Linguaggi a confronto (sec. XII–XVI). Convegno internazionale di Trento, 3–5 
settembre 2001 (2005), p. 73.
Sohm, R., Mitteis, L., and Wenger, L., Institutionen: Geschichte und System des 
römischen Privatrechts, 17th edn (1926).
Söllner, A., Römische Rechtsgeschichte, Eine Einführung (1971).
Spruit, J. E., Cunabula iuris: Elementen van het Romeinse privaatrecht (2003).
Talamanca, M., ‘Le Dodici Tavole ed i negozi obbligatori’, in M. Humbert (ed.), Le 
Dodici Tavole: Dai Decemviri agli Umanisti (2005), p. 331.
Thomas, P. J., ‘Fin de siècle of funksionele Romeinse reg?’, THRHR, 60.2 (1997), 
p. 202.
Thomas, P. J., ‘Alternative paradigm for Roman law’, RIDA, 45 (1998), p. 647.
Thomas, P. J., ‘A stratagem to avoid the limit on interest’, THRHR, 75.1 (2012), 
p. 101.
Wubbe, F. B. J., ‘Bei Max Kaser in Münster’, in Ius vigilantibus scriptum, Ausgewählte 
Schriften (2003), p. 512.
Wubbe, F. B. J., ‘Wozu römisches Recht?’, in P. Pichonnaz (ed.), Ius vigilantibus scrip-
tum (2003), p. 556.
van Oven, J. C., Leerboek van Romeinsch Privaatrecht, 3rd edn (1948).
van Rhee, C. H., and Winkel, L. C., ‘Een Romeinsrechtelijke Coryfee, Rechtshistorici 
uit de Lage Landen (11): Interview met Hans Ankum’, Pro Memorie: Bijdragen tot de 
rechtsgeschiedenis der Nederlanden, Jaargang 12 (2010), Afl evering 2, p. 163.
Voet, J., Commentarius ad Pandectas, vol. I (1731).
Ziegler, K.-H., ‘Regeln für Handelsverkehr in Staatsverträgern des Altertums’, TvR, 
70 (2002), p. 55.
Zimmermann, R., The Law of Obligations: Roman Foundations of the Civilian Tradition 
(1990).
DU PLESSIS PRINT.indd   244 19/12/2012   16:49
Index
actio ad exhibendum, 213
actio de in rem verso, 203
actio de peculio, 194, 195, 201, 202, 204, 205
actio exercitoria, 193, 194, 201
actio institoria, 193, 194, 195, 200, 201, 202
actio quod iussu, 193, 201, 202
actio rationibus distrahendis, 183
actio rei uxoriae, 119
actio suspecti tutoris, 183
actio tributoria, 193, 194, 201–2, 204
actio tutelae, 183, 187, 188
actiones adiecticiae qualitatis, meaning of, 182, 
193, 204
Afranius Dexter, death of, 63, 64, 66, 69
agency, impact on Roman commerce of, 177
Appuleia Varilia, adultery trial of, 54
Aristotle, Topica of, 34, 36
athletes, status of, 61
Babatha, archive of, 89
bankers, types of, 141
bounded rationality, meaning of, 179
castellum, meaning of, 215, 218
cautiones rei uxoriae, meaning of, 118–19
chirographum, 136, 138, 142, 143
Cicero, Topica of, 34, 36, 43, 46
cities, administrative responsibilities of, 77
cives sine suffragio, 115, 117, 120
Constitutio Antoniniana, effect of, 79–80
Contract, default rules in, 185
contractus mohatrae, 238
conubium, effect on inheritance of, 102
conubium, meaning of, 102
court-made law, importance of, 52
depositum irregulare, 238
diptychon, 127
disciplinary boundaries, drawbacks of, 13–14
edictal remedies, application in provinces 
of, 82
epigamia, meaning of, 107
episteme, 35
epistula, role in legal transactions of, 142, 
143, 144
expectation damages, 187
fi ducia, meaning in Roman law of, 152, 153
Foedus Cassianum, 109, 110, 232–3
freedmen, as agents, 129
freedmen, loyalty of, 183
Gaius, Institutes of, 36
Gaius, trichotomy of, 36, 39
hypotheca generalis, 155
infamia, as a penalty for tutor, 183, 188
inserta et inclusa, meaning of, 217–18
intermarriage, prohibition of, 106
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